Optimizing Conditions for Learning: Situating Refutations in Epistemic Cognition

A refutation text is designed to promote conceptual change by explicitly acknowledging commonly held misconceptions about a topic, directly refuting them, and providing an accurate explanation. In this study, we determined the impact of different types of refutation texts on adolescent readers’ conceptual change learning in science. Specifically, we manipulated the way the correct conception was justified and explained following work in epistemic cognition. Three different types of justification were compared to a control condition: justification by authority, justification by multiple sources, and justification by personal opinion. The findings showed that learning effects were optimized when the correct conceptions were presented in terms of a corroborated consensus among multiple sources.     

Socialising Epistemic Cognition

We draw on recent accounts of social epistemology to present a novel account of epistemic cognition that is ‘socialised’. In developing this account we foreground the: normative and pragmatic nature of knowledge claims; functional role that ‘to know’ plays when agents say they ‘know x’; the social context in which such claims occur at a macro level, including disciplinary and cultural context; and the communicative context in which such claims occur, the ways in which individuals and small groups express and construct (or co-construct) their knowledge claims. We frame prior research in terms of this new approach to provide an exemplification of its application. Practical implications for research and learning contexts are highlighted, suggesting a re-focussing of analysis on the collective level, and the ways knowledge-standards emerge from group-activity, as a communicative property of that activity.     

Synthesis of Epistemic Cognition

Science & Education -     

Incorporating Student-Centred Learning in Innovation and Entrepreneurship Education

Innovation and entrepreneurship are vital for economic growth, as was already asserted by Schumpeter in 1934. In a recent survey carried out by the Ministry of Economic Affairs ( Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2006 ) a picture emerges of The Netherlands as lagging behind when it comes to starting a company, whereby start-ups of students coming directly from an educational institution score even worse (Sijde et al., 2006). The average age of start-ups in The Netherlands is around 38 years ( Thijssen, 2004 ). Against this background, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Economic Affairs defined the stimulation of entrepreneurship and innovation as a policy item in 2005. Entrepreneurship and innovation are closely linked, according to Schumpeter, who regarded the entrepreneur as the driver for innovation. Through innovation, a process of creative destruction is set in, which alters the institutional context and context of companies in several ways. In The Netherlands, ambitions to improve entrepreneurial behaviour amongst students and the starting up of new companies are high. During the Lisbon meeting held in 2003, The Netherlands voiced the ambition to be among the top 10 knowledge economies in 2010. Students of universities of applied sciences and to a lesser extent of scientific universities are the agents of change when it comes to making the choice to become an entrepreneur or innovation manager in a company. With the growing importance of knowledge as an economic asset ( Prusak, 1997 ) students are becoming knowledge workers, as well as learning a certain profession. And educational organisations are becoming knowledge institutions involved in knowledge creation, sharing and transfer. This has important consequences for the pedagogical climate at universities and the methods used to teach students entrepreneurship and innovation. Whilst teaching methods based on an instruction-based approach of learning prevail, at The Hague University of Professional Education, we have introduced a learner-centred approach, in which the student is the driver of his learning process. In this article we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach and the pitfalls and potentials when it comes to stimulating innovative entrepreneurial behaviour amongst students. Between 2005 and today, nearly 150 students participated in this programme.     

The Role of Teacher Epistemic Cognition, Epistemic Beliefs, and Calibration in Instruction

This review examines the literature on teacher epistemic cognition, epistemic beliefs, and calibration to consider the relation between these constructs and instruction that emerged from empirical studies. In considering how this body of literature can enhance understanding of how students become masters of their learning processes, we will briefly review how different theoretical frameworks have conceptualized the relation between epistemic cognition, epistemic beliefs, calibration and metacognition, self-regulation, and self-regulated learning. Implications for research include a more nuanced conceptualization of epistemic beliefs and a theoretical integration of these constructs. Implications for practice regard the reciprocal relations between teachers’ knowledge, experience, epistemic cognition, epistemic beliefs, and calibration and their effects on pedagogical practices. The role of teachers’ education and professional development is discussed. Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.     

The Role of Epistemic Beliefs in Self-Regulated Learning

The purpose of this article is to present an integrated theoretical model between epistemic beliefs and self-regulated learning. Based on a review of various theoretical frameworks, models, and empirical studies that have examined relations between the two constructs, this article discusses the role of epistemic beliefs in self-regulated learning. Four propositions are presented: (a) epistemic beliefs are one component of the cognitive and affective conditions of a task, (b) epistemic beliefs influence the standards students set when goals are produced, (c) epistemic beliefs translate into epistemological standards that serve as inputs to metacognition, and (d) self-regulated learning may play a role in the development of epistemic beliefs. The goal of this article is to provide a foundation from which to improve understanding of the nature of epistemic beliefs and why they can facilitate or constrain facets of self-regulated learning.     

Calibration to Task Complexity: The Role of Epistemic Cognition

Abstract

We examined the role of epistemic cognition in calibration to task complexity before and during learning. Sixty-six undergraduate students were presented with two learning tasks—a simple task and a more complex task—in random order. Prior to learning, offline measures of learners’ epistemic beliefs about climate change were taken. An open-ended questionnaire was then used to capture task definitions, goals, and plans. To assess online epistemic cognition and learning strategies used during learning, a think-aloud protocol was employed. Results showed that epistemic beliefs before learning predicted epistemic cognition during learning. Further, results demonstrated that calibration to task complexity before learning was not related to epistemic beliefs but was related to epistemic cognition during learning. These findings suggest that individuals engage in epistemic cognition during learning to better understand the nature of the knowledge to be learned and that this results in better calibration of learning processes to task complexity.     

Plausibility Judgments in Conceptual Change and Epistemic Cognition

Plausibility judgments rarely have been addressed empirically in conceptual change research. Recent research, however, suggests that these judgments may be pivotal to conceptual change about certain topics where a gap exists between what scientists and laypersons find plausible. Based on a philosophical and empirical foundation, this article presents a theoretical model of the role of plausibility judgments in conceptual change (PJCC) with implications for epistemic cognition. The PJCC moves beyond the limitations of cold cognitive processing by incorporating the warmer constructs of affect, motivation, and motivated reasoning. We review recent research in plausibility judgments that informed the PJCC's development and discuss components of the model. Of particular note is the importance of using explicit critical evaluation to reappraise plausibility judgments that may have been originally made through implicit cognitive processes. We also suggest potentially productive areas of future research based on the PJCC model.     

The Role of Epistemic Emotions in Personal Epistemology and Self-Regulated Learning

The purpose of this article is to delineate the role of epistemic emotions in personal epistemology and self-regulated learning (SRL). We first review important tenets of personal epistemology and SRL and then present a model of SRL that situates personal epistemology within that model. We then define epistemic emotions, describe under what conditions epistemic emotions arise, and delineate how these emotions may facilitate or constrain learning processes and learning outcomes. Specifically, we present five antecedents to epistemic emotions and five consequences of those emotions during learning. The five antecedents are control, value, novelty, complexity, and achievement or impasses of epistemic aims. The five consequences are effects on planning and goal setting, motivation, cognitive and metacognitive strategies, learning outcomes, and revisions to antecedents. We end with a discussion of educational implications and future directions for research.     

Promoting Conceptual Understanding with Explicit Epistemic Intervention in Metacognitive Instruction: Interaction Between the Treatment and Epistemic Cognition

Research in Science Education - This study investigated the effect of the metacognitive instruction in which students’ epistemic cognitions were explicitly addressed, on tenth-grade...     

浅析了解西方文化在英语学习中的重要性

语言是一种构成民族文化的要素，能反映该民族文化的主要特征。外语学习对我们了解西方的礼节和习俗、民族性格和语言习惯等有所帮助，如果我们把英语教学建立在文化学习的基础上，英语学习的价值就会大大提高。     

The Importance of Grammar Consciousness in English Learning

Learning English is quite different from learning Chinese.Grammar consciousness is a very different type of knowledge from the ability to describe the sentence a speaker produces in terms of grammar.The passage explores the relationship between grammar consciousness and English learning and suggests that teachers attach great importance to the overall increase in students’ language sensitivity and grammar awareness.     

哼鸣对于声乐学习的重要性

哼鸣训练是学习声乐的一种好方法,它可以使学习者较快地掌握正确的歌唱状态,获得高位置的声音;能较好地使喉部肌肉放松,进而有助于打开喉咙,克服初学声乐的常见病;并有助于“换声区”的解决,使真假混声自然,声音统一,从而使歌唱技术得到明显的增强和提高。     

Modeling Epistemic and Ontological Cognition: Philosophical Perspectives and Methodological Directions

We propose an integration of aspects of several developmental and systems of beliefs models of personal epistemology. Qualitatively different positions, including realism, dogmatism, skepticism, and rationalism, are characterized according to individuals' beliefs across three dimensions in a model of epistemic and ontological cognition. This model incorporates ideas from philosophical epistemology, including a focus on students' multiple means of justification. Concerns regarding the psychometric qualities of quantitative measures of personal epistemology inform this model and its proposed operationalization. We suggest a means of statistical analysis that can be used to assess the construct and predictive validity of this conceptual model by testing the relations among positions, dimensions, and covariates of interest. Future research directions include investigating how individuals choose among various forms of justification.     

对接受式学习的再认识

接受式学习由于受自身缺点及其他因素的影响,在大力提倡教改的环境下,这种学习方式遭到人们的猛烈抨击,但根据相关研究,接受式学习有很多其他学习方式无法比拟的独特的优点,对于系统知识的学习起到比较大的作用.我们在教育实践中,应该根据接受式学习所适用的条件,灵活应用并和其他学习方式结合起来,从而能够正确认识这种古老的学习方式.     

Expanding the Dimensions of Epistemic Cognition: Arguments From Philosophy and Psychology

Psychological and educational researchers have developed a flourishing research program on epistemological dimensions of cognition (epistemic cognition). Contemporary philosophers investigate many epistemological topics that are highly relevant to this program but that have not featured in research on epistemic cognition. We argue that integrating these topics into psychological models of epistemic cognition is likely to improve the explanatory and predictive power of these models. We thus propose and explicate a philosophically grounded framework for epistemic cognition that includes five components: (a) epistemic aims and epistemic value; (b) the structure of knowledge and other epistemic achievements; (c) the sources and justification of knowledge and other epistemic achievements, and the related epistemic stances; (d) epistemic virtues and vices; and (e) reliable and unreliable processes for achieving epistemic aims. We further argue for a fine-grained, context-specific analysis of cognitions within the five components.     

Role of Epistemic Beliefs and Scientific Argumentation in Science Learning

We hypothesized that instruction in the criteria of scientific arguments, in combination with constructivist epistemic beliefs, would produce greater learning about physics concepts. The study was a randomized experiment, where college undergraduates (n = 88) discussed, in pairs over the Web, several physics problems related to gravity and air resistance. Prior to their discussions, one‐half of the dyads received information on the nature of scientific arguments. All students were classified epistemologically as relativists, multiplists, or evaluativists. We found that students in the treatment group incorporated more scientific criteria into their discussion notes and accordingly developed better arguments on several dimensions. In addition, significantly more participants in the treatment group adopted the correct answer to one of the problems. Outcomes also differed in relation to students’ epistemic beliefs. Specifically, multiplists were less critical of inconsistencies and misconceptions, and interacted with their partners less than other belief groups, whereas evaluativists interacted more critically, bringing up different ideas from their partners. Evaluativists also solved one of the physics problems more accurately and tended to demonstrate a reduction in misconceptions. We discuss the results in light of instruction in scientific argumentation, conceptual development and change, and epistemic beliefs.