Problematising Critique in Education and Child‐Rearing: Ruhloff's Scepticism

In ‘Problematising Critique in Pedagogy’ Jörg Ruhloff develops a concept of critique that is motivated by a deep concern for the state of humanity. This is a thought‐provoking development of critique, but I find myself disagreeing over, or rather simply unconvinced by, his understanding of the human condition, and, connected to this, of criticism. Referring to Nietzsche, I start by illustrating one way in which a concept of critique such as Ruhloff's may in some sense be implied in educational praxis, focusing mainly on his concern that critique is not domesticated by political, economic, or other forces. In the second section I draw on Stanley Cavell to discuss some contentious aspects of Ruhloff's construal of criticism. Here I focus on Ruhloff's claim to universality, as contained in his appeal to what he calls the condition of human rationality and to a procedure of critical‐transcendental‐sceptical deliberation over the presuppositions of different standpoints. Ruhloff's understanding of criticism exemplifies an attitude that presents itself as a hostility to the ordinary. Connected to this, I sketch a conception of scepticism that is different—viz. more dynamic—than his understanding of it as a kind of methodological tool in the service of exposing presuppositions. Scepticism needs to be acknowledged in existential terms, as inherent to the human condition: a condition of life with language. With further reference to Cavell, the importance of expression, of revealing oneself as an exemplar, can then be emphasised. I conclude, in the third section, by indicating in what sense I find that a commitment to substantial judgements is lacking in Ruhloff's conception of critique and criticality.     

Educational Critique,Critical Thinking and the Critical Philosophical Traditions

Responding to Jan Masschelein's discussion of critical distance and the trivialisation of critique in his ‘How to Conceive of Critical Educational Theory Today?’, I draw attention to the antinomic character of immanence and transcendence—that is, to the way that it entails both non‐circumventible necessity and omnipresent risks. I argue that the discourse of critical thinking in education is exemplary of the tensions generated by such consolidated meanings. Through this prism, I aim to offer a nuanced account of ways in which the trivialisation of critique nurtures narcissistic and conformist tendencies that do not leave unaffected any critical philosophical line of thought. To illustrate my critique of contemporary critical education of all persuasions, I deal with an ethics of reading and writing. I suggest that, rather than encouraging cynicism and an abdication of responsibility, this antinomic character of critique should discourage any complacent and one‐sided reliance on one's own tradition.     

Borrelli,Mill, Emily and Me

In this paper, I explore the insights suggested by Michele Borrelli's ‘The Utopianisation of Critique’ in the context of a real‐life educational encounter that involves an attempt at being ‘critical’. Borrelli's observation that all positive utopian critique implies an inevitable degree of dogmatism takes on a new—and less depressing—significance when examined in the light of such an encounter. Acknowledging the tensions suggested by Borelli's analysis is, I argue, what makes a particular educational stance ‘critical’. Rather than leading to conceptual confusion, this should be seen as integral to the transformative and motivational potential of the educational process.     

The didactics tradition in South Africa: a reply to Richard Krüger

There has been a growing interest in the European Didaktik tradition as part of a process of ‘internationalizing’ curriculum studies. Krüger provides useful insights into some aspects of Didaktiek in South Africa. However, the essay does not contextualize this tradition within the broader history of South African education. This reply contends that Didaktiek was interwoven with ‘fundamental pedagogics’ and as a consequence played a role in reproducing apartheid ideology—it did not provide a language of critique or possibility. This is one reason why the tradition has seen its demise in post‐apartheid South Africa. I argue that curriculum theory, which crucially deals with the relationship between schooling and society and highlights the socially constructed nature of schooling, offers a more useful alternative for critiquing apartheid education policy and for charting a process of transformation of education in South Africa.     

No science today—the demise of primary science

In this second article on the theory of ‘ground rules for talk’ I extend a debate between myself and Professor Neil Mercer over the introduction of ‘ground rules’ into classrooms. I critique ground rules through the use of sociological theory and argue that advocates of the ground rules perspective need to recognise the ideological nature of their theoretical position. In making this article a clear extension of my previous argument I introduce the work of Bernstein and Fairclough to support my new arguments. I use Bernstein's theory of pedagogy as cultural relay and Fairclough's appropriateness model of language variation to critique ‘ground rules perspectives’. In doing so, I draw out the political nature of educational theory and curriculum within the context of a specific socio-economic society.     

Towards a renewed flourishing of humanistic education?

Humanism has always been constructed out of an historical context. Despite the differences in the notions of humanism mediated by historical particularity, there has nevertheless been continuity in the tradition. This article argues that an orientation towards the ‘good life’ animates the various humanisms in modern Western history, and that a similarly oriented humanistic education is desirable today. After briefly introducing some of Said's thoughts regarding humanism, I provide a short account of humanistic education in the modern era. Here, I provide necessarily brief interpretations on the classical humanism of Plato and Kant before considering the naturalistic approaches of Rousseau and Dewey. Next, I will explore the focus on the development of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in existentialist approaches and the political critique of society through critical-radicals pedagogues such as Freire. Arising from the argument that the critical nature of Said's democratic humanism provides an ethically desirable basis for contemporary education, the paper will conclude by posing questions around how humanism and humanistic education might be imagined in the future.     

Losing Our Way: Pragmatism,Perfectionism and Education as Anxiety

I explore in this paper the extent to which Stanley Cavell's contribution to the philosophy of education is measured by his distance from American pragmatism. I wish to argue that pragmatism and what Cavell calls ‘perfectionism’ are simply not offered in the same key and crucially that it is this stylistic or tonal difference that separates Cavell not only from his pragmatist contemporaries but from the pragmatist picture of democracy and education as sketched so compellingly in the work of John Dewey. I suggest, in other words, not only that Cavell is importantly distant from the pragmatists but that it is this very distance—this very ambivalence to that tradition of thought often taken as the native philosophy of America—that captures Cavell's distinctive educational promise.     

A Genealogical Analysis of the Concept of ‘Good’ Teaching: A Polemic

In this essay I intentionally employ Nietzsche's genealogical method as a means to critique the complex concept of ‘good’ teaching, and at the same time reconstitute ‘good’ teaching in a form that is radically different from contemporary accounts. In order to do this, I start out by undertaking a genealogical analysis to both reveal the complicated historical development of ‘good’ teaching and also disentangle the intertwining threads that remain hidden from us so we are aware of the core threads that hold it together. Two major threads are identified in my analysis, which I refer to as: Genealogy I: Teaching as applied science or practice; and, Genealogy II: Teaching as a vocational calling or neutral profession. With this in mind, I take the two value systems (Genealogy I and II) presented in my critique of ‘good’ teaching, and rather than return to old, or create new values, I argue that the true task of any educational endeavour is to make human beings human. Therefore, in the spirit of Nietzsche, I revive and extend Nietzsche's account of Bildung as a dynamic way of living timeless educational aims, such as learning to see, think, speak, write and feel in becoming true human beings.     

Of dogs and martyrs. Sherrington,Richards, Pavlov and Vygotsky

I. A. Richards' psychological account of the poet's experience was central to his The principles of literary criticism. He aimed to ‘rehabilitate’ English criticism through perspectives gained from scientific discoveries in psychology after the Great War. A chief source for this was the work of the neurophysiologist, C. S. Sherrington. The title of this piece refers to a remark made by Sherrington to the Russian physiologist, Ivan Pavlov: ‘the animal [a dog] seemed to me in a state of persecution best comparable with that of a Christian martyr’. Paradoxically, Vygotsky retold the story within a critique of Pavlov's limiting accounts of human behaviour. Richards' picture of the complexity of the poet's experience—the balancing of conflicting impulses—also relied on an essentially reductive account of behaviour, in which the ‘extraordinary’ quality of the poet's experience is traceable to the workings of the brain and the nervous system. In contrast, Vygotsky offered a powerful picture of semiotically mediated consciousness, dependent on human agency and purpose. The story restores neglected European historical perspectives to a key development in English studies.     

Whose confession? Which tradition? (A preliminary critique of Penny Thompson, 2004)

What does Penny Thompson really want? Reading her article in BJRE 26 (1) proved a baffling experience: it clearly wanted to say something, and to say it passionately, yet signally failed to do so. It fails largely because it lacks an argument; there seems also to be conceptual muddle at its heart. A fuller critique will need to attend to Thompson’s reading of religious education’s history, particularly to her use of evidence—but that is a story for another night. Consequently, this brief critique has at its core four questions to elicit clarity where at present there is none: First, does Penny Thompson want so to revision religious education in community schools that she and other aspirants to ‘Christian confessional religious education’ may freely work to convert young people to ‘Christianity’ and to nurture them in a Christian tradition? Second, in what sense, or senses, does Thompson want readers to understand her phrase, ‘the truth of the Christian faith?’ Third, in whose confession and in which tradition does Thompson want this Christian confessional religious education to be rooted? Fourth, is Penny Thompson willing to allow Christian teachers to present alternative understandings of Christianity, critical of her (implied) view? These questions are preceded by reflection on the form of her article’s argument and on its use of ‘confess’ and its cognates.     

Developing ‘reflective’ development practitioners through an action-learning curriculum: problems and challenges in a South African context

Abstract

The paper begins by looking at the ‘context of practice’: the programmes of the SRCD are briefly described and even more briefly the dominant (global) socio-economic trends as they impact on ours and other tertiary institutions. Because it is important in order to make sense of the programme we then attempt to provide a detailed profile of our students.

The central questions with which we grapple, viz., the problems encountered in the curriculum activities designed to enable students to gain competence in ‘soft’ systems thinking and learning to learn, are dealt with in the sections ‘The Programme’, ‘The Results’ and ‘Bad practice, bad theory, or both’. In the first of these we give a very brief overview of Kolb's learning theory and Checkland's SSM and then show how the two can be (theoretically) integrated — Checkland's learning system is embedded in Kolb's learning cycle (LC). In the next section we report on an evaluation of the programme from the student's perspective. And then, finally, we discuss the shortcomings of Kolb's theory in our context as well as our use of Checkland's SSM. Our critique of Kolb is central to the entire endeavour, because his theory of experiential learning provides the theoretical underpinning of our curriculum development endeavour.

In the final section we make some suggestions for a way forward based on our critique.     

How to Conceive of Critical Educational Theory Today?

This paper starts from a brief sketch of the ‘classical’ figure of critical educational theory or science (Kritische Erziehungswissenshaft). ‘Critical educational theory’ presents itself as the privileged guardian of the critical principle of education (Bildung) and its emancipatory promise. It involves the possibility of saying ‘I’ in order to speak and think in one's own name, to be critical, self‐reflective and independent, to determine dependence from the present power relations and existing social order. Actual social and educational reality and relations are approached as a limitation, threat, alienation, re/oppression or negation of ultimate human principles or potential. The task of critical educational theory becomes one of enabling an autonomous, critical, self‐reflective life. While ‘critique’ and ‘autonomy’ have meanwhile become commonplace, and ‘critique’ and ‘autonomy’ are reclaimed and required from everybody, we should also consider the question of the relation between an institutional or ideological framework as that which claims to question this frame and to constitute its opposite. The trivialisation of critique is taken as occasion to recall Michel Foucault's analysis of power relations and especially his thesis according to which the ‘government of individualisation’ is the actual figure of power. Starting from the framework offered by Foucault, it can be made clear that the autonomous, critical, self‐reflective life does not represent an ultimate principle but refers to a very specific form of subjectification operating as a transmission belt for power. The autonomous, critical, self‐reflective person appears as an historical model of self‐conduct whereby power operates precisely through the intensification of reflectiveness and critique rather than through their repression, alienation or negation. This brings us back then to the question of how to conceive of the task of a critical educational theory at a time in which critique, autonomy and self‐determination have become an essential modus operandi of the existing order.     

‘To Be Is To Respond’: Realising a Dialogic Ontology For Deweyan Pragmatism

Dewey's pragmatism rejected ‘truth’ as indicative of an underlying reality, instead ascribing it to valuable connections between aims and ends. Surprisingly, his argument mirrors Bishop Berkeley's Idealism, summarised as ‘esse est percepi’ (to be is to be perceived), whose thinking is shown to be highly pragmatist—but who retained a foundationalist ontology by naming God as the guarantor of all things. I argue that while this position is unsustainable, pragmatism could nonetheless be strengthened through an ontological foundation. Koopman's charges of foundationalist ‘givenism’ in Dewey's work, and in his promotion of the scientific method, are not proven. However, Koopman's ‘genealogical pragmatism’ may develop Deweyan educational theory by addressing dilemmas around curricular study. Koopman's arguments also point towards a missing ontological piece in Dewey's theory of knowledge. In the final section of the article I offer a dialogic ontology as compatible with pragmatism. This dialogical ontology provides both an ethical foundation through interrelatedness, and a generative theory of meaning and experience, as emergent from the encounter with difference. In this framework, to be is to respond—or be responded to. I offer the metaphor of ‘realisation’ to capture the human experience implied by this ontological stance.     

Reinventing grounded theory: some questions about theory,ground and discovery

Grounded theory's popularity persists after three decades of broad‐ranging critique. In this article three problematic notions are discussed—‘theory,’ ‘ground’ and ‘discovery’—which linger in the continuing use and development of grounded theory procedures. It is argued that far from providing the epistemic security promised by grounded theory, these notions—embodied in continuing reinventions of grounded theory—constrain and distort qualitative inquiry, and that what is contrived is not in fact theory in any meaningful sense, that ‘ground’ is a misnomer when talking about interpretation and that what ultimately materializes following grounded theory procedures is less like discovery and more akin to invention. The procedures admittedly provide signposts for qualitative inquirers, but educational researchers should be wary, for the significance of interpretation, narrative and reflection can be undermined in the procedures of grounded theory.     

A dialogue on dialectics

The following comments are intended as a constructive critique of the questions posed by Lima, Osterman and Rezende. The issues raised by the authors advocate for a return in research and teaching to the impetus of dialectical materialist approaches in the originators of the sociocultural school, including Vygotsky. The focus of this response is directed toward the need to historicize dialectics itself, as a tradition, method and approach. The relation between dialectics and materialist critique requires a critical scrutiny that also provides pedagogical spaces and temporalities for an entwining of dialectical practices with dialogic interchange. The intent of the following comments is to engage with the authors in shaping a materialist critique of some of the ways through which the sociocultural school and ‘Vygotskyian inspired practices have been domesticated within the neoliberal university.     

Writing the Self: Wittgenstein,Confession and Pedagogy

In this paper I investigate ‘the confessional’ as an aspect of Wittgenstein's style both as a mode of philosophising and as a mode of ‘writing the self’, tied explicitly to pedagogical practices. There are strong links between Wittgenstein's confessional mode of philosophising and his life—for him philosophy is a way of life —and interesting theoretical connections between confessional practices and pedagogy, usefully explored in the writings of the French philosopher, Michel Foucault. The Investigations provides a basis and springboard for understanding the notion of ‘writing the self’ as a pedagogical practice which encourages a confessional mode compelling us to tell the truth about ourselves and, thus, creating the conditions for ethico‐poetical self‐constitution.     

‘To Catch at and Let Go’: David Bakhurst,Phenomenology and Post‐phenomenology

This paper examines David Bakhurst's attempt to provide a picture of ‘the kinds of beings we are’ that is ‘more realistic’ than rationalism. I argue that there is much that is rich and compelling in Bakhurst's account. Yet I also question whether there are ways in which it could be taken further. I introduce the discussion by exploring Bakhurst's engagement with phenomenology and, more specifically, Hubert Dreyfus—who enters Bakhurst's horizon on account of his inheritance of the philosophy of John McDowell. Whilst I recognise that Bakhurst's encounter with Dreyfus demonstrates his achievements—over rationalism and over Dreyfus—I also suggest that it opens up certain questions that remain to be asked of his position on account of its conceptualism. These questions originate, not from a Dreyfusian phenomenological perspective, but from the post‐phenomenological perspective of Jacques Derrida. Through appealing to key Derridean tropes, I aim to show why the conceptual idiom Bakhurst retains may hold us back from understanding the open nature of human thought. I end by considering what therefore needs to come—and what needs to be let go—in order to best do justice to the ‘kinds of beings we are’.     

Dewey as Virtue Epistemologist: Open‐Mindedness and the Training of Thought in Democracy and Education

In epistemology today, the intellectual virtues are receiving renewed attention. Contemporary normative virtue epistemology suggests that a key task of philosophy is not only to study the nature of knowledge and thought, but to promote good thinking. While not regarded as a standard thinker in the tradition of virtue epistemology, Dewey thought like this too. In fact, study of the virtues that make for good thinking plays a key role in Dewey's educational thought, most notably in Democracy and Education. In this paper, I reconstruct Dewey's work on ‘the training of thought’ in Democracy and Education as a form of virtue epistemology. I give particular attention to Dewey's thinking about the virtue of ‘open‐mindedness’ and highlight the touchpoints and differences between Dewey's conception of open‐mindedness and contemporary accounts.     

异化·归化·第三空间——对霍米·巴巴文化翻译观的再思考

文章从霍米·巴巴《奇迹的符号》一文讲述的故事入手,通过对该文中三个关键词——"混杂"、"模拟"和"第三空间"的阐释,对文化翻译中的"异化"和"归化"问题进行了再思考,提出异化和归化作为翻译的策略,并非截然分开,而实际上是你中有我,我中有你。作为译者,只有做到归化和异化的平衡,用归化的语言来传达异化的思想、内容,才能在实践中起到良好的效果。