The nature of preschoolers' concept of living and artificial objects

This study investigated preschoolers' living kinds conceptualization by employing an extensive stimulus set and alternate indices of understanding. Thirty-four 3- to 5-year-olds and 36 adult undergraduates completed 3 testing phases involving 4 object classes: plants, animals, mobile, and immobile artifacts. The phases involved inquiries participants generated, what biological properties they attributed and their assignment of "alive" to the 4 classes. The study also focused on preschoolers' conceptual coherence by examining their responding across indices. Results revealed both competence and confusion in preschoolers' living kinds conceptualization relative to adults'. In addition, demonstrations of coherence across testing situations suggest that the beginnings of an abstract, biologically organized framework for understanding of living and nonliving kinds are in place in the preschool period.     

The Development of Preschoolers’ Living Kinds Concept: A Longitudinal Study

Given limitations in the integrative scope of past research, basic questions about the organization and development of preschoolers’ living kinds concept remain open to debate. This study was designed to address past limitations through use of a longitudinal design, extensive stimulus set, and alternate indices of understanding. Thirty‐five English‐speaking 3‐year‐olds from middle‐class families in Albuquerque, NM participated in four testing sessions over 1 year. Indices of understanding included statements that preschoolers generated about various living and nonliving objects, biological properties they attributed to the objects, and their characterization of objects as “alive” or not. Results reveal a multifaceted picture of developmental change in preschoolers’ living kinds concept involving both the construction and elaboration of a core biological understanding.     

Preschoolers' Ability to Distinguish Living Kinds as a Function of Regrowth

In order to acquire a theory of biology, children must acquire knowledge about living kinds. Although many studies have shown that preschool children do not accurately classify living kinds and do not use appropriate properties when asked to decide whether something is a living kind, recent work has shown that 3- and 4-year-olds do know something about biological growth. The ability of kinds to heal through regrowth was used in this paper as a measure of children's implicit understanding that plants and animals can be grouped together. In 3 experiments, children were told that animals, plants, and artifacts had been damaged and were asked whether the objects could heal through regorwth and whether a person could mend them. In all studies, children were sensitive to ontological kind, 4-year-olds realized that both plants and animals can regrow but that artifacts must be fixed by human intervention. 3-year-olds were less knowledgeable but did realize that artifacts cannot regrow. Overall, children showed some biological knowledge, implicity grouping plants and animals together and differentiating them from artifacts.     

Sensing the Coherence of Biology in Contrast to Psychology: Young Children's Use of Causal Relations to Distinguish Two Foundational Domains

To what extent do children understand that biological processes fall into 1 coherent domain unified by distinct causal principles? In Experiments 1 and 2 ( N  =   125) kindergartners are given triads of biological and psychological processes and asked to identify which 2 members of the triad belong together. Results show that 5-year-olds correctly cluster biological processes and separate them from psychological ones. Experiments 3 and 4 ( N  =   64) examine whether or not children make this distinction because they understand that biological and psychological processes operate according to fundamentally different causal mechanisms. The results suggest that 5-year-olds do possess this understanding, and furthermore, they have intuitions about the nature of these different mechanisms.     

Preschool children use linguistic form class and pragmatic cues to interpret generics

Generic noun phrases (e.g., "Bats live in caves") are important for expressing knowledge about abstract kinds. Past work has found that parents frequently use generic noun phrases in their speech to young children. However, little is known regarding how children understand these expressions, nor which cues signal generic meaning. The present set of 5 studies examined the influence of linguistic form class (e.g., "What color are dogs?" [generic] versus "What color are the dogs?" [nongeneric]) and of pragmatic context (e.g., "What color are they?" in the presence of either a single exemplar [generic] or multiple exemplars [nongeneric]). Participants were 2-year-olds (N = 42), 3-year-olds (N = 40), 4-year-olds (N = 40), and adults (N = 51). The data indicate that by 2 years of age, children use linguistic form class, and by 3 years of age, children use pragmatic context. These findings demonstrate that young children have begun to understand the distinction between generic and nongeneric noun phrases from a very young age, and that identification of generics is signaled not by formal or pragmatic cues alone, but by a combination of information from both language form and pragmatic context. It is suggested that children make use of multiple linguistic and conceptual cues to acquire and interpret generics.     

Lexical categorization modalities in pre-school children: Influence of perceptual and verbal tasks

This study investigates how categorical organization functions in pre-school children, focusing on the dichotomy between living and nonliving things. The variables of familiarity, frequency of word use and perceptual complexity were controlled. Sixty children aged between 4 years and 5 years 10 months were investigated. Three tasks were used: a naming task; a concepts deconstruction task; and a concepts construction task. Results indicated that age influences: (a) the picture naming and concepts deconstruction task, with older children performing better, and (b) the prevalence of functional features for the inanimate stimuli. These data show that it would be risky to argue that there is a pre-eminence of one concept component without considering the task involved, which is of particular importance in the educational domain.     

The role of language, appearance, and culture in children's social category-based induction

Four studies examined whether Israeli 5-year-olds (N = 88) and adults (N = 48) drew inferences about psychological properties based on a character's social category, personality trait, or physical appearance trait. Study 1 revealed that while children drew inferences mostly by social category, adults did it by personality trait. Study 2 showed that the children's pattern was not due to how the categorical information was conveyed. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that for kindergarteners, labels, not appearances, are determinant of the inductive potential of social categories. Studies indicated that "Jew" and "Arab" were the most inductively powerful social categories for both children and adults. The results carry implications for the roles of language, appearances, and culture in the conceptualization of "human kinds."     

Do Lions Have Manes? For Children,Generics Are About Kinds Rather Than Quantities

Generic statements (e.g., “Lions have manes”) make claims about kinds (e.g., lions as a category) and, for adults, are distinct from quantificational statements (e.g., “Most lions have manes”), which make claims about how many individuals have a given property. This article examined whether young children also understand that generics do not depend purely on quantitative information. Five‐year‐olds (n = 36) evaluated pairs of questions expressing properties that were matched in prevalence but varied in whether adults accept them as generically true (e.g., “Do lions have manes?” [true] vs. “Are lions boys?” [false]). Results demonstrated that children evaluate generics based on more than just quantitative information. Data suggest that even young children recognize that generics make claims about kinds.     

Metacognition and control of study choice in children

Middle childhood may be crucial for the development of metacognitive monitoring and study control processes. The first three experiments, using different materials, showed that Grade 3 and Grade 5 children exhibited excellent metacognitive resolution when asked to make delayed judgments of learning (JOLs, using an analogue scale) or binary judgments of knowing (JOKs, ‘know’ or ‘don’t know’) without the target being present. (The delayed method used here also results in excellent metacognitive resolution in adults). In three subsequent experiments after making JOLs the children were asked to choose which items they would like to restudy to optimize learning. We then either honored or dishonored the children’s restudy choices, and tested their memory performance. In Experiment 4, honoring the children’s choices made no difference to final recall performance. Experiments 5 and 6 showed that when the computer, rather than the children, chose the items for restudy based on theoretical constraints proposed by the Region of Proximal Learning model of study time allocation, the children’s recall performance improved. In all three experiments, Grade 3 children’s choices were random. Whereas the Grade 5 children showed some indication of a metacognitively guided strategy of choosing the lowest JOL items for study, it did not, consistently, improve performance. Apparently, accurate metacognitive monitoring is largely in place in middle childhood, but is not yet converted into effective implementation strategies. This dissociation between metaknowledge and its implementation in choice behavior needs to be taken into account by educators aiming to design interventions to enhance learning in children at this age.     

Categories of Environmental Print: All Logos are Not Created Equal

The purpose of this research was to investigate whether different kinds of environmental print logos were known more frequently by young children than other kinds. Sixty-one 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were assessed on 20 full-context color pictures of environmental print logos. These 20 logos were divided into three categories: community (signs prevalent in the local community; e.g., McDonald’s, Kroger), household (items found in many American homes: e.g., Doritos, Crest), and child (items associated with children rather than adults; e.g., Toy Story 2, Lego). Chi-squares were run to determine whether, as hypothesized, the child logos would be better known than the community and household logos within: (1) the whole sample, (2) each of the three age groups, and (3) both genders. As expected, child logos were the best known by all age groups and both boys and girls. However, the differences between the three categories were not significant for the 3-year-olds. This paper concludes with advice to teachers of young children on how to use child related environmental print logos in their classrooms.     

On Wooden Pillows: Multiple Classification and Children''s Category-based Inductions

Previous research has indicated that preschoolers do not distinguish between properties that are generalizable within a given category and those that are not. 2 possible general constraints on children's cognition are proposed to account for these findings. 3 studies are reported that argue against the presence of such general constraints. We examine preschoolers' understanding of the properties associated with material (e.g., wood, cotton) and object (e.g., chair, pillow) categories. In Study 1, subjects consistently made inductions based on the material compositions of items when asked to predict texture and fragility. In Study 2, the same subjects judged that items that shared material would share an unfamiliar dispositional property (e.g., gets sodden in water), but items that shared object kind would share a novel functional property (e.g., used for accelerating). Study 3 tested a younger sample of 3-year-olds and found the same sensitivity to category type, albeit with larger individual differences. By age 3, children use different modes of categorization to generalize different kinds of phenomena. These results argue against general limitations on children's abilities to use categories to make inductions. Even when children lack specific theoretical knowledge, the ability to organize phenomena into domains allows children to recognize which categories are relevant in different situations. This understanding can provide a basis for the development of more specific theories.     

How Young Children Understand Electric Circuits: Prediction,explanation and exploration

This paper reports findings from a study of young children’s views about electric circuits. Twenty‐eight children aged 5 and 6 years were interviewed. They were shown examples of circuits and asked to predict whether they would work and explain why. They were then invited to try out some of the circuit examples or make circuits of their own choosing. Children expressed a variety of views about the connections needed in a circuit, offered different kinds of explanation and showed differing levels of competence in circuit making. The range of responses showed similarities to those of older students found in previous research. The relationship between practical competence, prediction, and explanation was not straightforward. For example, children with similar levels of practical competence made different predictions or offered different kinds of explanation. Analysis of the circuits children chose to construct suggested influences of existing competence and knowledge. In particular, some children tested out circuit examples about which they had been unsure during the interview, while others explored circuit connections more generally. Findings underline the importance of drawing on a variety of evidence in assessing young children’s understandings of electric circuits. They indicate that young children may offer views about electric circuits not unlike those of older children and adults with similar experience. Finally, there was some suggestion that the interview procedure may have acted as an instructive stimulus in helping children to become more conscious of their own views and reflect on their thinking in the light of further evidence.     

The Development of Children's Beliefs about Social and Biological Aspects of Gender Differences

2 studies examined children's beliefs about the origins of gender differences and addressed 2 main questions: (a) What age-related changes are there in children's beliefs about the contributions of nature and nurture to the development of gender roles? and (b) Do children differentiate between aspects of gender roles that adults believe to be more biologically determined and those they believe to be more socially influenced? 160 4- to 10-year-olds and 32 adults participated in Study 1. Participants were told about a child raised with only opposite-sex individuals and were asked whether the child would grow up to possess a series of gender-stereotyped, biological, and control properties. Until age 9 or 10, children believed that gender-stereotyped properties would develop in an infant regardless of the social context of upbringing. Study 2 provides evidence that children were not merely reporting stereotypical category associations. These studies suggest that young children may have an early bias to view gender categories as predictive of essential, underlying similarities between members, but later come to acknowledge the role of other causal mechanisms (e.g., the social environment) in shaping how category members develop.     

Young Children's Understanding of the Mind-Body Distinction

4 experiments investigated children's understanding of the mind-body distinction. Children of ages 4 and 5 recognized not only the differential modifiability of changeable versus unchangeable human properties and bodily versus mental properties, but also the independence of activities of bodily organs from a person's intention (Experiment 1). When presented 3 types of causal explanations (i.e., intentional, vitalistic, mechanical), 6-year-olds chose most often as most plausible for bodily functions vitalistic explanations (i.e., those ascribing the phenomena to a relevant bodily organ's initiative and effortful engagement in activity); 8-year-olds chose the vitalistic explanations second most often, following mechanical ones (Experiment 2). However, 6-year-olds, as well as 8-year-olds and adults, did not always choose vitalistic explanations over intentional explanations (Experiment 3); whereas they tended to prefer vitalistic explanations for biological phenomena, they predominantly accepted intentional ones for psychological phenomena (Experiment 3A). These results suggest that children as young as 6 years of age have acquired a form of biology as an autonomous domain which is separate from that of psychology.     

Emerging Differentiation of Folkbiology and Folkpsychology: Attributions of Biological and Psychological Properties to Living Things

Research suggests that for adults, "folkpsychology" and "folkbiology" represent distinct conceptual domains for reasoning about living things. However, it is not clear whether these domains are distinct for children; past work suggests that the 2 systems are confused until age 10, and that radical theory change accounts for eventual differentiation. To examine this claim, 16 subjects each at ages 6, 8, and adult were shown pictures of predatory and domestic animals and asked whether each animal displayed a variety of biological properties (e.g., has blood) and psychological properties (e.g., can think, can feel angry). Subjects at all ages showed clearly different attribution patterns for biological versus psychological properties. This dissociation of attribution patterns provides evidence that by kindergarten, notions of folkpsychology and folkbiology are sufficiently differentiated to constitute distinct and independent conceptual domains. This in turn suggests that radical theory change regarding living things either occurs prior to the beginning of formal education, or does not explain the development of folkbiological knowledge.     

If You Had My Brain, Where Would I Be? Children''s Understanding of the Brain and Identity

When do children distinguish a person's subjective identity from their outward bodily characteristics? As adults this distinction is evident in our commonsense recognition that a hypothetical brain transplant would entail a transplant of the mind or self. 4 studies were conducted to examine children's judgments about hypothetical body part transplants, including transplants of the brain, heart, mouth, and face. The results showed that during the elementary school years children are acquiring a firm understanding of the brain as the primary locus of psychological attributes and identity. The early school years, between the ages of 5 and 7 years, appeared to be a transitional phase, with performance being variable and subject to task conditions. While children this age readily imagined the consequences of transplants between themselves and another character of categorically different status (i.e., a pig or baby), they had great difficulty with proposed transplants between themselves and another child of the same status. Knowledge about categorical differences appeared to provide a needed framework for children's budding thinking about psychological differences.     

National survey of problems and competencies among four- to sixteen-year-olds: parents' reports for normative and clinical samples.

We compared parent-reported problems and competencies for national samples of 2,600 4-16-year-olds assessed at intake into mental health services and 2,600 demographically matched nonreferred children assessed in a home interview survey. Parents responded to the ACQ Behavior Checklist, which includes 23 competence items, three competence scales, 216 problem items, eight syndrome scales, Internalizing, Externalizing, and total competence and problem scores. Most items and scales discriminated significantly (p less than .01) between referred and nonreferred samples. There were important sex and age differences in problem patterns, but regional and ethnic differences were minimal. Somewhat more problems and fewer competencies were reported for lower- than upper-socioeconomic-status children. Referral rates were similar in the most urban and rural areas, but they were significantly higher in areas of intermediate urbanization. Correlations of problem scores with those obtained 10 years earlier in a regional survey and with surveys in other countries showed considerable consistency in the rank order of prevalence rates among specific problems. Apparently owing to its more differentiated response scales, the ACQ was susceptible to respondent characteristics that reduced its discriminative power below that of the Child Behavior Checklist. Comparisons of procedures for discriminating between the normal and the clinical range supported the value of a borderline category for children who are neither clearly normal nor clearly deviant. Interview data from the survey sample yielded significantly higher ACQ problem scores for children who had fewer related adults in their homes, those who had more unrelated adults in their homes, those whose biological parents were unmarried, separated, or divorced, those whose families received public assistance, and those whose household or family members had received mental health services. Children who scored higher on Externalizing than Internalizing problems tended to have unmarried, separated, or divorced parents and to come from families receiving public assistance. However, among children whose household or family members had received mental health services, there were greater proportions of both Externalizing and Internalizing patterns than among other children.