Computer ethics: Future directions

Changes in information technologylead to new topics and new emphases in computerethics. The present article examines a varietyof such issues, and argues that computer ethicsmust become more rigorous and develop astronger theoretical base. The articleconcludes with a discussion of ways to makecomputer ethics more effective in bringinghelpful changes to the world.     

Computer ethics: Its birth and its future

This article discusses some``historical milestones' in computer ethics, aswell as two alternative visions of the futureof computer ethics. Topics include theimpressive foundation for computer ethics laiddown by Norbert Wiener in the 1940s and early1950s; the pioneering efforts of Donn Parker,Joseph Weizenbaum and Walter Maner in the1970s; Krystyna Gorniak's hypothesis thatcomputer ethics will evolve into ``globalethics'; and Deborah Johnson's speculation thatcomputer ethics may someday ``disappear'.     

Post-September 11: Computers, ethics and war

This paper considers the moralresponsibility of computer scientists withrespect to weapons development in post-911America. It does so by looking at the doctrineof jus in bello as exemplified in fourscenarios. It argues that the traditionaldoctrine should be augmented by a number ofprinciples, including the Principle of aMorally Obligatory Smart Arms Race, thePrinciple of Assistance to One's Enemies, thePrinciple of Public Debate on Weapons of MassDisruption, and the Principle of the MoralUnjustifiability of Private Wars.     

Information ethics: On the philosophical foundation of computer ethics

The essential difficulty about Computer Ethics' (CE) philosophical status is a methodological problem: standard ethical theories cannot easily be adapted to deal with CE-problems, which appear to strain their conceptual resources, and CE requires a conceptual foundation as an ethical theory. Information Ethics (IE), the philosophical foundational counterpart of CE, can be seen as a particular case of “environmental” ethics or ethics of the infosphere. What is good for an information entity and the infosphere in general? This is the ethical question asked by IE. The answer is provided by a minimalist theory of deseerts: IE argues that there is something more elementary and fundamental than life and pain, namely being, understood as information, and entropy, and that any information entity is to be recognised as the centre of a minimal moral claim, which deserves recognition and should help to regulate the implementation of any information process involving it. IE can provide a valuable perspective from which to approach, with insight and adequate discernment, not only moral problems in CE, but also the whole range of conceptual and moral phenomena that form the ethical discourse.     

论传统伦理的科学理性思维

当代的环境问题固然是近代工业文明资本主义工业化的恶果,但其深层原因却是传统伦理中的传统科学理性思维。传统伦理观念否认人与自然间存在伦理关系,体现的是人类中心主义的思维方式。     

Mapping the foundationalist debate in computer ethics

The paper provides a critical review of thedebate on the foundations of Computer Ethics(CE). Starting from a discussion of Moor'sclassic interpretation of the need for CEcaused by a policy and conceptual vacuum, fivepositions in the literature are identified anddiscussed: the ``no resolution approach',according to which CE can have no foundation;the professional approach, according to whichCE is solely a professional ethics; the radicalapproach, according to which CE deals withabsolutely unique issues, in need of a uniqueapproach; the conservative approach, accordingto which CE is only a particular appliedethics, discussing new species of traditionalmoral issues; and the innovative approach,according to which theoretical CE can expandthe metaethical discourse with a substantiallynew perspective. In the course of the analysis,it is argued that, although CE issues are notuncontroversially unique, they are sufficientlynovel to render inadequate the adoption ofstandard macroethics, such as Utilitarianismand Deontologism, as the foundation of CE andhence to prompt the search for a robust ethicaltheory. Information Ethics (IE) is proposed forthat theory, as the satisfactory foundation forCE. IE is characterised as a biologicallyunbiased extension of environmental ethics,based on the concepts of information object/infosphere/entropy rather thanlife/ecosystem/pain. In light of the discussionprovided in this paper, it is suggested that CEis worthy of independent study because itrequires its own application-specific knowledgeand is capable of supporting a methodologicalfoundation, IE.     

Information ethics in the context of smart devices

In this paper, we employ Extended Cognition as a background for a series of thought experiments about privacy and common used information technology devices. Laptops and smart phones are now widely used devices, but current privacy standards do not adequately address the relationship between the owners of these devices and the information stored on them. Law enforcement treats laptops and smart phones are potential sources of information about criminal activity, but this treatment ignores the use of smart devices as extensions of users’ cognitive capability. In Philosophy of Mind, Extended Cognition is a metaphysical theory about the relationship between consciousness or cognitive activity and various external tools or aids that agents employ in the service of cognition. Supporters of Extended Cognition argue that mental activity must be understood as taking place both within the brain and by way of tools such as a logician’s pen and paper, a mathematician’s calculator, or a writer’s word processing program. While Extended Cognition does not have universal support among philosophers of mind, the theory nevertheless describes how agents interact with their “smart devices.” We explore the the implications of taking Extended Cognition seriously with regard to privacy concerns by way of a series of thought experiments. By comparing the differences in expectations of privacy between a citizen and the government, between an employee of a corporate firm, and between citizens alone, we show that expectations of privacy and injury are significantly affected by taking the cognitive role of smart devices into account.     

2008的中国与世界

2008年,联合国原副秘书长,中国联合国协会会长陈健同志在某重点大学做了关于国际形势的报告,引起了很大的反响,经陈会长同意,本刊将他的演讲稿发表,供关心国际形势的读者参阅。     

The relationship between the uniqueness of computer ethics and its independence as a discipline in applied ethics

A number of different uniquenessclaims have been made about computer ethics inorder to justify characterizing it as adistinct subdiscipline of applied ethics. Iconsider several different interpretations ofthese claims and argue, first, that none areplausible and, second, that none provideadequate justification for characterizingcomputer ethics as a distinct subdiscipline ofapplied ethics. Even so, I argue that computerethics shares certain important characteristicswith medical ethics that justifies treatingboth as separate subdisciplines of appliedethics.     

Machines and the face of ethics

In this article I try to show in what sense Emmanuel Levinas’ ‘ethics as first philosophy’ moves our ethical thinking away from what has been called ‘centrist ethics’. Proceeding via depictions of the structure of Levinasian ethics and including references to examples as well as to some empirical research, I try to argue that human beings always already find themselves within an ethical universe, a space of meaning. Critically engaging with the writings of David Gunkel and Lucas Introna, I try to argue that these thinkers, rather than clarifying, distort our ethical understanding of how we stand in relation to artefacts. Drawing a distinction between how pervasive our ethical relationship to other human beings, and living animals, is and how the nature of artefacts is tied to us, I conclude by indicating that the aspiration to give artefacts an ethical face suggests a fantasy to avoid ethical responsibility and generates what I call a ‘compensatory logic’.