The Development of Selective Copying: Children's Learning From an Expert Versus Their Mother

This study tested the prediction that, with age, children should rely less on familiarity and more on expertise in their selective social learning. Experiment 1 (N = 50) found that 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds copied the technique their mother used to extract a prize from a novel puzzle box, in preference to both a stranger and an established expert. This bias occurred despite children acknowledging the expert model's superior capability. Experiment 2 (N = 50) demonstrated a shift in 7‐ to 8‐year‐olds toward copying the expert. Children aged 9–10 years did not copy according to a model bias. The findings of a follow‐up study (N = 30) confirmed that, instead, they prioritized their own—partially flawed—causal understanding of the puzzle box.     

Late Emergence of the First Possession Heuristic: Evidence From a Small‐Scale Culture

Western preschool children often assign ownership based on first possession and some theorists have proposed that this judgment might be an early emerging, innate bias. Five‐ to 9‐year‐olds (n = 112) from a small‐scale group in Kenya (Kikuyu) watched videotaped interactions of two women passing an object. The object's starting position and the women's gestures were varied. Use of the first possession heuristic increased with age, and 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds performed similarly to German 5‐year‐olds (n = 24). Starting position and gestures had no effect. A control study confirmed that 5‐year‐old Kikuyus (n = 20) understood the video material. The findings reveal that the first possession heuristic follows different developmental trajectories cross‐culturally and stress the role of children's sociocultural environment.     

Accent,Language, and Race: 4–6‐Year‐Old Children's Inferences Differ by Speaker Cue

Three experiments examined 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds' use of potential cues to geographic background. In Experiment 1 (N = 72), 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds used a speaker's foreign accent to infer that they currently live far away, but 6‐year‐olds did not. In Experiment 2 (N = 72), children at all ages used accent to infer where a speaker was born. In both experiments, race played some role in children's geographic inferences. Finally, in Experiment 3 (N = 48), 6‐year‐olds used language to infer both where a speaker was born and where they currently live. These findings reveal critical differences across development in the ways that speaker characteristics are used as inferential cues to a speaker's geographic location and history.     

Order Matters: Children's Evaluation of Underinformative Teachers Depends on Context

The ability to evaluate “sins of omission”—true but pragmatically misleading, underinformative pedagogy—is critical for learning. This study reveals a developmental change in children's evaluation of underinformative teachers and investigates the nature of their limitations. Participants rated a fully informative teacher and an underinformative teacher in two different orders. Six‐ and 7‐year‐olds (N = 28) successfully distinguished the teachers regardless of the order (Experiment 1), whereas 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds (N = 82) succeeded only when the fully informative teacher came first (Experiments 2 and 3). After seeing both teachers, 4‐year‐olds (N = 32) successfully preferred the fully informative teacher (Experiment 4). These results are discussed in light of developmental work in pragmatic implicature, suggesting that young children might struggle with spontaneously generating relevant alternatives for evaluating underinformative pedagogy.     

Getting to No: Pragmatic and Semantic Factors in Two‐ and Three‐Year‐Olds' Understanding of Negation

Although infants say “no” early, older children have difficulty understanding its truth‐functional meaning. Two experiments investigate whether this difficulty stems from the infelicity of negative sentences out of the blue. In Experiment 1, given supportive discourse, 3‐year‐olds (N = 16) understood both affirmative and negative sentences. However, with sentence types randomized, 2‐year‐olds (N = 28) still failed. In Experiment 2, affirmative and negative sentences were blocked. Two‐year‐olds (N = 28) now succeeded, but only when affirmatives were presented first. Thus, although discourse felicity seems the primary bottleneck for 3‐year‐olds' understanding of negation, 2‐year‐olds struggle with its semantic processing. Contrary to accounts where negatives are understood via affirmatives, both sentence types were processed equally quickly, suggesting previously reported asymmetries are due to pragmatic accommodation, not semantic processing.     

“Everything Happens for a Reason”: Children's Beliefs About Purpose in Life Events

Do children believe that “everything happens for a reason?” That is, do children endorse purpose‐based, teleological explanations for significant life events, as they do for social behavior, artifacts, biological properties, and natural kinds? Across three experiments, 5‐ to 7‐year‐olds (N = 80), 8‐ to 10‐year‐olds (N = 72), and adults (N = 91) chose between teleological and nonteleological accounts of significant life events and judged how helpful those accounts were for understanding an event's cause. Five‐ to 7‐year‐olds favored teleological explanations, but this preference diminished with age. Five‐ to 7‐year‐olds and 8‐ to 10‐year‐olds also found teleological explanations more helpful than did adults. Perceiving purpose in life events may therefore have roots in childhood, potentially reflecting a more general sensitivity to purpose in the social and natural worlds.     

Realizing Relevance: The Influence of Domain‐Specific Information on Generation of New Knowledge Through Integration in 4‐ to 8‐Year‐Old Children

In accumulating knowledge, direct modes of learning are complemented by productive processes, including self‐generation based on integration of separate episodes. Effects of the number of potentially relevant episodes on integration were examined in 4‐ to 8‐year‐olds (N = 121; racially/ethnically heterogeneous sample, English speakers, from large metropolitan area). Information was presented along with unrelated or related episodes; the latter challenged children to identify the relevant subset of episodes for integration. In Experiment 1, 4‐ and 6‐year‐olds integrated in the unrelated context. Six‐year‐olds also succeeded in the related context in forced‐choice testing. In Experiment 2, 8‐year‐olds succeeded in open‐ended and forced‐choice testing. Results illustrate a developmental progression in productive extension of knowledge due in part to age‐related increases in identification of relevant information.     

Children's Norm Enforcement in Their Interactions With Peers

This study investigates how children negotiate social norms with peers. In Study 1, 48 pairs of 3‐ and 5‐year‐olds (N = 96) and in Study 2, 48 pairs of 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds (N = 96) were presented with sorting tasks with conflicting instructions (one child by color, the other by shape) or identical instructions. Three‐year‐olds differed from older children: They were less selective for the contexts in which they enforced norms, and they (as well as the older children to a lesser extent) used grammatical constructions objectifying the norms (“It works like this” rather than “You must do it like this”). These results suggested that children's understanding of social norms becomes more flexible during the preschool years.     

The Audiovisual Temporal Binding Window Narrows in Early Childhood

Binding is key in multisensory perception. This study investigated the audio‐visual (A‐V) temporal binding window in 4‐, 5‐, and 6‐year‐old children (total N = 120). Children watched a person uttering a syllable whose auditory and visual components were either temporally synchronized or desynchronized by 366, 500, or 666 ms. They were asked whether the voice and face went together (Experiment 1) or whether the desynchronized videos differed from the synchronized one (Experiment 2). Four‐year‐olds detected the 666‐ms asynchrony, 5‐year‐olds detected the 666‐ and 500‐ms asynchrony, and 6‐year‐olds detected all asynchronies. These results show that the A‐V temporal binding window narrows slowly during early childhood and that it is still wider at 6 years of age than in older children and adults.     

If You're Happy and You Know It: Positive Moods Reduce Age‐Related Differences in False Memory

When tested in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm, children typically exhibit fewer false memories than do adolescents or adults. Here, participants’ moods and the valence of word lists were manipulated to explore the mechanism responsible for this developmental reversal in memory performance. Children (7‐ to 8‐year‐olds), adolescents (11‐ to 12‐year‐olds), and young adults (18‐ to 22‐year‐olds; N = 270) were assigned to one of three induced mood conditions and were presented with emotional word lists. In negative moods, adolescents and adults falsely recalled more negative information than did children, showing the typical developmental reversal effect. This effect, however, was eliminated when participants were in positive moods. The findings provide support for associative‐activation theory and have important implications for our understanding of the development of emotional false memories.     

Enhancing the Executive Functions of 3‐Year‐Olds in the Dimensional Change Card Sort Task

Executive functions enable flexible thinking, something young children are notoriously bad at. For instance, in the dimensional change card sort (DCCS) task, 3‐year‐olds can sort cards by one dimension (shape), but continue to sort by this dimension when asked to switch (to color). This study tests a prediction of a dynamic neural field model that prior experience with the postswitch dimension can enhance 3‐year‐olds' performance in the DCCS. In Experiment 1A, a matching game was used to preexpose 3‐year‐olds (n = 36) to color. This facilitated switching from sorting by shape to color. In 3 , 3‐year‐olds (n = 18) were preexposed to shape. This did not facilitate switching from sorting by color to shape. The model was used to explain this asymmetry.     

Preferences for Explanation Generality Develop Early in Biology But Not Physics

One of the core functions of explanation is to support prediction and generalization. However, some explanations license a broader range of predictions than others. For instance, an explanation about biology could be presented as applying to a specific case (e.g., “this bear”) or more generally across “all animals.” The current study investigated how 5‐ to 7‐year‐olds (N = 36), 11‐ to 13‐year‐olds (N = 34), and adults (N = 79) evaluate explanations at varying levels of generality in biology and physics. Findings revealed that even the youngest children preferred general explanations in biology. However, only older children and adults preferred explanation generality in physics. Findings are discussed in light of differences in our intuitions about biological and physical principles.     

Carving Metacognition at Its Joints: Protracted Development of Component Processes

Two experiments investigated the development of metacognitive monitoring and control, and conditions under which children engage these processes. In Experiment 1, 5‐year‐olds (N = 30) and 7‐year‐olds (N = 30), unlike adults (N = 30), showed little evidence of either monitoring or control. In Experiment 2, 5‐year‐olds (N = 90) were given performance feedback (aimed at improving monitoring), instruction to follow a particular strategy (aimed at improving control), or both. Across conditions, feedback improved children's monitoring, and instruction improved both monitoring and control. Thus, children's poor metacognitive performance likely reflects a difficulty engaging the component processes spontaneously rather than a lack of metacognitive ability. These findings also suggest that the component processes are distinct, with both undergoing protracted development.     

Unpacking the Ontogeny of Gesture Understanding: How Movement Becomes Meaningful Across Development

Gestures, hand movements that accompany speech, affect children's learning, memory, and thinking (e.g., Goldin‐Meadow, 2003). However, it remains unknown how children distinguish gestures from other kinds of actions. In this study, 4‐ to 9‐year‐olds (n = 339) and adults (n = 50) described one of three scenes: (a) an actor moving objects, (b) an actor moving her hands in the presence of objects (but not touching them), or (c) an actor moving her hands in the absence of objects. Participants across all ages were equally able to identify actions on objects as goal directed, but the ability to identify empty‐handed movements as representational actions (i.e., as gestures) increased with age and was influenced by the presence of objects, especially in older children.     

The Ghost in the Touchscreen: Social Scaffolds Promote Learning by Toddlers

This study examined the effect of a “ghost” demonstration on toddlers’ imitation. In the ghost condition, virtual pieces moved to make a fish or boat puzzle. Fifty‐two 2.5‐ and 3‐year‐olds were tested on a touchscreen (no transfer) or with 3D pieces (transfer); children tested with 3D pieces scored above a no demonstration baseline, but children tested on the touchscreen did not. Practice on the touchscreen (n = 23) by 2.5‐ and 3‐year‐olds prior to the ghost demonstration did not improve performance. Finally, children who learned the puzzle task via a social demonstration and were tested on the touchscreen (n = 26) performed better than the ghost conditions. Taken together, these studies demonstrate that social demonstrations enhance learning from novel touchscreen tools during early childhood.     

The Role of Speaker Knowledge in Children's Pragmatic Inferences

During communication, conversational partners should offer as much information as is required and relevant. For instance, the statement “Some Xs Y” is infelicitous if one knows that all Xs Y. Do children understand the link between speaker knowledge and utterance strength? In Experiment 1, 5‐year‐olds (N = 32) but not 4‐year‐olds (N = 32) reliably connected statements of different logical strength (e.g., “The girl colored all/some of the star”) to observers who were fully or partially informed. Four‐year‐olds’ performance improved when observer knowledge could be assessed more easily (Experiment 2a, N = 25) but remained the same in a nonlinguistic version of Experiment 1 that preserved the epistemic requirements of the original study (Experiment 2b, N = 26). These findings have implications for the development of early communicative abilities.     

Who's the Boss? Concepts of Social Power Across Development

Power differences are observed in children's early relationships, yet little is known about how children conceptualize social power. Study 1 recruited adults (n = 35) to assess the validity of a series of vignettes to measure five dimensions of social power. Using these vignettes, Study 2 (149 three‐ to nine‐year‐olds, 42 adults) and Study 3 (86 three‐ to nine‐year‐olds, 22 adults) showed that children visiting a science museum at a middle class university town are sensitive to several dimensions of social power from a young age; however, an adult‐like breadth of power concepts does not develop until 7–9 years. Children understand social power whether the powerful character is malevolent or benevolent, though malevolent power is easier to detect for children and adults.     

Preschoolers’ Understanding of How Others Learn Through Action and Instruction

It is widely believed that exploration is a mechanism for young children's learning. The present investigation examines preschoolers’ beliefs about how learning occurs. We asked 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds to articulate how characters in a set of stories learned about a new toy. Younger preschoolers were more likely to overemphasize the role of characters’ actions in learning than older children were (Experiment 1, N = 53). Overall performance improved when the stories explicitly stated that characters were originally ignorant and clarified the characters’ actions, but general developmental trends remained (Experiment 2, N = 48). These data suggest that explicit metacognitive understanding of the relation between actions and learning is developing during the preschool years, which might have implications for how children learn from exploration.     

Prelinguistic Relational Concepts: Investigating Analogical Processing in Infants

This research asks whether analogical processing ability is present in human infants, using the simplest and most basic relation—the same–different relation. Experiment 1 (N = 26) tested whether 7‐ and 9‐month‐olds spontaneously detect and generalize these relations from a single example, as previous research has suggested. The attempted replication failed. Experiment 2 asked whether infants could abstract the relation via analogical processing (Experiment 2, N = 64). Indeed, with four exemplars, 7‐ and 9‐month‐olds could abstract the same–different relation and generalize it to novel pairs. Furthermore, prior experience with the objects disrupted learning. Facilitation from multiple exemplars and disruption by individual object salience are signatures of analogical learning. These results indicate that analogical ability is present by 7 months.     

Introspection Plays an Early Role in Children's Explicit Theory of Mind Development

This study assessed children's (N = 236) ability to introspect the mental states of seeing and knowing relative to their ability to attribute each state to others. Children could introspect seeing 10 months before they could introspect knowing. Two‐ and 3‐year‐olds correctly reported their own seeing states, whereas 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds correctly reported their own knowing states. For each mental state, there was a 7‐month difference before children could correctly attribute that state to another. These findings indicate that knowing is more difficult to introspect than seeing and that the ability to introspect each mental state emerges prior to the ability to correctly attribute them to others. Theoretical implications for self–other differences in theory‐of‐mind development are considered.