Taking decisions seriously: young children's understanding of conventional truth

Research suggests that young children may see a direct and one-way connection between facts about the world and epistemic mental states (e.g., belief). Conventions represent instances of active constructions of the mind that change facts about the world. As such, a mature understanding of convention would seem to present a strong challenge to children's simplified notions of epistemic relations. Three experiments assessed young children's abilities to track behavioral, representational, and truth aspects of conventions. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-old children (N = 30) recognized that conventional stipulations would change people's behaviors. However, participants generally failed to understand how stipulations might affect representations. In Experiment 2, 3-, 5-, and 7-year-old children (N = 53) were asked to reason about the truth values of statements about pretenses and conventions. The two younger groups of children often confused the two types of states, whereas older children consistently judged that conventions, but not pretenses, changed reality. In Experiment 3, the same 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 42) participated in tasks assessing their understanding of representational diversity (e.g., false belief). In general, children's performance on false-belief and "false-convention" tasks did not differ, which suggests that conventions were understood as involving truth claims (as akin to beliefs about physical reality). Children's difficulties with the idea of conventional truth seems consistent with current accounts of developing theories of mind.     

Specifying the Relation between Novel and Known: Input Affects the Acquisition of Novel Color Terms

4 studies investigate how differential input affects preschoolers' abilities to learn novel color words. 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children saw objects in novel shapes and colors and heard a novel color label for the object. Labels were presented through ostensive definition (e.g., "See, it's mauve"), corrective linguistic contrast (e.g., "See, it's not purple; it's mauve"), or an inclusion statement (e.g., "See, it's mauve; it's a kind of purple"). 4- and 5-year-old children interpreted the novel word as a shape term when ostensive information was provided but as a color term when additional information, either contrastive or inclusive, specified a relation between the novel term and a known label for that color. Furthermore, children who consistently interpreted the novel word as a color word tended to treat the novel and known labels as mutually exclusive color terms if they heard contrastive information, whereas they tended to treat the words as hierarchically related if they heard inclusion information. 3-year-olds generally did not make use of either type of information in determining the semantic domain of the novel word or the relation between terms.     

Mother-child conversations about pictures and objects: referring to categories and individuals

The distinction between individuals (e.g., Rin-Tin-Tin) and categories (e.g., dogs) is fundamental in human thought. Two studies examined factors that influence when 2- to 3-year-old children and adults focus on individuals versus categories. Mother-child dyads were presented with pictures and toys (e.g., a picture of a boat or a toy boat). Conversations were coded for references to generic categories ("Dogs are furry"), ostensive labels ("This is a dog"), or specific individuals ("Lassie"). Overall, pictures generated more talk about categories; objects generated more talk about individuals. However, when objects could not be manipulated, speakers expressed relatively more category references. These results suggest that representations (in the form of pictures or objects-on-display) encourage young children and parents alike to think about categories.     

Semantic Constraints on Word Learning: Proper Names and Adjectives

4 experiments examined 3- and 4-year-olds' interpretations of novel words applied to familiar objects in the sentence frame, "This Y is X," where X is a novel word, and Y is a familiar basic-level count noun (e.g., "dog", "cup"). These novel words are ambiguous and could be interpreted either as proper names (e.g., "Fred") or as adjectives/mass nouns (e.g., "red"/"lead"). The experiments addressed 2 questions. First, do children appreciate that the words can be construed either as proper names referring to individuals or as adjectives/mass nouns referring to salient properties/material kinds? The results showed that children could easily make either interpretation. Second, what factors affect children's tendency to make either a proper name or an adjective/mass noun interpretation? In the experiments, children learned the novel words for a range of animals and artifacts. Most children who learned the words for typical pets (e.g., a bird) made proper name interpretations, as did the majority of those who learned the words for certain non-pet animals (e.g., a caterpillar) described as possessed by someone, but only about half of those who learned the words for such non-pet animals not so described. Very few children who learned the words for either simple (e.g., a shoe) or complex (e.g., a boat) artifacts made proper name interpretations. The results provide clear evidence of the role of semantic information in constraining children's interpretation of a novel word, and they help to refine an understanding of what counts as a nameable individual for preschoolers.     

Relative roles of general and complementation language in theory-of-mind development: evidence from Cantonese and English

Complex complements are clausal objects containing tensed verbs (e.g., that she cried) or infinitives (e.g., to cry), following main verbs of communication or mental activities (e.g., say, want). This research examined whether English- and Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds' complement understanding uniquely predicts their representation of other minds (i.e., theory of mind). Results showed that neither meaning of main verbs (communication vs. desire) nor complement structure (tensed vs. infinitival) affected the correlation between complement understanding and theory of mind. More important, the correlation became insignificant after controlling for general language comprehension. These findings led to the conclusion that the syntax of complement per se does not contribute uniquely to theory-of-mind development; general language comprehension is a more important factor to consider.     

凤阳方言中的“可”（[k‘γ^53]）

在凤阳方言中,＂可＂（[k‘γ^53）具有特殊的用法：作为否定副词,用来表示否定的回答,其否定的语气比用＂不＂字要重一些。凡是能用＂不＂进行否定回答的问句一般都可以用＂可＂（[k‘γ^53）代替进行否定回答。用＂没＂、＂没有＂进行否定回答的问句有时用＂可＂[k‘γ^53）表示否定的回答,有时为了简洁和顺口就不用＂可＂（[k‘γ^53）表示否定的回答。＂可＂（[k‘γ^53）是由＂可（[k‘γ^53）＂变调形成的。研究凤阳方言中＂可＂（[k‘γ^53）这个词的词义和语法功能,可以补正《方言大词典》对＂可＂（[k‘γ^53）的注释,也为古代汉语中存在破读现象提供一个有力的方言证据。     

Assumptions about Word Meaning: Individuation and Basic-Level Kinds

In 2 experiments, 3 1/2-year-old children interpreted a novel count noun (e.g., "This is a murvil") applied to an unfamiliar stuffed animal as referring to a basic-level kind, rather than to a kind that individuates its members by type of situation (context or life-phase). For example, children made interpretations akin to PERSON (a basic-level kind) rather than PASSENGER (a context-restricted kind), and DOG (a basic-level kind) rather than PUPPY (a life-phase-restricted kind). These experiments also document the role of object familiarity (previous knowledge of a basic-level count noun for the animal) and explicit information (about the relevance of the animal's situation) in the learning of count nouns for situation-restricted kinds. We note that children readily learn the meanings of basic-level count nouns through ostensive definitions (e.g., "This is an X"), although ostensive definitions do not distinguish basic-level kinds from situation-restricted kinds. Therefore, we suggest that children make an implicit assumption that a count noun applied to an unfamiliar solid object refers to a basic-level kind of object, and not to a kind that individuates its members by type of situation. We illustrate the importance of this assumption by showing how it bears directly on individuation, and therefore, on quantification (e.g., counting).     

How Two- and Four-Year-Old Children Interpret Adjectives and Count Nouns

We examined the role of object kind familiarity (i.e., knowledge of a count noun for an object) on preschoolers' sensitivity to the relation between a novel word's form class (adjective or count noun) and its reference (to a material kind-property or to an object kind). We used a forced-choice match-to-target task, in which children learned a word for one object (e.g., a metal cup), and then chose between 2 other objects. One was from the same object kind but a different material kind (with different related properties, such as color and texture; e.g., a white plastic cup); the other was from a different object kind but the same material kind (with the same related properties; e.g., a metal spoon). In Experiment 1, children learned either a count noun (e.g., "This is a zav") or an adjective (e.g., "This is a zav one"). Within each form class, we crossed the familiarity of the referent object kind (familiar and unfamiliar) with the age of the children (2- and 4-year-olds). The principal finding was that in interpreting an adjective, 4-year-olds were more likely to choose the object sharing material kind with the target if the target was familiar than if it was unfamiliar. No such familiarity effect was evident among 2-year-olds. In Experiment 2, we employed a more unambiguously adjectival frame (e.g., "This is a very zav-ish one"), and replicated the results of Experiment 1. We interpret the results in terms of 2 proposed word learning biases: one that learners initially expect any word applied to an unfamiliar object to refer to a (basic-level) kind of object, and a second that learners prefer words to contrast in meaning. We consider several interpretations of the observed age difference.     

Counterfactual Reasoning: Developing a Sense of "Nearest Possible World"

This study investigated at what point in development 3- to 6-year-old children begin to demonstrate counterfactual reasoning by controlling for fortuitously correct answers that result from basic conditional reasoning. Basic conditional reasoning occurs when one applies typical regularities (such as "If 'whenever' it doesn't rain the street is dry") to counterfactual questions (such as "If it had not rained, would the street be wet or dry?") without regard to actual events (e.g., if street cleaners had just been washing the street). In counterfactual reasoning , however, the conditional reasoning must be constrained by actual events (according to the "nearest possible world"). In situations when counterfactual reasoning and basic conditional reasoning would yield the same answers, even the youngest children gave mostly correct answers. However, tasks in which the 2 reasoning strategies resulted in different answers proved unusually difficult even for the older children.     

Preschoolers' use of morphosyntactic cues to identify generic sentences: indefinite singular noun phrases, tense, and aspect

Generic sentences (e.g., "Birds lay eggs") convey generalizations about entire categories and may thus be an important source of knowledge for children. However, these sentences cannot be identified by a simple rule, requiring instead the integration of multiple cues. The present studies focused on 3- to 5-year-olds' (N = 91) use of morphosyntactic cues--in particular, on whether children can (a) interpret indefinite singular noun phrases (e.g., "a strawberry") as generic and (b) use a verb's tense and aspect (e.g., "A bat sleeps/slept/is sleeping upside down") to determine whether its subject noun phrase is generic. Children demonstrated sensitivity to both cues. Thus, solving the in-principle problem of identifying generics may not be beyond the reach of young children's comprehension skills.     

Elaborated metaphors support viable inferences about difficult science concepts

Instructional metaphors scaffold learning better when accompanied by an elaboration. Applying structure mapping theory, we developed and used an elaborated instructional metaphor (text and illustrations) for introductory chemistry concepts. In two studies (N ₁ = 44, N ₂ = 57), college students with little chemistry background read either the elaborated metaphor, sub‐concept metaphor statements (e.g. an atom is like a tile) only or (Study 2) sub‐concept labels (e.g. atom) only. When asked to write what they knew about the sub‐concept, those in the elaborated metaphor condition wrote more sophisticated domain inferences than those in the other condition(s), p < .05. The elaborated metaphor helped participants construct accurate pre‐conceptual mental models that could prepare them for future learning (i.e. acquisition of new knowledge). The results also suggested that acquisition of high‐level concepts may require active learner transactions with the analogue, as can be had in interactive instructional game worlds.     

Children's use of syntactic and pragmatic knowledge in the interpretation of novel adjectives

In Study 1, English-speaking 3- and 4-year-olds heard a novel adjective used to label one of two objects and were asked for the referent of a different novel adjective. Children were more likely to select the unlabeled object if the two adjectives appeared prenominally (e.g., "a very DAXY dog") than as predicates (e.g., "a dog that is very DAXY"). Study 2 revealed that this response occurred only when both adjectives were prenominal. Study 3 replicated Study 1 with Hebrew-speaking 3- and 4-year-olds, even though in Hebrew both types of adjectives appear postnominally. Preschoolers understand that prenominal adjectives imply a restriction of the reference of nouns, and this knowledge motivates a contrastive pragmatic inference regarding the referents of different prenominal adjectives.     

Developmental Differences in Decoding the Meanings of the Appraisal Actions of Teachers

Teachers convey evaluations through such "appraisal actions" as ability versus effort attributions for children's performance, spontaneous displays of warmth versus matter-of-fact acceptance, and attention versus inattention. Some appraisal actions (e.g., ability-effort) require an understanding of multiplicative relations to arrive at an "adult" interpretation. Others (e.g., attention-inattention) do not. First through sixth graders watched videotaped scenes in which teachers attributed one child's performance to ability but chided another for lack of effort even though he had given an equivalent performance, hugged one child but not another for equivalent performance, and paid attention to one child's oral report but not another's. Younger students (ages 5-9 to 7-10) rated the ability-attributed and hugged children as smarter; older students (ages 9-9 to 11-10) rated the effort-attributed and unhugged children as smarter. In contrast, no age differences were found in decoding attention versus inattention. The results suggest that younger children use a different strategy in decoding the meanings of complex appraisal actions.     

First Contact in Verb Acquisition: Defining a Role for Syntax

The goal of this research was to address 2 questions regarding children's use of syntactic information in acquiring verbs: First, what are children's biases for actions in the absence of syntactic information; and second, how specific is the meaning derived for verbs when syntactic information is present? In 3 experiments we presented nonsense verbs either in syntactic isolation (e.g., "Look! Sebbing!") or embedded within a transitive syntactic frame (e.g., "The frog is sebbing the duck"). These actions were then separated, and the children (mean age = 2 years, 3 months) were asked to select the action which was the referent of the verb. In Experiment 1, Causative actions (in which 1 character forces another to move in some way) were paired with Synchronous actions (in which both characters move simultaneously). In Experiment 2, the same Synchronous actions were now paired with Contact actions (in which 1 character merely touches the other). In Experiment 3, the Contact actions were paired with Causative ones. 2 results emerged: (1) Children have identifiable action biases in the absence of syntactic information and (2) these biases can be shifted by the addition of a transitive syntactic frame. We conclude that the meaning derived from the transitive frame is not specifically Causative or Contact but, more generally, a sense that 1 character is affecting another.     

顾炎武“理学，经学也”新释

顾炎武“理学,经学也”这一著名命题,是试图对“理学”概念作一种历史释解,并表明了他所提倡的社会改造理论的一种致思趋向。现代著名学者侯外庐先生批评了全祖望的说法,以为全氏之说缩小了顾炎武“经学”所涵盖的内容,而认为顾炎武此论主要是区别古今思想的异同离合和批判理学－禅学式脱离现实的空谈。宋人所论“理学”,即顾炎武所述的“今之所谓‘理学’,已非孔子儒学;其专论“心”、“性”,空谈义理,故顾炎武斥之为“禅学”。     

"网络社会"概念刍议

“网络社会”的概念及其中英文表述,仍然悬而未决。本文分析了“网络社会”概念未能界定的分歧所在．并提出解决的初步建议。     

Sociocultural input facilitates children's developing understanding of extraordinary minds

Three- to 5-year-old (N = 61) religiously schooled preschoolers received theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks about the mental states of ordinary humans and agents with exceptional perceptual or mental capacities. Consistent with an anthropomorphism hypothesis, children beginning to appreciate limitations of human minds (e.g., ignorance) attributed those limits to God. Only 5-year-olds differentiated between humans' fallible minds and God's less fallible mind. Unlike secularly schooled children, religiously schooled 4-year-olds did appreciate another agent's less fallible mental abilities when instructed and reminded about those abilities. Among children who understood ordinary humans' mental fallibilities, knowledge of God predicted attributions of correct epistemic states to extraordinary agents. Results suggest that, at a certain point in ToM development, sociocultural input can facilitate an appreciation for extraordinary minds.     

Incorporating new words into the lexicon: preliminary evidence for language hierarchies in two-year-old children

In 4 experiments, we examined how young children incorporate new word meanings into their lexicons. 2-year-olds were each taught a new noun for an object that already had a known label (e.g., a "fep" for a dog). Children's interpretations of the new nouns were assessed by asking subjects to select the named toy from an array of 4 toys (e.g., "Point to a fep"). The experiments were designed to determine which of several possible semantic relations between novel and familiar words was most consistent with children's performance. It was found that children often seemed to interpret the new word as referring to a subordinate of the known category. This tendency was reduced when the named object could sensibly receive a proper name (e.g., when the named object was a stuffed animal), particularly when children had to consider both the familiar and the novel label for the object in the same session. Although not all alternative explanations have been ruled out, these results suggest that, from a very young age, children may spontaneously form language hierarchies when they hear a novel work for an object that already has a familiar name.     

Grown-ups are not afraid of scary stuff, but kids are: young children's and adults' reasoning about children's, infants', and adults' fears

Three-, 5-, and 7-year-olds and adults ( N = 64) listened to stories depicting 2 protagonists of different ages (infant and child or child and grownup) that encounter an entity that looks like a real (e.g., a snake) or an imaginary (e.g., a ghost) fear-inducing creature. Participants predicted and explained each protagonist's intensity of fear. Results showed significant age-related increases in knowledge that infants and adults would experience less intense fears than young children and that people's fears are causally linked to their cognitive mental states. Across age, stories involving imaginary beings elicited more frequent mental explanations for fear than stories about real creatures. Results are discussed in relation to children's developing awareness of the mind as mediating between situations and emotions.     

Thought in the face of violence: a child's need

OBJECTIVE: This article provides a clinical perspective on the combined impacts on children of spousal violence in the home and the absence of attuned parental thought that accompanies it. METHODS: This article takes the form of a commentary, drawing on clinical case studies and research literature to illustrate the child's experience of "unthinking," nonreflective parental states of mind, from the point of witnessing violence through to contact arrangements post-separation. Parallel dynamics and impacts are discussed with caregiving and legislative systems. RESULTS: The article suggests that "unthinking" states of mind in parents can be as damaging for a child as the overt witnessing and experiencing of violence. CONCLUSIONS: The prevention or early overturning of unthinking states of mind, in and out of the home, greatly influences the nature of a child's recovery from domestic violence.