``Weighing' the Earth: a Newtonian Test and the Origin of an Anachronism

The measure G, the universal gravitational constant, is attributed to Henry Cavendish. Nevertheless, the intention of the English physicist was to measure the density of the earth, which at that time was necessary in order to decide between different theories about the composition of this planet. G was measured much later. In this article I will try to explain how Cavendish accomplished the famous experiment and what his results were. Likewise, I will consider the problems that can arise in the scientific training of students from maintaining anachronisms such as this.     

Education and the overcoming of evil

Abstract

In this essay, I try to make sense out of Kant’s unusual concept of grace, particularly as regards its uneasy relationship to education within the context of the effort to overcome evil. The key to the puzzle, I argue, lies in what I call ‘moral receptivity’. Part of education’s job is to make us morally receptive to grace by preparing us for its possibility.     

中国史学和(西)德/西方史学:一种对话?--始于1980年代中国社会史转向

全文分三部分:第一部分讨论比较方法中的一些问题,并通过比较揭示中国和西方/德国的史学研究中的不平等关系及其后果。第二部分,作者把1980年代以来中国史学研究中出现的社会史研究潮流称为“社会史转向”(Soc ialH istory Turn),分析其特征并以其为例呈现中国史学研究在全球学术结构中的自我定位。第三部分,通过比较德国与中国社会史兴起过程中的异同来“构建他者”(to Construct the O ther)和“衡量差异”(toM easure the D ifference),从而指出占统治地位的线性发展和现代化模型是以统一的全球意识形态体系为基础的,并强调对其重新思考的必要性。     

Moral Decision‐Making,Religious Reinforcement and Some Educational Implications

Abstract

There is a fundamental gap between people's assertions as to what is right or wrong and their actual behaviour. This has been traditionally attributed to akrasia or weakness of the will. This paper examines this concept, and the related positive concept of KRAT, and considers what moral education can do about it. Claims by R.B. Braithwaite and others that religious traditions can provide reinforcement are examined and attention is directed to some important qualifications. The implications for moral education are considered, and it is argued that attempts by moral educationists to get to grips with this weakness must involve their own participation in moral debate and in decisions concerning the moral ethos of society.

Anyone who observes human behaviour through moral spectacles soon discovers that there is a significant gap between people's assertions as to what is right or wrong and their actual behaviour. This gap is traditionally attributed to akrasia or weakness of the will. Any attempt to get to grips with moral education must (a) take cognizance of this phenomena and (b) consider what, if anything, can be done about it. In this paper I aim to do three things: (i) to draw attention to some significant factors associated with akrasia, (ii) to explore claims that religious traditions can help to overcome such weakness and (iii) to draw some general conclusions from these points for moral education.     

Nudging the public sphere: a Habermasian perspective on public deliberation as an aim of moral education

This article offers an account of the understanding citizens need in order to justify moral principles in the public sphere and it identifies an important role for moral education in the promotion of that civic understanding. I develop this account through a contrastive analysis of Phillip Kitcher’s conception of public knowledge and Jurgen Habermas’ Discourse Ethics. Kitcher is focused on the social conditions necessary for the circulation of scientific knowledge in advanced democracies; the analysis offered in this article expands on what Habermas and other deliberative democrats claim are epistemic conditions necessary for the construction and circulation of moral understanding. I use this account to critically assess public policy that aims to ‘get around’ public deliberation by using strategies derived from behavioral economics in order to shift civic behavior in specific (moral) directions. Finally, I specify how such strategies have the potential to undermine moral understanding in the public sphere and I argue for a central role for moral education in mitigating such effects.     

Telling a tale: pieces of SMEC in my wind of memories

This article is a personal history of the Science and Mathematics Education Center (SMEC) in Perth, Australia, during my time there as a student. I make use of narratives to express what I see as the impact on my professional practice of having attended SMEC. I am grateful to SMEC, but what is being grateful really? In this paper I try to illustrate it, agreeing that while it is easy to start a thanksgiving text, I feel handicapped to capture all the greatness I am full of.     

International Institute for Collaborative Cell Biology and Biochemistry—History and Memoirs from an International Network for Biological Sciences

I was invited to write this essay on the occasion of my selection as the recipient of the 2012 Bruce Alberts Award for Excellence in Science Education from the American Society for Cell Biology (ASCB). Receiving this award is an enormous honor. When I read the email announcement for the first time, it was more than a surprise to me, it was unbelievable. I joined ASCB in 1996, when I presented a poster and received a travel award. Since then, I have attended almost every ASCB meeting. I will try to use this essay to share with readers one of the best experiences in my life. Because this is an essay, I take the liberty of mixing some of my thoughts with data in a way that it not usual in scientific writing. I hope that this sacrifice of the format will achieve the goal of conveying what I have learned over the past 20 yr, during which time a group of colleagues and friends created a nexus of knowledge and wisdom. We have worked together to build a network capable of sharing and inspiring science all over the world.     

论高校道德教育的问题与对策

随着时代的不断发展,我国高校道德教育面临着诸多的问题和挑战。高校道德教育如何能够满足时代发展的要求,适应当下的社会需求,关键在于对自身进行改革。改革将有助于改变我国高校道德教育的现状,促进高校道德教育的发展。本文旨在探索高校道德教育目前存在的问题,以及应采取的对策,从而为高校道德教育改革提供思路。     

What’s the use of ethical philosophy? The role of ethical theory in special educational needs

This article examines the relevance of modern moral philosophy to education, with particular reference to special educational needs. Where moral philosophers explore the tension between utilitarian and deontological reasoning, they often consider the balance between the rights of the individual and the benefits or costs for the majority. I argue that the debate is predicated on a false dichotomy between minority and majority which is best overcome by a return to virtue ethics. In exploring this ethical debate, I draw on a case study from Australia of a student excluded from mainstream education on the basis that inclusion will not serve the greater good of the majority of students. My intention here is not to offer practical guidance in the complex day-to-day deliberations of educators dealing with issues of inclusion, but to elaborate the structure of the present thinking about inclusion. It is hoped that an appreciation of the deeper basis of ethical reasoning will itself lead to a greater recognition of the need for exploring the ethical grounds of teaching and learning. I will argue that any dichotomy between the utilitarian happiness of the many and the deontological commitment to the rights of the individual is based on a misconception of human identity. The false choice between the many and the one rests upon the assumption that morality is fundamentally about restricting personal preferences in favour of the good of the majority, that there exists a fundamental conflict between what is good for the individual and what is good for society as a whole. This will lead me to argue that we need to reinterpret human identity as constituted by its social relations and that this reorientation is best achieved by reference to virtue ethics.     

Can we measure practical wisdom?

ABSTRACT

Wisdom, long a topic of interest to moral philosophers, is increasingly the focus of social science research. Philosophers have historically been concerned to develop a rationally defensible account of the nature of wisdom and its role in the moral life, often inspired in various ways by virtue theoretical accounts of practical wisdom (phronesis). Wisdom scientists seek to, among other things, define wisdom and its components so that we can measure them. Are the measures used by wisdom scientists actually measuring what philosophers have in mind when they discuss practical wisdom? I argue that they are not. Contemporary measures of wisdom and its components may pick out some necessary prerequisites of practical wisdom, but they do not measure a philosophically plausible practical wisdom or its components. After explaining the argument and defending it against objections, I consider its implications. Should wisdom scientists ignore the philosophical conception of practical wisdom in favor of other conceptions, revise their methods to try to measure it, or continue the interdisciplinary study of practical wisdom without expecting to measure it? I make a preliminary argument for the third option.     

中外学生品德测评的比较研究

学生品德测评是德育研究领域密切关注的焦点之一,进行中外学生品德测评的比较研究是德育研究领域的有益尝试。本文将从品德测评的内容与方法两个方面进行比较研究,以期对中国德育研究有所帮助,从而提高中国德育工作的质量。     

Teaching About Love and Practicing Feminist Pedagogy in a College Classroom

Being a feminist teacher, working on gender equity education, including teaching, reading, writing, and doing research on this topic, has become a commitment for me. I have frequently reflected my teaching practices and occasionally found new teaching strategies in the classroom. I always try to bring new topics or issues into the classroom in order to raise students' gender consciousness. I also try hard to figure out what can be done to empower students. Teaching about love is one way I use to empower college students in the gender course. This article is about my teaching experiences. I intend to discuss the teaching strategies, particularly focusing on the topic of love, to explore the possible ways of practicing feminist pedagogy.     

On the Prerequisites of Moral Education: a Wittgensteinean perspective

In this paper I distinguish between education and its prerequisites and try to defend the ontological and epistemological priority of the latter. This distinction parallels Wittgenstein's distinctions between knowledge and its river-bed, justification and its grounds, explaining and showing, learning and acquisition. With respect to moral thinking and education, I argue that the fundamental moral principles occupy a position akin to that of the river-bed propositions; that these principles are embedded in ordinary human activities and forms of life and, therefore, ought to be taught by example and by practice and not by abstract moral thinking or contrived moral dilemmas, as some rationalist moral theorists sugges‡     

The Regime of Self-Evaluation: Self-Conception for Teachers and Schools

Self-evaluation in inspection policy has become a global phenomenon. The idea is that it increases levels of teacher and school autonomy, wherein both schools and teachers have more ownership and responsibility over their work. In turn, such a process has allowed for greater accountability, which is then said to provide high quality education and, therefore, greater competitive advantage amongst knowledge-based economies. In both England and Ireland, self-evaluation has become a demanding procedure that is meant to complement external inspections of schools and teachers. In this article, I will argue that self-evaluation, whilst having the potential to become a worthwhile endeavour, does not live up to its name. In the first instance, the criteria used for self-evaluation are not internally generated but externally imposed. Thus, I would like to discuss the extent to which visions of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ education developed by inspecting bodies influence the way in which teachers and schools assess themselves. Furthermore, I will raise questions as to what appropriate criteria for teaching might look like. In doing so, I shall try to show that what is now current is a debased form of self-evaluation that is not only detrimental to the self-perception of teachers, but inadequate to what any coherent notion of the ‘self’ might be. In light of work by the philosopher Charles Taylor in particular, I will argue that the self is not something that can be examined in the way that is imagined in these inspection systems but is rather something dynamic and unfixed, constituted within a wider community of practice and, therefore, not amenable to evaluation in quite the way that is supposed.     

我国高等职业教育创新模式研究

当前社会经济飞速发展,我国普通高等教育已经走向大众化,而高等职业教育却没有得到长足发展,显得滞后。本文通过对高等职业教育的分析,对高等职业教育中存在的问题提出一些应对性的策略,力求为高等职业教育研究以及企业和学校实践操作提供理论参考。     

Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?

There is an apparent tension between Immanuel Kant's model of moral agency and his often-neglected philosophy of moral education. On the one hand, Kant's account of moral knowledge and decision-making seems to be one that can be self-taught. Kant's famous categorical imperative and related 'fact of reason' argument suggest that we learn the content and application of the moral law on our own. On the other hand, Kant has a sophisticated and detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience. The task of this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly conflicting claims. Ultimately, I argue, Kant's philosophy of education makes sense as a part of his moral theory if we look not only at individual moral decisions, but also at the goals or ends that these moral decisions are intended to achieve. In Kant's case, this end is what he calls the highest good, and, I argue, the most coherent account of the highest good is a kind of ethical community and end of history, similar to the Groundwork 's realm of ends. Seen as a tool to bring about and sustain such a community, Kant's philosophy of moral education exists as a coherent and important part of his moral philosophy.     

SEX DIFFERENCES IN THE LEADER‐BEHAVIOUR OF NIGERIAN COLLEGE PRINCIPALS

I believe that before all else, I am a reasonable human being just as your are–or at all events that I must try and become one. I know quite well, Torvald, that most people, think you are right, and that views of that kind are to be found in books. But I can no longer content myself with what most people say, or with what is found in books. I must think over things for myself and get to understand them.     

Free will,moral responsibility and ADHD

One of the oldest problems in philosophy concerns the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If we adopt the position that we lack free will, in the absolute sense—as have most philosophers who have addressed this issue—how can we truly be held accountable for what we do? This paper will contend that the most significant and interesting challenge to the long‐standing status quo on the matter comes not from philosophy, jurisprudence or even physics, but rather from psychology. By examining this debate through the lens of contemporary behaviour disorders, such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, it will be argued that notions of free will, along with its correlate, moral responsibility, are being eroded through the logic of psychology, which is steadily reconfiguring large swathes of familiar human conduct as pathology. The intention is not only to raise some concerns over the exponential growth of behaviour disorders, but also, and more significantly, to flag the ongoing relevance of philosophy for prying open contemporary educational problems in new and interesting ways.