The Heisenberg Microscope: A Powerful Instructional Tool for Promoting Meta-Cognitive and Meta-Scientific Thinking on Quantum Mechanics and the ‚Nature of Science’

In this paper, we present a multi-dimensional study concerning Heisenberg’s ‚gamma ray microscope’, a thought experiment, which is intimately connected with the historical development of quantum mechanics (QM), and also with the most disputed interpretations of quantum theory. In this study: (a) we investigate how philosophers of science read and explicate the function of thought experimentation in physical science; (b) in the light of relevant philosophical theories, we examine the complicated epistemological questions raised by the ‚gamma-ray microscope’ during the birth-process of QM and the contribution of this thought experiment to the clarification of the physical meaning of Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations; (c) on the basis of the preceding analysis, we propose an instructional intervention, which aims at leading learners not only to an essential understanding of QM worldview, but to a deep insight into the Nature of Science as well.     

A Research-Informed Instructional Unit to Teach the Nature of Science to Pre-Service Science Teachers

In this paper we discuss the foundations and process of design of a research-informed instructional unit aimed for pre-service science teacher education. The unit covers some key ideas on the nature of science (around methodology, theory change, scientific inference and explanation, values, gender issues) anchoring them in a well-known episode from the history of science—the ‘discovery’ of radium by the Curies. Such episode is mainly examined as reconstructed in the 1997 French commercial film ‘Les Palmes de Monsieur Schutz’. Pre-service science teachers are required to solve three tasks, individually and in small groups; those tasks are respectively centred around: (1) the distinction between ‘discovering’ and ‘inventing’; (2) scientific modelling via abduction; and (3) the extended hagiographic treatment of the figure of Madame Curie. Plenary debates around the tasks aim at acquainting pre-service science teachers with some powerful concepts of twentieth century philosophy of science.     

‘Quantum Mechanics’ and ‘Scientific Explanation’ An Explanatory Strategy Aiming at Providing ‘Understanding’

Empirical studies persistently indicate that the usual explanatory strategies used in quantum mechanics (QM) instruction fail, in general, to yield understanding. In this study, we propose an instructional intervention, which: (a) incorporates into its subject matter a critical comparison of QM scientific content with the fundamental epistemological and ontological commitments of the prominent philosophical theories of explanation, a weak form of which we meet in QM teaching; (b) illuminates the reasons of their failure in the quantum domain; and (c) implements an explanatory strategy highly inspired by the epistemological pathways through which, during the birth-process of QM, science has gradually reached understanding. This strategy, an inherent element of which is the meta-cognitive and meta-scientific thinking, aims at leading learners not only to an essential understanding of QM worldview, but to a deep insight into the ‘Nature of Science’ as well.     

The Relation between Idealisation and Approximation in Scientific Model Construction

The notions of ‘idealisation’ and ‘approximation’ are strongly linked to the question of ‘how our theories represent the phenomena in their scope’. Although there is no consensus amongst Philosophers on the nature of the process of idealisation and how it affects theoretical representation, at the level of science education much can be gained from the insights of existing philosophical analyses. Traditionally, teaching methodologies treat the observed divergence between theoretical predictions and experimental data by appealing to the more common-sensical notion of ‘approximation’. The use of the latter notion, however, to explicate discrepancies between theory and experiment obscures the theory/experiment relation. It does so, I argue, because from the viewpoint of scientific modelling ‘approximation’ either depends upon or piggybacks on ‘idealisation’.     

Skepticism, truth as coherence, and constructivist epistemology: grounds for resolving the discord between science and religion?

Science and religion exhibit multiple relationships as ways of knowing. These connections have been characterized as cousinly, mutually respectful, non-overlapping, competitive, proximate-ultimate, dominant-subordinate, and opposing-conflicting. Some of these ties create stress, and tension between science and religion represents a significant chapter in humans’ cultural heritage before and since the Enlightenment. Truth, knowledge, and their relation are central to science and religion as ways of knowing, as social institutions, and to their interaction. In religion, truth is revealed through God’s word. In science, truth is sought after via empirical methods. Discord can be viewed as a competition for social legitimization between two social institutions whose goals are explaining the world and how it works. Under this view, the root of the discord is truth as correspondence. In this concept of truth, knowledge corresponds to the facts of reality, and conflict is inevitable for many because humans want to ask which one—science or religion—gets the facts correct. But, the root paradox, also known as the problem of the criterion, suggests that seeking to know nature as it is represents a fruitless endeavor. The discord can be set on new ground and resolved by taking a moderately skeptical line of thought, one which employs truth as coherence and a moderate form of constructivist epistemology. Quantum mechanics and evolution as scientific theories and scientific research on human consciousness and vision provide support for this line of argument. Within a constructivist perspective, scientists would relinquish only the pursuit of knowing reality as it is. Scientists would retain everything else. Believers who hold that religion explains reality would come to understand that God never revealed His truth of nature; rather, He revealed His truth in how we are to conduct our lives.     

Philosophical skepticism not relativism is the problem with the Strong Programme in Science Studies and with Educational Constructivism

The structure of David’s Bloor argument for the Strong Programme (SP) in Science Studies is criticized from the philosophical perspective of anti-skeptical, scientific realism. The paper transforms the common criticism of SP—that the symmetry principle of SP implies an untenable form of cognitive relativism—into the␣clear philosophical issue of naturalism versus Platonism. It is also argued that the concrete patterns of SP’s interest-explanations and its sociological definition of knowledge involve philosophical skepticism. It is claimed, then, that the most problematic elements of SP reside primarily in philosophical skepticism. It is also claimed that this sort of criticism can be directed against other more radical, versions of constructivism in science and science education studies.     

The constructivist paradox: Teachers’ knowledge and constructivist science teaching

Advocates of constructivist science recommend that school science begins with children’s own constructions of reality. This notion of the way in which students’ knowledge of science grows is closely paralleled by recent research on teachers’ knowledge. This paper draws on case study evidence of teachers’ work to show how two experienced teachers’ attempts to develop alternative ways of teaching science involved reframing their previous patterns of understanding and practice. Two alternative interpretations of the case study evidence are offered. One interpretation, which focuses on identifying gaps in the teachers’ knowledge of science teaching, leads to theconstructivist paradox. The second interpretation explores theconstructivist parallel, an approach which treats the process of teachers’ knowledge growth with the same respect as constructivists treat students’ learning of science. This approach, the authors argue, is not only more epistemologically consistent but also opens up the possibilities of helping teachers lead students towards a constructivist school science. Specializations: Teachers’ knowledge and culture, educational change, qualitative research methodology. Specializations: Teachers’ knowledge, imagery and teachers’ work, teacher collegiality, supervision of teachers’ work.     

Understanding the Dialectical Relations Between Everyday Concepts and Scientific Concepts Within Play-Based Programs

In recent times there has been an enormous interest in Vygotsky’s writing on conceptual development, particularly his insights on the differences between everyday and scientific thinking. In drawing upon cultural–historical theory, this paper seeks to examine the relations between everyday concepts and scientific concepts within playful contexts, such as preschools, with a view to better understanding how very young children develop conceptual understandings in science. This paper presents an overview of a study which sought to map the transformation and appropriation of scientific concepts within two early childhood settings. Approximately ten weeks of data gathering took place, with video recordings, field notes, photographic documentation, and child and teacher interviews for recording child concept formation within these naturalistic settings. The findings indicate that when teacher programs are more oriented towards concepts rather than materials, children’s play is focused on conceptual connections. Importantly, the study showed that: It was possible to map the multiple and dynamic levels or stratas of thinking that a child or group of children may exhibit within play-based contexts; An analysis of ‘unorganised heaps’ and ‘complexive thinking’ evident in conceptually or materially oriented play-based programs can be determined; the dialectical relations between everyday concepts and scientific concepts in play-based programs can be understood; and greater understanding about the nature of concept formation in situated playful contexts have been possible.     

Scientists’ Ontological and Epistemological Views about Science from the Perspective of Critical Realism

Including the perspectives of scientists about the nature and process of science is important for an authentic and nuanced portrayal of science in science education. The small number of studies that have explored scientists’ worldviews about science has thus far generated contradictory findings, with recent studies claiming that scientists simultaneously hold contradictory sophisticated and naïve views. This article reports on an exploratory study that uses the framework of Bhaskar’s critical realism to elicit and separately analyse academic scientists’ ontological and epistemological views about science in semi-structured interviews. When the views of scientists are analysed through the lens of critical realism, it is clear that it is possible to hold a realist ontological commitment about what knowledge is of, simultaneously with a fallibilist epistemological commitment about knowledge itself. The apparent incongruence of scientists’ so-called naïve and sophisticated views about science is resolved when analysed using a critical realist framework. Critical realism offers a simple and coherent framework for science educators that avoids many of the problems of positivism and social constructivism by finding a middle ground between them. The three pillars of critical realism: ontological realism, epistemological fallibilism and judgmental rationality help to make sense of how socially constructed scientific knowledge can be anchored in an independent reality.     

Translation Studies and the History of Science: The Greek Textbooks of the 18th Century

The process of translation has been studied extensively from a philological point of view, and has been lately regarded as a creative activity, during which the translated text is not treated in isolation from the circumstances of its reception. Current research has related communicational and functional approaches with concepts such as authorship, textual transmission and cultural factors. Very few historians of science, however, have looked systematically at the issue of translation as worth studying in its own right. Yet the history of translation of philosophical and scientific texts calls, in particular, on the transfer of knowledge from ‘centres’ to ‘peripheries’ and could make serious inroads into reception studies.     

Kuhn and conceptual change: on the analogy between conceptual changes in science and children

This article argues that the analogy between conceptual changes in the history of science and conceptual changes in the development of young children is problematic. We show that the notions of ‘conceptual change’ in Kuhn and Piaget’s projects, the two thinkers whose work is most commonly drawn upon to support this analogy, are not compatible in the sense usually claimed. We contend that Kuhn’s work pertains not so much to the psychology of individual scientists, but to the way philosophers and historians should describe developments in communities of scientists. Furthermore, we argue that the analogy is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of science and the relation between science and common sense. The distinctiveness of the two notions of conceptual change has implications for science education research, since it raises serious questions about the relevance of Kuhn’s remarks for the study of pedagogical issues.     

科学实在论与真理关系的消除主义进路

真理问题是科学实在论与反实在论争论的一个重要方面,科学理论为真或近似为真被视为科学实在论立场的必要部分。然而德维特主张实在论应当排除与真理有关的语义学和认识论,倡导无真理的实在论;此外,实在论的视角主义、建构经验论、依赖模型的实在论均可视为消除或削弱科学实在论与真理关系的尝试。上述立场构成了科学实在论与真理关系的消除主义进路,该认识有助于人们形成更恰当的实在观。     

论塞拉斯的“两种映像”观——兼谈哲学研究的目标问题

塞拉斯把人类与世界之间的关系划分为"常识的"映像和"科学的"映像。他认为,前者是关于人类自己的概念,是一种前科学的、未受批判的、朴素的人类世界观,它定义了已有的哲学反思的一个端点;后者是一种经过反思、批判和逻辑加工形成的框架,是用假定感觉不到的客体和事件来说明能感觉到的客体与事件之间的相互关联。哲学研究的目标正是向着把这两种既相互竞争又相互补充的映像统一起来的方向发展的。这种观点促进了对整个哲学史的批判与反思,为科学实在论的辩护提供了方法论的借鉴意义。但是,他把人类概念思维的社会的、伦理的和价值的维度留给常识映像,把认知与说明维度留给科学映像的做法,有可能会加深自然科学与社会科学之间的分离;他对理论实体的本体论地位的论证方式有可能陷入"理论家的困境"。     

Views about Physics held by Physics Teachers with Differing Approaches to Teaching Physics

Physics teachers’ approaches to teaching physics are generally considered to be linked to their views about physics. In this qualitative study, the views about physics held by a group of physics teachers whose teaching practice was traditional were explored and compared with the views held by physics teachers who used conceptual change approaches. A particular focus of the study was teachers’ views about the role of mathematics in physics. The findings suggest the traditional teachers saw physics as discovered, close approximations of reality while the conceptual change teachers’ views about physics ranged from a social constructivist perspective to more realist views. However, most teachers did not appear to have given much thought to the nature of physics or physics knowledge, nor to the role of mathematics in physics.

What Are We Looking For?—Pro Critical Realism in Text Interpretation

A visible role in the theoretical discourses on education has been played in the last couple of decades by the constructivist epistemologies, which have questioned the basic assumptions of realist epistemologies. The increased popularity of interpretative approaches especially has put the realist epistemologies on the defensive. Basing itself on critical realism, this article discusses the ontological and epistemological commitments of educational research and its consequences for text interpretation. The article defends ontological realism and the semantic conception of truth against radical constructivist ontology and the epistemic conceptions of truth.     

An Essay for Educators: Epistemological Realism Really is Common Sense

“What is truth?” Pontius Pilot asked Jesus of Nazareth. For many educators today this question seems quaintly passé. Rejection of “truth” goes hand-in-hand with the rejection of epistemological realism. Educational thought over the last decade has instead been dominated by empiricist, anti-realist, instrumentalist epistemologies of two types: first by psychological constructivism and later by social constructivism. Social constructivism subsequently has been pressed to its logical conclusion in the form of relativistic multiculturalism. Proponents of both psychological constructivism and social constructivism value knowledge for its utility and eschew as irrelevant speculation any notion that knowledge is actually about reality. The arguments are largely grounded in the discourse of science and science education where science is “western” science; neither universal nor about what is really real. The authors defended the notion of science as universal in a previous article. The present purpose is to offer a commonsense argument in defense of critical realism as an epistemology and the epistemically distinguished position of science (rather than privileged) within a framework of epistemological pluralism. The paper begins with a brief cultural survey of events during the thirty-year period from 1960–1990 that brought many educators to break with epistemological realism and concludes with comments on the pedagogical importance of realism. Understanding the cultural milieu of the past forty years is critical to understanding why traditional philosophical attacks on social constructivist ideas have proved impotent defenders of scientific realism.     

What ‘ideas-about-science’ should be taught in school science? A chemistry teachers’ perspective

The objective of this study is to facilitate in-service chemistry teachers’ understanding of nature of science and what ‘ideas-about-science’ can be included in the classroom. The study is based on 17 in-service teachers who had registered for a 11-week course on ‘Epistemology of Science Teaching’ as part of their Master’s degree program. The course is based on 17 readings drawing on nature of science and its critical evaluation. Course activities included written reports, classroom discussions based on participants’ presentations and written exams. Based on the results obtained this study has the following educational implications: (a) Experimental data need to be interpreted carefully due to underdetermination of theories by data; (b) Kuhn’s normal science manifests itself in the science curriculum through the scientific method and wields considerable influence; (c) Trilemma posed by Collins (Stud Sci Educ 35:169–173, 2000), viz., creation of new knowledge ⇔ Kuhn’s normal science ⇔ teaching nature of science, provided a big challenge and was thought provoking; (d) Of the different aspects of nature of science suggested by experts, these teachers endorsed the following as most important: Creativity, Historical development of scientific knowledge, Diversity of scientific thinking and Scientific method and critical testing; (e) With respect to the contradiction between the positions of Lederman et al. (J Res Sci Teach 39:497–521, 2002) and Osborne et al. (J Res Sci Teach 40:692–720, 2003), few supported the position of latter, viz., inclusion of scientific method in the classroom and a majority supported the former, viz., scientific method as a myth; and (f) Participants were critical of the present stage of research with respect to the scientific method and suggested the introduction of history, philosophy and epistemology of science to counteract its influence.