Trait Understanding or Evaluative Reasoning? An Analysis of Children''s Behavioral Predictions

This study tested the hypothesis that in predicting the future behavior of an actor, older children rely on trait inferences, whereas younger children rely on global, evaluative inferences. Vignettes depicting actors engaging in trait-relevant behaviors were presented to 5- and 6-year-olds (N = 67) and 9- and 10-year-olds (N = 71). For each actor, children made predictions of future behavior, evaluated the goodness and badness of the actor, and rated each actor on a relevant trait. A mediational analysis found that the behavioral predictions of older children were mediated solely by trait ratings, whereas those of younger children were mediated by evaluative ratings. Furthermore, unlike older children, younger children made trait-like predictions only when they made an evaluation of the actor. These results suggest that young children utilize evaluative reasoning when making behavioral predictions, and therefore rely on an inferential process that is distinct from that of older children.     

Knowledge, Concepts, and Inferences in Childhood

The role of knowledge in children's inferences was investigated in 3 experiments. Experiment 1 examined developmental changes in the role of categorical membership, perceptual appearance, and item complexity in inferences for natural kind and artifact concepts. Preschoolers (5-year-olds), second graders (8-year-olds), and fourth graders (10-year-olds) were taught novel properties about target concepts and asked whether each of 4 probes had those properties. Probes varied in category membership and perceptual appearance relative to the target item. Item complexity also varied. Experiments 2 and 3 examined inferences with known and unknown concepts for familiar and unfamiliar properties. Older children's knowledge led to differential weighting of categorical information over appearance but only for known concepts and/or familiar properties. Preschoolers made no distinction between category and appearance for either known or unknown concepts. Additionally, as target item complexity increased, older children made more inferences than preschoolers. No differences between inferences about natural kind and artifact concepts were found. The role of theories and knowledge in children's drawing of inferences is discussed.     

Children's Understanding of Aggression and Withdrawal as Social Stigmas: An Attributional Analysis

3 studies examined children's ability to differentiate aggression and social withdrawal using attributional constructs. In Study 1, first–sixth-grade subjects read scenarios describing a hypothetical male peer as either aggressive or withdrawn. They then made inferences about the peer's responsibility for his behavior, the amount of sympathy and anger they would feel, and the likelihood that they would help the peer with his schoolwork and want him as a friend. Perceived responsibility, and its emotional and behavioral consequences, comprised a salient dimension along which all children distinguished the 2 behavior types. The aggressive child was perceived as more responsible for his behavior, deserving of more anger and less sympathy, and eliciting less willingness to help and social acceptance. Study 2 replicated these findings with 5-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds. Study 3 revealed that other attributional dimensions, namely, locus and stability, were also used by even first graders to differentiate aggression and withdrawal, but responsibility proved to be the most salient dimension. In addition, Study 3 documented a temporal sequence whereby inferences about responsibility influence emotions of anger and sympathy, and these emotions, in turn, directly influence social acceptance of aggressive versus withdrawn peers. The importance of perceived responsibility as an organizing construct for studying peer relations was discussed.     

Young children's comprehension of montage

2 studies examined children's comprehension of brief stop-animation televised segments incorporating elements of cinematic montage such as pans, zooms, and cuts. Children reconstructed the action and dialogue in these segments using the same dolls and settings depicted. In Study 1, there was no effect of cinematic techniques on reconstruction performance of 3- and 5-year-olds as compared to control segments filmed without these techniques. The results challenged the assumption that the use of such techniques per se contributes to young children's poor comprehension of television shows. In Study 2, 12 new segments were produced in which comprehending the montage required inferences of character perspective, implied action sequences, spatial relationships, and simultaneity of different actions. Averaging across all segments, 62% of the 4-year-olds and 88% of the 7-year-olds demonstrated clear comprehension of the montage. Inferences concerning implied action sequences were easiest for both ages. Inferences of simultaneity were most difficult for 4-year-olds, whereas inferences of character perspective were most difficult for 7-year-olds. Preschool children are thus capable of understanding cinematic events conveyed through camera techniques and film editing, despite previous assertions to the contrary. This ability nevertheless substantially increases with age.     

Boys Will Be Boys; Cows Will Be Cows: Children's Essentialist Reasoning About Gender Categories and Animal Species

Two studies ( N =  456) compared the development of concepts of animal species and human gender, using a switched-at-birth reasoning task. Younger children (5- and 6-year-olds) treated animal species and human gender as equivalent; they made similar levels of category-based inferences and endorsed similar explanations for development in these 2 domains. In contrast, 10-year-olds and adults treated gender and species concepts as distinct from one another. They viewed gender-linked behavioral properties as open to environmental influence and endorsed environment-based mechanisms to explain gender development. At all ages, children demonstrated differentiated reasoning about physical and behavioral properties, although this differentiation became more stable with age. The role of psychological essentialism in guiding conceptual development is discussed.     

The Use of Trait Labels in Making Psychological Inferences

Three studies investigated children's capacity to use trait labels as tools for making inferences about mental states. For example, knowledge that a story character is "nice" as opposed to "mean" could lead to predictions that the character would respond with greater negative affect upon discovering that his or her action had made someone upset. Study 1 (N = 48) examined whether participants (kindergartners, second graders, fifth graders, and adults) would make different psychological inferences based on whether a character was labeled as "nice" versus "mean." Study 2 (N = 30) examined the same issue with 4-year-olds using a simpler methodology. Study 3 (N = 30) extended the results of Study 2, by examining whether describing characters as "shy" versus "not shy" would lead 4-year-olds to make different mental state inferences. Taken together, these findings suggest that even for young children, trait labels can serve as a basis for making nonobvious inferences. Developmental differences are discussed.     

Realizing that you don't understand: elementary school children's awareness of inconsistencies.

2 factors were proposed to affect awareness of one's comprehension failure: the inferential processing requirements, and the kind of standards against which comprehension is evaluated. These studies investigated elementary school children's awareness of their own comprehension failure when presented with inconsistent information. Study 1 showed that children were more likely to notice explicit than implicit contradictions. However, even 12-year-olds judged as comprehensible a sizable proportion of essays with seemingly obvious inconsistencies. Yet, the children had good probed recall of the information, the logical capacity to draw the inferences, and were not generally reluctant to question the experimenter. In subsequent studies children were (a) asked to repeat sentences in order to guarantee that the 2 inconsistent propositions were concurrently activated in working memory, and (b) warned about the existence of a problem in order to promote more careful evaluation. Taken together, the results suggest that to notice inconsistencies children have to encode and store the information, draw the relevant inferences, retrieve and maintain the (inferred) propositions in working memory, and compare them. Third through sixth graders do not spontaneously carry out those processes that they are capable of carrying out.     

Providing preschool foundations for later reading comprehension: The importance of and ideas for targeting inferencing in storybook‐sharing interventions

A significant gap in emerging literacy intervention with preschoolers relates to a skill that is crucial to later reading comprehension–the ability to engage in inferencing. This article presents a theoretical rationale for fostering inferential language during book sharing with preschool children, and provides research‐based ideas for how this can be best accomplished. It is suggested that, at the preschool level, children can be supported in their ability to make inferences about stories read aloud to them by having adults ask both literal and inferential questions that, first and foremost, relate to the causal structure of stories. Additionally, questions focused on informational and evaluative inferences serve to further enhance story comprehension. A rubric for connecting such questions to the elements of story grammar is offered, and a specific example from a published preschool level storybook is provided. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Individual Differences in Achievement Goals among Young Children

Smiley, Patricia A., and Dweck, Carol S. Individual Differences in Achievement Goals among Young Children . Child Development, 1994 65 , 1723–1743. Developmental research has generally not found evidence of helpless responses to failure in young children; a prevailing view is that young children lack the cognitive prerequisite for helplessness. However, recent evidence suggests that even preschoolers are vulnerable to helplessness in some situations. In the present study with 4- and 5-year-olds, we tested a goal-confidence model that predicts achievement behavior during failure for older children. We first categorized preschoolers' orientations toward "learning" or "performance" goals based on their preference for a challenging or nonchallenging task. As for older children, goal orientation was independent of ability and predicted cognitions and emotions during failure. Further, consistent with the model, within a learning goal, children displayed the mastery-oriented pattern regardless of confidence level, whereas within a performance goal, children with low confidence were most susceptible to helplessness. These behavior patterns were found on a second task as well. Thus, our findings show that individual differences in achievement goals emerge very early.     

Preschoolers' prosocial repertoires: Parents' perspectives

Two cross-sectional developmental studies of prosocial behaviors displayed in natural settings by 2- and 5-year-olds using a prototype approach are reported. In the first study, caretakers described the most prosocial child they knew, resulting in 20 attributes for 2-year-olds and 24 attributes for 5-year-olds. In the second study, parents rated the relative importance of each attribute in defining a child as prosocial. Results indicated more similarities than differences between the two age groups and that research has underrepresented the rich repertoire of naturally occurring prosocial behavior in young children, ignoring behaviors salient and important to parents (e.g., being cheerful, sensitive, affectionate, friendly, and praising others) in favor of less typical behaviors (e.g., donation of commodities to charity). Broader and more relevant indices of prosocial behavior are needed. Results provide researchers with a data base which enables them to make informed decisions about the assessment of prosocial behavior.     

Young Children's Concept of Color and Its Relation to the Acquisition of Color Words

Many children experience great difficulty in learning their first color word. In contrast, once children have learned 1 color word, they learn additional color words more easily. This striking fact raises the question of whether children who do not know color words have conceptual color categories capable of supporting inferences about word meaning. In 3 experiments 2-year-olds were provided with tasks that required them to base inferences on color or to map things onto color. Half the children comprehended at least 1 color word, and the remaining children comprehended none. In all experiments, the children in both groups succeeded on the color tasks. It was argued that children who do not know color words have the conceptual foundation necessary to base inferences on color but have specific constraints against basing inferences about word meaning on color.     

Young Children's Awareness of Their Mental Activity: The Case of Mental Rotation

From Piaget's early work to current theory of mind research, young children have been characterized as having little or no awareness of their mental activity. This conclusion was reexamined by assessing children's conscious access to visual imagery. Four-year-olds, 6-year-olds, and adults were given a mental rotation task in the form of a computer game, but with no instructions to use mental rotation and no other references to mental activity. During the task, participants were asked to explain how they made their judgments. Reaction time patterns and verbal reports revealed that 6-year-olds were comparable to adults both in their spontaneous use and subjective awareness of mental rotation. Four-year-olds who referred to mental activity to explain their performance had reaction time and error patterns consistent with mental rotation; 4-year-olds who did not refer to mental activity responded randomly. A second study with 5-year-olds produced similar results. This research demonstrates that conscious access to at least 1 type of thinking is present earlier than previously recognized. It also helps to clarify the conditions under which young children will and will not notice and report their mental activity. These findings have implications for competing accounts of children's developing understanding of the mind and for the "imagery debate."     

Children's and adults' evaluation of the certainty of deductive inferences,inductive inferences,and guesses

Two experiments investigated kindergarten through fourth-grade children's and adults' (N = 128) ability to (1) evaluate the certainty of deductive inferences, inductive inferences, and guesses; and (2) explain the origins of inferential knowledge. When judging their own cognitive state, children in first grade and older rated deductive inferences as more certain than guesses; but when judging another person's knowledge, children did not distinguish valid inferences from invalid inferences and guesses until fourth grade. By third grade, children differentiated their own deductive inferences from inductive inferences and guesses, but only adults both differentiated deductive inferences from inductive inferences and differentiated inductive inferences from guesses. Children's recognition of their own inferences may contribute to the development of knowledge about cognitive processes, scientific reasoning, and a constructivist epistemology.     

Young children's causal inferences

We report 2 experiments that show a striking development between the ages of 3 and 4 years in children's ability to make causal inferences about sequences of events. The task in the first experiment was to work out what had caused the change to an object that started out as odd (noncanonical) in 1 way and ended up as odd in 2 ways--starting, for example, as a broken cup and ending as a wet and broken cup. When asked to choose the instrument that had caused the change, 3-year-olds often selected the instrument that could have caused the initial state (a hammer, in our example) and not the instrument that would produce the change. 4-year-olds hardly ever made this mistake. In the second experiment, the 3-year-olds were able to make the correct choice when the change was from a canonical to a noncanonical state (cup-wet cup) but had much more difficulty when the change was from noncanonical to canonical (wet cup-dry cup). The difference was much smaller in the older group. The first of these tasks can be solved simply on the basis of knowledge that a particular instrument can cause a particular effect without reference to the initial state. The second task requires attention to the differences between initial and final state. We conclude that the ability to make genuine causal inferences develops between the ages of 3 and 4 years.     

Children's ability to impute inferentially based knowledge

Do young children appreciate the importance of access to premises when judging what another person knows? In Experiment 1, 5-year-olds (N=31) were sensitive to another person's access to premises when predicting that person's ability to point to a target after eliminating alternatives in a set of 3 cartoon characters. Experiment 2 replicated the finding when 5- to 6-year-olds (N=102) judged who the other person thought the target was, and whether the other person knew who the target was. Experiment 3 demonstrated that children aged 5-7 years (N=107) more successfully imputed inference by elimination than syllogistical inferential knowledge. Findings suggest that an early understanding of inference by elimination offers a route into understanding that people can sometimes gain knowledge without direct perceptual access.     

Components of young children's trait understanding: behavior-to-trait inferences and trait-to-behavior predictions

Trait attribution is central to people's na?ve theories of people and their actions. Previous developmental research indicates that young children are poor at predicting behaviors from past trait-relevant behaviors. We propose that the cognitive process of behavior-to-behavior predictions consists of two component processes: (1) behavior-to-trait inferences and (2) trait-to-behavior predictions. Experiment 1 demonstrates that 4-, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds can infer trait labels from behaviors. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds can predict behaviors from trait labels but not from past behaviors. Experiment 3 demonstrates that 4- and 5-year-olds understand traits as predictive and stable over time. Taken together, these three studies show that young children, in possessing component trait-reasoning processes, have a nascent understanding of traits.     

Phantoms and fabrications:young children's detection of implausible lies

The present study investigated whether young children are gullible and readily deceived by another's lies. Specifically, this study examined whether young children believe a lie teller's statement when the statement violates their developing knowledge of a distinction between reality and fantasy. In the first three experiments 3- to 6-year-olds (N = 293) were presented with either a story or a live staged event in which an individual made an implausible statement about a misdeed (claiming that a ghost jumped out of a book and broke a glass). A significant age effect was obtained: 5- and 6-year-olds tended to report that the individual who made the implausible statement had actually committed the misdeed, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds tended to accept the claim of the protagonist. Experiment 4 revealed that 5- and 6-year-olds (N = 43) not only disbelieved an individual's implausible statement but also inferred that the individual was lying and had a deceptive intent. In contrast, Experiment 5 revealed that 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 41) had difficulty disbelieving an individual's implausible claim about an inanimate object (i.e., the claim that a chair came alive and broke the glass). The findings suggest that 5- and 6-year-olds are not so gullible as previously thought, and that they use their well-developed real-world knowledge to detect scapegoating lies. In contrast, many younger children tend to believe another's implausible lies, perhaps due to the fact that the knowledge needed to detect such lies has not yet been consolidated.     

Effects of context on judgments concerning the reality status of novel entities

Three studies examined the effects of context on decisions about the reality status of novel entities. In Experiment 1 (144, 3- to 5-year-olds), participants less often claimed that novel entities were real when they were introduced in a fantastical than in a scientific context. Experiment 2 (61, 4- to 5-year-olds) revealed that defining novel entities with reference to scientific entities had a stronger effect on reality status judgments than did hearing scientifically oriented stories before encountering the novel entities. The results from Experiment 3 (192, 3- to 6-year-olds) indicated that definitions that support inferences facilitate reality status judgments more than do definitions that simply associate novel and familiar entities. These findings demonstrate that children share with adults an important means of assessing reality status.