Constructivism: Sound theory for explicating the practice of science and science teaching

Critics praise applications of constructivism in science pedagogy, but they argue that constructivism is severely impaired and hopelessly flawed as a theory. Flawed theory should not be employed to explain innovative practice. My purposes are twofold. First and foremost, I present a case to support my own and others' assertions that constructivism is a sound theory with which to explain the practice of science and science pedagogy. In accomplishing my primary purpose, I also fulfill my secondary purpose, to respond to constructivism's critics. My argument is presented in three parts. In Part 1, I delineate the epistemological ground with a brief synopsis of the purpose, nature, and orientation of radical and social constructivism. I then offer a synthesis of their foundations. In Part 2, I offer a constructivist account of five long-standing epistemological issues, including truth, solipsism, experience, instrumentalism, and relativity. Truth is the center piece of the argument, and I show how constructivism avoids the root paradox by embracing truth as coherence. Next, constructivism is shown to be a rejection of solipsism. Then, an account of experience based in neurophysiological theory, emergent properties, and the brain as a parallel data-processing organ is provided to support constructivism's inside-out view of experience, in which meaning making occurs within individual minds and in communities of individuals. In the final segment of Part 2, I present a constructivist account of relativity which focuses on physicists' acceptance of relativity, its translation to constructivist epistemology, and constructivists' request for silence regarding ontology. Response to critics' objections are also presented at appropriate points throughout Part 2. In the third part, I present constructivism as an epistemological foundation for a cybernetic perspective of knowing. I then summarize the value of constructivism in explaining and interpreting the practice of science and science pedagogy. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 35: 501–520, 1998.     

From Constructivism to a Pragmatist Conception of Learning

This paper contributes to the debate on constructivist learning theory. We contrast the constructivist notion of activity that identifies 'active' with 'conscious' and 'intentional' with John Dewey's habitual conception of action, knowing and learning by doing. As regards language and truth, we defend an anti-representationalist conception that sees words as tools of communication and coordination rather than representations reflecting reality. To compare our Deweyan pragmatist conception of learning with contemporary viewpoints associated with constructivism, we examine and criticise the notions of 'knowledge building' and 'metacognition'. Finally, we consider what Deweyan ideas about learning and growth might mean for education in the twenty-first century.     

HOW CAN SCIENCE HELP US CARE FOR NATURE? HERMENEUTICS,FRAGILITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EARTH

In this review essay, Clarence Joldersma argues for a novel role for science in developing an affirmative answer to his title question, “How can science help us care for nature?” He does so in dialogue with Clare Palmer's edited volume, Teaching Environmental Ethics, Dirk Postma's Why Care for Nature? and Michael Bonnett's Retrieving Nature. Joldersma suggests that although each book can help address the issue of how to teach students to care for nature, he parts company with their stance that we must go beyond science to develop a metaphysics of nature adequate to the task. Relying on the same Heideggerian framework as Postma and Bonnett, Joldersma comes to a different assessment of the role of science. He does so by arguing for a hermeneutic understanding of science as social practice and by claiming that science so construed can disclose the planet as earth (in the later Heidegger's sense), for which we owe thanks. This disclosure reveals earth as that which is fragile and for which we are responsible.     

Education,Illusions and Valuable Fictions

Saul Smilansky's Illusionism suggests that some false beliefs are important enough to warrant the indefinite perpetuation of illusions in order to protect the larger moral community from breaking down. In this article I suggest that this position actualises an old educational paradox where education is expected to protect the common moral community (even if this means maintaining some illusions), and at the same time promote the pursuit of truth. Taking Smilansky's position of Illusionism as a starting point, I argue that while Illusionism highlights and addresses an important problem—that sometimes false beliefs can function to maintain social stability where the truth threatens to unsettle it—relying on indefinite illusions is problematic from an educational point of view. It is difficult to justify that education, being at least in part motivated by truth-seeking, should (or even could) be grounded in illusion. Taking seriously the fact that a dimension of education concerns maintaining social stability, I suggest that Spinoza's notion of fiction can complement Smilansky's view in that it can be conceived in terms of an instrument for maintaining social stability and promoting truth-seeking without assuming that one end is pursued at the expense of the other.     

An Essay for Educators: Epistemological Realism Really is Common Sense

“What is truth?” Pontius Pilot asked Jesus of Nazareth. For many educators today this question seems quaintly passé. Rejection of “truth” goes hand-in-hand with the rejection of epistemological realism. Educational thought over the last decade has instead been dominated by empiricist, anti-realist, instrumentalist epistemologies of two types: first by psychological constructivism and later by social constructivism. Social constructivism subsequently has been pressed to its logical conclusion in the form of relativistic multiculturalism. Proponents of both psychological constructivism and social constructivism value knowledge for its utility and eschew as irrelevant speculation any notion that knowledge is actually about reality. The arguments are largely grounded in the discourse of science and science education where science is “western” science; neither universal nor about what is really real. The authors defended the notion of science as universal in a previous article. The present purpose is to offer a commonsense argument in defense of critical realism as an epistemology and the epistemically distinguished position of science (rather than privileged) within a framework of epistemological pluralism. The paper begins with a brief cultural survey of events during the thirty-year period from 1960–1990 that brought many educators to break with epistemological realism and concludes with comments on the pedagogical importance of realism. Understanding the cultural milieu of the past forty years is critical to understanding why traditional philosophical attacks on social constructivist ideas have proved impotent defenders of scientific realism.     

A critique of John Hattie’s theory of Visible Learning

In this paper, I work out a five-stringed criticism of John Hattie’s theory of Visible Learning. First, I argue that the theory is a theory of evaluation that denies education as such. Second, I show that there are problems with the dependent variable, learning, i.e. the effect of a given intervention. Thirdly, I show that Hattie's theory belongs to the radical constructivist paradigm. Thus, the problems of constructivism, i.e. problems of normativity and the outside world, walks directly into Hattie’s concept of teaching, resulting in a double breakdown of the essence of teaching. Fourth, I argue that Hattie’s concept of feedback has a centralizing trend which ultimately has the potential to transform the country’s educational activities into a big hierarchical and data-driven organism. Finally, I show that Hattie’s reference to Karl Popper’s theory of “three worlds” is based on a highly problematic reading, where Popper’s objective world is reduced to a subset of a radical subjectivity.     

真理与科学实在论的方法辩护

科学实在论至今仍是世界科学哲学界热烈争论的一个主题。科学实在论与反实在论所争论的焦点之一是,科学理论对不可观察的理论实体的描述是真实的或者只是一种为“拯救现象”而做的虚设。面对反实在论的非难,科学实在论者提出一些辩护策略,其中之一就是成功论证。基于对科学实在论与反实在论各自的立场的分析,我们提出确认科学理论真理性的进步评价法观点,认为当我们拥有的假说为真时,这种方法会让我们渐渐确认这点;当我们拥有的假说为似真时,这种方法会让我们改进这假说,使之向真理的方向进步;当我们拥有的假说为假时,这种方法会让我们将它排除。运用这种方法,能够使我们的科学探究活动朝着越来越趋真的方向迈进和发展,从而让我们逐步揭示未知的知识,由此而对科学实在论进行方法辩护。     

Elementary teaming: Learning improvement or administrative ploy

Trends suggest that homeschooling continues to increase among black families. Yet, research on contemporary Black homeschooling remains scarce. Given black educational history, the phenomena of Black families choosing homeschooling over public and private schools in the post-Desegregation era is worthy of investigation. Further, documenting the ways in which black homeschool families engage their children in learning will inform the needs of black education in conventional schools, public and private. The phenomenon of increasing black home education represents a radical transformative act of self-determination, the likes of which have not been witnessed since the 1960s and ‘70s. This work highlights the primacy of agency among black homeschooling families. Thus, contrary to the negative depictions of black families as disengaged from the educational pursuits of their children, we evoke hooks's (1990) notion of homeplace to argue that black home education represents a vehicle of resistance to institutionalized racism and ideological mismatches between black families and their children's educational needs.     

Earth Juts into World: An Earth Ethics for Ecologizing Philosophy of Education

Philosophers of education often focus their critique on issues such as neoliberalism, consumerism, pluralism, and so on, and they typically turn for solutions to what we might call the political: democracy, the public, cosmopolitanism, dissent. These critiques and solutions remain firmly connected to what Heidegger calls “the world,” and this worldly analysis seemingly hovers above earthly issues of the environment and ecology. In this article, Clarence Joldersma employs Martin Heidegger's distinction between earth and world, drawing on Kelly Oliver's interpretation of it, to “ecologize” philosophy of education by arguing that that earth “juts” into the world. Philosophy of education needs a Derridean supplement, something that makes up for a lack, but that, in filling the lack, simultaneously supplants it. Joldersma invites philosophy of education to supplement its worldly principles (dissent, democracy, and the like) with an “earth ethics” that is characterized by three features. First, this ethics lets the earth and earthlings be, recognizing their continuing mystery as beings. Second, it acknowledges gratefulness toward the earth, an indebtedness to the earth for the reliable support it provides to our worldly projects and concerns. Third, it recognizes earth's fundamental fragility, that its seeming worldly dependability conceals an earthly vulnerability. Joldersma concludes that these three features, in tandem, give rise to an earthly ethics of responsibility. Philosophy of education needs an earth ethics to supplement, if not supplant, its worldly principles.     

‘It's the end of the university as we know it (and I feel fine)’: the Generation Y student in higher education discourse

This paper examines discussions of Generation Y within higher education discourse, arguing the sector's use of the term to describe students is misguided for three reasons. First, portraying students as belonging to Generation Y homogenises people undertaking higher education as young, middle-class and technologically literate. Second, speaking of Generation Y students allows constructivism to be reinvented as a ‘new’ learning and teaching philosophy. Third, the Generation Y university student has become a central figure in concerns about technology's role in learning and teaching. While the notion of the ‘Generation Y student’ creates the illusion that higher education institutions understand their constituents, ultimately, it is of little value in explaining young adults' educational experiences.     

A place for organisational critical consciousness: comparing two case studies of Freirean nonprofits

One of the primary goals of Freirean theory is the achievement of a higher level of political and social consciousness amongst participants in educational programming. Freire himself only loosely defined this sense of consciousness, and interpretations of how this abstract concept might look vary widely. In some organisations, the politically radical goals of Freirean facilitators do not match the desired outcomes of participants. Other organisations may use Freirean methods to pursue their programming, but without subscribing to Freire's revolutionary educational project. This article provides case study examples of both extremes in Brazil and Mozambique, concluding with the argument that applying Freire's notion of critical consciousness organisationally can help to make sense of the diversity of interpretation among Freirean nonprofits.     

Power/Knowledge for Educational Theory: Stephen Ball and the Reception of Foucault

This paper explores the significance of the concept of power/knowledge in educational theory. The argument proceeds in two main parts. In the first, I consider aspects of Stephen J. Ball's highly influential work in educational theory. I examine his reception of Foucault's concept of power/knowledge and suggest that there are problems in his adoption of Foucault's thought. These problems arise from the way that he settles interpretations into received ideas. Foucault's thought, I try to show, is not to be seen in a confined way. In the second part, I seek a different reading of Foucault's notion of power/knowledge in order to break with this tendency to confine, referring to the work of Gilles Deleuze. I draw particularly on Deleuze's thought of the outside as a means of manifesting the significance of power/knowledge in relation to processes of subjectification. At the end of the paper, I suggest how educational theory might be reconceived in the light of potencies of power/knowledge that the paper has demonstrated.     

Cognitive schema theory in the constructivist debate

Cognitive constructivism is not a unique theoretical framework, pedagogical approach, or epistemology, but a general, metaphorical assumption about the nature of cognition that virtually all cognitive educational researchers accept. Despite this unifying assumption, there are many different cognitive constructivist research programs and theories within the community at large. This article contrasts cognitive constructivism with several other forms of constructivism in the educational research community. It then attempts to represent the range of theoretical approaches within cognitive constructivism, pointing to examples and potential educational applications of cognitive constructivist ideas. Cognitive schema theory receives special attention as an important theoretical perspective that has been relatively neglected in recent theoretical discussions. It is believed to have significant potential for building conceptual bridges between information processing and radical constructivist viewpoints.     

Constructivist research in educational technology: A retrospective view and future prospects

Along with a socially urgent impetus for revolutionary reform of an educational environment appropriate to the 21st century society, constructivism is highlighted in various fields related to education as an alternative educational ideology and approach. Despite its radical shift from traditional learning environments, and the diverse interpretation and understanding among scholars on the nature of constructivism, constructivism surely has brought out meaningful changes and developments in understanding how people learn. In light of this context, the present study aims to retrospectively review the last decade of constructivism, which will be followed by a brief prospective on its future in the next decade, simultaneously taking into account expectations as to how constructivism can stand firm as a theoretical basis for the digital age.     

Growing Roots and Becoming Interested: Teaching about the World through Exemplarity

The discussion of the power of the teacher's voice is raging again in light of the standardisation of education and the emergence of testing as the new regime of truth in educational processes. In confrontation with this paradigm, Jasinki and Lewis have raised pertinent questions regarding the role of language and the voice of the teacher. By highlighting what they coin the time of ritualised learning they expose how even when the teacher becomes almost surplus in the face of standardised curriculum and adaptive testing, there is a reproductive power being ‘cursed’ at our children. By introducing the notion of communities of infancy, Jasinski and Lewis point to another way of conceptualising learning and education, where the teacher portrays love for the children and not the truth about the world. In this article, I will argue that even in their very enticing argumentation for speaking silence, something goes missing. What goes missing is the quintessential component of the school, namely the world as it is ‘handed over’ to the children. By turning to a perhaps unlikely couple in the form of Hannah Arendt and Martin Wagenschein I will attempt to complement the framework of Jasinski and Lewis with a world that can be spoken about by teachers and students. Through a re-introduction of the notion of exemplarity I will present a didactic framework where the teacher's voice does not become a curse, but retains the possibility of representing a world to the children in the activity of schooling.     

The conflict between science and religion: a discussion on the possibilities for settlement

In his article Skepticism, truth as coherence, and construtivist epistemology: grounds for resolving the discord between science and religion?, John Staver identifies what he considers to be the source of the conflicts between science and religion: the establishment of the relationship between truth and knowledge, from the perspective of those who see a correspondence between reality and knowledge, assumed in the realm of both contending fields. In the present work, although agreeing with the general principles of constructivism, I discuss Staver’s option of viewing truth as coherence and his proposal of renouncing the objective of knowing reality from both fields’ perspective. Three aspects of Staver’s article are commented and discussed here: the one referring to views of reality or of nature as shared by scientists; the one concerning the different forms of religious beliefs among scientists; and the one accounting for the impossibility, from the standpoint of constructivism, of determining limits to the objectives of science and religion. Also emphasized in this discussion is the importance of combining theoretical and methodological approaches in tune with the complexity of the theme under discussion, accounting for the need to preserve the freedom of thinking and of doing research.     

On the Historical and Ideal Nature of Human Rights: reading Human Rights and Human Diversity by A.J.M.Milne

Taking as its exegetic point of departure Peirce's outline of a semiotic theory of cognition from the mid 1890s, this paper explores the relevance of this outline to a theory of learning and also to a broader, normative vision of education. Firstly, besides providing for fallibilism in philosophical inquiry Peirce's outline accords with critical strategies of his fellow pragmatists, such as William James's detection of the ‘psychologist's fallacy’ and John Dewey's rejection of the ‘philosophical fallacy’. It is pointed out that this merit of Peirce's outline is due to his abstract and often neglected notion of a prespecialised scientific intelligence. Secondly, the paper shows that Peirce's semiotic approach to prescientific learning processes conditioning all kinds of theoretical activity may indeed complement James's and Dewey's contributions: giving careful attention to the work of linguistic and paralinguistic signs in such learning processes Peirce's analysis captures indexical and iconic aspects, as well as symbolic aspects of linguistic interaction and experientially constrained dialogue. Following Peirce's analysis the paper considers how the iconicity of linguistic structure, ostensive acts and the practical situatedness of language use are pre‐conditions of experiential learning in every day life as well as in scientific learning. It is also shown how this semiotic analysis is connected with Peirce's important notion of abduction. Finally, it is pointed out that a broader vision of education may issue from Peirce's semiotic analysis and that such a vision would emphasise that the life experience of individuals entering educational institutions should be made to bear on the objectives as well as the teaching practices of educational institutions.     

Antecedent Recognition: Some Problematic Educational Implications of the Very Notion

Contemporary recognition theory based on Axel Honneth's foundational work is a well‐established research programme that is highly relevant also for philosophy of education. However, some of Honneth's own relatively recent writings on pathologies of recognition, and especially on the notion of antecedent recognition threaten to undermine the carefully built systematic foundations of the theory. These developments also problematise the educational significance that recognition theory in its previously established form arguably has. In this paper, I will analyse and critically evaluate some of the educational implications of the very notion of antecedent recognition as discussed by Honneth. As my overall conclusion, I will argue that because of its unclear nature, the notion of antecedent recognition is highly problematic, and therefore, has questionable value for the philosophy of education. Although the discussion here focuses on Honneth, what is fundamentally at stake is a more general issue regarding capabilities and their preconditions. Honneth's conceptualisations and arguments represent particular types of moves in this educationally relevant discussion. Therefore, the conclusions drawn also have wider systematic significance beyond Honneth scholarship.     

Icarus Falling: Re‐Imagining Educational Theory

This article offers a critique of the notion of ‘capacity building’ in educational theory. Are the intentions behind the latter enterprise as benign and altruistic as they first appear? How is the term ‘capacity building’ to be understood? The article presents a radical and daring alternative for re‐invigorating educational research that foregrounds the ethical engagement of the researcher by exploring the expressive, cognitive and imaginative possibilities of language. Drawing on the Calvino's idea of the ‘lightness of thoughtfulness’, I suggest that the emphasis accorded to the notion of ‘capacity building’ may detract attention from the equally significant role of incapacity in helping us to move the discussion forward in a responsive and ethical way.