Using Animals to Teach Children Biology: Exploring the Use of Biological Explanations in Children’s Anthropomorphic Storybooks

Research Findings: Anthropomorphism—the attribution of human characteristics to nonhuman entities—has long been a staple of children’s media. However, children’s experiences with anthropomorphic media may interfere with biological reasoning instead encouraging an anthropocentric view of the natural world. To date, little research has addressed the typical content of children’s storybooks about animals: Do these storybooks present factual information that may support early developing biological reasoning, or do they instead focus on human-centered, psychological information that may encourage anthropocentrism? We analyzed the types of causal explanatory information that commercial storybooks about animals provide to children about 2 biological concepts that have been extensively studied in the experimental literature: biological inheritance and the transmission of illness. Using coding schemes similar to those used in prior experimental literature to assess preschool-age children’s biological reasoning, we found that none of the anthropomorphized books presented children with scientifically accurate causal mechanisms. These books focused almost exclusively on social-emotional experiences as opposed to biological explanations, which may inadvertently encourage anthropocentric reasoning. Practice or Policy: Understanding more about the content of informal sources of early learning can help inform educators on how to best support developing knowledge about the natural world and biological properties.     

Sensing the Coherence of Biology in Contrast to Psychology: Young Children's Use of Causal Relations to Distinguish Two Foundational Domains

To what extent do children understand that biological processes fall into 1 coherent domain unified by distinct causal principles? In Experiments 1 and 2 ( N  =   125) kindergartners are given triads of biological and psychological processes and asked to identify which 2 members of the triad belong together. Results show that 5-year-olds correctly cluster biological processes and separate them from psychological ones. Experiments 3 and 4 ( N  =   64) examine whether or not children make this distinction because they understand that biological and psychological processes operate according to fundamentally different causal mechanisms. The results suggest that 5-year-olds do possess this understanding, and furthermore, they have intuitions about the nature of these different mechanisms.     

Students’ reasons for preferring teleological explanations

The teleological bias, a major learning obstacle, involves explaining biological phenomena in terms of purposes and goals. To probe the teleological bias, researchers have used acceptance judgement tasks and preference judgement tasks. In the present study, such tasks were used with German high school students (N?=?353) for 10 phenomena from human biology, that were explained both teleologically and causally. A sub-sample (n?=?26) was interviewed about the reasons for their preferences. The results showed that the students favoured teleological explanations over causal explanations. Although the students explained their preference judgements etiologically (i.e. teleologically and causally), they also referred to a wide range of non-etiological criteria (i.e. familiarity, complexity, relevance and five more criteria). When elaborating on their preference for causal explanations, the students often focused not on the causality of the phenomenon, but on mechanisms whose complexity they found attractive. When explaining their preference for teleological explanations, they often focused not teleologically on purposes and goals, but rather on functions, which they found familiar and relevant. Generally, students’ preference judgements rarely allowed for making inferences about causal reasoning and teleological reasoning, an issue that is controversial in the literature. Given that students were largely unaware of causality and teleology, their attention must be directed towards distinguishing between etiological and non-etiological reasoning. Implications for educational practice as well as for future research are discussed.     

Reasoning about structure and function: Children's conceptions of gears

Twenty-three second graders and 20 fifth graders were interviewed about how gears move on a gearboard and work in commonplace machines. Questions focused on transmission of motion; direction, plane, and speed of turning; and mechanical advantage. Several children believed that meshed gears turn in the same direction and at the same speed. Many second graders provided very incomplete explanations of transmission of motion. Most children confused mechanical advantage with speed. Yet as the interview proceeded, several fifth graders generalized conceptions about transmission of motion into a rule about turning direction. They increasingly justified their ideas about gear speed by referring to ratio. Children's reasoning became more general, formal, and mathematical as problem complexity increased, suggesting that mathematical forms of reasoning may develop when they provide a clear advantage over simple causal generalizations. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 35: 3-25, 1998.     

The Development of Reasoning about Causal and Noncausal Influences on Levers

2 studies examined 5–12-year-olds' judgments regarding the behavior of balance scales and other levers whose arms varied in a causal (the number of equally weighted objects or their distances from the fulcrum) or a noncausal (the color, position, or orientation of objects) variable. There were age-related increases in correct judgments for each causal and noncausal variable, with children tending to make correct judgments about the influence of physical features of objects (their number and color) at an earlier age than they did about spatial relations between objects (their distance, orientation, and position). Children's patterns of errors judging the influence of causal (particularly distance) and noncausal (particularly position and orientation) variables were different, and there was no relation between children's correct judgments regarding causal and noncausal variables The results suggest that there are separate processes underlying children's ability to identify causal and dismiss noncausal influences on levers which are dependent on the kinds of features (physical or both physical and spatial) which children conceive of as potentially influencing the behavior of levers.     

Children’s and adolescents’ thoughts on pollution: cognitive abilities required to understand environmental systems

Pollution phenomena are complex systems in which different parts are integrated by means of causal and temporal relationships. To understand pollution, children must develop some cognitive abilities related to system thinking and temporal and causal inferential reasoning. These cognitive abilities constrain and guide how children understand pollution processes. Hence, ascertaining whether changes among children’s ideas of pollution are related to system thinking and inferential reasoning abilities could be useful in improving environmental education. Eighty participants between 9 and 16 years old were interviewed to evaluate how children explain different aspects of pollution-related systems. From the explanations found in these interviews, three progressive epistemic structures were reconstructed. The three epistemic structures differ in the type of causal and temporal relationship established by the participants and in the mechanisms that the participants used to relate the pollutant to its effects.     

How Does Your Garden Grow? Early Conceptualization of Seeds and Their Place in the Plant Growth Cycle

Although an increasing body of research supports the view that preschoolers hold theory-like conceptions in the biological domain, most studies concerned have focused exclusively on early conceptions of animals and humans. As a complement to such research, the present studies examined 4-year-olds' conceptualization of seeds, a key stage of plant growth, itself a critical biological process. Study 1 examined judgments about seed origins and growth preconditions, in order to tap early understanding of causal mechanisms pertaining to plant growth. Studies 2 and 3 examined specific understandings of the relations that hold among the distinct stages of growth (seed, plant, flower, fruit). Overall, children demonstrated an impressive grasp of seeds and their place in the growth cycle. By age 41/2 years, children realized that natural causal mechanisms and not other sorts (e.g., human intervention) underlie growth, appreciated the unique relation of seeds to the plant domain, and demonstrated an emerging grasp of growth's cyclical nature. Together, these findings suggest that preschoolers may hold theory-like understandings of plants similar to those they hold of animals and humans.     

Speech and Language Difficulties in Children With and Without a Family History of Dyslexia

According to recent psychological theories of situation model construction, readers routinely and quickly construct inferences that elaborate causal antecedents of explicit events in the text, but not inferences about causal consequences. The process of forecasting lengthy causal chains into the future is taxing on working memory, so these inferences are either not constructed or their construction consumes a comparatively large amount of reading time. This study collected self-paced sentence reading times from younger and older adults who read expository texts on scientific and technological mechanisms. Readers were also measured on working memory span, general world knowledge, reasoning ability, and reading frequency. Multiple regression analyses on the reading times revealed that (a) causal consequence inferences were more time consuming than causal antecedent inferences and (b) noncausal elaborative inferences were not constructed. The pattern of beta weights for inference variables was remarkably similar for younger and older adults and was unaffected by other measures of individual differences. The process of constructing causal inferences is therefore stable and predictable across different groups of readers.     

Understanding Natural Cause: Children''s Explanations of How Objects and Their Properties Originate

An understanding of natural cause includes the realization that events can occur independently of human activity or intentions. It also often entails realizing that causal mechanisms can be nonobservable or nonobvious. The present research investigated to what extent children ages 4-7 have developed a concept of natural cause. Study 1 examined children's understandings of object origins (e.g., how the sun began); Study 2 probed children's causal understandings of object behaviors and properties (e.g., why rabbits hop and have long ears). In both studies, children by age 4 were sensitive to the natural kind-artifact distinction in their explanations. They mentioned human intervention for human-made artifacts but rarely for naturally occurring things. Moreover, subjects at all ages were able to identify specific kinds of natural cause, including intrinsic causes (such as growth) and inborn nature. Finally, subjects understood the link between nonobvious, internal parts and self-generated activity (e.g., that bones are important for the flight of a bird). Altogether, these results suggest that even preschool children realize that natural causes exist. They contradict Piaget's characterization of young children as artificialistic (believing that naturally occurring things are created by people) and as focused on observable properties.     

Causal reasoning as a base for advancing a systemic approach to simple electrical circuits

This paper focuses on the use of research results on students' causal reasoning in designing the teaching of electricity. Examination of students' replies in written questions and classroom teacher-lead discussions suggests that several students, when they construct microscopic mechanisms to explain electrical phenomena, may envision transient states and employ a specific type of causal chain, the iterative one, in addition to the simple and linear causal reasoning. In the second part of paper we present and discuss features of a microscopic mechanism adapted to students' causal reasoning patterns which relies on qualitative modelling of transient states of electrical circuit operation.     

Children's hypothetical reasoning about complex and dynamic systems

Children's hypothetical reasoning about a complex and dynamic causal system was investigated. Predominantly White, middle-class 5- to 7-year-old children from the Greater Toronto Area learned about novel food chains and were asked to consider the effects of removing one species on the others. In Study 1 (N = 72; 36 females, 36 males; 2018), 7-year-olds answered questions about both direct and indirect effects with a high degree of accuracy, whereas 5-year-olds performed at chance. Six-year-olds showed intermediate performance. Using food chains with clearer constraints, Study 2 (N = 72; 35 females, 37 males; 2020–2021) replicated these findings. These results indicate that the ability to think about hypothetical changes to dynamic causal systems develops between 5 and 7 years. Implications for science education are discussed.     

Changes over time and transfer of analogy-problem solving of gifted and non-gifted children in a dynamic testing setting

This study examined differences in transfer of analogical reasoning after analogy-problem solving between 40 gifted and 95 average-ability children (aged 9–10 years old), utilising dynamic testing principles. This approach was used in order to examine potential differences between gifted and average-ability children in relation to progression after training, and with regard to the question whether training children in analogy problem-solving elicits transfer of analogical reasoning skills to an analogy construction-task. Children were allocated to one of two experimental conditions: either children received unguided practice in analogy problem-solving, or they were provided with this in addition to training incorporating graduated prompting techniques. The results showed that gifted and average-ability children who were trained made more progress in analogy problem-solving than their peers who received unguided practice experiences only. Gifted and average-ability children were found to show similar progression in analogy problem-solving, and gifted children did not appear to have an advantage in the analogy-construction transfer task. The dynamic training seemed to bring about no additional improvement on the transfer task over that of unguided practice experiences only.     

Social interaction,relationships, and the development of causal discourse and conflict management

Links between the development of social understanding and social processes are considered, in the context of data on the development of causal reasoning and argument in conflict, drawn from a longitudinal study of 50 children observed in conversation with their mothers, siblings, and friends at 33 and 47 months of age. Children showed powers of causal reasoning before they were 3 years, capabilities that showed rapid developmental change; their interest in cause was particularly focussed on psychological causality and social action. The contexts of disputes were especially important. Differences were found in children’s arguments with their mothers, siblings, and friends, with more ‘other-oriented’ reasoning shown with friends. It is argued that the data support Vygotskyan ideas on the significance of social interaction in developmental advance, that the pragmatics of what children and their partners are trying to do must be taken into account in considering what children may be learning in interactions, and that ‘social competence’ should not be treated as an individual within-child trait, but that we should move towards a ‘relationships’ approach to the development of social understanding.     

Robots and rodents: children's inferences about living and nonliving kinds

This study tests the firm distinction children are said to make between living and nonliving kinds. Three, 4-, and 5-year-old children and adults reasoned about whether items that varied on 3 dimensions (alive, face, behavior) had a range of properties (biological, psychological, perceptual, artifact, novel, proper names). Findings demonstrate that by 4 years of age, children make clear distinctions between prototypical living and nonliving kinds regardless of the property under consideration. Even 3-year-olds distinguish prototypical living and nonliving kinds when asked about biological properties. When reasoning about nonbiological properties for the full range of items, however, even 5-year-olds and adults occasionally rely on facial features. Thus, the living/nonliving distinction may have more narrow consequences than previously acknowledged.     

Where the wild things are: informal experience and ecological reasoning

Category-based induction requires selective use of different relations to guide inferences; this article examines the development of inferences based on ecological relations among living things. Three hundred and forty-six 6-, 8-, and 10-year-old children from rural, suburban, and urban communities projected novel diseases or insides from one species to an ecologically or taxonomically related species; they were also surveyed about hobbies and activities. Frequency of ecological inferences increased with age and with reports of informal exploration of nature, and decreased with population density. By age 10, children preferred taxonomic inferences for insides and ecological inferences for disease, but this pattern emerged earlier among rural children. These results underscore the importance of context by demonstrating effects of both domain-relevant experience and environment on biological reasoning.     

Exploring college students’ cognitive patterns during reasoning*

This research aimed to investigate the nature of cognitive processes when college students reason about evidence on global climate change (GCC). Twenty-six undergraduate students participated in this qualitative study, where they were interviewed to evaluate competing arguments on key issues related to GCC and discuss their own perspectives. Constant comparative analysis of data from think-aloud protocols and semi-structured interviews revealed three patterns of reasoning: minimum reasoning, constrained reasoning, and deliberative reasoning. Minimum reasoning demonstrated that participants predominantly favoured arguments which supported their own beliefs, with limited reasoning about the relative correctness of opposing arguments. Constrained reasoning showed participants’ emphasis on surface features of evidence on GCC rather than its scientific underpinnings. In contrast, deliberative reasoning involved more sophisticated cognitive efforts in coordinating evidence and claims, and a key characteristic of this pattern was in-depth statistical and causal reasoning. The current findings added to our understanding of college students’ reasoning processes when they are faced with controversial issues like GCC. This work contributed to current efforts in using cognitive research to inform science and environmental education, and laid a foundation for future endeavours in promoting scientific reasoning and argumentation in climate change education.     

Emotion discourse, social cognition, and social skills in children with and without developmental delays

This study examined parent-child emotion discourse, children's independent social information processing, and social skills outcomes in 146 families of 8-year-olds with and without developmental delays. Children's emergent social-cognitive understanding (internal state understanding, perspective taking, and causal reasoning and problem solving) was coded in the context of parent-child conversations about emotion, and children were interviewed separately to assess social problem solving. Mothers, fathers, and teachers reported on children's social skills. The proposed strengths-based model partially accounted for social skills differences between typically developing children and children with delays. A multigroup analysis of the model linking emotion discourse to social skills through children's prosocial problem solving suggested that processes operated similarly for the two groups. Implications for ecologically focused prevention and intervention are discussed.     

The acquisition of biological knowledge during childhood: Cognitive conflict or tabula rasa?

Clinical interviews were conducted with three elementary school children, who varied in age but not in family or school environment, to determine the extent to which they held naive misconceptions about important biological topics and to determine agewise trends in the development of biological knowledge. Does early biological knowledge acquisition follow a pattern of spontaneous naive theory construction and cognitive conflict or does it follow a pattern of gradual accretion to an initially blank slate? Contrary to findings in the physical sciences, little evidence was found for biological “misconceptions” as knowledge acquisition appeared to more directly follow the gradual accretion hypothesis with the primary source of that knowledge adult authority rather than personal experience. However, “conceptual change teaching” is still advocated due to its ability to provoke students to consider and test alternative conceptions (even if they are not their own) as a means of encouraging the development of important general reasoning patterns utilized in the testing of causal hypotheses.