Children's understanding of moral emotions

4-8-year-old children's attributions of emotion to a story figure who violated a moral rule were studied in a series of experiments. Most 4-year-olds judged a wrongdoer to experience positive emotions, focusing their justifications on the successful outcome of his action, whereas almost all 8-year-olds attributed negative feelings, focusing on the moral value of the wrongdoer's action. A developmental trend from outcome-oriented toward morally oriented emotion attributions was also observed in children's judgments of the feelings of a story character who had resisted temptation. When morally evaluating a wrongdoer, only children above the age of 6 years took emotional reactions into account, judging a "happy" wrongdoer to be worse than a "sorry" one. 4- and 5-year-olds attributed positive emotions to a wrongdoer even if his transgression was severe and if he did not gain any material profit from it. However, they did not expect a person (even an ill-motivated one) to feel good if he or she unintentionally harmed another person or merely observed someone being hurt. These results are discussed in relation to recent research on children's developing conceptions of emotion and on the early development of moral understanding.     

Children's understanding of emotion in speech

Children's understanding of emotion in speech was explored in three experiments. In Experiment 1, 4- to 10-year-old children and adults (N = 165) judged the happiness or sadness of the speaker from cues conveyed by propositional content and affective paralanguage. When the cues conflicted (i.e., a happy situation was described with sad paralanguage), children relied primarily on content, in contrast to adults, who relied on paralanguage. There were gradual developmental changes from 4-year-olds' almost exclusive focus on content to adults' exclusive focus on paralanguage. Children of all ages exhibited greater response latencies to utterances with conflicting cues than to those with nonconflicting cues, indicating that they processed both sources of emotional information. Children accurately labeled the affective paralanguage when the propositional cues to emotion were obscured by a foreign language (Experiment 2, N = 20) or by low-pass filtering (Experiment 3, N = 60). The findings are consistent with children's limited understanding of the communicative functions of affective paralanguage.     

Children's understanding of familiar astronomical events

In this paper I describe the notions used by children aged 9‐16 years to account for a number of easily observed astronomical events. General features in the development of the notions are identified and historical parallels are noted.

The data presented come from a wider study intended to develop materials and approaches for teaching astronomy as part of the science curriculum of all pupils. An indication is given as to how the findings of the survey are being used in developing appropriate curriculum materials.     

Children's understanding of electric current in three countries

Conclusion This project was not conceived as a research study and clearly it would be dangerous to generalize from the small and atypical sample of children involved. Nor were the interviews as extended and probing as would be expected in a research study. Nevertheless it is of interest that, even in such a small sample, three of the models of electric current which Osborne has proposed have been identified in each country. The results may be taken as further evidence, however, weak, of the universality of children's conceptions of the world.     

What's the point? Children's understanding of didactic stories

When do children reliably understand that a simple narrative text such as a fable is conveying a point or moral lesson? What role does culture play in influencing understanding? These questions were explored in a cross-sectional sample of 192 children, aged 7, 9 and 11 years drawn from the two largest groups in Singapore, Chinese and Malays. During interviews the child participants were read traditional Aesop's, Chinese and Malay fables and manipulated fables and fable-like stories, and asked to identify and generate the points or morals. The sample and design of the study allowed for comparisons with similar American research. The evidence suggests that, as predicted, cultural background exerts a positive influence on this ability. A number of ethnic differences in response between the Chinese and Malays emerged and possible reasons for these are discussed.     

Children's understanding of the distinction between intentions and desires

Much of the previous research on children's understanding of intentions confounded intentions with desires. Intentions and desires are different, in that a desire can be satisfied in a number of ways, but an intention must be satisfied by carrying out the intended action. Children 3 through 7 years of age and adults were presented with situations in which intentions were satisfied but desires were not, or vice versa, in a story-comprehension task (N = 71) and a target-hitting game (N = 45). Although 3- and 4-year-olds were unable to differentiate desires and intentions consistently, 5- and 7-year-olds often matched the adult pattern. Younger children's difficulties in understanding intentions are discussed in terms of their use of a desire-outcome matching strategy and the representational complexities of intentions.     

Children's understanding of the distinction between real and apparent emotion

2 experiments examined children's understanding of the distinction between real and apparent emotion. In Experiment 1, 6- and 10-year-old children listened to stories in which it would be appropriate for the story protagonist to feel either a positive or negative emotion but to hide that emotion. Subjects were asked to say both how the protagonist would look and how the protagonist would really feel, and to justify their claims. The results indicated that 6- and 10-year-olds alike could distinguish quite accurately between real and apparent emotion, although 10-year-olds were somewhat better at justifying this distinction. In Experiment 2, a slightly modified procedure was used to test 4- and 6-year-olds. Again, 6-year-olds demonstrated their grasp of the difference between real and apparent emotion, and even 4-year-olds showed a limited grasp of the distinction. The findings are discussed in relation to recent research concerning children's concept of mind, their grasp of the appearance-reality distinction, their ability to produce complex, embedded justifications, and their ideas about emotion.     

Children's understanding of the implications of causal attributions for emotional experiences

Children's perceptions of how the cause of achievement outcomes affects individuals' emotional responses were studied. In Study 1, children aged 6 and 7, 9 and 10, and 12 and 13 listened to stories describing hypothetical children's achievement outcomes. Success and failure were explicitly attributed to luck, ability, effort, or another person's intervention. After each story subjects rated the story child's emotional reactions. Only seventh graders associated pride and shame exclusively with outcomes attributed to ability and effort. Guilt was strongly associated with effort attributions, and surprise was associated with luck attributions for fourth- and seventh-grade children but not for first-grade children. The attribution-affect linkages assumed by the older children are the same as those found in previous studies of adults. In Study 2, children aged 6 and 7, 9 and 10, and 12 and 13 rated the cause of the outcomes in the same stories according to Weiner's controllability and locus dimensions. Children's placement of specific attributions on these dimensions was used to explain age differences in their beliefs about the effect of the attributions on emotional responses.     

Children's long-term reactions to participating in sociometric assessment

Fifth-grade children completed a positive- and negative-peer nomination technique during the last week of school and were subsequently assigned to peer status groups of Average, Controversial, Neglected, Popular, Rejected, and Other. Following summer vacation and return to school, 45 of the subjects (now sixth graders) were individually interviewed to assess their reactions to the sociometric procedures. As many as one third of the subjects indicated that they had discussed the measures with their peers, in spite of directions not to do so. Subjects liked participating in the sociometric procedures, although they liked the negative nomination technique significantly less than any of the other measures. Comments about the nomination techniques were analyzed by peer status group; no evidence of reactions indicative of harm was revealed. Directions for future research are discussed. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Children's reactions to sex abuse investigation and litigation

This investigation attempted to begin to quantify the extent to which children are helped or further victimized by sex abuse investigation and litigation procedures. Although there is virtually no research on the subject, frequent assumptions have been made that these procedures often further victimize children. Significant changes in state legislation have and are being considered which would protect victims from further victimization. A child victim questionnaire was sent to the presidents of all area child abuse and neglect councils in the state of Iowa as well as to other personnel working with sexually abused children. The somewhat surprising findings revealed that of the 48 questionnaires returned only approximately 21% of the victims perceived that the questioning and investigation was harmful, while approximately 53% saw it as helpful. Other analyses found that ratings of helpfulness were not correlated with the age of the victim, the presence of a supportive adult during questioning, the number of abuse incidents, whether or not the interviews were videotaped, and whether or not the perpetrator was a family member. Testifying in court and high numbers of interviewers were associated with more negative ratings. The limitations and implications of the results are discussed along with suggestions for future research.     

Children's probability intuitions: understanding the expected value of complex gambles

Two experiments used Information Integration Theory to study how children judge expected value of complex gambles in which alternative outcomes have different prizes. Six-year-olds, 9-year-olds and adults (N = 73 in Study 1, N = 28 in Study 2) saw chance games that involved shaking a marble in a bicolored tube. One prize was won if the marble stopped on blue, another if it stopped on yellow. Children judged how happy a puppet playing the game would be, with the prizes and probability of the blue and yellow outcomes varied factorially. Three main results appeared in both studies: First, participants in all age groups used the normatively prescribed multiplication rule for integrating probability and value of each individual outcome--a striking finding because multiplicative reasoning does not usually appear before 8 years of age in other domains. Second, all age groups based judgment of overall expected value meaningfully on both alternative outcomes, but there were individual differences--many participants deviated from the normative addition rule, showing risk seeking and risk averse patterns of judgment similar to the risk attitudes often found with adults. Third, even the youngest children took probability to be an abstract rather than physical property of the game. Overall, in contrast to the traditional view, the present results demonstrate functional understanding of probability and expected value in children as young as 5 or 6. These results contribute to the growing evidence on children's intuitive reasoning competence. This intuition can, on the one hand, support surprisingly precocious performance in young children, but it may also contribute to the biases evident in adults' judgment and decision.     

Children's understanding of substances,part 1: recognizing chemical change

Arising from a study which explored the development children's concept of a substance (ages 11-14), this two-part paper focuses on the idea of chemical change. Part one considers substance identity and pupils' interaction with the scientific idea of melting and boiling behaviour as a means for identification and the assessment of purity. Evidence is presented which suggests that children do not 'naturally' have a concept of substance identity which allows them to recognize chemical change as a possibility. Instead, their thinking is in terms of the history of samples. The scientific idea of identity led to a confrontation with the idea of chemical change but the pupils were unwilling to accept this phenomenon. The preference was to view the product of a chemical change as a 'mix' of the original substances rather than as a substance in its own right. Implications for teaching are discussed. Part two (in press) goes on to examine the issue of explaining chemical change.     

Children's understanding of substances,Part 2: Explaining chemical change

This is the second part of a paper which focuses on the idea of chemical change (see Johnson 2000). The reported data comes from a study which explored the development of children's concept of a substance (ages 11-14). It examines the use of the ideas of elements, compounds and the bonding between atoms to explain chemical change and the intersection of these ideas with 'basic' particle ideas. Evidence is presented which suggests that the particle ideas were the means by which the pupils came to acknowledge the phenomenon of chemical change, having been unmoved by a macroscopic approach which identified substances by melting and boiling point. Furthermore, a basic particle model in which individual particles still retained the macroscopic properties of the substance was found to inhibit an understanding of chemical change. Findings with respect to a burning candle are reported in a separate section. Important implications for teaching are discussed.     

Children's suggestibility in relation to their understanding about sources of knowledge

In the experiments reported here, children chose either to maintain their initial belief about an object's identity or to accept the experimenter's contradicting suggestion. Both 3- to 4-year-olds and 4- to 5-year-olds were good at accepting the suggestion only when the experimenter was better informed than they were (implicit source monitoring). They were less accurate at recalling both their own and the experimenter's information access (explicit recall of experience), though they performed well above chance. Children were least accurate at reporting whether their final belief was based on what they were told or on what they experienced directly (explicit source monitoring). Contrasting results emerged when children decided between contradictory suggestions from two differentially informed adults: Three- to 4-year-olds were more accurate at reporting the knowledge source of the adult they believed than at deciding which suggestion was reliable. Decision making in this observation task may require reflective understanding akin to that required for explicit source judgments when the child participates in the task.     

Children's understanding of representational change and its relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance-reality distinction

This research concerns the development of children's understanding of representational change and its relation to other cognitive developments. Children were shown deceptive objects, and the true nature of the objects was then revealed. Children were then asked what they thought the object was when they first saw it, testing their understanding of representational change; what another child would think the object was, testing their understanding of false belief; and what the object looked like and really was, testing their understanding of the appearance-reality distinction. Most 3-year-olds answered the representational change question incorrectly. Most 5-year-olds did not make this error. Children's performance on the representational change question was poorer than their performance on the false-belief question. There were correlations between performance on all 3 tasks. Apparently children begin to be able to consider alternative representations of the same object at about age 4.     

Children's interpretations of covariation data: Explanations reveal understanding of relevant comparisons

This research investigates children's understanding of the significance of comparisons between data categories for judgments of covariation. Past studies showed that children sometimes neglect some of the relevant data categories. This may occur because children fail to understand the relevance of the comparisons between data categories. To investigate this interpretation, 51 second graders and 43 fourth graders were tested in a between-subject design. In the standard condition, children were asked to explain their own covariation judgments. In the explain-correct condition, children were told the correct judgments and asked to explain them. Children in the explain-correct condition often provided explanations that were consistent with the correct judgments; children in the standard condition did so less often. Thus, when asked to explain correct judgments, elementary school children's explanations reveal that they possess a basic conceptual understanding of inference from covariation data.     

Children's aesthetic understanding of photographic art and the quality of art-related parent-child interactions

This research was designed to examine the quality of children's aesthetic understanding of photographs, observe social interactions between parents and children in this aesthetic domain, and study whether qualitatively different dyadic interactions were associated with children's own aesthetic understanding. Parents and children (7-13 years; 40 dyads) individually completed measures of aesthetic understanding and jointly selected photographs for a souvenir scrapbook. Parents' artistic experience varied widely and was associated with their own performance on aesthetic understanding measures. Children's performance on the individual aesthetic tasks was related to age, but not to parents' art experience nor to the qualities of parent-child discussions of aesthetic concepts. Among both parents and children, artistic experience was associated with aesthetic preferences for photographs.     

Children's understanding of the commutativity and complement principles: A latent profile analysis

This study examined patterns of individual differences in the acquisition of the knowledge of the commutativity and complement principles in 115 five-to six-year-old children and explored the role of concrete materials in helping children understand the prinicples. On the basis of latent profile analysis, four groups of children were identified: The first group succeeded in commutativity tasks with concrete materials but in no other tasks; the second succeeded in commutativity tasks in both concrete and abstract conditions, but not in complement tasks; the third group succeeded in all commutativity tasks and in complement tasks with concrete materials, and the final group succeeded in all the tasks. The four groups of children suggest a developmental trend – (1) Knowledge of the commutativity and of the complement principles seems to develop from thinking in the context of specific quantities to thinking about more abstract symbols; (2) There may be an order of understanding of the principles – from the commutativity to the complement principle; (3) Children may acquire the knowledge of the commutativity principle in the more abstract tasks before they start to acquire the knowledge of the complement principle. This study contributes to the literature by showing that assessing additive reasoning in different ways and identifying profiles with classification analyses may be useful for educators to understand more about the developmental stage where each child is placed. It appears that a more fine-grained assessment of additive reasoning can be achieved by incorporating both concrete materials and relatively abstract symbols in the assessment.