Testing the dynamic field theory: working memory for locations becomes more spatially precise over development

The dynamic field theory predicts that biases toward remembered locations depend on the separation between targets, and the spatial precision of interactions in working memory that become enhanced over development. This was tested by varying the separation between A and B locations in a sandbox. Children searched for an object 6 times at an A location, followed by 3 trials at a B location. Two- and 4-year-olds', but not 6-year-olds', responses were biased toward A when A and B were 9-in. and 6-in. apart. When A and B were separated by 2 in., however, 4- and 6-year-olds' responses were biased toward A. Thus, the separation at which responses were biased toward A decreased across age groups, supporting the predictions of the theory.     

Delay-induced bias in children's memory for location

Two experiments examined how imposing a delay between learning and reproducing locations influences children's memory for location. In Experiment 1, ninety-six 7-, 9-, and 11-year-old children and adults learned the locations of 20 objects in an open, square box divided into four regions by opaque walls. During test, participants attempted to place the objects in the correct locations without the aid of the dots that had marked the locations or the boundaries that had divided the space. The test phase began either immediately following learning or following a 12-min delay. As predicted by the Category-Adjustment model, bias toward category centers increased significantly following an intervening delay. Moreover, the magnitude of categorical bias followed a systematic U-shaped developmental pattern. Results from a second study (N = 72) replicated this developmental pattern. Discussion focuses on the implications of these results for understanding how children and adults remember locations.     

The Mind's "I": Children's Conception of the Mind as an Active Agent

1 hypothesis about children's developing conception of the mind is that preschoolers are limited to an understanding that persons have internal, mental contents like thoughts and beliefs, whereas older children and adults conceive of the mind itself as an independent, active structure or processor. Adults' conception of the mind in this independent active fashion seems evident in their use of personified mental metaphor (e.g., "My mind tricked me"). 3 studies examined the development and consolidation of this active, personified view. Study 1 provided an analysis of natural language data regarding 1 child's uses of vision words such as see and look from age 2 1/2 to 8 years. We examined the child's use of such words to refer literally to perception (e.g., "I see the TV") and also to refer nonliterally to active mental processes such as comprehension and inference (e.g., "I see what you mean"). Studies 2 and 3 examined 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds' comprehension and production of mental metaphors. In a metaphor comprehension task, we asked children to interpret personified metaphoric statements about the mind (e.g., "My mind wandered") and 3 comparison domains, mechanics (e.g., "The car is dead"), nature (e.g., "The wind is howling"), and emotion (e.g., "Her heart was smiling"). In an explanation task, we asked children to explain the processes underlying the making of both instant photos and mental images. The findings reveal a developing ability to interpret and produce statements personifying the mind and provide considerable evidence about children's movement toward a conception of the mind as an independent entity deserving reference and conceptualization in its own right.     

Deaf children's use of phonological coding: evidence from reading, spelling, and working memory

Two groups of deaf children, aged 8 and 14 years, were presented with a number of tasks designed to assess their reliance on phonological coding. Their performance was compared with that of hearing children of the same chronological age (CA) and reading age (RA). Performance on the first task, short-term recall of pictures, showed that the deaf children's spans were comparable to those of RA controls but lower than CA controls. For the older deaf children, short-term memory span predicted reading ability. There was no clear evidence that the deaf children were using phonological coding in short-term memory when recall of dissimilar items was compared with recall of items with similarly sounding names. In the second task, which assessed orthographic awareness, performance of the deaf children was similar to that of RA controls although scores predicted reading level for the deaf children but not the hearing. The final task was a picture spelling test in which there were marked differences between the deaf and hearing children, most notably in the number of spelling refusals (which was higher for the deaf children in the older group than their RA controls) and the percentage of phonetic errors (which was considerably lower for both groups of deaf children than for any of the hearing controls). Overall these results provide support for the view that deaf children place little reliance on phonological coding.     

The trouble with transfer: insights from microgenetic changes in the representation of numerical magnitude

Spontaneous transfer of learning is often difficult to elicit. This finding may be widespread partly because pretests proactively interfere with transfer. To test this hypothesis, 7-year-olds' transfer was examined across 2 numerical tasks (number line estimation and categorization) in which similar representational changes have been observed. As predicted, children given feedback on numerical estimates learned to use a linear representation of numerical quantity instead of a logarithmic one, but providing practice on a categorization pretest led children to continue using a logarithmic representation on the same task, which they otherwise abandoned with surprising frequency. These findings imply unsupervised practice of inappropriate representations impedes transfer, and studies of learning can greatly underestimate children's potential for transfer if pretest effects are uncontrolled.     

The development of memory for location: what role do spatial prototypes play?

Two experiments investigated the role of spatial prototypes in estimates of location. In Experiment 1 (N = 144), children and adults learned the locations of 20 objects in an open, square box designed to look like a model house. In two conditions, opaque lines or walls divided the house into four regions, and in the other condition, no boundaries were present. Following learning, the dots marking the locations were removed, and participants attempted to replace the objects. Children and adults overestimated distances between target locations in different regions. Contrary to Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Duncan's hierarchical theory of spatial memory, none of the groups displaced the objects toward the region centers. In Experiment 2 (N = 96), boundaries were removed during testing to determine whether children and adults were more likely to displace objects toward region centers when uncertainty about location increased. Again, all age groups overestimated distances between target objects in different regions. In addition, adults and 11-year-olds in the most salient boundary condition displaced objects toward the region centers. Discussion focuses on the implications of these results for understanding how children and adults estimate location.     

Acting out the details of a pediatric check-up: the impact of interview condition and behavioral style on children's memory reports

This investigation was designed to determine whether an enactment interview condition involving a doll and props, in contrast to a verbal interview, would enhance 3- and 5-year-olds' (N = 62) recall of a pediatric examination. An additional aim was to explore the influence of behavioral styles and language skills on children's performance, and the extent to which these relations varied by age and interview condition. Both 1- and 6-weeks following their check-ups, the children in the enactment condition, particularly the 3-year-olds, provided more spontaneous, elaborate reports than did those assessed with a verbal protocol. Nonetheless, enactment also resulted in increased errors by the 3-year-olds at the first interview, and by children in both age groups after the 6-week delay. The age and interview condition effects, however, were moderated by the children's behavioral characteristics. Among the younger children, a measure of manageability predicted performance in the enactment setting, whereas an indicator of persistence was associated with recall in the verbal condition. The results have implications for an understanding of children's memory of events and of their ability to provide testimony in legal settings.     

Tests of a Dynamic Systems Account of the A-not-B Error: The Influence of Prior Experience on the Spatial Memory Abilities of Two-Year-Olds

Recently, Smith, Thelen, and colleagues proposed a dynamic systems account of the Piagetian "A-not-B" error in which infants' errors result from general processes that make goal-directed actions to remembered locations. Based on this account, the A-not-B error should be a general phenomenon, observable in different tasks and at different points in development. Smith, Thelen, et al.'s proposal was tested using an A-not-B version of a sandbox task. During three training trials and three "A" trials, 2-year-olds watched as a toy was buried in a sandbox at Location A. Following a 10-s delay, children searched for the object. Across five experiments, children's (total N = 92) performance on the A trials was accurate. After the A trials, children watched as a toy was hidden at Location B, 8 to 10 inches from Location A. In all experiments, children's searches after a 10-s delay were significantly biased in the direction of Location A. Furthermore, this bias toward Location A decreased with repeated trials to Location B, as well as when children completed fewer trials to Location A. Together, these data suggest that A-not-B-type errors are pervasive across tasks and development.     

Metamemory in children with autism

Five experiments are reported comparing metamemory abilities in children with autism, age- and language-matched mentally retarded children, and language-matched young normal controls. The mean language age of the participants in Experiment 1 was approximately 6 years, in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 approximately 8 years, and in Experiment 5 approximately 9 years. All the children were given one or more false belief tests. Experiment 1 assessed the children's understanding that a task variable (list length) and a person variable (age) will affect their own and others' performances on an immediate auditory-verbal recall task. Experiment 2 assessed the ability to utilize category cues in a picture recall task. Experiments 3 and 4 assessed the ability to verbalize strategies used in a memory span test and in one retrospective and two prospective memory situations. Experiment 5 assessed the children's knowledge and understanding of another person's memory. On the basis of available evidence and theory, we predicted that the children with autism would be impaired on all the metamemory tasks and that impairment would be associated with failure on tests of false belief. Our predictions were not supported. The children with autism were not impaired on any of the metamemory tasks, although they were less likely than controls to make spontaneous use of memory strategies involving other people. Unexpectedly few of the children failed the false belief tasks. These results are discussed in relation to theories concerning primary psychological deficits underlying autism.     

Structural Influences on Deaf and Hearing Children's Recall of Temporal/Spatial Incongruent Letter Strings

A test of individual differences in cognitive flexibility was made by challenging 16 prelingually profoundly deaf children (CA = 11.33 yr.) and 16 hearing children (CA = 11.75 yr) with a short‐term memory task that required immediate recall of the temporal or spatial sequence in which four letters were presented. For each trial, letter presentation was arranged so that the temporal sequence was not correlated with the spatial sequence. On initial free‐response trials, all hearing children and seven deaf children showed a temporal orientation. The remaining nine deaf children showed a spatial orientation. On later trials, each child was instructed to take the orientation not originally taken. It was predicted from O'Connor & Hermelin (Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (1973) 25, 335‐343) that all groups would show substantial flexibility going from the initial to the challenge test, but only the hearing group actually showed the predicted recovery. Moreover, recall response times indicated processing differences between the two deaf groups, even when stimulus presentation parameters were individually adjusted to tap each child's optimum performance. It was concluded that individual differences in deaf children's initial orientations bear significantly upon differences in performance because of these children's relatively weak adaptive responses under challenging conditions.     

Further development in social reasoning revealed in discourse irony understanding

This study describes the development of social reasoning in school-age children. An irony task is used to assess 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds' (N= 72) and adults' (N= 24) recursive understanding of others' minds. Guttman scale analysis demonstrates that in order to understand a speaker's communicative intention, a child needs to recognize the speaker's belief, the detection of which depends on the ability to identify the discrepancy between the intended and the expressed meaning. Only children who understand these aspects of mind are able to reflect on the speaker's attitude. Theory of mind and language ability make unique contributions to children's interpretation of irony over and above the impact of age and memory, but attunement to expressive prosody does not.     

Guise and Guile: Children's Understanding of Narratives in Which the Purpose of Pretense Is Deception

This study examined children's understanding of pretense and deception in folktales in which a villam deceives his victim by pretending to be someone else. In Experiment 1, the 3-year-olds distinguished the real from the pretend persona, but neither understood the victim's false belief nor predicted that the villain would perpetrate the unwelcome act. In Experiment 2, revealing the villainous action facilitated 3-year-olds' predictions of this action during a retelling of the stories, but did not improve subjects' understanding of the victim's false belief. In Experiment 3, although the tasks were further refined to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation, 3-year-olds again did not follow the deception. The results are discussed in relation to 3-year-olds' difficulties with deceptive appearances and their understanding of acting-as-if in pretense.     

A tale of two representations: the misinformation effect and children's developing theory of mind

The present research investigates representational ability as a cognitive factor underlying the suggestibility of children's eyewitness memory. The misinformation effect is used as an index of children's suggestibility, and performance on the false belief task is used as an assessment of children's representational abilities (N = 117). Analyses that considered the effect of representational ability and general memory ability on children's susceptibility to misleading information showed that differences in representational ability and general memory ability predicted participants' susceptibility to misleading information. These results demonstrate that the eyewitness memory of children who lack either multirepresentational abilities, sufficient general memory abilities, or both (i.e., most 3- and 4-year-olds) is less accurate than the eyewitness memory of children with both multirepresentational abilities and sufficient memory abilities (i.e., most 6-year-olds and adults). Thus, it appears that the earliest age at which children's eyewitness memory can be considered to be similar to that of adults is 6 years of age, when children's mental representational abilities are similar to those of adults. These results suggest that one factor underlying children's vulnerability to misleading information is the number of representations of an event that they can simultaneously hold and compare.     

Parental predictions of their children's knowledge about dangerous situations

This study explored the extent to which parents can predict their 5-, 8-, and 12-year-old male and female children's responses to questions about safe and dangerous situations. A total of 68 children and 61 parents of these children were questioned about their children's knowledge of (1) home address/telephone number, (2) strangers, (3) what to do in various emergency situations, (4) trust in police, (5) compliance towards police, and (6) resistance towards strangers. Parents were most accurate in predicting their children's understanding of strangers and trust in police officers. Parents overestimated their 5-year-olds' knowledge of home address/telephone and appropriate behaviors when lost or in abduction situations. Parental overestimations of knowledge and the likelihood to behave safely were more frequent with boys than with girls. Parental underestimations of children's knowledge of certain types of avoidance actions also were found. The results were interpreted in terms of metacognition and sex differences in spatial freedom.     

The Development of Reasoning about Causal and Noncausal Influences on Levers

2 studies examined 5–12-year-olds' judgments regarding the behavior of balance scales and other levers whose arms varied in a causal (the number of equally weighted objects or their distances from the fulcrum) or a noncausal (the color, position, or orientation of objects) variable. There were age-related increases in correct judgments for each causal and noncausal variable, with children tending to make correct judgments about the influence of physical features of objects (their number and color) at an earlier age than they did about spatial relations between objects (their distance, orientation, and position). Children's patterns of errors judging the influence of causal (particularly distance) and noncausal (particularly position and orientation) variables were different, and there was no relation between children's correct judgments regarding causal and noncausal variables The results suggest that there are separate processes underlying children's ability to identify causal and dismiss noncausal influences on levers which are dependent on the kinds of features (physical or both physical and spatial) which children conceive of as potentially influencing the behavior of levers.     

Social effects on spatial choice in the radial arm maze

Social memory was investigated in the context of a spatial working memory task. Pairs of rats were tested in an eight-arm radial maze. Under most conditions, there was a tendency to choose maze locations that had been visited earlier by the other rat. The possibility that this tendency is produced by common preferences for particular maze locations was ruled out. An opposite tendency to avoid visits to locations that had been visited earlier during the trial by another rat was found only when the maze location contained two pellets (rather than an undepletable supply), the rats’ ability to see each other in the maze was restricted to the central arena, and the maze location had been previously visited by the focal rat. The amount of food available in maze locations did not otherwise modulate social influences on spatial choice. The results indicate that memory for a rat’s own previous choices is combined with memory for the choices made by another rat.     

Young Children's Spatial Representations Developed through Exploration of a Desktop Virtual Reality Scene

Virtual Reality (VR) technology seems to offer the opportunity of designing 3D worlds and navigation activities which provide settings that are close to children's everyday experiences, capitalising on their enthusiasm for videogame-like technologies.This paper describes how different types of exploration of a VR scene by 6[emsp4 ]y-old children affected their performance in a series of spatial tasks. Individual children explored a desktop virtual world where we varied both the visual perspective on the VR scene (route vs. survey view) and the level of exploration control (active vs. passive movement). We measured children's knowledge of the spatial layout of the environment through their memory of objects' location in the virtual scene and through the analysis of their wayfinding abilities within the scene.The results indicate that children were able to develop and display different levels of allocentric knowledge about the virtual world depending on the way they had familiarized with it and on the characteristics of the task demands. This finding contributes to inform the design of VR technologies aimed at supporting or evaluating spatial abilities in children of this age.     

Knowing about Guessing and Guessing about Knowing: Preschoolers' Understanding of Indeterminacy

In this article we investigate preschool children's understanding of indeterminacy by examining their ability to distinguish between determinate situations—in which the available evidence eliminates all uncertainty about an outcome—and indeterminate situations—in which it does not. We argue that a full understanding of indeterminacy requires the coordination of 3 processes: search, evaluation , and mapping . We describe 3 experiments aimed at discovering the extent to which these processes, each of which has been implicated in previous accounts of indeterminate reasoning, are developed in preschoolers and the extent to which different children organize the processes into different strategies. Experiment 1 examines 5-year-olds' performance on 1- versus 2-solution problems having different configurations of irrelevant information. Experiments 2 and 3 extend the possible sources of indeterminacy from 2 to 4 and vary the amount of consistent, inconsistent, and to-be-discovered evidence. Our results show that 4- and 5-year-old children readily give "Can tell" responses to determinate problems, as well as "Can't tell" responses when they think that the evidence warrants such a response. In addition, we report 2 new findings: ( a ) different children use different strategies to process determinate evidence, and these strategies, in turn, predict their performance on indeterminate problems; ( b ) evidence patterns in which a single positive instance is contrasted with 1 or more negative or unknown instances are particularly difficult to resolve. Many children use a decision rule—the Positive Capture rule—that produces consistent errors on this type of problem.     

The Early Development of Children's Communication about Nested Spatial Relations

This investigation examined how the nature of the spatial relation influences young children's ability to remember and communicate about nested landmarks. Of particular interest was whether young children are more likely to use a supporting than a proximal landmark to disambiguate identical landmarks (e.g., "it's in the basket on the table" vs. "it's in the basket next to the table"). 3- and 4-year-olds hid objects in a dollhouse and described their locations. Children had to disambiguate the target primary landmark by relating it to a supporting or proximal secondary landmark. Both age groups almost always provided the primary landmark, but 4-year-olds were more likely to provide the secondary landmark than were 3-year-olds. Moreover, children were more successful at providing supporting than proximal secondary landmarks. These results suggest that both referential communication skills and biases in coding location influence children's communication about nested landmarks.     

The effect of being a victim or witness of family violence on the retrieval of autobiographical memories.

OBJECTIVE: This study was designed to determine whether greater reliance on general memory retrieval in children was related to depression, and whether family violence affected the specificity of children's memory retrieval. METHOD: We compared children who had experienced some form of family violence with children who had never experienced any form of family violence, based on their responses to questions concerning child-parent and interparental disagreements. RESULTS: As expected, there was a positive correlation between the extent of "generic-categoric" memory retrieval and depression level. There was no evidence, however, that autobiographical memory was affected by family violence. CONCLUSIONS: This study is the first to report significant associations between depression and autobiographical memory style in children. The results suggest that the effect of family violence on children's memory retrieval may be mediated by depression.