Moral Development Among Mildly Mentally Handicapped School Children

Abstract

According to the cognitive‐developmental theory, intellectual development is best understood in terms of age‐related changes. This has been found to be a valid theory in the case of mentally subnormal subjects as well, although their development proceeds at a speed and up to a level different from their normal age‐mates. The same theory has been applied to moral development and describes it, likewise, as a stage‐like progress of moral reasoning with age. The present study tries to answer the following question: Does the moral reasoning of the subjects classified as subnormal change with age so that it can be said to develop? According to the results obtained (dealing with subjects nine‐, 11‐, 13‐, 15‐ and 17‐years‐old), the cognitive‐developmental hypothesis of moral development is only partially confirmed. Namely, there is a development from the less to the more mature forms of moral reasoning, but the course of that development is not entirely such as the theory assumes. Moreover, moral reasoning of the subjects in this study is more advanced than their intelligence level as expressed by the IQ score.     

Moral and Religious Education

Abstract

Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral reasoning postulates a supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending, labelled Stage Six. Kohlberg identifies this with a principle of justice, though without adequately justifying the elimination of other autonomous universal principles. The claim that this principle provides consistent, reversible and universalizable moral judgements is criticized: by itself a purely formal principle of justice can provide no particular moral judgements at all; for that we need independent values, such as the value of life which Kohlberg appeals to, but does not justify, in his discussions of the Heinz dilemma. More generally there is no reason to expect that any form of moral reasoning will be supremely adequate in Kohlberg's sense, providing a solution to all moral problems and dilemmas. The principle of justice is merely one among the many specifically moral principles which Kohlberg locats at Stage Five, albeit the one which he personally happens to favour.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Lawrence Kohlberg's many accounts of his cognitive‐developmental theory of moral reasoning is the crucial importance which he attaches to the form of reasoning labelled Stage Six, when it is a stage of development that only a tiny minority of individuals actually attain. Indeed it appears that even that number has had to be revised downward in the light of changes to the theory and scoring system, until it begins to seem that only a handful of saints and heroes, such as Socrates or Martin Luther King, remain. In fact so slender is the empirical evidence for a separate form of Stage Six reasoning that the official scoring manual (Kohlberg et al., 1977) prefers to ignore it altogether. Clearly, then, the case for Stage Six must be almost wholly theoretical, not to say philosophical, as the supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending. And by the same token it may seem that criticisms of Kohlberg's claims for Stage Six will leave the rest of the theory untouched. But that, I think, is to underestimate the significance of Stage Six. It is the apogee of his system, providing both a focus and a rationale for the stage‐development that allegedly leads to it; it is as crucial to the theory as Kohlberg's own writings make it. Without Stage Six the cognitive‐developmental account stands in need of radical re‐thinking, to put it no higher.     

A New "Stairway to Moral Heaven"? A systematic reconstruction of stages of moral thinking based on a Piagetian "logic" of cognitive development

One of the main deficiencies of the Kohlberg theory is that it has never lived up to the claim of being a structural developmental theory. First of all, it has never been shown, what specific problems arise at each stage and how these are resolved at the following one (integrating all lower stages). The present approach tries to fill this gap by starting from an elaborated developmental logic, which is then applied to the field of moral thinking. Thus, stages are (re)constructed successively out of one another. This procedure, however, yields a new taxonomy of moral stages, the "architecture" of which is expounded in some detail in the present paper. This new approach has important implications for moral education, especially as it allows for fine-tuned moral-cognitive stimulation (a feature which is discussed in comparison with received ways of fostering moral development). The article ends with a discussion of what the new "stairway" means for Kohlbergian theory.     

Moral Reasoning and Homosexuality: The acceptability of arguments about lesbian and gay issues

In the political arena, lesbian and gay issues have been contested typically on grounds of human rights, but with variable success. Using a moral developmental framework, the purpose of this study was to explore preferences for different types of moral arguments when thinking about moral dilemmas around lesbian and gay issues. The analysis presented here comprised data collected from 545 students at UK universities who completed a questionnaire, part of which comprised a moral dilemma task. Findings of the study showed that respondents do not apply moral reasoning consistently, and do not (clearly) favour human rights reasoning when thinking about lesbian and gay issues. Respondents tended to favour reasoning supporting existing social structures and frameworks, therefore this study highlights the importance of structural change in effecting widespread attitude change in relation to lesbian and gay rights issues. The implications of the findings for moral education are also discussed.     

A longitudinal study of moral reasoning

Several issues concerning Gilligan's model of moral orientations and Kohlberg's models of moral stages and moral orientations were examined in a longitudinal study with 233 subjects (from 78 families) who ranged in age from 5 to 63 years. They participated in 2 identical interviews separated by a 2-year interval. In each interview, they discussed hypothetical dilemmas and a personally generated real-life dilemma, which were scored for both moral stage and moral orientation (both Gilligan's and Kohlberg's typologies). Results revealed few violations of the stage sequence over the longitudinal interval, supporting Kohlberg's moral stage model. Sex differences were almost completely absent for both Gilligan's and Kohlberg's moral orientations, although there were clear developmental trends. Hypothetical and real-life dilemmas elicited different moral orientations, especially in terms of Kohlberg's typology. The interrelations between the 2 models of moral orientations were generally weak, indicating that they are not synonymous.     

Moral Reasoning of Nigerian and Pakistani Muslim Adolescents

Abstract

Two studies were conducted to test the universality of Piaget's and Kohlberg's stages of the development of moral judgment in Nigerian and Pakistani cultures. For the first study, 120 Nigerian Muslim Hausa secondary school adolescents (60 boys and 60 girls), whose ages ranged between 14 and 16, were questioned individually about two of Piaget's moral judgment situations, representing two different moral attributes, clumsiness and equality. In the second study, 90 subjects (30 Nigerian Muslim Hausa, 30 Nigerian Muslim Yoruba, and 30 Pakistani Muslim Punjabi adolescents), whose ages ranged between 12 and 13, were questioned about one of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas. The nature of the subjects’ responses suggested that moral reasoning of Nigerian and Pakistani Muslim adolescents are greatly affected by their cultural values.     

In support of the cognitive‐developmental approach to moral education: a response to David Carr

This article examines real‐life moral conflicts from the perspective of the ethic of care. Fifty‐six (Time 1) and 57 (Time 2) real‐life dilemmas provided by students representing different fields of study were analysed in terms of level of care reasoning according to Skoe's Ethic of Care Interview. The results showed that antisocial temptation and transgression dilemmas tended to invoke lower levels of care reasoning than conflicting‐demands and social‐pressure dilemmas. Participants reporting temptation dilemmas had the least developed care reasoning. The results suggest that subjects identified at different care levels perceive different types of real‐life moral conflict, and that the function of care reasoning varies according to the type of moral conflict.     

The Application of Moral Judgments to Other Cultures: Relativism and Universality

This study examined how moral judgments are applied to events in other cultures. It was hypothesized that subjects make both universal and relativistic judgments, contingent on the types of beliefs held in the culture to which the moral judgments were applied. It was furthermore expected that subjects would be both relativists and universalists at all ages. 72 subjects (aged 11–9, 15–10, and 21–3 years) were asked to apply moral judgments which they had made about a familiar context to 2 types of cultures, 1 where different informational beliefs were held and 1 where different moral beliefs were held. The results confirmed the hypotheses. Most subjects, at all ages, contextualized their moral judgments when they applied them to cultures with different informational beliefs but made nonrelativistic judgments with respect to cultures with opposing moral beliefs. Furthermore, subjects justified their relativistic judgments on informational grounds and their nonrelativistic judgments on moral grounds. These findings demonstrated that nonrelativistic and relativistic thinking coexist throughout a wide age range and underscored the need to distinguish between moral and nonmoral relativism when studying developmental patterns in the moral domain.     

Developmental Level of Moral Judgment Influences Behavioral Patterns During Moral Decision-Making

Abstract

We developed and tested a behavioral version of the Defining Issues Test-1 revised (DIT-1r), which is a measure of the development of moral judgment. We conducted a behavioral experiment using the behavioral Defining Issues Test (bDIT) to examine the relationship between participants’ moral developmental status, moral competence, and reaction time when making moral judgments. We found that when the judgments were made based on the preferred moral schema, the reaction time for moral judgments was significantly moderated by the moral developmental status. In addition, as a participant becomes more confident with moral judgment, the participant differentiates the preferred versus other schemas better particularly when the participant’s abilities for moral judgment are more developed.     

The contribution of schools to moral development: A working paper in the theory of action

In what is essentially a working paper, an ideal typical and analytical concept of moral action is derived from the general theory of action. The concept is described in terms of the pattern-variable scheme, with moral action seen as involving the choices of affective neutrality, quality, universalism, and diffuseness. This model of moral action is then used to hypothesize an end state of moral development. The definition of this end state involves the specification of the analytical choices to the human condition, which is a given of all human action and the most universal point of reference for moral action in relation to human communities. The full development of moral action is thus seen to involve the capacity for involvement with others as whole persons; for relating to people in terms of their humanity; for respecting the moral autonomy and liberty of others; and for resolving moral issues by reasoning, which implies flexibility in relation to specific situations. A major part of the paper is devoted to an examination of some social structural features of schools, indicating the considerable extent to which schools ordinarily inhibit the development of such moral capacities in children.     

情绪与道德推理的关系研究

从认识论角度而言,道德推理属于认知阶段的高级形式。传统的认知理论认为情绪是道德思考的阻碍物,近年来研究表明情绪对道德推理有重要的推动作用。本文从自我意识情绪、移情以及情绪和认知三个方面探讨情绪和道德推理的关系,及其对道德教育的启示。     

Do negative mood states impact moral reasoning?

This paper presents three studies exploring the relationship between emotional responses to classic cognitive developmental moral dilemmas and moral reasoning indices as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT). Each study indicated that certain moral dilemmas elicit varying levels of anger and sadness as compared to a neutral baseline. In each study, decreased moral reasoning was observed in those instances where reports in both sadness and anger were high following a dilemma. This did not occur, however, in those instances where only sadness or anger was high following a dilemma. Affective inductions prior to taking the DIT (study 3) did not impact trends beyond that found for individual moral dilemmas in studies 1 and 2. Although certain dilemmas elicited affective states that temporarily influenced reasoning, in general participants’ reasoning levels stayed consistent across dilemmas. Results are discussed in terms of the role of affect on the moral judgment process.     

Kohl berg's Cognitive‐Developmental Theory in Educational Settings: Some Possible Abuses

Abstract

Kohlberg's cognitive‐developmental theory provides teachers with a framework for understanding the change and development of moral judgment and decision‐making of their pupils. One major abuse, however, may be when teachers take the stage labels associated with the hypothesized stage levels of moral judgment as indicative of static student qualities or characteristics, by placing more emphasis on perceived and labelled qualities than on the actual moral reasoning of the student. This, it is suggested, together with some empirical examples, may obscure the developmental trend of the student's moral judgment or even affect the teacher's expectations and consequently student's performance, and fails to take into account such factors as environment and interpersonal interaction. A study is reported in which curriculum consultants exposed to moral development theory were tested to determine whether they would use Kohlbergian labels of stage content or actual moral reasoning when required to make assessments. Suggestions are put forward as to how moral development theory can be more closely linked to pedagogy.     

Religious conviction,morality and social convention among Finnish adolescents

The assumptions of Kohlberg, Turiel and Shweder regarding the features of moral reasoning were compared empirically. The moral reasoning of Finnish Evangelical Lutheran, Conservative Laestadian and non‐religious adolescents was studied using Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview and Turiel Rule Transgression Interview methods. Religiosity and choice in moral dilemmas (orientation) were related to the structural stages of reasoning. The choice in moral dilemmas was related to the distinction between morality and social convention as separate domains. Religious participants made no distinction between morality and social convention, and their conception of morality was dependent on religious authorities. The implications of the results for moral education in schools are briefly discussed.     

The ethical claim of partiality: practical reasoning,the discipline,and teacher education

Practical reasoning refers to a teacher's capacity to discern particulars and make wise judgements about how to act in pedagogical situations. But how do teachers know what is right? How are teachers' preferences to be grounded and their choices justified? I explore the disciplines as one source of moral perception. Assuming that narrative unities underscore the coherence and continuity of an individual's experience, I generated data in the context of a 2‐year teacher education programme. The case study of an aspiring teacher of secondary school language arts illustrates how the intellectual virtues of a discipline can influence a student teacher's practical reasoning. I conclude that teacher educators must attend to the complex ways in which a prospective teacher's prior discipline may influence aspiring teachers' orientations to experience, their consideration of educational ends, and, finally, their characters.     

WHY ARE NONPROTOTYICAL EVENTS So DIFFICULT, AND WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL-DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY?

The findings of Turiel, Hildebrandt, and Wainryb's study of reasoning and judgement on nonprototypical issues that seem to span domains are discussed. Opinions were obtained from high school and college students on 1-4 nonprototypical issues (abortion, pornography, homosexuality, and incest), and compared with judgments and reasoning on 2-3 moral issues (killing, rape, and theft), and 1-3 personal issues (nudity at a public beach, smoking marijuana, and men wearing makeup). Those evaluating the nonprototypical issues negatively were placed in 1 group, and those positively in another group. The goal was to determine how opposite positions on nonprototypical issues related to judgments and reasonings on moral and personal issues. 5 explanations are given for nonprototypical thought which are based on Turiel and the author's constructs. 1) Issues like abortion and pornography are of a type where moral principles clash and lead to different judgments, and thus, require higher level moral principles. 2) The greater cognitive complexity of these nonprototypical issues yields domain differences which are manifestations of a decalage in judgement. 3) Nonprototypical issues may be ambiguous as to their proper moral, conventional, or personal category. Judgments are predictable once the proper category is made. Categories may be complex or ambiguous. 4)Ambiguity involves rational determinism, where reasoning on nonprototypical issues derives from the reasoner's understanding and interpretation of the situation, "social construals." 5)Complexity involves different supraordinate structures within which , e.g., morality and social convention operate. The results indicate that judgments on nonprototypical issues could not be predicted on moral or personal positions. The importance of this finding about how group and individual differences cannot be explained is in its exploration of the limits of moral theory and the preeminent need to place moral theory in a broader and deeper supraordinate context. Discussion is directed to fundamental organization of moral and social thought within which a developmental progression must operate, and a more comprehensive approach to the development of social thought. The research defines morality in the context of universal, rational, and absolute thought, which appeals to the author.     

Identifying mediating factors of moral reasoning in science education

The purpose of this research was to examine how science content knowledge, moral reasoning ability, attitudes, and past experiences mediate the formation of moral judgments on environmental dilemmas. The study was conducted in two phases using environmental science majors and nonscience majors of college age. Phase One determined if environmental science majors exhibited higher levels of moral reasoning on nontechnical environmental social issues than on general social issues and examined the extent to which possible mediating factors accounted for differences in moral reasoning. Phase Two was qualitative in nature, the purpose of which was to observe and identify trends in conversations between subjects as to how certain mediating factors are revealed as people form moral judgments. The framework on which this study was constructed incorporates a progressive educational position; a position that views science education as being interdisciplinary, and a social means to a social end.     

Examining the impact of prior academic achievement on moral reasoning development among college students: A growth curve analysis

Moral reasoning is concerned with making decisions regarding the appropriate course of action in particular situations and has been highlighted as a critical factor that may facilitate (or impede) the effectiveness of educational programs in promoting positive outcomes. This study examined the trajectories of moral reasoning as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT2) for college students and to what extent there are intra-individual (within student) and inter-individual (between student) changes in moral reasoning during this developmental period. The results suggest that moral reasoning was best represented by a linear increase on the mean level and non-signi?cant variability across students. The relationship between moral reasoning and students’ prior academic attainment was also examined.     

Parent and peer contexts for children's moral reasoning development

This study addressed the polarization among theoretical perspectives in moral psychology regarding the relative significance of parents and peers in children's developing moral maturity. The sample was composed of 60 target children from late childhood and midadolescence, 60 parents, and 60 friends who participated in parent/child and friend/child dyadic discussions of a series of moral conflicts. The quality of parents' and friends' verbal interactions, ego functioning, and level of moral reasoning in these discussions was used to predict the rate of children's moral reasoning development over a 4-year longitudinal interval. Results revealed that interactions with both parents and peers were predictive of children's development but that these two types of relationships influence development in rather different ways. Implications of the findings for the understanding of these socialization agents' roles in moral development are discussed.     

A Comparative Study of Moral Development of Korean and British Children

The present study explored Kohlberg's theory of moral development in relation to Korean and British children. A total of 128 Korean and British children aged 7-16 years were interviewed individually using Kohlberg's moral dilemmas, Form A. It was thought that the children in both cultural groups would develop moral stages at a similar rate. However, they showed cultural differences in the use of moral orientations. In addition, it was not possible to match some of the responses from the Korean children to Kohlberg's manual, implying that there are some Korean traditional concepts which affect Korean children's moral reasoning that Kohlberg was not aware of. Thus, Kohlberg's system could be used to examine children's general moral stage but was insufficient to understand fully Korean children's moral reasoning. The present study suggests that the interpretation of children's moral reasoning should be made based on consideration of cultural influence.