Self-Recognition in Young Children Using Delayed versus Live Feedback: Evidence of a Developmental Asynchrony

The ability of young children to recognize themselves in delayed videotapes and recent photographs was investigated using a delayed analog of the mirror mark test, as well as verbal reports. In Experiment 1, 42 2–4-year-old children were videotaped while playing an unusual game. During the game an experimenter covertly placed a large sticker on the child's head. The videotape was played back 3 min later to the children. Older, but not younger, children reached up to remove the sticker when the tape revealed it being placed on their heads. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used with 60 3- and 4-year-olds where Polaroid photographs were taken during and after the act of the sticker being placed on the child's head. When allowed to look at the photographs, young 3-year-olds did not reach up to search for the sticker, whereas older 3- and 4-year-olds did. Almost all of the children who did not appear to realize that there was a sticker on their head from the information provided by the photographs did provide a correct verbal label for the image, and reached up to remove the sticker when presented with a mirror. Experiment 3 compared the reaction of 48 21/2–31/2-year-olds to live versus delayed video feedback and indicated an effect of the temporal aspect of the stimulus. The results are discussed in the context of the different forms of self-conception that may underwrite the 2 manifestations of self-recognition.     

There's More to the Picture Than Meets the Eye: Young Children's Difficulty Understanding Biased Interpretation

5 experiments investigated children's understanding that expectations based on prior experience may influence a person's interpretation of ambiguous visual information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to infer a puppet's interpretation of a small, ambiguous portion of a line drawing after the puppet had been led to have an erroneous expectation about the drawing's identity. Children of both ages failed to ascribe to the puppet an interpretation consistent with the puppet's expectation. Instead, children attributed complete knowledge of the drawing to the puppet. In Experiment 2, the task was modified to reduce memory demands, but 4- and 5-year-olds continued to overlook the puppet's prior expectations when asked to infer the puppet's interpretation of an ambiguous scene. 6-year-olds responded correctly. In Experiment 3, 4- and 5-year-olds correctly reported that an observer who saw a restricted view would not know what was in the drawing, but children did not realize that the observer's interpretation might be mistaken. Experiments 4 and 5 explored the possibility that children's errors reflect difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge when responding. The results are taken as evidence that understanding of interpretation begins at approximately age 6 years.     

Response stability and variability induced in humans by different feedback contingencies

In two experiments, the behavioral effects of different response-feedback contingencies were examined with a task requiring human subjects to repeatedly type three-key sequences on a computer keyboard. In Experiment 1, the subjects first received positive feedback for response variability, followed by no feedback, or vice versa. In Experiment 2, the subjects first received positive feedback for response variability, followed by response-independent positive feedback, or vice versa. Response stability and variability were examined using different measures, such as percentage of trials meeting the variability criteria, frequency of use of the different response alternatives, and autocorrelations as an index of response randomness. The subjects’ behavior in the first phase in each condition came to reflect the current feedback contingency. Depending on the measure examined, responding after each contingency change was characterized by both response stability and decreases or increases in response variability. The collective results are discussed in the framework of previous animal and human studies on behavioral stability and variability.     

Children's understanding of the distinction between real and apparent emotion

2 experiments examined children's understanding of the distinction between real and apparent emotion. In Experiment 1, 6- and 10-year-old children listened to stories in which it would be appropriate for the story protagonist to feel either a positive or negative emotion but to hide that emotion. Subjects were asked to say both how the protagonist would look and how the protagonist would really feel, and to justify their claims. The results indicated that 6- and 10-year-olds alike could distinguish quite accurately between real and apparent emotion, although 10-year-olds were somewhat better at justifying this distinction. In Experiment 2, a slightly modified procedure was used to test 4- and 6-year-olds. Again, 6-year-olds demonstrated their grasp of the difference between real and apparent emotion, and even 4-year-olds showed a limited grasp of the distinction. The findings are discussed in relation to recent research concerning children's concept of mind, their grasp of the appearance-reality distinction, their ability to produce complex, embedded justifications, and their ideas about emotion.     

Early Deception and the Child's Theory of Mind: False Trails and Genuine Markers

The ability to understand false beliefs is critical to a concept of mind. Chandler, Fritz, and Hala challenge recent claims that this ability emerges only at around 4 years of age. They report that 2- and 3-year-olds remove true trails and lay false ones to mislead someone about the location of a hidden object. Experiment 1 confirmed that 2- and 3-year-olds produce apparently deceptive ploys, but they produce them less often than 4-year-olds, require prompting, and rarely anticipate their impact on the victim's beliefs or search. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that 3-year-olds produce deceptive and informative ploys indiscriminately, whether asked to mislead a competitor or inform a collaborator. By contrast, 4-year-olds act selectively. The results support earlier claims that an understanding of false beliefs and deceptive ploys emerges at around 4 years of age. 2- and 3-year-olds can be led to produce such ploys but show no clear understanding of their effect.     

Effects of context on judgments concerning the reality status of novel entities

Three studies examined the effects of context on decisions about the reality status of novel entities. In Experiment 1 (144, 3- to 5-year-olds), participants less often claimed that novel entities were real when they were introduced in a fantastical than in a scientific context. Experiment 2 (61, 4- to 5-year-olds) revealed that defining novel entities with reference to scientific entities had a stronger effect on reality status judgments than did hearing scientifically oriented stories before encountering the novel entities. The results from Experiment 3 (192, 3- to 6-year-olds) indicated that definitions that support inferences facilitate reality status judgments more than do definitions that simply associate novel and familiar entities. These findings demonstrate that children share with adults an important means of assessing reality status.     

Young children category learning: a training study

From an integrative approach, this work focuses on the role of conceptual mechanisms, such as comparison and conceptual-based inference, and sociopragmatic support in young children's taxonomic categorization. “Experiment 1” assessed whether 3-, 4-, and 6-year-old children succeed in detecting taxonomic relations on their own. A clear developmental trend was found: 6-year-olds succeeded, whereas 4- and 3-year-olds relied primarily on perceptually based categories. “Experiment 2” assessed if 3-year-olds are able to change their perceptual response into a taxonomic categorization as a function of the co-occurrence of contingent category information and feedback in an interactive process with an adult (experimenter). A pretest–posttest training study compared 3-year-olds' performance in four conditions: comparison, conceptual-based, information-only, and feedback-only. A perceptual–totaxonomic shift was found only in the comparison and conceptual-based training groups. Children who only received either category information or corrective feedback did not make such a shift. The results show that social interaction with supportive adults is a mechanism that drives conceptual understanding in early childhood.     

Becoming Kinder: Prosocial Choice and the Development of Interpersonal Regret

Three experiments examined children's ability to feel regret following a failure to act prosocially. In Experiment 1, ninety 6- to 7-year-olds and one hundred seven 7- to 9-year-olds were given a choice to donate a resource to another child. If they failed to donate, they discovered that this meant the other child could not win a prize. Children in both age groups then showed evidence of experiencing regret, although not in control conditions where they had not made the choice themselves or their choice did not negatively affect the other child. In Experiment 2, eighty-five 5- to 6-year-olds and one hundred nine 7- to 9-year-olds completed the same task; only the older group showed evidence of regret. In Experiment 3, with one hundred thirty-four 6- to 7-year-olds, experiencing regret was associated with subsequently making other prosocial choices.     

Young children's understanding of random phenomena

2 experiments on the development of the understanding of random phenomena are reported. Of interest was whether children understand the characteristic uncertainty in the physical nature of random phenomena as well as the unpredictability of outcomes. Children were asked, for both a random and a determined phenomenon, whether they knew what its next outcome would be and why. In Experiment 1, 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds correctly differentiated their responses to the question of outcome predictability; the 2 older groups also mentioned appropriate characteristics of the random mechanism in explaining why they did not know what its outcome would be. Although 3-year-olds did not differentiate the random and determined phenomena, neither did they treat both phenomena as predictable. This latter result is inconsistent with Piaget and Inhelder's characterization of an early stage of development. Experiment 2 was designed to control for the possibility that children in Experiment 1 learned how to respond on the basis of pretest experience with the 2 different phenomena. 5- and 7-year-olds performed at a comparable level to the same-aged children in Experiment 1. Results suggest an earlier understanding of random phenomena than previously has been reported and support results in the literature indicating an early understanding of causality.     

The development of children's ability to fill the gaps in their knowledge by consulting experts

This research investigated children's ability to recognize gaps in their knowledge and seek missing information from appropriate informants. In Experiment 1, forty-five 4- and 5-year-olds were adept in assigning questions from 3 domains (medicine, firefighting, and farming) to corresponding experts (doctor, firefighter, or farmer). However, when given the options of answering the same questions themselves or assigning them to an expert (Experiment 2), only 6-year-olds were consistently able to recognize when they did not know answers and then assign test questions correctly. Four- and 5-year-olds tended to overestimate their own knowledge or assign questions to the wrong expert. This result was replicated in Experiment 3, in which 5-year-olds were given incentives for correct answers.     

Children's Understanding of Knowledge Acquisition: The Tendency for Children to Report That They Have Always Known What They Have Just Learned

Children's attention to knowledge-acquisition events was examined in 4 experiments in which children were taught novel facts and subsequently asked how long they had known the new information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds tended to claim they had known novel animal facts for a long time and also reported that other children would know the novel facts. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2, using facts associated with chemistry demonstrations. In Experiments 3 and 4, children were taught new color words. 5-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, distinguished between novel and familiar color words, reporting they had not known the novel words before the test session, but they had always known the familiar words. 4-year-olds in Experiment 4 were better able to distinguish novel and familiar color words when the teaching of the novel words was an explicit and salient part of the procedure.     

Children's perseverative appearance-reality errors are related to emerging language skills

Two experiments explored the communicative bases of preschoolers' object appearance-reality (AR) errors. In Experiment 1, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 36) completed the AR test (with high- and low-deceptive objects), a control test with the same discourse structure but nondeceptive stimuli, and stimulus naming and memory tests. AR performance correlated positively with control (discourse) and naming test performance. Object deceptiveness had little effect. In Experiment 2, 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 64) completed AR tests that experimentally varied question phrasing and use of exemplar objects. Children also completed memory, vocabulary, and control tests (of verbal perseveration). AR performance variance was predicted by a composite perseveration score from three non-AR tasks, vocabulary, and exemplars. The results indicate that the discourse structure of the AR test elicits a perseverative tendency that is mediated by children's verbal knowledge.     

Early understanding and production of graphic symbols

Young children's ability to understand and produce graphic symbols within an environment of social communication was investigated in two experiments. Children aged 2, 3, and 4 years produced graphic symbols of simple objects on their own, used them in a social communicative game, and responded to experimenter's symbols. In Experiment 1 (N = 48), 2-year-olds did not effectively produce symbols or use the experimenter's symbols in the choice task, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds improved their drawings following the game and performed above chance with the experimenter's symbols. Ability to produce an effective graphic symbol was correlated with success on a task that measured understanding of the experimenter's symbols, supporting the claim that children's ability to produce a graphic symbol rests on the understanding of the symbolic function of pictures. In Experiment 2, 32 children aged 3 and 4 years improved their third set of drawings when they received feedback that their drawings were not effective communications. The results suggest that production and understanding of graphic symbols can be facilitated by the same social factors that improve verbal symbolic abilities, thereby raising the question of domain specificity in symbolic development.     

Flavor evaluative conditioning and contingency awareness

The relationship between flavor evaluative conditioning and contingency awareness was examined in two experiments using flavored drinks. In Experiment 1, one flavor was always paired with sugar and the other with bitter tween (polysorbate20) during conditioning. In a subsequent test phase, participants tasted the two flavors, and their evaluative ratings indicated an overall preference for the sugar-paired flavor. Moreover, participants were generally able to report which flavor had been paired with sugar and which with tween. This finding was replicated and confirmed in Experiment 2A. Furthermore, in both experiments, evaluative conditioning was seen only in those participants who were aware of the contingencies. Experiment 2B demonstrated that evaluative conditioning does not occur to colors, although participants are contingency aware. The differences between the present findings and prior studies, in which apparently unaware flavor conditioning has been found, are discussed.     

Preschoolers are sensitive to the speaker's knowledge when learning proper names

Unobservable properties that are specific to individuals, such as their proper names, can only be known by people who are familiar with those individuals. Do young children utilize this “familiarity principle” when learning language? Experiment 1 tested whether forty-eight 2- to 4-year-old children were able to determine the referent of a proper name such as “Jessie” based on the knowledge that the speaker was familiar with one individual but unfamiliar with the other. Even 2-year-olds successfully identified Jessie as the individual with whom the speaker was familiar. Experiment 2 examined whether children appreciate this principle at a general level, as do adults, or whether this knowledge may be specific to certain word-learning situations. To test this, forty-eight 3- to 5-year-old children were given the converse of the task in Experiment 1—they were asked to determine the individual with whom the speaker was familiar based on the speaker’s knowledge of an individual’s proper name. Only 5-year-olds reliably succeeded at this task, suggesting that a general understanding of the familiarity principle is a relatively late developmental accomplishment.     

Guise and Guile: Children's Understanding of Narratives in Which the Purpose of Pretense Is Deception

This study examined children's understanding of pretense and deception in folktales in which a villam deceives his victim by pretending to be someone else. In Experiment 1, the 3-year-olds distinguished the real from the pretend persona, but neither understood the victim's false belief nor predicted that the villain would perpetrate the unwelcome act. In Experiment 2, revealing the villainous action facilitated 3-year-olds' predictions of this action during a retelling of the stories, but did not improve subjects' understanding of the victim's false belief. In Experiment 3, although the tasks were further refined to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation, 3-year-olds again did not follow the deception. The results are discussed in relation to 3-year-olds' difficulties with deceptive appearances and their understanding of acting-as-if in pretense.     

Components of young children's trait understanding: behavior-to-trait inferences and trait-to-behavior predictions

Trait attribution is central to people's na?ve theories of people and their actions. Previous developmental research indicates that young children are poor at predicting behaviors from past trait-relevant behaviors. We propose that the cognitive process of behavior-to-behavior predictions consists of two component processes: (1) behavior-to-trait inferences and (2) trait-to-behavior predictions. Experiment 1 demonstrates that 4-, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds can infer trait labels from behaviors. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds can predict behaviors from trait labels but not from past behaviors. Experiment 3 demonstrates that 4- and 5-year-olds understand traits as predictive and stable over time. Taken together, these three studies show that young children, in possessing component trait-reasoning processes, have a nascent understanding of traits.     

Predicting the outcomes of physical events: two-year-olds fail to reveal knowledge of solidity and support

Two-year-olds' (N = 153) knowledge of solidity was tested in four search tasks adapted from infant looking-time experiments. In Experiment 1, 2-year-olds failed to search in the correct location for a falling ball after a hidden shelf that blocked its trajectory had been inserted in the apparatus. Experiment 2 extended this finding by showing that 2-year-olds failed to take into account the effects of either removing or inserting a shelf in their search for a toy dropped behind a screen. Experiment 3 examined sensitivity to the constraint provided by a solid barrier on horizontal motion. In all three experiments, 2-year-old children searched initially at the location where they saw the object during familiarization. Experiment 4, using multiple test trials but no familiarization to a pretest location, also showed that 2-year-olds failed to take the presence or absence of a barrier into account when planning where to search for a toy they had seen dropped behind a screen. In all of these studies, 2-year-olds showed no evidence of representing solidity and support constraints on the trajectories of falling objects. Experiments 1 and 3 also included 2 1/2-year-olds (N = 31), who succeeded on these search tasks. The implications of the poor performance of 2-year-olds, in the face of success by very young infants on looking-time measures of sensitivity to similar constraints on object motion, are discussed.