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1.
Sebastian Ostritsch 《Ethics and Information Technology》2017,19(2):117-128
According to the amoralist, computer games cannot be subject to moral evaluation because morality applies to reality only, and games are not real but “just games”. This challenges our everyday moralist intuition that some games are to be met with moral criticism. I discuss and reject the two most common answers to the amoralist challenge and argue that the amoralist is right in claiming that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in simply playing a game. I go on to argue for the so-called “endorsement view” according to which there is nevertheless a sense in which games themselves can be morally problematic, viz. when they do not only represent immoral actions but endorse a morally problematic worldview. Based on the endorsement view, I argue against full blown amoralism by claiming that gamers do have a moral obligation when playing certain games even if their moral obligation is not categorically different from that of readers and moviegoers. 相似文献
2.
Garry Young 《Ethics and Information Technology》2017,19(3):209-219
This paper raises three objections to the argument presented by Ostritsch in The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation, in which the amoralist’s mantra “it’s just a game” is viewed as an illegitimate rebuttal of all moral objections to (typically violent) video games. The first objection focuses on Ostritsch’s ‘strong sense’ of player enjoyment, which I argue is too crude, given the moral work it is meant to be doing. Next, I question the legitimacy of Ostritsch’s claim that certain video games are immoral. I examine what is involved in making this claim and what would be required for a normative position to be established: none of which is addressed by Ostritsch. Finally, I challenge the legitimacy of his claim that players are obliged not to play certain video games in certain ways (i.e., games endorsing immorality as ‘fun games’). I distinguish between immoral and suberogatory actions, arguing that the latter is in fact more applicable to cases Ostritsch has in mind, and that one is not obliged not to engage in these actions. 相似文献
3.
Christopher Bartel 《Ethics and Information Technology》2012,14(1):11-16
Morgan Luck raises a potentially troubling problem for gamers who enjoy video games that allow the player to commit acts of
virtual murder. The problem simply is that the arguments typically advanced to defend virtual murder in video games would
appear to also support video games that allowed gamers to commit acts of virtual paedophilia. Luck’s arguments are persuasive,
however, there is one line of argument that he does not consider, which may provide the relevant distinction: as virtual paedophilia
involves the depiction of sexual acts involving children, it is therefore an instance of child pornography. I argue that virtual
paedophilia involves the depiction of sexual acts involving children, which amounts to child pornography. I then draw on arguments
to show that child pornography is morally objectionable. Finally, depictions of virtual murder are not instances of pornography,
and so are not morally objectionable for this reason. So, there is a relevant moral distinction to draw between virtual murder
and virtual paedophilia that is able to justify the former but not the latter. 相似文献
4.
Stephanie L. Patridge 《Ethics and Information Technology》2013,15(1):25-34
In a recent and provocative essay, Christopher Bartel attempts to resolve the gamer’s dilemma. The dilemma, formulated by Morgan Luck, goes as follows: there is no principled distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. So, we’ll have to give up either our intuition that virtual murder is morally permissible—seemingly leaving us over-moralizing our gameplay—or our intuition that acts of virtual pedophilia are morally troubling—seemingly leaving us under-moralizing our game play. Bartel’s attempted resolution relies on establishing the following three theses: (1) virtual pedophilia is child pornography, (2) the consumption of child pornography is morally wrong, and (3) virtual murder is not murder. Relying on Michael Rea’s definition of pornography, I argue that we should reject thesis one, but since Bartel’s moral argument in thesis two does not actually rely thesis one that his resolution is not thereby undermined. Still, even if we grant that there are adequate resources internal to Bartel’s account to technically resolve the gamer’s dilemma his reasoning is still unsatisfying. This is so because Bartel follows Neil Levy in arguing that virtual pedophilia is wrong because it harms women. While I grant Levy’s account, I argue that this is the wrong kind of reason to resolve the gamer’s dilemma because it is indirect. What we want is to know what is wrong with virtual child pornography itself. Finally, I suggest alternate moral resources for resolving the gamer’s dilemma that are direct in a way that Bartel’s resources are not. 相似文献
5.
Monique Wonderly 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(1):1-10
Although the word empathy only recently came into existence, eighteenth century philosopher, David Hume, significantly contributed to our current understanding
of the term. Hume was among the first to suggest that an empathic mechanism is the central means by which we make ethical
judgments and glean moral knowledge. In this paper, I explore Hume’s moral sentimentalism, and I argue that his conception
of empathy provides a surprisingly apposite framework for interpreting and addressing a current issue in practical ethics:
the moral significance of ultra-violent video games. Ultimately, I attempt to show that a Humean account of morality uniquely
explains the dangers of ultra-violent video gaming by elucidating a direct connection between playing such games and moral
harm. 相似文献
6.
My avatar,my self: Virtual harm and attachment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jessica Wolfendale 《Ethics and Information Technology》2007,9(2):111-119
Multi-user online environments involve millions of participants world-wide. In these online communities participants can use
their online personas – avatars – to chat, fight, make friends, have sex, kill monsters and even get married. Unfortunately
participants can also use their avatars to stalk, kill, sexually assault, steal from and torture each other. Despite attempts
to minimise the likelihood of interpersonal virtual harm, programmers cannot remove all possibility of online deviant behaviour.
Participants are often greatly distressed when their avatars are harmed by other participants’ malicious actions, yet there
is a tendency in the literature on this topic to dismiss such distress as evidence of too great an involvement in and identification
with the online character. In this paper I argue that this dismissal of virtual harm is based on a set of false assumptions
about the nature of avatar attachment and its relation to genuine moral harm. I argue that we cannot dismiss avatar attachment
as morally insignificant without being forced to also dismiss other, more acceptable, forms of attachment such as attachment
to possessions, people and cultural objects and communities. Arguments against according moral significance to virtual harm
fail because they do not reflect participants’ and programmers’ experiences and expectations of virtual communities and they
have the unintended consequence of failing to grant significance to attachments that we take for granted, morally speaking.
Avatar attachment is expressive of identity and self-conception and should therefore be accorded the moral significance we
give to real-life attachments that play a similar role.
A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Cyberspace 2005 Conference at Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic 相似文献
7.
Darryl J. Murphy 《Ethics and Information Technology》2012,14(2):109-121
This paper argues that intellectual property rights are incompatible with Rawls’s principles of justice. This conclusion is
based upon an analysis of the social stratification that emerges as a result of the patent mechanism which defines a marginalized
group and ensure that its members remain alienated from the rights, benefits, and freedoms afforded by the patent product.
This stratification is further complicated, so I argue, by the copyright mechanism that restricts and redistributes those
rights already distributed by means of the patent mechanism. I argue that the positions of privilege established through both
the patent and the copyright mechanisms are positions that do not “allow the most extensive liberty compatible with a like
liberty for all.” They do not “benefit the least advantaged.” Nor are they “open to all under conditions of fair equality
of opportunity.” In making this argument I critically assess the utilitarian defense of intellectual property rights and find
it insufficient to respond to the injustices manifest in our current arrangement for the protection of intellectual property
rights. 相似文献
8.
Garry Young 《Ethics and Information Technology》2014,16(2):91-102
The morality of virtual representations and the enactment of prohibited activities within single-player gamespace (e.g., murder, rape, paedophilia) continues to be debated and, to date, a consensus is not forthcoming. Various moral arguments have been presented (e.g., virtue theory and utilitarianism) to support the moral prohibition of virtual enactments, but their applicability to gamespace is questioned. In this paper, I adopt a meta-ethical approach to moral utterances about virtual representations, and ask what it means when one declares that a virtual interaction ‘is morally wrong’. In response, I present constructive ecumenical expressivism to (i) explain what moral utterances should be taken to mean, (ii) argue that they mean the same when referring to virtual and non-virtual interactions and (iii), given (ii), explain why consensus with regard to virtual murder, rape and paedophilia is not forthcoming even though such consensus is readily found with regard to their non-virtual equivalents. 相似文献
9.
Mark Coeckelbergh 《Ethics and Information Technology》2007,9(3):219-231
Many philosophical and public discussions of the ethical aspects of violent computer games typically centre on the relation
between playing violent videogames and its supposed direct consequences on violent behaviour. But such an approach rests on
a controversial empirical claim, is often one-sided in the range of moral theories used, and remains on a general level with
its focus on content alone. In response to these problems, I pick up Matt McCormick’s thesis that potential harm from playing
computer games is best construed as harm to one’s character, and propose to redirect our attention to the question how violent
computer games influence the moral character of players. Inspired by the work of Martha Nussbaum, I sketch a positive account
of how computer games can stimulate an empathetic and cosmopolitan moral development. Moreover, rather than making a general
argument applicable to a wide spectrum of media, my concern is with specific features of violent computer games that make
them especially morally problematic in terms of empathy and cosmopolitanism, features that have to do with the connections
between content and medium, and between virtuality and reality. I also discuss some remaining problems. In this way I hope
contribute to a less polarised discussion about computer games that does justice to the complexity of their moral dimension,
and to offer an account that is helpful to designers, parents, and other stakeholders.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ACLA 2006 conference in Princeton, 25 March 2006. 相似文献
10.
Delegating and Distributing Morality: Can We Inscribe Privacy Protection in a Machine? 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1
This paper addresses the question of delegation of morality to a machine, through a consideration of whether or not non-humans
can be considered to be moral. The aspect of morality under consideration here is protection of privacy. The topic is introduced
through two cases where there was a failure in sharing and retaining personal data protected by UK data protection law, with
tragic consequences. In some sense this can be regarded as a failure in the process of delegating morality to a computer database.
In the UK, the issues that these cases raise have resulted in legislation designed to protect children which allows for the
creation of a huge database for children. Paradoxically, we have the situation where we failed to use digital data in enforcing
the law to protect children, yet we may now rely heavily on digital technologies to care for children. I draw on the work
of Floridi, Sanders, Collins, Kusch, Latour and Akrich, a spectrum of work stretching from philosophy to sociology of technology
and the “seamless web” or “actor–network” approach to studies of technology. Intentionality is considered, but not deemed
necessary for meaningful moral behaviour. Floridi’s and Sanders’ concept of “distributed morality” accords with the network
of agency characterized by actor–network approaches. The paper concludes that enfranchizing non-humans, in the shape of computer
databases of personal data, as moral agents is not necessarily problematic but a balance of delegation of morality must be
made between human and non-human actors. 相似文献
11.
I argue for two theses. First, many arguments against violent gaming rely on what I call the contamination thesis, drawing their conclusions by claiming that violent gaming contaminates real world interactions. I argue that this thesis is empirically and philosophically problematic. Second, I argue that rejecting the contamination thesis does not entail that all video games are morally unobjectionable. The violence within a game can be evaluated in terms of the values the game cultivates, reinforces, denigrates, or disrespects. Games which present violence in ways that disrespect objects of values are more objectionable than violent games that reinforce or cultivate those values. The resulting analysis evaluates games on a case-by-case basis and pays particular attention to the representational context of the violence. 相似文献
12.
Susan A. J. Stuart 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(4):255-264
My aim in this paper is to go some way towards showing that the maintenance of hard and fast dichotomies, like those between
mind and body, and the real and the virtual, is untenable, and that technological advance cannot occur with being cognisant
of its reciprocal ethical implications. In their place I will present a softer enactivist ontology through which I examine
the nature of our engagement with technology in general and with virtual realities in particular. This softer ontology is
one to which I will commit Kant, and from which, I will show, certain critical moral and emotional consequences arise. It
is my contention that Kant’s logical subject is necessarily embedded in the world and that Kant, himself, would be content
with this view as an expression of his inspired response to the “scandal to philosophy… that the existence of things outside
us… must be accepted merely on faith” [Bxl]. In keeping with his arguments for the a priori framing of intuition, the a priori
structuring of experience through the spontaneous application of the categories, the synthesis of the experiential manifold,
and the necessity of a unity of apperception, I will present an enactivist account of agency in the world, and argue that
it is our embodied and embedded kinaesthetic engagement in our world which makes possible the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction
and recognition, and which, in turn, make possible the activity of the reproductive or creative imagination. 相似文献
13.
The “free” in “free software” refers to a cluster of four specific freedoms identified by the Free Software Definition. The
first freedom, termed “Freedom Zero,” intends to protect the right of the user to deploy software in whatever fashion, towards
whatever end, he or she sees fit. But software may be used to achieve ethically questionable ends. This highlights a tension
in the provision of software freedoms: while the definition explicitly forbids direct restrictions on users’ freedoms, it
does not address other means by which software may indirectly restrict freedoms. In particular, ethically-inflected debate
has featured prominently in the discussion of restrictions on digital rights management and privacy-violating code in version
3 of the GPL (GPLv3). The discussion of this proposed language revealed the spectrum of ethical positions and valuations held
by members of the free software community. In our analysis, we will provide arguments for upholding Freedom Zero; we embed
the problem of possible uses of software in the broader context of the uses of scientific knowledge, and go on to argue that
the provision of Freedom Zero mitigates against too great a moral burden—of anticipating possible uses of software—being placed
on the programmer and that, most importantly, it facilitates deliberative discourse in the free software community. 相似文献
14.
We argue that the notion of trust, as it figures in an ethical context, can be illuminated by examining research in artificial
intelligence on multi-agent systems in which commitment and trust are modeled. We begin with an analysis of a philosophical
model of trust based on Richard Holton’s interpretation of P. F. Strawson’s writings on freedom and resentment, and we show
why this account of trust is difficult to extend to artificial agents (AAs) as well as to other non-human entities. We then
examine Margaret Urban Walker’s notions of “default trust” and “default, diffuse trust” to see how these concepts can inform
our analysis of trust in the context of AAs. In the final section, we show how ethicists can improve their understanding of
important features in the trust relationship by examining data resulting from a classic experiment involving AAs. 相似文献
15.
David Sanford Horner 《Ethics and Information Technology》2010,12(4):299-312
I argue that the problem of ‘moral luck’ is an unjustly neglected topic within Computer Ethics. This is unfortunate given
that the very nature of computer technology, its ‘logical malleability’, leads to ever greater levels of complexity, unreliability
and uncertainty. The ever widening contexts of application in turn lead to greater scope for the operation of chance and the
phenomenon of moral luck. Moral luck bears down most heavily on notions of professional responsibility, the identification
and attribution of responsibility. It is immunity from luck that conventionally marks out moral value from other kinds of
values such as instrumental, technical, and use value. The paper describes the nature of moral luck and its erosion of the
scope of responsibility and agency. Moral luck poses a challenge to the kinds of theoretical approaches often deployed in
Computer Ethics when analyzing moral questions arising from the design and implementation of information and communication
technologies. The paper considers the impact on consequentialism; virtue ethics; and duty ethics. In addressing cases of moral
luck within Computer Ethics, I argue that it is important to recognise the ways in which different types of moral systems
are vulnerable, or resistant, to moral luck. Different resolutions are possible depending on the moral framework adopted.
Equally, resolution of cases will depend on fundamental moral assumptions. The problem of moral luck in Computer Ethics should
prompt us to new ways of looking at risk, accountability and responsibility. 相似文献
16.
Real friends: how the Internet can foster friendship 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Adam Briggle 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(1):71-79
Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews’ article “Unreal Friends” (Ethics and Information Technology, 2000) argues that the formation
of purely mediated friendships via the Internet is impossible. I critique their argument and contend that mediated contexts,
including the Internet, can actually promote exceptionally strong friendships according to the very conceptual criteria utilized
by Cocking and Matthews. I first argue that offline relationships can be constrictive and insincere, distorting important
indicators and dynamics in the formation of close friends. The distance of mediated friendships mitigates this problem by promoting the courage to be candid. Next, I argue that the offline world
of largely oral exchanges is often too shallow and hasty to promote deep bonds. The deliberateness of written correspondence acts as a weight to submerge friendships to greater depths and as a brake to enhance attentiveness
to and precision about one’s own and one’s friend’s character. Nonetheless, close friendships may fail to develop on the Internet.
Insofar as this failure occurs, however, it would be for reasons other than those identified by Cocking and Matthews. 相似文献
17.
Christopher Bartel 《Ethics and Information Technology》2015,17(4):285-293
Can a player be held morally responsible for the choices that she makes within a videogame? Do the moral choices that the player makes reflect in any way on the player’s actual moral sensibilities? Many videogames offer players the options to make numerous choices within the game, including moral choices. But the scope of these choices is quite limited. I attempt to analyze these issues by drawing on philosophical debates about the nature of free will. Many philosophers worry that, if our actions are predetermined, then we cannot be held morally responsible for them. However, Harry Frankfurt’s compatibilist account of free will suggests that an agent can be held morally responsible for actions that she wills, even if the agent is not free to act otherwise. Using Frankfurt’s analysis, I suggest that videogames represent deterministic worlds in which players lack the ability to freely choose what they do, and yet players can be held morally responsible for some of their actions, specifically those actions that the player wants to do. Finally, I offer some speculative comments on how these considerations might impact our understanding of the player’s moral psychology as it relates to the ethics of imagined fictional events. 相似文献
18.
Michael Nagenborg 《Ethics and Information Technology》2009,11(3):175-179
J. van den Hoven suggested to analyse privacy from the perspective of informational justice, whereby he referred to the concept
of distributive justice presented by M. Walzer in “Spheres of Justice”. In “privacy as contextual integrity” Helen Nissenbaum did also point to Walzer’s approach of complex equality as well to
van den Hoven’s concept. In this article I will analyse the challenges of applying Walzer’s concept to issues of informational
privacy. I will also discuss the possibilities of framing privacy from the point of the “art of separation” by looking at
the intersection of information infrastructures and institutions. 相似文献
19.
Artificial Life (ALife) has two goals. One attempts to describe fundamental qualities of living systems through agent based
computer models. And the second studies whether or not we can artificially create living things in computational mediums that
can be realized either, virtually in software, or through biotechnology. The study of ALife has recently branched into two
further subdivisions, one is “dry” ALife, which is the study of living systems “in silico” through the use of computer simulations,
and the other is “wet” ALife that uses biological material to realize what has only been simulated on computers, effectively
wet ALife uses biological material as a kind of computer. This is challenging to the field of computer ethics as it points
towards a future in which computer and bioethics might have shared concerns. The emerging studies into wet ALife are likely
to provide strong empirical evidence for ALife’s most challenging hypothesis: that life is a certain set of computable functions
that can be duplicated in any medium. I believe this will propel ALife into the midst of the mother of all cultural battles
that has been gathering around the emergence of biotechnology. Philosophers need to pay close attention to this debate and
can serve a vital role in clarifying and resolving the dispute. But even if ALife is merely a computer modeling technique
that sheds light on living systems, it still has a number of significant ethical implications such as its use in the modeling
of moral and ethical systems, as well as in the creation of artificial moral agents. 相似文献
20.
Norman Mooradian 《Ethics and Information Technology》2009,11(3):163-174
James Rachels’ seminal paper “Why Privacy Is Important” (1975) remains one of the most influential statements on the topic. It offers a general theory that explains why privacy
is important in relation to mundane personal information and situations. According to the theory, privacy is important because
it allows us to selectively disclose personal information and to engage in behaviors appropriate to and necessary for creating
and maintaining diverse personal relationships. Without this control, it is implied, the diversity of relationships would
diminish; relationships would “flatten out”, we might say. The aspect of the paper that addresses information flows (what
I refer to as his information privacy theory) has been of particular interest to computer information privacy theorists. Despite
its continued importance to computer privacy theorists, however, the information privacy theory appears to be contradicted
by recent developments in computing. In particular, since the publication of Rachels’ paper we have seen an extensive amount
of personal information collected. Further, recent developments in computing falling under the heading of social computing
have brought about a new wave of personal information creation and collection. This paper will reassess and resituate Rachels’
information privacy theory in light of these developments. I will argue that the increasing collection of personal data will
not flatten relationships as the information privacy theory predicts because such data lack contextual factors important to
Rachels’ general theory. The paper will conclude by pointing to some areas where Rachels’ general theory and where his information
privacy theory will continue to be relevant. 相似文献