Equity and Excellence in Research Funding

The tension between equity and excellence is fundamental in science policy. This tension might appear to be resolved through the use of merit-based evaluation as a criterion for research funding. This is not the case. Merit-based decision making alone is insufficient because of inequality aversion, a fundamental tendency of people to avoid extremely unequal distributions. The distribution of performance in science is extremely unequal, and no decision maker with the power to establish a distribution of public money would dare to match the level of inequality in research performance. We argue that decision makers who increase concentration of resources because they accept that research resources should be distributed according to merit probably implement less inequality than would be justified by differences in research performance. Here we show that the consequences are likely to be suppression of incentives for the very best scientists. The consequences for the performance of a national research system may be substantial. Decision makers are unaware of the issue, as they operate with distributional assumptions of normality that guide our everyday intuitions.     

On the Teaching of Science, Technology and International Affairs

Despite the ubiquity and critical importance of science and technology in international affairs, their role receives insufficient attention in traditional international relations curricula. There is little literature on how the relations between science, technology, economics, politics, law and culture should be taught in an international context. Since it is impossible even for scientists to master all the branches of natural science and engineering that affect public policy, the learning goals of students whose primary training is in the social sciences should be to get some grounding in the natural sciences or engineering, to master basic policy skills, to understand the basic concepts that link science and technology to their broader context, and to gain a respect for the scientific and technological dimensions of the broader issues they are addressing. They also need to cultivate a fearless determination to master what they need to know in order to address policy issues, an open-minded but skeptical attitude towards the views of dueling experts, regardless of whether they agree with their politics, and (for American students) a world-view that goes beyond a strictly U.S. perspective on international events. The Georgetown University program in Science, Technology and International Affairs (STIA) is a unique, multi-disciplinary undergraduate liberal arts program that embodies this approach and could be an example that other institutions of higher learning might adapt to their own requirements.     

Science,Technology and Democracy

Science and the institutions of science are far from democratic systems,and yet they are the most democratic of regimes. This essay examinesthe demand for transparency and public participation. One can distinguishseveral levels of public influence. Their function suggests thatdecision-makers, both scientists and technocrats, are being obligedto accept and work with rules which are no longer laid down by themselves.     

Science and McCarthyism

Students of the `long' McCarthy period in the United States – fromthe late 1940s through the 1950s – have paid inadequate attentionto the effects of this oppressive time upon science. Visa andpassport denials, loyalty oaths, security investigations, andother problems placed in the paths of scientists no doubthindered science. But they also increased the political maturityof its practitioners, a fact of which recent events make usparticularly aware.     

VAM on trial: judging science in teacher evaluation lawsuits

ABSTRACT

Value Added Modeling (VAM) is a statistical technology used to evaluate teacher effectiveness. While it was heralded for years as the next big innovation in education reform, VAM has become an object of legal scrutiny since it was implemented in dozens of states across the U.S. Building on STS findings about science and the law, this paper considers the lawsuits involving VAM as an opportunity to analyze the contestation of expertise in court. It finds that not only is there a great deal of variation in terms of how expertise gets constructed in legal settings, leading to very different outcomes, but also that judges’ assessments of VAM are conducted such that they are implicitly adjudicating what constitutes proper science. Contrary to the idea that judges conform to criteria for evaluating expertise imposed by the scientific community limiting themselves to the inclusion or exclusion of expertise, in the case of VAM the legal system is asserting its own vision of how science should operate and thus making judgments about what counts authentically as science.     

The Complementarity Between the Collective and the Individual

Besides his activities as a theoretical physicist, the Belgian Léon Rosenfeld cultivated and showed a lively concern for history of science since his student years. This paper is a study of his publications, correspondence and other endeavours in history of science, mainly during the early Cold War period, in order to explore his essentially Marxist views on science and society and how they differed from those of other Marxists scholars, most notably John D. Bernal and Boris Hessen.     

Regimes of Knowledge Production in Society: Towards a More Political and Social Reading

The `co-productions' of science and society have undergone dramatic changes in recent decades. However, contrasts between `Mode 1' and `Mode 2' are not compelling inhistorical terms. This essay will argue that, in fact, they offer too naturalistic and a-political a picture.     

Expertise,Regulatory Science and the Evaluation of Technology and Risk: Introduction to the Special Issue

Regulating technologies, innovations and risks is an activity that, as much as scientific research needs proofs and evidence. It is the site of development of a distinct kind of science, regulatory science. This special issue addresses the question of the standards of knowledge governing how we test, assess and monitor technologies and their effects. This topic is relevant and timely in the light of problematics of regulation of innovation, regulatory failure and capture. Given the enormous decisions and stakes regulatory science commends, it becomes crucial to ask where its standards come from and gain credibility, but also what valuations of technology and appreciations of their risks or benefits do they embed, and who controls them? This paper introduces the four contributions comprising the special issue, and outlines a perspective from which to question the construction of regulatory science or, in the terminology adopted here, the authorization and standardization of regulatory knowledge, particularly the role of networks of scientific experts therein.     

Federal support of basic research: Some economic issues

Summary There is no necessary connection between leadership in basic science and leadership in the applications of science, because scientific progress is a cooperative endeavour and not a competitive game; indeed, there may be a conflict between basic research and applied science. The notion of a position of leadership; in science raises questions of what leadership consists in and what its value is to the nation. The two main arguments for government support of science are cultural-social, and economic. The cultural-social argument stresses scientific activity as a form of social consumption of wealth and raises the question of whether other uses of the resources employed would contribute more to the greatness of the society. The economic argument stresses basic scientific research as a form of investment for the future, and raises the questions of what the rate of return on such investment is and whether and to what extent government support is called for. Relevant economic research results bearing on this problem are scarce. Economic theory suggests that competition in the market will supply less than the optimal amount of basic research; but our society substantially supplements the market through private contributions to and government support of science, and the question is whether this supplementation is deficient or excessive. Here difficult problems arise, on which more economic research is needed; one of these concerns the relative merits of government and private support of science. The rule-of-thumb procedures generally recommended for determining the volume and allocation of government support to basic scientific research generally ignore these problems, and amount to endorsing the present level of government support or recommending that it be increased. Allocation of federal support of science should take account of the possibility of stimulating the economic development of poor regions of the country by locating scientific research facilities in them.     

The Russian Academy of sciences and the Soviet Academy of sciences: Continuity or disjunction?

Conclusion Although the Russian Academy has not been operating long enough to permit a categorical statement that it will act exactly as the Soviet Academy did, there is now enough information to justify stating that in its structure and stated functions it differs in no significant way from the Soviet Academy which it replaced. While it might well have been weakened, through a decline in its own prestige and through the weakening of the government under which it operates, it is unlikely to be so weakened that it will allow either the democrats and rank-and-file research workers on the one hand, or the new bureaucratic arrangements on the other to get the better of it. While the desperate budgetary situation will almost certainly force the Russian Academy into considerable retrenchment in its research activities, it will continue to be a body of bureaucratically organised and experienced managers of science and will conduct itself accordingly. Those who believe that a high level of participation by the rank-and-file of the staff is essential in the management of science, will see that as a catastrophe for Russian science. Those who believe that particularly in times of stress, bureaucratic skill and experience are of great importance will see it as providing some hope of salvation.     

Scientism at the end of the old regime: Reflections on a theme of Professor Charles Gillispie

What is it that statesmen have generally wanted from science? They have not wanted admonitions or collaboration, much less interference, in the business of government, which is the exercise of power over persons, nor in the political maneuverings to secure and retain control over governments. From science, all the statesmen and politicians want are instrumentalities, powers but not power: weapons, techniques, information communications, and so on. As for scientists, what have they wanted of governments? They have expressly not wished to be politicized. They have wanted support, in the obvious form of funds, but also in the shape of institutionalization and in provision of authority for the legitimation of their community in its existence and in its activities, or in other words for its professional status.     

Moral Economies in Science: From Ideal to Pragmatic

In the following pages we discuss three historical cases of moral economies in science: Drosophila genetics, late twentieth century American astronomy, and collaborations between American drug companies and medical scientists in the interwar years. An examination of the most striking differences and similarities between these examples, and the conflicts internal to them, reveals constitutive features of moral economies, and the ways in which they are formed, negotiated, and altered. We critically evaluate these three examples through the filters of rational choice, utility, and American pragmatism, using the latter to support the conclusion that there is no single vision of moral economies in science and no single theory—moral, political, social—that will explain them. These filters may not be the only means through which to evaluate the moral economies examined, but aspects of each appear prominent in all three cases. In addition, explanations for decisions are often given in the language of these theories, both at the macro (policy) level and at the local level of the moral economies we discuss. In light of such factors, the use of these frameworks seems justified. We begin with an attempt to define the nature of moral economies, then move to a consideration of scientific communities as moral communities operating within material and other constraints which we relate to wider questions of political economy and societal accountabilities.

Prices for superstars can flatten out

We reconsider Rosen’s economics of superstars model establishing, in the case of single-type consumers, a constant price-to-quality ratio. Rosen also conjectured that, in the case of multiple-type consumers, the normal course of consumer behavior forces the price-to-quality relationship to be convex and prevents it from being concave. We show that this conjecture is false and explain why there is no a priori reason to rule out concavity in the price-to-quality relationship. In this model, the market matches consumers to artists on the basis of quality: consumers of each type select only one level of quality, supplied by artists endowed with a specific level of talent. The concavity or convexity of the price-to-quality relationship is non-trivially related to the way both populations are matched. Consumers with poor knowledge have greater fixed costs above and beyond the price they have to pay on the market. They are therefore less reluctant when prices rise sharply and they specialize in levels of quality that entail a high marginal appreciation of quality: this can mean either a high or a low level of quality, depending on price curvature. With convexity, as Rosen pointed out, they turn toward superstars. Symmetrically, convexity encourages connoisseurs to turn toward low quality. But concavity too is fully possible: consumer–artist matching, for the same reasons, simply has the reverse effect. Connoisseurs go for great talents, whose price of quality flattens out. The global shape of the price-to-quality relationship (concave or convex) is determined by market clearing conditions and, more crucially, by the distribution of agents on both sides.     

Disciplinary Networks and Bounding: Scientific Communication Between Science and Technology Studies and the History of Science

This article examines the communication networks within and between science and technology studies (STS) and the history of science. In particular, journal relatedness data are used to analyze some of the structural features of their disciplinary identities and relationships. The results first show that, although the history of science is more than half a century older than STS, the size of the STS network is more than twice that of the history of science network. Further, while a majority of the journals in the STS network are connected by weak ties, about half of the history of science network consists of strong ties. The history of science network is thus more cohesive than the STS network. The relatively strong cohesion within the history of science network is associated with comparatively high degrees of intra-disciplinary communication, but comparatively weak ties to only a few related disciplines. The analysis also shows that very few members of the history of science cliques are situated on the shortest path between both specialties. Moreover, given the relatively impermeable nature of the history of science network, the latter partially depends on STS to reach some of the neighboring disciplines.     

Congressmen and scientists in the making of science policy: The Allison Commission, 1884–1886

Conclusion The Allison Commission focused attention on the administration of the scientific bureaux and its relation to the jurisdictional system in the Congress. The commission also had a more considerable influence on congressional policy towards the scientific bureaux than was previously thought. Legislative recommendations offered by the Allison Commission became law, even if they avoided the notice of congressional opponents through the strategic manipulation of the appropriations process. Hilary Herbert was not a crude enemy of science, but a staunch defender of the obligations of Congress to scrutinise the expenditure of funds it allocated.This detailed political history of the Allison Commission is a necessary part of any history of American science policy. William Boyd Allison and Hilary Herbert were, no less than scientists like Powell, initiators of a tradition which has continued to be important in American governmental science policy.The form of the special committee devoted to scientific issues was initiated by the Allison Commission. It prefigured more recent and familiar congressional inquiries like the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Government Operations Committee under Representative Fountain, the House Science Policy Task Force, and the Energy and Commerce Committee under Representative Dingell. The attentiveness to details like pay, printing, food and morale—as small but manageable parts of the larger enterprise—foreshadows more contemporary inquiries into the details of the procedures for awarding grants and contracts and the assurances of financial and scientific integrity. The mechanisms of control applied to governmental science by the Allison Commission—particularly itemised appropriations, but also control over personnel through promotions and control of bureaucratic organisation by virtue of congressional rather than disciplinary organisation—stand as early examples of how Congress may continue to exert its constitutional authority to scrutinise an innovative and entrepreneurial scientific community.     

Prediction as an Impediment to Preparedness: Lessons from the US Hurricane and Earthquake Research Enterprises

No matter one’s wealth or social position, all are subject to the threats of natural hazards. Be it fire, flood, hurricane, earthquake, tornado, or drought, the reality of hazard risk is universal. In response, governments, non-profits, and the private sector all support research to study hazards. Each has a common end in mind: to increase the resilience of vulnerable communities. While this end goal is shared across hazards, the conception of how to get there can diverge considerably. The earthquake and hurricane research endeavors in the US provide an illustrative contrast. The earthquake community sets out to increase resilience through a research process that simultaneously promotes both high quality and usable – preparedness-focused - science. In order to do so, the logic suggests that research must be collaborative, responsive, and transparent. Hurricane research, by contrast, largely promotes high quality science – predictions - alone, and presumes that usability should flow from there. This process is not collaborative, responsive, or transparent. Experience suggests, however, that the latter model – hurricane research - does not prepare communities or decision makers to use the high quality science it has produced when a storm does hit. The predictions are good, but they are not used effectively. Earthquake research, on the other hand, is developed through a collaborative process that equips decision makers to know and use hazards research knowledge as soon as an earthquake hits. The contrast between the two fields suggests that earthquake research is more likely to meet the end goal of resilience than is hurricane research, and thus that communities might be more resilient to hurricanes were the model by which research is funded and conducted to change. The earthquake research experience can provide lessons for this shift. This paper employs the Public Value Mapping (PVM) framework to explore these two divergent public value logics, their end results, and opportunities for improvement.     

Excellence and Frontier Research as Travelling Concepts in Science Policymaking

Excellence and frontier research have made inroads into European research policymaking and structure political agendas, funding programs and evaluation practices. The two concepts travelled a long way from the United States and have derived from contexts outside of science (and policy). Following their conceptual journey, we ask how excellence and frontier research have percolated into European science and higher education policies and how they have turned into lubricants of competition that buttress an ongoing reform process in Europe.     

Beyond Private and Public Research: The Legal and Organizational Reality Behind Industrial Research Institutes in Interwar France

The initiatives attempting to forge links between the academia and the industry flourished in France after World War I. The so-called “industrial institutes” shared a common goal: to reinvigorate the French economy through science. Because of their focus on applied research, they differed from traditional engineering schools that usually neglected laboratory work and innovation. However, while the industrial institutes were a distinct category that shows broader trends in science-industry relations, from a formal point of view they did not constitute a coherent category. The term “institute” was ambiguous and applied to various legal and administrative arrangements. While the French state attempted to unify terminology by introducing “faculty institutes” through the 1920 Decree on the constitution of universities, the measure was not sufficient to englobe all types of institutions. The diversity of organizational realities behind the industrial institutes is, however, useful for analyzing power structures and hierarchies in a given industrial sector. The legal form of an industrial institute was conditioned by the state and the robustness of the industry that funded it. As such, the history of the French industrial institutes may constitute a fertile ground for broader analyses on the impact of power relations on the legal reality behind the initiatives uniting science and industry.     

The EPSRC’s Policy of Responsible Innovation from a Trading Zones Perspective

Responsible innovation (RI) is gathering momentum as an academic and policy debate linking science and society. Advocates of RI in research policy argue that scientific research should be opened up at an early stage so that many actors and issues can steer innovation trajectories. If this is done, they suggest, new technologies will be more responsible in different ways, better aligned with what society wants, and mistakes of the past will be avoided. This paper analyses the dynamics of RI in policy and practice and makes recommendations for future development. More specifically, we draw on the theory of ‘trading zones’ developed by Peter Galison and use it to analyse two related processes: (i) the development and inclusion of RI in research policy at the UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC); (ii) the implementation of RI in relation to the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) project. Our analysis reveals an RI trading zone comprised of three quasi-autonomous traditions of the research domain – applied science, social science and research policy. It also shows how language and expertise are linking and coordinating these traditions in ways shaped by local conditions and the wider context of research. Building on such insights, we argue that a sensible goal for RI policy and practice at this stage is better local coordination of those involved and we suggest ways how this might be achieved.     

What’s Wrong with Talking About the Scientific Revolution? Applying Lessons from History of Science to Applied Fields of Science Studies

Since the mid-twentieth century, the ‘Scientific Revolution’ has arguably occupied centre stage in most Westerners’, and many non-Westerners’, conceptions of science history. Yet among history of science specialists that position has been profoundly contested. Most radically, historians Andrew Cunningham and Perry Williams in 1993 proposed to demolish the prevailing ‘big picture’ which posited that the Scientific Revolution marked the origin of modern science. They proposed a new big picture in which science is seen as a distinctly modern, western phenomenon rather than a human universal, that it was invented in the Age of Revolutions 1760–1848, and that science be de-centred within the new big picture: treated as just one of many forms of human knowledge-seeking activity. Their paper is one of the most highly cited in the history of science field, and has the potential to transform the way that science educators, science communicators, science policy-makers and scientists view science. Yet the paper and historians’ scholarly response to it are not well-known outside the history discipline. Here I attempt to bridge that disciplinary gap with a review of scholarly papers published 1994–2014 that cited Cunningham and Williams or otherwise discussed the Scientific Revolution, to gauge the extent of support for the old and new big pictures. I find that the old big picture is disintegrating and lacks active defenders, while many scholars support aspects of the new big picture. I discuss the significance of this for scholars in ‘applied’ fields of science studies such as education, communication and policy.