New evidence on the development of the word big

Previous studies of children's understanding of big suggest a curvilinear trend. 3-year-olds, like adults, interpret big as referring to area, while 5-year-olds take big to mean tall. The results of 6 experiments indicate that the curvilinear trend is not obtained in all stimulus contexts. When objects vary extremely, younger and older children take big to mean tall. The object to which big is applied also influences whether height, length, or area is attended to. Moreover, in a production task, adults rarely used the work big to describe the stimuli with which children's understanding of big is typically tested. Taken together, the results suggest that the meaning and use of big is complex and that big may not at any age refer simply to the larger object. It is proposed that the meaning of big is a dynamic system driven by a multiple of perceptual, conceptual, and semantic influences.     

Children's use of nonegocentric standards in judgments of functional size

Dimensional adjectives are inherently relative in meaning, and so provide a test of children's ability to apply nonegocentric standards. The present research investigates children's ability to apply one kind of relative standard assessing the size of an object with regard to its intended use (a functional interpretation). In 3 experiments, children 3-5 years of age were asked to judge objects as "big" or "little" according to their function (e.g., a hat for a doll; a key for a door). Contrary to previous claims, the ability to use nonegocentric functional standards was present by age 3. However, 3-year-olds performed above chance only when their attention was directed to the relevant function, either by means of action (when actually shown how the objects fit together) or by means of language. In contrast, 4-year-olds performed well without additional action-based or linguistic cues. It is suggested that children have an implicit ordering in their interpretations of big and little, such that functional judgments are lower in priority than 2 other standards: normative (the size of an object is compared to a stored mental standard, e.g., a chihuahua is small for a dog) and perceptual (the size of an object is compared to another physically present object of the same type, e.g., a chihuahua 6 inches tall is big compared to a chihuahua 4 inches tall). Even 3-year-olds can make nonegocentric functional judgments of relative size, but the basis of the judgment must be unambiguous.     

How Much Does a Shared Name Make Things Similar? Linguistic Labels, Similarity, and the Development of Inductive Inference

This article examines the development of inductive generalization, and presents a model of young children's induction and two experiments testing the model. The model specifies contribution of linguistic labels and perceptual similarity to young children's induction and predicts a correspondence between similarity judgment and induction of young children. In Experiment 1, 4- to 5-year-olds, 7- to 8-year-olds, and 11- to 12-year-olds were presented with triads of schematic faces (a Target and two Test stimuli), which varied in perceptual similarity, with one of the Test stimuli sharing a linguistic label with the Target, and another having a different label. Participants were taught an unobservable biological property about the Target and asked to generalize the property to one of the Test stimuli. Although 4- to 5-year-olds' proportions of label-based inductive generalizations varied with the degree of perceptual similarity among the compared stimuli, 11- to 12-year-olds relied exclusively on labels, and 7- to 8-year-olds appeared to be a transitional group. In Experiment 2 these findings were replicated using naturalistic stimuli (i.e., photographs of animals), with perceptual similarity manipulated by "morphing" naturalistic pictures into each other in a fixed number of steps. Overall results support predictions of the model and point to a developmental shift from treating linguistic labels as an attribute contributing to similarity to treating them as markers of a common category-a shift that appears to occur between 8 and 11 years of age.     

Children's Use of Context in Interpreting "Big" and "Little"

In order to use the words "big" and "little" appropriately, adults use 3 kinds of contexts: normative (the size of the object is compared to a stored mental representation), perceptual (the object is compared to another physically present object of the same kind), and functional (the object is judged with regard to its intended use). In 3 experiments, we examined how flexibly children switch from one context to another. 2–4-year-olds judged a series of everyday objects as "big" or "little." To answer correctly, children had to judge each object twice, once in a normative context and once in a perceptual or functional context. Results showed that switching from one context to another was not inherently difficult, even for 2-year-olds. However, the direction of switch was important: children throughout the age range tested switched easily from a normative context but made errors when asked to switch to a normative context. We suggest that the normative context differs from the perceptual and functional contexts in that it is unmarked, and that unmarked contexts are accessible only when no other context has been recently experienced. When context is marked more explicitly, children shift flexibly among different meanings.     

One Cow Does Not an Animal Make: Young Children Can Extend Novel Words at the Superordinate Level

Six match-to-sample picture/object selection experiments were designed to explore children's knowledge about superordinate words (e.g., "food") and how they acquire this knowledge. Three factors were found to influence the learning and extension of superordinate words in 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 230): The number of standards (one versus two), the type of standards presented (from different basic-level categories versus from the same basic-level category), and the nature of the object representations used (pictures versus objects). A different pattern of superordinate word acquisition was found between 3-year-olds and 4- and 5-year-olds. Although 4- and 5-year-olds could learn and extend novel words to superordinate categories in the presence of two picture exemplars from different categories or a single three-dimensional (3-D) exemplar, 3-year-olds could do so only in the presence of two 3-D exemplars. These findings indicate that young children's acquisition of superordinate words is influenced by multiple factors and that there is a developmental progression from multiple exemplars to single exemplars in superordinate word learning.     

Young Children's Understanding of Forgetting over Time

2 studies investigated young children's understanding that as the retention interval increases, so do the chances that one will forget. In Study 1 (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds), 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that of 2 characters who simultaneously saw an object, the character who waited longer before attempting to find it would not remember where it was. In study 2 (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds), 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that of 2 objects seen by a character, the object that was seen a "long long time ago" would be forgotten and the object seen "a little while ago" would be remembered. The findings are discussed in relation to research on young children's understanding of the acquisition, retention, and retrieval of knowledge over time.     

Acting out the details of a pediatric check-up: the impact of interview condition and behavioral style on children's memory reports

This investigation was designed to determine whether an enactment interview condition involving a doll and props, in contrast to a verbal interview, would enhance 3- and 5-year-olds' (N = 62) recall of a pediatric examination. An additional aim was to explore the influence of behavioral styles and language skills on children's performance, and the extent to which these relations varied by age and interview condition. Both 1- and 6-weeks following their check-ups, the children in the enactment condition, particularly the 3-year-olds, provided more spontaneous, elaborate reports than did those assessed with a verbal protocol. Nonetheless, enactment also resulted in increased errors by the 3-year-olds at the first interview, and by children in both age groups after the 6-week delay. The age and interview condition effects, however, were moderated by the children's behavioral characteristics. Among the younger children, a measure of manageability predicted performance in the enactment setting, whereas an indicator of persistence was associated with recall in the verbal condition. The results have implications for an understanding of children's memory of events and of their ability to provide testimony in legal settings.     

Seeing Is Believing: Children's Explanations of Commonplace, Magical, and Extraordinary Transformations

Children's magical explanations and beliefs were investigated in 2 studies. In Study 1, we first asked 4- and 5-year-old children to judge the possibility of certain object transformations and to suggest mechanisms that might accomplish them. We then presented several commonplace transformations (e.g., cutting a string) and impossible events (magic tricks). Prior to viewing these transformations, children suggested predominantly physical mechanisms for the events and judged the magical ones to be impossible. After seeing the impossible events, many 4-year-olds explained them as "magic," whereas 5-year-olds explained them as "tricks." In Study 2, we replaced the magic tricks with "extraordinary" events brought about by physical or chemical reactions (e.g., heat causing paint on a toy car to change color). Prior to viewing the "extraordinary" transformations, children judged them to be impossible. After viewing these events, 4-year-olds gave more magical and fewer physical explanations than did 5-year-olds. Follow-up interviews revealed that most 4-year-olds viewed magic as possible under the control of an agent (magician) with special powers, whereas most 5-year-olds viewed magic as tricks that anyone can learn. In a third study, we surveyed parents to assess their perceptions and conceptions of children's beliefs in magic and fantasy figures. Parents perceived their children as believing in a number of magic and fantasy figures and reported encouraging such beliefs to some degree. Taken together, these findings suggest that many 4-year-olds view magic as a plausible mechanism, yet reserve magical explanations for certain real world events which violate their causal expectations.     

Priorities in children's expectations about object label reference: form over color

Young children show considerable interest in color similarity; thus we might expect them to use color as a basis for generalizing object labels. However, natural language observations suggest they do not: children tend to overextend labels based on form similarity and rarely, if ever, overextend labels to objects that share only color. Perhaps, then, children give form priority over color in their expectations about object-label reference. This hypothesis was investigated in 2 studies. In a first study, 40 2- and 3-year-olds sorted 10 sets of 3 pictures that contrasted form with color. Children participated in 1 of 2 conditions: half of the children were shown a target object and asked to "find another one" from among the two choice objects, while the other children heard a novel label for the target (e.g., "See this zom?") and were asked to extend the label (e.g., "Can you find another zom?"). 3-year-olds sorted almost exclusively on the basis of form in both conditions, while 2-year-olds performed differently in the 2 conditions: they frequently chose the color match when labels were absent, but selected by form rather than color when asked to extend a novel label. A second study replicated these findings with novel objects that were real rather than pictured. This study also suggested that 3-year-olds grant color some role in their decisions about object-label reference as long as form differences are reduced to a tolerable level. In sum, young children expect form to be more important than color for guiding object-label reference, even though they may find color interesting when not asked to extend labels. This expectation helps explain the speed and relative ease with which children acquire object labels.     

Dimensional salience and judgments of bigness by three-year-old children.

3-year-olds were shown triads of rectangles and asked to select the "big" one, where the biggest rectangle in each triad was neither the tallest nor the widest. Dimensional salience and response choice were highly related. In addition, as saliency of a particular dimension increased relative to the other dimension, significantly more responses were based on that dimension. The results support the notion that the young child does not rely on 1 specific dimension to make judgments of bigness but, rather, attends to the most salient differences among stimuli.     

Young Children's Understanding of "Remember" and "Forget"

3 studies examined young children's understanding that if one "remembers" or "forgot," one must have known at a prior time. In Study 1,4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood the prior knowledge component of "forgot"; both groups understood that a character with prior knowledge was "gonna remember." Study 2 controlled for the possibility that good performance on "remember" might be due to a simple association of remembering with knowledge. A significant number of 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that when 2 characters currently knew, the one with prior knowledge remembered, and that when neither character currently knew, the one with prior knowledge forgot. Study 3 made prior knowledge more salient by making the remembered or forgotten item visible to the subjects throughout. 4-year-olds performed near ceiling on both verbs, whereas 3-year-olds' performance did not differ from chance. The results are discussed in relation to children's developing understanding of the mind.     

Literacy skills in children with cochlear implants: the importance of early oral language and joint storybook reading

The goal of this study was to longitudinally examine relationships between early factors (child and mother) that may influence children's phonological awareness and reading skills 3 years later in a group of young children with cochlear implants (N = 16). Mothers and children were videotaped during two storybook interactions, and children's oral language skills were assessed using the "Reynell Developmental Language Scales, third edition." Three years later, phonological awareness, reading skills, and language skills were assessed using the "Phonological Awareness Test," the "Woodcock-Johnson-III Diagnostic Reading Battery," and the "Oral Written Language Scales." Variables included in the data analyses were child (age, age at implant, and language skills) and mother factors (facilitative language techniques) and children's phonological awareness and reading standard scores. Results indicate that children's early expressive oral language skills and mothers' use of a higher level facilitative language technique (open-ended question) during storybook reading, although related, each contributed uniquely to children's literacy skills. Individual analyses revealed that the children with expressive standard scores below 70 at Time 1 also performed below average (<85) on phonological awareness and total reading tasks 3 years later. Guidelines for professionals are provided to support literacy skills in young children with cochlear implants.     

Preschool Children's Symbolic Representation of Objects through Gestures

To investigate the symbolic quality of preschoolers' gestural representations in the absence of real objects, 48 children (16 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) performed 2 tasks. In the first task, they were asked to pretend to use 8 common objects (e.g., "pretend to brush your teeth with a toothbrush"). There was an age-related progression in the symbolic quality of gestural representations. 3- and 4-year-olds used mostly body part gestures (e.g., using an extended finger as the toothbrush), whereas 5-year-olds used imaginary object gestures (e.g., pretending to hold an imaginary toothbrush). To determine if children's symbolic skill is sufficiently flexible to allow them to use gestures other than those spontaneously produced in the first task, in the second task children were asked to imitate, for each object, a gesture modeled by an experimenter. The modeled gesture was different from the one the child performed on the first task (e.g., if the child used a body part gesture to represent a particular object, the experimenter modeled an imaginary object gesture for that object). Ability to imitate modeled gestures was positively related to age but was also influenced by the symbolic mode of gesture. 3-year-olds could not imitate imaginary object gestures as well as body part gestures, suggesting that young preschoolers have difficulty performing symbolic acts that exceed their symbolic level even when the acts are modeled. Results from both tasks provide strong evidence for a developmental progression from concrete body part to more abstract imaginary object gestural representations during the preschool years.     

Semantic Constraints on Word Learning: Proper Names and Adjectives

4 experiments examined 3- and 4-year-olds' interpretations of novel words applied to familiar objects in the sentence frame, "This Y is X," where X is a novel word, and Y is a familiar basic-level count noun (e.g., "dog", "cup"). These novel words are ambiguous and could be interpreted either as proper names (e.g., "Fred") or as adjectives/mass nouns (e.g., "red"/"lead"). The experiments addressed 2 questions. First, do children appreciate that the words can be construed either as proper names referring to individuals or as adjectives/mass nouns referring to salient properties/material kinds? The results showed that children could easily make either interpretation. Second, what factors affect children's tendency to make either a proper name or an adjective/mass noun interpretation? In the experiments, children learned the novel words for a range of animals and artifacts. Most children who learned the words for typical pets (e.g., a bird) made proper name interpretations, as did the majority of those who learned the words for certain non-pet animals (e.g., a caterpillar) described as possessed by someone, but only about half of those who learned the words for such non-pet animals not so described. Very few children who learned the words for either simple (e.g., a shoe) or complex (e.g., a boat) artifacts made proper name interpretations. The results provide clear evidence of the role of semantic information in constraining children's interpretation of a novel word, and they help to refine an understanding of what counts as a nameable individual for preschoolers.     

Object similarity bootstraps young children to action-based verb extension

Young children often fail to generalize a novel verb based on sameness of action since they have difficulty focusing on the relational similarity across events while at the same time ignoring the objects that are involved. Study 1, with Japanese-speaking 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 28 in each group), found that similarity of objects involved in action events plays a scaffolding role in children's extraction of relational similarity across events when they extend a verb. Study 2, with 4-year-olds (N = 47), further showed that repeated experience of action-based verb extension supported by object similarity leads children to be better able to extend a novel verb based on sameness of action, even without support from object similarity.     

Knowledge, Concepts, and Inferences in Childhood

The role of knowledge in children's inferences was investigated in 3 experiments. Experiment 1 examined developmental changes in the role of categorical membership, perceptual appearance, and item complexity in inferences for natural kind and artifact concepts. Preschoolers (5-year-olds), second graders (8-year-olds), and fourth graders (10-year-olds) were taught novel properties about target concepts and asked whether each of 4 probes had those properties. Probes varied in category membership and perceptual appearance relative to the target item. Item complexity also varied. Experiments 2 and 3 examined inferences with known and unknown concepts for familiar and unfamiliar properties. Older children's knowledge led to differential weighting of categorical information over appearance but only for known concepts and/or familiar properties. Preschoolers made no distinction between category and appearance for either known or unknown concepts. Additionally, as target item complexity increased, older children made more inferences than preschoolers. No differences between inferences about natural kind and artifact concepts were found. The role of theories and knowledge in children's drawing of inferences is discussed.     

There's More to the Picture Than Meets the Eye: Young Children's Difficulty Understanding Biased Interpretation

5 experiments investigated children's understanding that expectations based on prior experience may influence a person's interpretation of ambiguous visual information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to infer a puppet's interpretation of a small, ambiguous portion of a line drawing after the puppet had been led to have an erroneous expectation about the drawing's identity. Children of both ages failed to ascribe to the puppet an interpretation consistent with the puppet's expectation. Instead, children attributed complete knowledge of the drawing to the puppet. In Experiment 2, the task was modified to reduce memory demands, but 4- and 5-year-olds continued to overlook the puppet's prior expectations when asked to infer the puppet's interpretation of an ambiguous scene. 6-year-olds responded correctly. In Experiment 3, 4- and 5-year-olds correctly reported that an observer who saw a restricted view would not know what was in the drawing, but children did not realize that the observer's interpretation might be mistaken. Experiments 4 and 5 explored the possibility that children's errors reflect difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge when responding. The results are taken as evidence that understanding of interpretation begins at approximately age 6 years.     

Young children's inductions from natural kinds: the role of categories and appearances

Recent analyses of natural kind terms (e.g., dog, gold) suggest that people expect members of a kind to share unforeseen properties. The present study investigated the development of this expectation by studying children's inductive inferences. On each of a series of problems, 3- and 4-year-old children were taught a new fact about an object and then were asked whether it would generalize to: an object that looked like the original, that had the same label as the original, that looked like the original and had the same label, or that differed from the original in both respects. The results indicate that 3- and 4-year-olds drew more inferences based on category membership than on perceptual appearances, when both were available. Furthermore, children often based their inferences on category membership even when no label was provided. Thus even 3-year-olds assumed that natural kind categories include more than superficial features.     

Basic level object categories support the acquisition of novel adjectives: evidence from preschool-aged children

Two experiments examined 3- and 4-year-old children's ability to map novel adjectives to object properties. Sixty-four children were introduced to a target (e.g., a bumpy object), and asked to choose between (1) a matching test object (e.g., a different bumpy object), and (2) a contrasting test object (e.g., a smooth object). Four-year-olds successfully extended novel adjectives from the target to the matching test object whether these objects were drawn from the same, or different, basic level categories. In contrast, 3-year-olds' extensions were more restricted. They successfully extended novel adjectives if the target and test objects were drawn from the same basic level category but failed to do so if the objects were drawn from different basic level categories (Experiment 1). However, if 3-year-olds (n = 20) were first permitted to extend a novel adjective to objects within the same basic level category, they were subsequently able to extend that novel adjective broadly to objects from different basic level categories (Experiment 2). Thus, basic level object categories serve as an initial foundation in the process of mapping novel adjectives to object properties.     

How specific is the shape bias?

Children tend to extend object names on the basis of sameness of shape, rather than size, color, or material-a tendency that has been dubbed the "shape bias." Is the shape bias the result of well-learned associations between words and objects? Or does it exist because of a general belief that shape is a good indicator of object category membership? The present three studies addressed this debate by exploring whether the shape bias is specific to naming. In Study 1, 3-year-olds showed the shape bias both when asked to extend a novel name and when asked to select an object of the same kind as a target object. Study 2 found the same shape bias when children were asked to generalize properties relevant to category membership. Study 3 replicated the findings from Study 1 with 2-year-olds. These findings suggest that the shape bias derives from children's beliefs about object kinds and is not the product of associative learning.