PUBLIC OPINION AND PARLIAMENTARY ACTION: RESPONSIVENESS OF THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Does the parliamentary behavior of members of parliament, parliamentaryparties, and government correspond with the public's preferencesregarding political issues? What conditions support the emergenceof congruence between public opinion and public policy? Thesequestions are central concerns of democratic theory. In thispaper, they are investigated empirically for the activitiesin the federal German legislature, the German Bundestag, between1949 and 1990. For this purpose, 94 time series of public opinionpolls have been combined with content analysis of more than3, 000 parliamentary documents (e.g. parliamentary questions,committe reports). If public opinion about a policy matter changes,approximately 60 percent of the respective parliamentary actionsare congruent with the direction of opinion change. The congruencebetween public opinion and public policy is greatest for opinionchanges in a conservative direction when the political statusquo is supported. Even more important than the direction ofopinion change is the public's majority opinion at the timeof parliamentary action.     

What Underlies the False Consensus Effect? How Personal Opinion and Disagreement Affect Perception of Public Opinion

This study draws on a sample of participants in online groupsto analyze the interaction between individual-level and communicative-levelfactors that affect public opinion perception. We first assessthe association between individual views on several issues—thedeath penalty, gun regulation and teaching morality in publicschools—and false consensus, i.e., the tendency to attributeown views to others. We also examine whether the associationbetween individual opinion and false consensus is mitigatedby perceived disagreement with offline discussion networks andwith participants in online discussion groups. As expected,not only is there a correlation between personal and perceivedopinion, but also those who strongly favor the three policiesestimate public support to be higher than do those who are unfavorableor moderate. Multivariate models further show that encounteringdisagreement, online or offline, attenuates the associationbetween the individual opinion and false consensus. Theoreticaland practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

OPINION LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM

An analysis of a survey material with 14,000 respondents fromNorway 1984–5 shows a U-shaped relationship between positionon a political left–right scale and activity to influenceothers through personal communication, with the exception ofa sharp drop at the extreme left. Various hypotheses attemptingto explain this pattern of a left dip are tested and refuted:1) it does not seem to be the result of sampling or measurementerror, 2) it is only to a limited extent explained by the socialcomposition of the extreme left, 3) it is not due to the partycomposition of the extreme left, but exists within all partiesof the left, 4) it is not a symptom of a general withdrawalfrom political activity, the extreme left does not lag behindin membership in parties or local elected councils, 5) it isnot part of a general withdrawal from personal communication,there is no left dip in the proportion of opinion leaders invarious non-political areas. Trend data show a changing patternfor the relationship between opinion leadership and politicalextremism from 1973 to 1989, which corresponds to changes inelectoral support for parties of the left and right in Norway.     

OPINION QUALITY IN PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH

In recent years, a number of new techniques have been developed—includingdeliberative polls and educational surveys—that attemptto gather measures of public opinion that is of higher quality(i.e. better informed or more deliberative) than that recordedin typical mass opinion surveys. This paper addresses severalgeneral sets of questions. What is meant by ‘quality’in public opinion? What criteria can be enumerated by whichthe quality of public opinion can be assessed? In grapplingwith these questions, the paper argues that conceptions of qualityin public opinion are inextricably bound to broader conceptionsof quality in democratic decision making, a complex processinvolving multiple phases and collective participants. In addition,a number of important contradictions and ambiguities underlieconceptions of quality in public opinion.     

MEDIA TONE AND PUBLIC OPINION: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF MEDIA COVERAGE AND PUBLIC OPINION ON CHANCELLOR KOHL

This study investigates the relationship between media coverageof Helmut Kohl in seven leading German print media and the opinionsof the German general public about the politician between 1975and 1984. For the content analysis evaluative assessments aboutHelmut Kohl on six different dimensions of characteristics werecoded. The analysis of public opinion is based on 72 representativesurveys in which respondents expressed their evaluations ofthe politician. The two time series were compared by means ofcross-lagged correlations. The whole period was first examinedwith aggregations of three-months-intervals; then closer attentionwas paid to the time period since Helmut Kohl took office aschancellor on the basis of monthly intervals. In both cases,the results show that evaluation shifts in the media precedesimilar evaluation shifts in public opinion with a time lagof about three to six months for the whole period of investigation,and a somewhat shorter time lag for the time of his chancellorship.Evaluation shifts in the political magazines Der Spiegel andStern were more closely related to public opinion than evaluationshifts in the national dailies.     

OPINION RESEARCH AND THE FALL OF COMMUNISM: POLAND 1981-1990

The first polling organization in Eastern Europe was set upin the late 1950s in Warsaw. It did not happen accidentally;Poland had a long tradition of social research reaching backto the early 1920s. After the Stalinist period of the early1950s these traditions were continued by a new generation ofresearchers. This paper analyzes the development of opinionresearch centers and progress in the area of methodology. Twoproblems, very important for public opinion research in Polandas well as in the other East European countries, are stressedin the article: the complex relations between opinion pollingand political circumstances, and the scientific debates focusedon the reliability and accuracy of the survey findings.     

ISSUE SALIENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION: ARE THERE CONSEQUENCES OF AGENDA-SETTING?

Recent studies have suggested that agenda-setting may influencenot only what we think about, but also what we think. This studyexamines the correlations between the salience of one issue(the federal budget deficit) and public knowledge, opinion,and behavior, using fall 1988 survey data. It finds statisticallysignificant correlations between issue salience and knowledgeabout the deficit issue, strength and direction of opinion regardingone possible solution to the issue, and political behavior relatedto the issue. These correlations remain statistically significantin multiple regression analyses where demographics and mediaexposure and attention measures are controlled simultaneouslyand in hierarchical blocks. Taken together, the findings reportedhere suggest that increased salience of the deficit issue wasaccompanied by increased knowledge of its possible causes andsolutions, stronger opinions, less likelihood of taking a neutralposition, and more likelihood of participating in politics throughsuch behavior as signing petitions, voting, attending meetings,and writing letters.     

AMERICAN OPINION TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

Using a variety of public opinion sources, this article examinesAmerican attitudes toward the Soviet Union. It establishes thatAmericans are basically wary of the Soviet Union, and that thisattitude is largely based on Americans' reactions to Sovietbehavior. Furthermore, the data suggest that Americans favorfirmness in dealing with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Americansexpress faith in having dialogue with the Soviets and want theirgovernment to be engaged in negotiations. The limited knowledgeAmericans have of the Soviet Union and their reliance on televisionfor news of that country make American opinion susceptible tochange. Indeed, some American attitudes about the Soviets havechanged coincident with Gorbachev's ascension to power and theSoviet-US rapproachment. These findings reject the notion thatAmerican public opinion is capricious and volatile, having noplace in foreign policy formation. Rather, they suggest thatAmerican attitudes have been reasonable, responding to eventsin what would appear to be a logical manner, and that US foreignpolicy makers would be wise to consider American public opinionin their deliberations.     

REFERENCE GROUP INFLUENCE ON OPINION EXPRESSION

This study investigates the role of reference groups in individualwillingness for personal xpression, within the context of theSpiral of Silence theory. Reference group research as foundimportant influences on individual opinion and behavior dueto reference roup behavior. Individuals commonly and spontaneouslyconsider referent others' positions when making personal decisions.This interpersonal influence on individual behavior is missingfrom most research, if not theory, on public opinion, as inthe case of the Spiral of Silence theory, where researchershave emphasized only strong mass mediated societal or intra-individualsources of social influence. The individual is often treatedas if in social isolation, bereft of friendship and ommunityties, open to the influences of societal forces. Reviews ofthe Spiral of Silence esearch in particular, and of public opinionresearch more generally, have urged the investigation of groupsas important intermediaries in social influence settings. Inthis study, societal majority influence was compared to referentother majority nfluence in an experimental setting. Overall,when reference and societal majority opinions are made equallysalient, the more important influence is clearly that of one'sreference group. Individuals with extreme opinions, however,seem altogether unaffected by social influence. Results andalternative explanations are discussed.     

OPINION RESEARCH, LIBERALISM AND THE FRENCH RIGHT

During the rewriting of its program in the early 1980s, theRassemblement pour la République (RPR) carried out anumber of opinion surveys. The person in charge of this wasnot a member of the inner leadership circle; he warned the partyleader, Jacques Chirac, that themes forming a coherent ‘liberal’program for the transformation of the relationship between citizens,state, and the economy, were not popular with public opinion,which remained attached to progressive taxation and a comprehensivesocial welfare system. The party leadership ignored these warnings.Rather than attempting to align their policies with voter aspirations,their principal use of political communications techniques aimedat improving their leader's image. The person in charge of thiswork was a stranger to politics whose understanding of the waycultural or political attitudes are changed led him to interpretvery fatalistically the chances of influencing election outcomesby communications techniques. His methods were treated withfrank skepticism by party communications colleagues, his client'spersonality was particularly unamenable to his efforts, andhis one successful initiative—the rejuvenation of theexecutive committee—was operated at the cost of a rowin the party. In the case of the RPR, opinion research seemsto have played no role at all in an important party policy review,the causes of which should be sought elsewhere.     

MASS MEDIA AND POLITICAL OUTSPOKENNESS IN HONG KONG: LINKING THE THIRD-PERSON EFFECT AND THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE

This study analyzes the impact of perceptions of the opinionsof others on political outspokenness in Hong Kong. Two relatedtheories, the third-person effect and the spiral of silence,are tested in the context of public opinion regarding the Sino-Britishdispute over Hong Kong's political future. To estimate the potentialinfluence of perceived public opinion on political outspokennessduring this political crisis, a representative telephone surveyof 660 respondents in Hong Kong was conducted in November 1993. As hypothesized by the third-person effect, perceptions of theinfluence of media reports about the Sino-British dispute onothers were found to be consistently greater than perceptionsof influence on self. Similar to previous findings, respondentswith a higher level of education were more likely to believethat the mass media influence others more than themselves. Thestudy also found empirical support for the spiral of silencehypothesis. Politically unconcerned respondents were less willingto voice their political opinions publicly when they perceivedthe majority opinion not to be on their side. Findings alsoindicate that the third-person effect indirectly influencesthe spiral of silence process through its impact on perceptionsof public opinion.     

媒介舆论:在各种权力与公众之间——兼论公共舆论向媒介舆论的转向

本文通过对公共舆论形成条件和形成过程的梳理,认为伴随着公共领域的转型,公共舆论的本质已经发生了变化。在一定层面上,被社会所感知的舆论实际上是媒介舆论。作为一种自为意见的表达体系,媒介舆论上是国家政治权力、经济权力、媒介和公众利益搏弈、平衡的结果,表现出现实的真实性。     

PUBLIC OPINION AND CONFLICTS: A THEORY AND SYSTEM OF OPINION POLLS

Some years ago, major French firms and institutions joined forcesto develop the AGORAMETRIE system, which analyzes and followsup public opinion about controversial matters in French society.The system is based on annual comprehensive surveys of representativesamples of the French population. We present here the theoreticalbasis of the system, and its application as a decoding toolto the analysis of specific social problems, by consideringthe following points: the modelling of public opinion througha constructivist approach; questionnaire design and interpretationof structural factors; evolution of public opinion, effectsof date, age and generation; and the ‘grafting’procedure and its application, illustrated by opinion aboutAIDS.     

REFERENCE GROUPS, OPINION INTENSITY, AND PUBLIC OPINION EXPRESSION

Noelle-Neumann's work on the spiral of silence (1974, 1977,1984) has been one of the most significant theoretical developmentsin public opinion research of the past quarter-century. Thetheory is well known among public opinion researchers, and anumber of research efforts have been directed toward examiningspecific parts of the theory. However, the theory is difficultto test, incorporating psychological, social-psychological andsociological variables, including psychological variables andsweeping changes in the social climate of opinion (cf. Noelle-Neumann1984). This study investigated the role of opinion thresholds, socialgroups and weighing of others' opinions in opinion expression.Using Krassa's (1988) computer simulation and modificationsof Noelle-Neumann's (1974) spiral of silence as a base, we testseveral theoretical modifications to the spiral of silence modelusing data gathered from people living in or near six nationalparks in Canada. Primary interest is on the ability of opinionthresholds, social group and weighing of others' opinions topredict the expression of opinion for particular issues.     

COPING WITH FREEDOM AND UNCERTAINTY: PUBLIC OPINION IN HUNGARY, POLAND, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1989-1992

For the first time in more than four decades, Central and EastEuropeans can openly voice their opinion about everything fromthe price of bread to the performance of the government. Publicopinion has become a dynamic factor in the decision-making processof the new governments of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakiaand will play an important role in determining what kind ofpost-communist societies develop in these countries. In an effortto explore public sentiment about what kind of society theywant to develop, we analyze results from 14 nationwide, representativepublic opinion polls commissioned by the United States InformationAgency's Office of Research between June 1989 and January 1992in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. After tracing trendsin public opinion over this period, we look at some aspectsof the political culture in these countries. We then reporton our preliminary attempts to understand the determinants ofindividual preferences for either a society that emphasizesindividual freedom and responsibility (‘individual opportunities’society) or one in which the state assumes responsibility forassuring public welfare (‘state guarantees’ society).     

Fear of Isolation and Perceived Affordances: The Spiral of Silence on Social Networking Sites Regarding Police Discrimination

The spiral of silence (SoS) framework elaborates the factors that determine whether individuals are willing to express their opinions in public. Although previous scholarship has examined differences in between face-to-face and computer-mediated communication, research studies have rarely tested how perceived affordances of the channel influence whether individuals express opinions or self-censor. In this study (N = 399), we examine several propositions of SoS within the context of discussing police discrimination on Facebook. To extend the theory’s relevance to social networking sites, we examined how users’ perceptions of network association, social presence, anonymity, and persistence related to opinion expression. Findings indicate support for some of the theory’s original tenets, as well as the role of multiple perceived affordances in determining whether people will express an opinion to their online social network. We discuss the implications for measuring and understanding political expression and silencing on social media as well as offline.     

LIFE AND DEATH AS PUBLIC POLICY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND ABORTION IN AMERICAN POLITICAL OPINION

Recent decisions of the US Supreme Court, in returning to theissues of capital punishment and abortion, have simultaneouslyexpanded the potential for public opinion on these issues tohave an impact on public policy. This article considers thedistribution of the available combinations of attitudes towardissues of the institutionalized taking (or preservation) ofhuman life, both in the general American public and in subgroupswhich combine these opinions in distinctive fashion. These patternsare then compared to attitudes among partisan political activists,suggesting a further set of recurring, élite-mass tensions.Finally, the resulting tensions and cross-pressures are examinedfor their relationship to the presidential vote in 1984 and1980.     

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS IN JAPAN

This article examines, from secondary sources, various aspectsof public opinion surveys in Japan. During the 1975 to 1990period, there was an increase in the number of surveys and therewere some similarities and some differences in their topics.The use of the Basic Residents Registers as a sampling framehas increased. The plurality of the surveys drew their samplesfrom a single city. The proportion of mail surveys increased;whereas personal interviews and drop-off self-administered surveysdecreased. Response rates for all major questionnaire administrationmethods decreased. Despite the decline, the median responserate was 75.2 percent during this period. Response rates wereexamined more closely using the rates of the National Life Surveyfor 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990. The following trends were noted:(a) response rates of urban areas declined more sharply thanthose of rural areas; (b) overall response rates of males wereabout 10 percentage points lower than those of females; (c)response rates of females in their twenties had the steepestdecline; and (d) refusals almost doubled. Some of the reasonsfor these changes are discussed and it is noted that the decreasingresponse rates probably reflect changes in lifestyles and attitudestowards surveys.     

INTENSE MINORITIES AND THE PATTERN OF PUBLIC OPINION

Data from seven Swedish Election Studies were analyzed to testthree hypotheses about aggregate public opinion. Various facetsof public opinion, including a balance measure of direction,five measures of intensity, percentage don't know, and percentageneutral, were found to be highly stable across time. In mostinstances, the majority was more intense than the minority.Changes in public opinion could not be predicted from the relativeintensity of the majority and the minority in the election threeyears before.     

Modeling the Effects of Political Information Source Use and Online Expression on Young Adults’ Political Efficacy

This online survey conducted at a public university in the Northwest (N = 434) examines the influence of political involvement, information source attention, and online political discussion on young adults’ political efficacy. A factor analysis indicated that political information sources loaded into three factors including conventional and online hard news media such as newspapers, opinion and social media such as blogs or social networking websites, and public affairs websites including government and candidate websites. A path analysis revealed significant differences in their association with online political expression and external efficacy. As an entry point in the theoretical model, involvement in public affairs positively associated with attention to political information sources, online political expression, and external political efficacy. Attention to hard news and to public affairs websites positively predicted political efficacy. Attention to online opinion and social media and to public affairs websites positively predicted online political expression.