Retraction: ‘Role of Methodology in Action Research’ by Kubilay Kaptan

The above article, published online on 20 March 2016 in Wiley Online Library ( wileyonlinelibrary.com ), has been retracted by agreement between the author, the journal Editor in Chief, Bob Davis, and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. The retraction has been agreed due to unattributed overlap with Carr (2006). REFERENCES Carr, W. (2006 ) Philosophy, Methodology and Action Research, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 40 , pp. 421–435. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2006.00517.x Kaptan, K. (2016 ) Role of Methodology in Action Research, Journal of Philosophy of Education. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12181     

Better Red than Dead—Putting an End to the Social Irrelevance of Postwar Philosophy of Science

This paper asks what is necessary in a theory of science adequate to the task of empowering philosophers of science to participate in public debate about science in a social context. It is argued that an adequate theory of science must be capable of theorizing the role of values and motives in science and that it must take seriously the irreducibly social nature of scientific knowledge.

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What is Philosophy for Children? From an educational experiment to experimental education

Abstract

Philosophy seems to have gained solid ground in the hearts and minds of educational researchers and practitioners. We critique Philosophy for Children as an experimental programme aimed at improving children’s thinking capacity, by questioning the concept of critique itself. What does it mean when an institutional framework like the school claims to question its own framework, and what is the consequence of such a claim for thinking, in education, philosophy and the child? Implications for the concept of critical thinking follow.     

Conceptual ecologies for educational research through Deleuze,Guattari and Whitehead

This article will explore the increasing interest in the application of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Alfred North Whitehead to educational research, for example, as a conceptual underpinning for inquiry in the new materialisms, and/or educational posthumanism. The exploration of this paper is complicated by the fact that Deleuze and Guattari changed their philosophical position in their dual publications, with, for example, their last book: What is Philosophy? representing a substantial departure from their rhizomatic work in, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. This article will explain the changes in position with reference to the mapping of conceptual ecologies that Deleuze and Guattari are describing through their philosophy, and not dualism. Concept creation appears in the analysis of Western philosophy in: What is Philosophy? and as the job of philosophy. In contrast, A Thousand Plateaus presents a whole raft of interrelated concepts that help explain the connections between capitalism and schizophrenia, but do not present ‘concept creation’ as a positive task as such, even though one could impute that they are successfully doing it. This article will explain these changes in positioning of Deleuze and Guattari as a mode of sophisticated conceptual ecology, which takes into account the work that they want their concepts to perform. Transcribed to educational research, ‘concept creation’ is an importantly non-methodological task, which is augmented and expanded with reference to the metaphysics of Whitehead’s process philosophy (a non-method), and how it has been taken up, for example, by Isabelle Stengers in terms of research positioning and science.     

A New Way of Thinking about Social Location in Science

The Durkheimian concept of the density of social relationships may prove more fruitful than the historical materialist notion of a social hierarchy for thinking about the social location of epistemic agents in science. To define a scientist’s social location in terms of the density of her professional relationships with other scientists permits us to give a more precise characterization of marginalization and thus to formulate more testable hypotheses about marginalized groups in science. The notion of social density helps to explain not only how some individual scientists are more likely than others to get a hearing for their ideas, but also how scientific inquiry flourishes more in some societies than in others.

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‘Emplaced Transcendence’ as Ecologising Education in Michael Bonnett's Environmental Philosophy

At the 2019 Annual Conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, Michael Bonnett was an invited speaker, giving a paper entitled ‘Transcendent nature, sustainability, and ‘ecologising’ education’. In this keynote, Bonnett shared portions of his forthcoming book, Environmental Consciousness, Nature, and Philosophy of Education: Ecologizing Education (London, Routledge). A day earlier at the conference Jeff Stickney gave a paper entitled ‘Informal place-based learning in environmental sustainability education: Seeing anew the Cloister oak tree at New College through Heidegger & Wittgenstein's Philosophies.’ Here we offer a section of Stickney's paper discussing Bonnett's environmental philosophy, focusing on a central aspect of his work: aesthetic and place-based education as a way of connecting more deeply with ‘nature’. Instead of delivering his paper at the conference, Stickney led participants on a walk across the Oxford campus, talking about the place and seeking to enhance appreciation of the evergreen oak tree in the cloister by entertaining different philosophical perspectives while those gathered drew the tree. The exercise was meant to illustrate what aesthetic, emplaced transcendence might actually look and feel like, in practice. Bonnett humbly agreed to write a brief response for this Special Issue.     

Peers on Socrates and Plato

There is more to be said about two of the topics Chris Peers addresses in his article Freud, Plato and Irigaray: A morpho-logic of teaching and learning (2012, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 44, 760–774), namely the Socratic method of teaching and Plato’s stance with regard to women and feminism. My purpose in this article is to continue Peers’s discussion of these two topics.     

Why Compulsory Science Education Should <Emphasis Type="Italic">Not</Emphasis> Include Philosophy of Science

Like many readers of this journal, I have long been an advocate of having science students introduced to philosophy of science. In particular, influenced by the Philosophy for Children movement founded by Matthew Lipman, I have advocated such an introduction as early as possible and have championed early secondary school as an appropriate place. Further, mainstream science curricula in a number of countries have, for some time now, supported such introductions (albeit of a more limited sort) under the banner of introducing students to the “Nature of Science”. In this paper, I explore a case against such introductions, partly in role as “Devil’s Advocate” and partly exploring genuine qualms that have come to disturb me. Generally speaking, my judgement is that no justification is available in terms of benefit to the individual or to society of sufficient weight to outweigh the loss of freedom of choice involved in such forced learning. One possible exception is a minimalist and intellectually passive “Nature of Science” introduction to some uncontroversial philosophical views about science. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Seventh International Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science and Science Teaching, University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg and subsequently published in its proceedings (see my 2003). I am grateful to those who engaged in discussion of the paper upon its presentation. I am also grateful to the advice of this journal’s anonymous referees.     

Theory and Practice: the Politics of Philosophical Character

This essay explores the thorny issue of theory and practice, partly in response to the special issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Education (37.2, 2003) but more especially as a way of offering a critique of Joseph Dunne's book, Back to the Rough Ground (1993). It argues that Dunne's notion of phronetic techne risks the reduction of philosophy to the merely instrumental, and, in turn, that this approach threatens the significance of philosophical character.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed: Al Hurwitz and Stanley S. Madeja with Eldon Katter Pathways to Art Appreciation: A Source Book for Media and Methods Brandon Taylor Art Today Candace Jesse Stout The Flower Teachers: Stories for a New Generation Stuart Macdonald The History and Philosophy of Art Education John Swift An Illustrated History of Moseley Art School: Art Education in Birmingham 1800–1975     

Preoccupation with Quality

The teacher, like the artist, the philosopher, and the man of letters, can only perform his work adequately if he feels himself to be an individual directed by an inner creative impulse, not dominated and fettered by outside authority. (Bertrand Russell, Unpopular Essays, 1961.)

Conformity then becomes the criterion by which the pupil is judged in spite of the fact that initiative, originality and independence are precious qualities of life. (John Dewey, The Need for a Philosophy of Education, 1974a.)     

Increasing the number of feminist scientists: why feminist aims are not served by the Underdetermination Thesis

Recent feminist philosophers of science have argued that feminist values can contribute to rational decisions about which scientific theories to accept. On this view, increasing the number of feminist scientists is important for ensuring rational and objective theory acceptance. The Underdetermination Thesis has played a key role in arguments for this view [Anderson (1995) Hypatia 10(3), 50–84; Hankinson Nelson (1990) Who knows? From Quine to a feminist empiricism. Temple University Press, Philadelphia; Longino (1990) Science as social knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Longino (2002) The fate of knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Kourany (2003) Philosophy of Science 70, 1–14]. This thesis is alleged to open an argumentative “gap” between evidence and theory acceptance and provide a rationale for filling the gap with feminist values. While I agree with the conclusion that feminist values can contribute to rational decisions about which theories to accept, I argue that the Underdetermination Thesis cannot support this claim. First, using earlier arguments [Laudan (1990) in: R. Giere (ed) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol 14, pp 267–297; Slezak (1991) International Studies in Philosophy of Science 5, 241–256; Pinnick (1994) Philosophy of Science 61, 664–657] I show that Underdetermination cannot, by itself, establish that feminist values should fill the gap in theory acceptance. Secondly, I argue that the very use of the Underdetermination Thesis concedes that feminist values are extra-scientific, a-rational, factors in theory acceptance. This concession denies feminists grounds to explain why their values contribute to rational scientific reasoning. Finally, I propose two alternative ways to explain how feminist values can contribute to rational theory acceptance that do not rely on Underdetermination.

Table of Contents

ARTICLES A Survey of Attitudes About Methods of Assessment David A. Eubanks, Kenneth D. Royal Editor's Notes Trudy W. Banta A Kind of Heresy: Assessing Student Learning in Philosophy Charles W. Wright Program Portfolio Analysis: Evaluating Academic Program Viability and Mix Vernon B. Harper Jr. COLUMN From the States: Aligning Academic Standards: The Lumina Degree Profile Peter T. Ewell     

State Education Finance and Governance Profile: Delaware

McDougall, William. Outline of Psychology. New York: Scribners, 1923. Pp. xii + 456.

Josey, C. C. The Social Philosophy of Instinct. New York: Scribners, 1922. Pp. 274.

Phillips, Claude A. Modern Methods and the Elementary Curriculum. New York: Century Company, 1923.

Bradbuky, Robert H. A First Book in Chemistry. New York: Appleton, 1922.     

That’s Not For Our Kids: The strange death of philosophy and ethics in a low socioeconomic secondary school

Abstract

This article reflects on the successes and failures of a new Philosophy and Ethics course in a low socioeconomic context in Perth, Western Australia, with the eventual demise of the subject in the school at the end of 2010. We frame this reflection within Deleuzian notions of geophilosophy to advocate for a Philosophy and Ethics that is informed by nomadic thought, as this offers a critical freedom for students to transform themselves and their society and suggests practical ways both of overcoming the prejudices which led to its demise and of student reluctance to engage in open discussion in class. We consider the demise of the course a ‘missed opportunity’ because it had so much potential to be transformative of student subjectivities in schools.     

Philosophy in Primary Schools: Fostering Thinking Skills and Literacy

We read for many reasons and this paper focuses on one of those – reading for thinking. It reports on the Philosophy in Primary Schools project and argues that one of the best ways teachers can add value to their work in literacy is by incorporating philosophical discussion with children through an approach called Stories for Thinking. It outlines what ‘philosophy for children’ is and how it can be used for developing the thinking skills that underpin literacy and higher order reading skills. It argues that a Stories for Thinking approach can enrich thinking and learning in the literacy hour, and uses evidence from teachers and children to illustrate the effects of the programme on classroom practice and on raising levels of pupil achievement     

The Distinction Between Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values in the Natural Sciences

In this paper I examine the particular question of the meaning of the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values in the natural sciences and, if this would make sense, the possibility to transcend this distinction. I claim that the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values maintains its necessity as long as a certain sort of unity between the theoretical and the practical sides of the scientific endeavour has not been achieved. The distinction in question would cease to have meaning only from the perspective of such a unity, since in this manner the normative dimension of science would become an internal term for its historical construction.

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The role of spatial ability in mixed reality learning with the HoloLens

The use of mixed reality in science education has been increasing and as such it has become more important to understand how information is learned in these virtual environments. Spatial ability is important in many learning contexts, but especially in neuroanatomy education where learning the locations and spatial relationships between brain regions is paramount. It is currently unclear what role spatial ability plays in mixed reality learning environments, and whether it is different compared to traditional physical environments. To test this, a learning experiment was conducted where students learned neuroanatomy using both mixed reality and a physical plastic model of a brain (N = 27). Spatial ability was assessed and analyzed to determine its effect on performance across the two learning modalities. The results showed that spatial ability facilitated learning in mixed reality (β = 0.21, P = 0.003), but not when using a plastic model (β = 0.08, P = 0.318). A non-significant difference was observed between the modalities in terms of knowledge test performance (d = 0.39, P = 0.052); however, mixed reality was more engaging (d = 0.59, P = 0.005) and learners were more confident in the information they learned compared to using a physical model (d = 0.56, P = 0.007). Overall, these findings suggest that spatial ability is more relevant in virtual learning environments, where the ability to manipulate and interact with an object is diminished or abstracted through a virtual user interface.     

Co-production of Knowledge in Multi-stakeholder Processes: Analyzing Joint Experimentation as Social Learning

Purpose: Changing research design and methodologies regarding how researchers articulate with end-users of technology is an important consideration in developing sustainable agricultural practices. This paper analyzes a joint experiment as a multi-stakeholder process and contributes to understand how the way of organizing social learning affects stakeholders’ ownership of process outcomes. Design/Methodology/Approach:A learning group composed of the different stakeholders of the oil palm seed system in Benin was set around a joint experiment. We use a detailed account of the group dynamics to understand the social process. Findings: The way the process is designed and conducted has a great effect on the ownership by the participants. Methodological steps taken in this research process showed its efficacy to produce quick and positive feedback mechanisms. Stakeholders’ perspectives on what constitutes a quality oil palm seedling varied widely. Participants, mainly nursery holders, learned new production practices. Representatives of the research center learned a mismatch of recommendations with users’ contexts. Field observations further to the process indicate changes in practices among stakeholders that would be sustainable. Practical Implications: Beyond focusing on outcomes, initiatives in multi-stakeholder processes should also document and analyze social processes in order to better understand the mechanisms by which such processes foster socio-technical change, as well as identify potential institutional barriers to such processes. Originality/Value: Through a detailed analysis of group dynamics, this paper addresses an important knowledge gap in participatory agricultural development.