Relative roles of general and complementation language in theory-of-mind development: evidence from Cantonese and English

Complex complements are clausal objects containing tensed verbs (e.g., that she cried) or infinitives (e.g., to cry), following main verbs of communication or mental activities (e.g., say, want). This research examined whether English- and Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds' complement understanding uniquely predicts their representation of other minds (i.e., theory of mind). Results showed that neither meaning of main verbs (communication vs. desire) nor complement structure (tensed vs. infinitival) affected the correlation between complement understanding and theory of mind. More important, the correlation became insignificant after controlling for general language comprehension. These findings led to the conclusion that the syntax of complement per se does not contribute uniquely to theory-of-mind development; general language comprehension is a more important factor to consider.     

Language, cognitive flexibility, and explicit false belief understanding: longitudinal analysis in typical development and specific language impairment

The hypothesis that language plays a role in theory-of-mind (ToM) development is supported by a number of lines of evidence (e.g., H. Lohmann & M. Tomasello, 2003). The current study sought to further investigate the relations between maternal language input, memory for false sentential complements, cognitive flexibility, and the development of explicit false belief understanding in 91 English-speaking typically developing children (M age = 61.3 months) and 30 children with specific language impairment (M age = 63.0 months). Concurrent and longitudinal findings converge in supporting a model in which maternal language input predicts the child's memory for false complements, which predicts cognitive flexibility, which in turn predicts explicit false belief understanding.     

Sequential progressions in a theory-of-mind scale: longitudinal perspectives

Consecutive retestings of 92 U.S. preschoolers (n=30), Chinese preschoolers (n=31), and deaf children (n=31) examined whether the sequences of development apparent in cross-sectional results with a theory-of-mind scale also appeared in longitudinal assessment. Longitudinal data confirmed that theory-of-mind progressions apparent in cross-sectional scaling data also characterized longitudinal sequences of understanding for individual children. The match between cross-sectional and longitudinal sequences appeared for children who exhibit different progressions across cultures (United States vs. China) and for children with substantial delays (deaf children of hearing parents). Moreover, greater scale distances reflected larger longitudinal age differences.     

Executive functioning and preschoolers' understanding of false beliefs, false photographs, and false signs

Two studies were conducted to investigate the specificity of the relationship between preschoolers' emerging executive functioning skills and false belief understanding. Study 1 ( N =44) showed that 3- to 5-year-olds' performance on an executive functioning task that required selective suppression of actions predicted performance on false belief tasks, but not on false photograph tasks. Study 2 ( N =54) replicated the finding from Study 1 and showed that performance on the executive functioning task also predicted 3- to 5-year-olds' performance on false sign tasks. These findings show that executive functioning is required to reason only about representations that are intended to reflect a true state of affairs. Results are discussed with respect to theories of preschoolers' theory-of-mind development.     

Individual differences in children's developing theory of mind and implications for metacognition

For readers interested in metacognition broadly, this review article introduces some of the recent research and theory concerning children's developing understanding of mental states, focusing particularly on attempts to understand individual differences in development. We contend that the conceptual developments investigated by “theory of mind” researchers constitute a foundation for later metacognition. We examine studies that have focused on individual differences in children's developing understanding of mental states, particularly those investigating its antecedents in early social interactions. Implications from theory-of-mind research for an understanding of metacognition are articulated.     

自闭症儿童的心理理论发展及其与言语能力的关系

研究用5个信念任务测量心理理论能力,用皮博迪图片词汇测验测量言语能力,比较12名自闭症儿童和同等言语能力的28名正常儿童的表现,并分析了心理理论和言语能力的相关。结果表明:(1)自闭症儿童的心理理论发展显著落后于同等言语智力的正常儿童;(2)自闭症和正常儿童的信念理解发展序列基本一致;(3)心理理论和言语能力保持中度相关,但控制年龄因素后的偏相关不显著。本研究支持心理理论发展的领域特殊性观点。     

Social and cognitive correlates of children's lying behavior

The relation between children's lie-telling and their social and cognitive development was examined. Children (3–8 years) were told not to peek at a toy. Most children peeked and later lied about peeking. Children's subsequent verbal statements were not always consistent with their initial denial and leaked critical information revealing their deceit. Children's conceptual moral understanding of lies, executive functioning, and theory-of-mind understanding were also assessed. Children's initial false denials were related to their first-order belief understanding and their inhibitory control. Children's ability to maintain their lies was related to their second-order belief understanding. Children's lying was related to their moral evaluations. These findings suggest that social and cognitive factors may play an important role in children's lie-telling abilities.     

To lie or not to lie? The influence of parenting and theory-of-mind understanding on three-year-old children’s honesty

Prior studies have demonstrated that social-cognitive factors such as children’s false-belief understanding and parenting style are related to children’s lie-telling behaviors. The present study aimed to investigate how earlier forms of theory-of-mind understanding contribute to children’s lie-telling as well as how parenting practices are related to children’s antisocial lie-telling behaviors (rather than prosocial lie-telling as examined in previous studies). Seventy-three three-year-olds from Hangzhou, P. R. China were asked not to peek at a toy in the experimenter’s absence. The majority of children who peeked, lied about it. Children’s lies were positively related to performance on the knowledge-ignorance theory-of-mind task. Additionally, Control parenting, characterized by high levels of monitoring and demanding, unquestioning obedience, was negatively related to three-year-olds’ lying. The relation between Control parenting and lie-telling was partially mediated by children’s theory-of-mind understanding. These findings suggest that children’s early lie-telling behaviors are influenced by social and social-cognitive factors.     

Relationship between perceptions of classroom climate and institutional goal structures and student motivation,engagement and intention to persist in college

Disengagement and a lack of motivation have been found to be the major reasons for student drop out from higher education. In order to broaden our understanding of institutional and personal factors associated with intention to complete a college degree, this investigation examined the relationship between students’ perceptions of classroom climate and institutional goal structures and their motivational orientation, engagement and intention to persist in college. Data was collected from first-year students (N = 1778) enrolled in an institution of higher education near Bangkok, Thailand. The results indicate that perceptions of classroom climate and institutional goal structures have significant associations with students’ motivational orientations and levels of engagement and contribute to intention to persist in college.     

Neurodevelopmental Correlates of Theory of Mind in Preschool Children

Baseline electroencephalogram (EEG) data were collected from twenty-nine 4-year-old children who also completed batteries of representational theory-of-mind (RTM) tasks and executive functioning (EF) tasks. Neural sources of children's EEG alpha (6–9 Hz) were estimated and analyzed to determine whether individual differences in regional EEG alpha activity predicted children's RTM performance, while statistically controlling for children's age and EF skills. Results showed that individual differences in EEG alpha activity localized to the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and the right temporal–parietal juncture (rTPJ) were positively associated with children's RTM performance. These findings suggest that the maturation of dMPFC and rTPJ is a critical constituent of preschoolers' explicit theory-of-mind development.     

Responses to refusals of requests: Face threat and persistence,persuasion and forgiving statements

Wilson et al.'s (1998) revision of politeness theory has been applied to requesting, refusing and relational development, finding that different types of face threat are present in an interaction depending on the interaction goals. This investigation seeks to extend Wilson et al.'s (1998) work by determining how threats to a speaker's and hearer's face needs influence a requester's desire to persist and use of persuasion and forgiving statements after refusal. Results indicate that refusals creating greater threat to the positive and negative face needs of requesters yield greater desire to persist and use of persuasion statements. Specific face threats did not appear to be related to use of forgiving statements.     

Young Children's Reasoning About the Effects of Emotional and Physiological States on Academic Performance

This study assessed young children's understanding of the effects of emotional and physiological states on cognitive performance. Five, 6-, 7-year-olds, and adults ( N = 96) predicted and explained how children experiencing a variety of physiological and emotional states would perform on academic tasks. Scenarios included: (a) negative and positive emotions, (b) negative and positive physiological states, and (c) control conditions. All age groups understood the impairing effects of negative emotions and physiological states. Only 7-year-olds, however, showed adult-like reasoning about the potential enhancing effects of positive internal states and routinely cited cognitive mechanisms to explain how internal states affect performance. These results shed light on theory-of-mind development and also have significance for children's everyday school success.     

Let's Talk: Parents’ Mental Talk (Not Mind-Mindedness or Mindreading Capacity) Predicts Children's False Belief Understanding

Although one might expect parents’ mind-mindedness (MM; the propensity to view children as mental agents) to relate to everyday mental-state talk (MST) and theory-of-mind capacity, evidence to support this view is lacking. In addition, both the uniqueness and the specificity of relations between parental MM, parental MST, and children's false belief understanding (FBU) are open to question. To address these three gaps, this study tracked 117 preschoolers (60 boys) and their parents across a 13-month period (M_age = 3.94 years, SD = 0.53, at Time 1). Parental MM, MST, and theory-of-mind capacity showed little overlap. Both MM and MST were weakly associated with children's concurrent FBU, but in line with social constructivist accounts, only MST predicted later FBU.     

8～11岁农村留守儿童失言理解的发展

该文运用失言理解任务考察了123名8-11岁留守儿童失言理解的发展,得出如下结论:(1)农村留守儿童在失言理解任务上的得分随年龄呈不断增长趋势;(2)农村留守儿童在失言理解任务上的三种心理状态(失言的识别判断、情绪理解、意图理解)的发展趋势是对失言的识别判断早于情绪理解和意图理解。     

Theory of mind and self-control: more than a common problem of inhibition

This study tested the theory that advances on theory-of-mind tasks and on executive function tasks show a strong correlation because the typically used theory-of-mind tasks pose the same executive demands. In Experiment 1 with fifty-six 3- to 6-year-old children, performance on the dimensional change card-sorting task as an executive function task was correlated with performance on the usual false-belief prediction task, r = .65, and the false-belief explanation task, r = .65, as measures of theory-of-mind development. Because the explanation version of the false-belief test is supposed to be free of the alleged executive demands inherent in the prediction version, the equally strong correlation with the executive function task suggests that this correlation cannot be due to common executive demands. In Experiment 2, the basic finding of Experiment 1 was replicated on another sample of 73 children, ages 3 to 5.5 years. The need for new theories to explain the developmental link between theory of mind and executive function development is discussed, and some existing candidates are evaluated.     

Children's understanding of the distinction between intentions and desires

Much of the previous research on children's understanding of intentions confounded intentions with desires. Intentions and desires are different, in that a desire can be satisfied in a number of ways, but an intention must be satisfied by carrying out the intended action. Children 3 through 7 years of age and adults were presented with situations in which intentions were satisfied but desires were not, or vice versa, in a story-comprehension task (N = 71) and a target-hitting game (N = 45). Although 3- and 4-year-olds were unable to differentiate desires and intentions consistently, 5- and 7-year-olds often matched the adult pattern. Younger children's difficulties in understanding intentions are discussed in terms of their use of a desire-outcome matching strategy and the representational complexities of intentions.     

教师参与课程发展:调查与反思

教师参与课程发展要取得良好效果至少要以一定的课程权力、课程能力和教师的参与意愿作保证。2008年6—9月,在对黑龙江省三个城市部分中小学教师参与课程发展的实际情况进行调查的基础上,笔者发现,当前教师们参与课程发展的意愿不强,能力不足,尚未明确参与课程发展的重要意义。     

Development of children's knowledge about unconsciousness

Children of ages 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 years, and adults were asked whether people who are sound asleep and not dreaming could or would: (1) see, hear, listen, notice, think, wish, pretend, and feel things (primary-consciousness activities), (2), know that they are asleep, and know whether they are or are not engaged in primary-consciousness activities such as perceiving and thinking (reflective-consciousness activities), (3) deliberately decide to or try to perform mental or physical actions (control activities). Results indicated that the recognition that people do not engage in conscious mental activities when unconscious is still developing during the late middle-childhood years. We speculate that a developing understanding of consciousness may assist the development of an understanding of unconsciousness and vice versa, and that sensitivity to the phenomenology as contrasted with the content of mental states may be a late acquisition in the theory-of-mind area.     

Mind what mother says: narrative input and theory of mind in typical children and those on the autism spectrum

In 2 studies mothers read wordless storybooks to their preschool-aged children; narratives were analyzed for mental state language. Children's theory-of-mind understanding (ToM) was concurrently assessed. In Study 1, children's (N=30; M age 3 years 9 months) ToM task performance was significantly correlated with mothers' explanatory, causal, and contrastive talk about cognition, but not with mothers' simple mentions of cognition. In Study 2, the same pattern was found in an older sample of typically developing children (N=24; M age 4 years 7 months), whereas for children on the autism spectrum (N=24; M age 6 years 7.5 months), ToM task performance was uniquely correlated with mothers' explanatory, causal, and contrastive talk about emotions.