Developing Theories of Mind: Understanding Concepts and Relations between Mental Activities

The purpose of the study was to expand our knowledge of older children's understanding of the unique features and potential relations existing among mental activities. 8- and 10-year-olds as well as adults were asked to rate the similarity of pairs of mental activity scenarios in terms of how their mind would be used for each one. The scenarios involved primarily Prospective Memory, List Memory, Recognition Memory, Comprehension, Inference, Planning, Comparison, or Selective Attention. There was a developing tendency to organize mental activities on the degree to which memory was a component of the activity. Several distinctions were also more likely to be made with age: the distinction between recall and recognition, the distinction between the roles of internal and external cues in mediating cognitive activity, and the distinction among the various roles of attentional processes in regulating input from the sensory world. Together, these findings suggest that a constructivist theory of mind develops in later childhood.     

The Mind's "I": Children's Conception of the Mind as an Active Agent

1 hypothesis about children's developing conception of the mind is that preschoolers are limited to an understanding that persons have internal, mental contents like thoughts and beliefs, whereas older children and adults conceive of the mind itself as an independent, active structure or processor. Adults' conception of the mind in this independent active fashion seems evident in their use of personified mental metaphor (e.g., "My mind tricked me"). 3 studies examined the development and consolidation of this active, personified view. Study 1 provided an analysis of natural language data regarding 1 child's uses of vision words such as see and look from age 2 1/2 to 8 years. We examined the child's use of such words to refer literally to perception (e.g., "I see the TV") and also to refer nonliterally to active mental processes such as comprehension and inference (e.g., "I see what you mean"). Studies 2 and 3 examined 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds' comprehension and production of mental metaphors. In a metaphor comprehension task, we asked children to interpret personified metaphoric statements about the mind (e.g., "My mind wandered") and 3 comparison domains, mechanics (e.g., "The car is dead"), nature (e.g., "The wind is howling"), and emotion (e.g., "Her heart was smiling"). In an explanation task, we asked children to explain the processes underlying the making of both instant photos and mental images. The findings reveal a developing ability to interpret and produce statements personifying the mind and provide considerable evidence about children's movement toward a conception of the mind as an independent entity deserving reference and conceptualization in its own right.     

The development of children's knowledge of the times of future events

Four studies with 261 children were conducted to describe 4- through 10-year-olds' ability to differentiate the future distances of events. Distances ranged from later the same day through nearly a year in the future. Judgment methods included pointing to parts of a spatial scale representing future distances and answering open-ended questions. Although 4-year-olds failed to differentiate future distances, 5-year-olds were able to distinguish events that would occur in the coming weeks and months from those that would not occur for many months. However, like young children in earlier studies of memory for time, they confused the near future with the recent past. Children 6 through 8 years of age made more differentiated judgments but collapsed the distances of events more than a few months in the future. By 8 to 10 years of age, children accurately judged distances by using mental representations of the times of events in the annual cycle.     

3～8岁儿童假装理解和绘画理解能力的研究

心理理论是发展心理学研究领域中的一个新兴领域。近十几年来，研究者对儿童心理理论的研究较多地转向了对假装的研究，尤其是对儿童假装理解的研究。许多研究者认为儿童对绘画的理解与对假装的理解也一样可以看作是一种表征行为。本研究对120名3～8岁的中国儿童进行研究，验证了Lillard2002年的研究中的一些结果，同时发现在本研究中的各问题中，不同年龄阶段的中国儿童和欧洲儿童的通过率存在着一些差异。     

Relative roles of general and complementation language in theory-of-mind development: evidence from Cantonese and English

Complex complements are clausal objects containing tensed verbs (e.g., that she cried) or infinitives (e.g., to cry), following main verbs of communication or mental activities (e.g., say, want). This research examined whether English- and Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds' complement understanding uniquely predicts their representation of other minds (i.e., theory of mind). Results showed that neither meaning of main verbs (communication vs. desire) nor complement structure (tensed vs. infinitival) affected the correlation between complement understanding and theory of mind. More important, the correlation became insignificant after controlling for general language comprehension. These findings led to the conclusion that the syntax of complement per se does not contribute uniquely to theory-of-mind development; general language comprehension is a more important factor to consider.     

“It’s the X and Y Thing”: Cross-sectional and Longitudinal Changes in Children’s Understanding of Genes

Studies from different theoretical traditions investigating children’s inheritance and genetics concepts have adopted a cross-sectional method. This paper is the first to examine both cross-sectional and longitudinal changes in children’s basic genetic concepts. It forms part of a larger investigation into the development of intuitive inheritance and genetics concepts in childhood. Four age cohorts (4–5 years, 7–8 years, 10–11 years, 14–15 years) were interviewed individually at two measurement occasions (T1, N = 182; T2, N = 164) separated by a 1-year interval. Cross-sectional analyses revealed an increase in children’s knowledge of genetics by 10 years. Between 10 and 14 years, there were fewer changes in the content of children’s knowledge, especially at the level of scientific genetic understanding. There was little evidence of longitudinal changes over the 1-year period. Overall, children may hold an understanding of genetics that is tied to knowledge of inheritance within families. This may pose challenges for acquiring more abstract and formal concepts of genes.     

Age and language skills of deaf children in relation to theory of mind development

Using four traditional false-belief tasks, I investigated deaf children's age and expressive language skills in relation to their theory of mind development. The children's parents who signed reported on their own knowledge of a mental sign vocabulary. The results indicate age of the child to be strongly related to theory of mind development. Deaf children demonstrated an ability to pass the theory of mind assessment battery between the ages of 7 and 8 years, on average. In comparison, hearing children have consistently demonstrated the ability to perform such tasks between the ages of 4 and 5 years. Therefore, the results indicate deaf children are delayed by approximately 3 years in this cognitive developmental milestone. Expressive language skills of the children and sign language skills of the parents who signed were not found to be significantly related to the children's theory of mind development.     

Further development in social reasoning revealed in discourse irony understanding

This study describes the development of social reasoning in school-age children. An irony task is used to assess 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds' (N= 72) and adults' (N= 24) recursive understanding of others' minds. Guttman scale analysis demonstrates that in order to understand a speaker's communicative intention, a child needs to recognize the speaker's belief, the detection of which depends on the ability to identify the discrepancy between the intended and the expressed meaning. Only children who understand these aspects of mind are able to reflect on the speaker's attitude. Theory of mind and language ability make unique contributions to children's interpretation of irony over and above the impact of age and memory, but attunement to expressive prosody does not.     

Young children's references to temporal attributes of allegedly experienced events in the course of forensic interviews

Developmental differences in references to temporal attributes of allegedly experienced events were examined in 250 forensic interviews of 4- to 10-year-old alleged victims of sexual abuse. Children's ages, the specific temporal attributes referenced, and the types of memory tapped by the interviewers' questions significantly affected the quantity and quality of temporal references produced. The findings documented age-related increases in 4- to 10-year-olds' references to temporal attributes, using the appropriate relational terminology, both spontaneously and in response to temporal requests. More references to temporal attributes were elicited from recall than from recognition memory, highlighting spontaneous reporting capabilities. Implications for theories concerning the developing understanding of temporal concepts and for the design of effective, age-appropriate, forensic interview techniques are discussed.     

The development of mental processing: efficiency,working memory,and thinking

This Monograph aims to contribute to the information processing, the differential, and the developmental modeling of the mind, and to work these into an integrated theory. Toward this aim, a longitudinal study is presented that investigates the relations between processing efficiency, working memory, and problem solving from the age of 8 years to to the age of 16 years. The study involved 113 participants, about equally drawn among 8-, 10-, 12-, and 14-year-olds at the first testing; these participants were tested two more times spaced one year apart. Participants were tested with a large array of tasks addressed to processing efficiency (i.e., speed of processing and inhibition), working memory (in terms of Baddeley's model, phonological storage, visual storage, and the central executive of working memory), and problem solving (quantitative, spatial, and verbal reasoning). Confirmatory factor analysis validated the presence of each of the above dimensions and indicated that they are organized in a three-stratum hierarchy. The first stratum includes all of the individual dimensions mentioned above. These dimensions are organized, at the second stratum, in three constructs: processing efficiency, working memory, and problem solving. Finally, all second-order constructs are strongly related to a third-order general factor. This structure was stable in time. Structural equation modeling indicated that the various dimensions are interrelated in a cascade fashion so that more fundamental dimensions are part of more complex dimensions. That is, speed of processing is the most important aspect of processing efficiency, and it perfectly relates to the condition of inhibition, indicating that the more efficient one is in stimulus encoding and identification, the more efficient one is in inhibition. In turn, processing efficiency is strongly related to the condition of executive processes in working memory, which, in turn, is related to the condition of the two modality-specific stores (phonological and visual). Finally, problem solving is related to processing efficiency and working memory, the central executive in particular. All dimensions appear to change systematically with time. Growth modeling suggested that there are significant individual differences in attainment in each of the three aspects of the mind investigated. Moreover, each of the three aspects of the mind as well as their interrelations change differently during development. Mixture growth modeling suggested that there are four types of developing persons, each defined by a different combination of performance in these aspects of the mind. Some types are more efficient and stable developers than others. These analyses indicated that processing efficiency is a factor closely associated with developmental differences in problem solving, whereas working memory is associated with individual differences. Modeling by logistic equations uncovered the rates and form of change in the various dimensions and their reciprocal interactions during development. These findings are discussed from the point of view of information processing, differential, and developmental models of thinking, and an integrative model is proposed.     

The relation between preschool children’s false-belief understanding and domain-general experimentation skills

The focus of the present study is on the developmental antecedents of domain-general experimentation skills. We hypothesized that false-belief understanding would predict the ability to distinguish a conclusive from an inconclusive experiment. We conducted a longitudinal study with two assessment points (t1 and t2) to investigate this hypothesis. As language, executive functioning, working memory, and intelligence have been discussed as potential influencing factors in theory of mind and scientific reasoning development, we included measures of these abilities as control variables. We recruited 161 preschool children (73 girls and 88 boys); we administered a false-belief task, an experimentation task, and the control variables at t1 when the children were 4 years old. We repeated the false-belief and experimentation tasks at t2 when the children were 5 years old. Our results show that children who solved the false-belief task correctly at age 4 were more likely to solve the experimentation task correctly at age 5, but not vice versa, even after controlling for the influence of language, executive functioning, working memory, and intelligence. The implications of these results on theories about the development of scientific reasoning and for science education concepts for young children are briefly discussed.     

Do you see what I mean? Shared reference in non-native, early signing deaf children

A group of non-native, early signing deaf children between the ages of 7 and 11 years were tested on a referential communication task. A group of hearing children matched for sex and mental and chronological age were also included in the study. The aim was to study the deaf children's ability to take another persons perspective in a task that resembled a real-life communicative situation to a higher extent than the standard theory of mind (ToM) tasks. A further aim was to investigate the possible importance of a number of background variables such as mental and chronological age, working memory, and false-belief attribution. Results show that the hearing children outperformed the deaf children on the referential communication task and that results were highly correlated with both chronological and mental age, as well as with working memory. There was a positive, but not significant, correlation between false belief and success on the referential communication task. This is an indication that the two tasks tap different abilities and that false belief might be necessary, but not sufficient in order to be skilled in the art of referential communication. The possible role of working memory in the referential communication task is also discussed. The results support the hypothesis of the importance of early talk about mental states for the later development of ToM abilities.     

Relations between maternal input and theory of mind understanding in deaf children

This study investigates the relationship between theory of mind (ToM) skills in deaf children and input from their hearing mothers. Twenty-two hearing mothers and their deaf children (ages 4-10 years) participated in tasks designed to elicit talk about the mind. The mothers' mental state talk was compared with that of 26 mothers with hearing children (ages 4-6 years). The frequency of mothers' mental talk was correlated with deaf children's performance on ToM tasks, after controlling for effects of child language and age. Maternal sign proficiency was correlated with child language, false belief, and mothers' talk about the mind. Findings are discussed in relation to experiential accounts of ToM development and roles of maternal talk in children's social understanding.     

University Educator Mindsets: How Might Adult Constructive‐Developmental Theory Support Design of Adaptive Learning?

This article explores Robert Kegan's adult constructive‐developmental (ACD) theory. We compare these ideas to the way educators at each of Kegan's meaning‐making levels might plan, implement, and assess digitally enhanced teaching activities. Using Drago‐Severson's interpretation of Kegan's concepts, the authors propose that behaviors of university teaching practitioners indicate mindsets evident at four ACD levels—instrumental, socialized, self‐authoring, and self‐transforming. Higher education professional development literature has identified a significant gap in practitioner implementation of interactive strategies using digital tools. If university practitioners increase their mental complexity they may become more adaptive in the application of interactive pedagogies and digital technologies. Adaptive approaches might cultivate new pedagogies supporting and challenging students toward more complex and flexible qualities of mind.     

Three-Year-Olds'' Problems with False Belief: Conceptual Deficit or Linguistic Artifact?

Researchers are divided over whether young children understand other people's minds. This study reexamines the main technique used to show a basic inability in 3-year-olds to make judgments about a person's thoughts when that person's knowledge happens to be false. 131 children, aged 3, 3 1/2, and 4, were shown the real, unexpected contents of a chocolate box and were required to say what a friend would think was in it and what their own previous expectations had been. Success in this task was compared between the 3 age groups and also according to the specificity of questions asked. It was found, in contrast to previous findings, that test questions that are temporally specific and syntactically straightforward enable most 3-year-olds to attribute false beliefs to others. These results suggest that 3-year-olds' access to information about others' mental states is bounded by the linguistic demands placed upon them, but long before their fourth birthday children have some understanding of others' mind.     

Theory of mind and language in children with cochlear implants

Thirty children with cochlear implants (CI children), age range 3-12 years, and 30 children with normal hearing (NH children), age range 4-6 years, were tested on theory of mind and language measures. The CI children showed little to no delay on either theory of mind, relative to the NH children, or spoken language, relative to hearing norms. The CI children showed a slightly atypical sequence of acquisition of theory of mind concepts. The CI children's theory of mind performance was associated with general syntactic proficiency more than measures of complement syntax, and with time since implantation more than age at implantation. Results suggest that cochlear implantation can benefit spoken language ability, which may then benefit theory of mind, perhaps by increasing access to mental state language.     

Children's Teaching Skills: The Role of Theory of Mind and Executive Function

ABSTRACT— Teaching others effectively may rely on knowledge about the mind as well as self-control processes. The goal of this investigation was to explore the role of theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) in children's developing teaching skills. Children 3.5–5.5 years of age ( N = 82) were asked to teach a confederate learner how to play a board game and were administered multitask batteries of ToM and EF with mental age, sex, and memory capacity as controls. There was a developmental increase in children's teaching skills (e.g., older children taught longer, explained more rules, and used more strategies when teaching). Examined separately, both ToM and EF explained unique variance in teaching skills over and above controls. Taken together, EF was a significant predictor of teaching efficacy over and above ToM and controls, whereas the same did not hold true for ToM. These results suggest that ToM may be a necessary prerequisite for teaching to occur; however, EF skills appear to play a vital role in children's teaching efficacy.     

Mental retardation general intelligence and modularity

This article presents a case for distinguishing between mental retardation as a general deficit of thinking and mental retardation that might result from the global effects of a specific deficit in a cognitive module. Using Anderson's (1992a) theory of the minimal cognitive architecture of intelligence and developmental, I show how this distinction can explain the pattern of intellectual strengths and weaknesses in Savant syndrome, Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, and autism. In addition, I discuss the developmental versus difference view and the distinction between organic and cultural familial mental retardation in the light of this theory. I conclude that not only is there no inherent incompatibility between the constructs of general intelligence and modularity of mind but that both are essential to understanding the different patterns of abilities and developmental profiles found in individuals with low IQ.     

The Role of Age and Verbal Ability in the Theory of Mind Task Performance of Subjects with Autism

A number of studies have reported that most children with autism fail theory of mind tasks. It is unclear why certain children with autism pass such tests and what might be different about these subjects. In the present study, the role of age and verbal ability in theory of mind task performance was explored. Data were pooled from 70 autistic, 34 mentally handicapped, and 70 normal young subjects, previously tested for a number of different studies. The analysis suggested that children with autism required far higher verbal mental age to pass false belief tasks than did other subjects. While normally developing children had a 50% probability of passing both tasks at the verbal mental age of 4 years, autistic subjects took more than twice as long to reach this probability of success (at the advanced verbal mental age of 9-2). Possible causal relations between verbal ability and the ability to represent mental states are discussed.