MASS MEDIA, THE ELECTORATE, AND THE BANDWAGON. A STUDY OF COMMUNICATION EFFECTS ON VOTE CHOICE IN GERMANY

The paper addresses two propositions: (1) that by publishingnews stories about the electoral strength of parties or candidates,the mass media contribute to shaping the voters' expectationsabout the likely outcome of an upcoming election; (2) that theseexpectations in turn stimulate a bandwagon effect, i.e. theyinfluence vote choice to the advantage of the apparent futurewinner of the election. Analyzing media content and survey datagathered during the campaign for the first all-German nationalelection of December 2, 1990, it can be shown that (1) interestin the media's political reporting as well as interpersonalpolitical communication contributed significantly to convertingvoters to the view of the election outcome that was constantlypresented by the mass media; (2) this belief in turn causedparticularly unsophisticated independent voters to vote forthe apparent winner of the election. Referring to the conceptualframework of ‘low information rationality’, thisbandwagon effect is interpreted as ‘majority-led proxyvoting’. Since public opinion polls play the key rolein its definition, the media portrayal of the competing parties'electoral prospects can be assumed to be fairly accurate, sothat voters relying on such information in casting their voteare not misled.     

THE 'OTHER' AS THE VULNERABLE VOTER: A STUDY OF THE THIRD-PERSON EFFECT IN THE 1988 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

The tendency for individuals to perceive a greater impact ofmedia messages on others than on the self, Davison (1983) argues,has led to a number of policy decisions in which éliteshave exercised control of mass media messages in order to ‘protect’vulnerable others. The third-person effect has been well-documentedin experimental research with little attention to its theoreticalunderpinnings, or its antecedents or consequences. This articleargues that the third-person effect can be understood throughattribution theory, especially through the concepts of self-servingbias and effectance motivation. Second, it demonstrates thatthe third-person effect is influenced by certain social structuralfactors, media use patterns, and perceived harm of content.Finally, while perceptions of harm are related to perceptionsof influence, influence does not play a role in predicting supportfor external control of media content, while perceived harmhas a significant impact.     

VALUE-FRAMING ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN APPLICATION OF MEDIA SYSTEM DEPENDENCY THEORY

This paper is in the tradition of social analysis aimed at creatingframeworks to join mass media and public opinion processes (e.g.Clarke and Evans, 1983; Gamson, 1975; Gitlin, 1980; Hall, 1977;Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Lang and Lang, 1968, 1983; Lippman,1922; Mollotch and Lester, 1974; Noelle-Neuman, 1974; Paletzand Entman, 1981; Shaw and McCombs, 1977; Turner and Paz, 1986).After a brief review of media system dependency (MSD) theory,we illustrate how it may apply to public opinion processes thatentail contested issue ‘value-frames’ (Ball-Rokeachand Rokeach, 1987). In such cases, the media system is directlyimplicated in the negotiation of legitimacy of opposing positionson an issue. Our illustrative case is the abortion issue asit has been played out in the United States over recent decades(Luker, 1984). We focus upon the respective capacities of pro-and anti-abortion movements to control the value-frame of mediacoverage of the issue (Guthrie, 1989). A value-frame may beconceived as ‘... the main substantive theme of a moralityplay’ (Ball-Rokeach and Tallman, 1979) wherein the distinctionbetween ‘good’ and ‘bad’ hangs in thebalance; in this case, between positions on abortion. We suggestthat change in the value-frame of media coverage and publicdiscourse may be understood, at least in part, as an outcomeof change in contestants' MSD relations.     

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF TELEVISION INFLUENCE AND OPINIONS ABOUT CENSORSHIP IN SINGAPORE

It is a common assumption that in many countries mass mediacensorship is imposed by an authoritarian government on an unwillingpublic. This study examines public opinion about televisioncensorship in the island nation of Singapore. More specifically,we tested the third-person effect hypothesis, which suggeststhat people expect media content to have more negative influenceon others than on themselves, and that some support for censorshipis based on that perceptual bias. Data for the study came from face-to-face interviews with 506randomly selected Singaporeans who evaluated ten categoriesof ‘sensitive’ television content. Results revealed(1) a substantial perceptual bias in all content categories;(2) generally strong opinion favoring censorship of televisioncontent; and (3) a significant relationship between these twofactors, suggesting that people may support censorship of mediain part because of a tendency to overestimate its negative influence.     

Priming Effects of Late-Night Comedy

Having become fully integrated into the contemporary politicallandscape, infotainment-oriented media extend Americans’traditional news (e.g. newspaper, radio, and television) toinclude a greater number of sources for political information,and in some cases, political mobilization. Given the increasingprominence of infotainment-oriented media in contemporary politics,this study addresses the effects of one particular type of infotainment—late-nightcomedy—during the 2000 presidential campaign. Specifically,we are interested in whether watching late-night comedy showsinfluences viewers’ evaluations of the candidates whohave appeared on these shows; in particular, we investigatepriming as the mechanism by which such influences occur. Findingsfrom the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey (N = 11,482)indicate that evaluations of candidates are based in part onrespondents’ sociodemographics, perceptions of candidatesto handle certain issues, and their character traits. Therewas a main effect of watching late-night comedy on evaluationsof candidates; more importantly, viewers were more likely thannonviewers to base their evaluations of George W. Bush on charactertraits after he appeared on The Late Show with David Letterman.     

MEASURING THE THIRD-PERSON EFFECT OF NEWS: THE IMPACT OF QUESTION ORDER, CONTRAST AND KNOWLEDGE

This study investigated the extent to which the third-personeffect—the tendency of people to estimate greater impactof media messages on ‘other people’ than on themselves—mightdepend upon question-contrast effects (i.e. self-serving comparisonstriggered by back-to-back questions dealing with effect on othersand oneself), the order of questions, and respondents' levelsof background political knowledge. Two hundred and eighty-sevensubjects participated in two experimental studies involvingquestions about media coverage of President Clinton's possiblerole in the ‘Whitewater Affair’, his alleged frequentpolicy reversals, the O. J. Simpson murder trial, and childmolestation charges against Michael Jackson. Both experimentsresulted in significant third-person effects that did not dependupon having the same respondents answer both questions; meansfor single-question (no contrast) conditions did not differsignificantly from comparable means in two-question (contrast)conditions. No significant main effects of question order wereobserved. In Experiment 1 a significant interaction betweenpolitical knowledge and question order was found, such thata negative relationship between knowledge and perceived impacton oneself emerged when the ‘self’ question followeda question about perceived effects on others. Experiment 2 replicatedthe interaction for two of three news stimuli, and indicatedthat it was not a product of differences in the personal importanceof issues. Implications of these results for understanding thethird-person effect are discussed.     

THE STRUCTURATION OF EUROPE

Europe is characterized by a unique path of social differentiation.The ‘two swords’—state and church—thatstructured western European society in the Middle Ages havesince multiplied into six. Six cardinal institutions of society—theeconomy, government, science, religion, ethics, and art—eachmaintain a large measure of independence. Each is dependenton a special type of freedom: civic liberties, free trade, academicfreedom, religious toleration, the right to follow one’sconscience, artistic licence. The modern Europeans are offeredthe opportunity to create self-chosen biographies in their questfor wealth, order, truth, salvation, virtue, and beauty. Thesuccess of the EC depends on finding a form that suits thismainstream of European structuration. The appropriate form seemscloser to the model of ancient Athens that that of the RomanEmpire. Public opinion plays a vital role in integrating thistype of social order.     

MEDIA INFLUENCES ON SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN PRIMARY ELECTIONS: THEORY, METHOD, AND EVIDENCE

In this article the authors argue that studies of the influenceof the mass media on public support for presidential candidatesin primary elections should return to the social pyschologicalmodel of attitude change. This model should take into account,however, that in the real world, unlike laboratory settings,randomization and complete controls of variables are not possible,and rational and strategic choice considerations come into play,along with the cumulative effects of new information on aggregateopinion. The variables found to be relevant to attitude change,especially the characteristics of the communicator and the communication,have not been studied systematically in natural settings. Littleis known about how new information unrelated to electoral ‘momentum’affects the public's evaluations and support for candidates.A fuller explanation is needed of what are complex media influenceson candidate support in primary elections—including especiallythose messages conveyed through the media which tend to be distinctiveand most accessible to memory: information about the viabiltiyof candidates; positive messages and images conveyed directlyfrom the candidates themselves and (to a lesser extent) fromother major party leaders who support or oppose them; and, ofspecial theoretical importance, the ostensibly credible newscommentary about the candidates.     

Katrin Doveling (2005). Emotionen--Medien--Gemeinschaft. Eine kommunikationssoziologische Analyse [Emotions--media--community. A study from the perspective of communication sociology]. Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag, 340 pp., ISBN 3-531-14236-4.

‘Here is a book that makes you want to shout, "Finally!"’That is the opening sentence of a recent book review that theauthor of this review wrote for the International Journal ofPublic Opinion Research about Campaigning for Hearts and Minds:How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work by Ted Brader (2006).The remark refers to the fact that Brader’s book focuseson an issue that has thus far received very little attentionin the field of communication studies, or, for that matter,in the fields of political science or sociology, namely, themajor role emotions play in explaining collective behavior,social decisions, opinion formation and—especially inthe case at hand—the effects of media coverage on opinionformation. Now, in the form of Katrin Döveling’scomprehensive new     

Keeping Our Research Up to Date: Is the Election Cycle Too Fast for Scholarship=

This research scrutinizes 5 background assumptions frequently overlooked by scholars working within the third-person framework. These include: the kind of media influence (general vs. specific) referenced by respondents, the use of general versus specific "other" groups, neglect of likely second-person effects, distinguishing the problem as portrayed from the problem itself, and the potential range of behavioral effects. The study probed the influence of racial cues contained in a news story on estimates of the story's influence on self and others. Participants (n = 152) were presented with a news article conveying information that prostitutes were operating in a local neighborhood and local residents were upset. The study varied 2 experimental factors: the race of the prostitutes (White vs. African American) and the racial composition of the neighborhood residents (minority vs. White). Several important findings emerged from the study. First, manipulated elements of story content had a direct effect on estimates of the portrayal's influence on others. Second, the range of effects attributed to the media included specific factors such as thinking, feeling, problem importance, and harmful impact of the content. In addition to considering media censorship as a possible corrective measure, the study explored the influence of first-, second-, and third-person effects on a broader range of suggested actions, including increased criminal penalties and interpersonal discussion. Third-person "perceptual" effects were found throughout the data; however, they had little discernable effect on intended behaviors. Second-person effects significantly predicted proposed remedial actions and opinion expression. Discussion centers on the prospect of reorienting the third-person framework toward an expanded view of media effects and closer integration with other approaches to mass communication.     

Editorial

If the founders and editors of the International Journal ofPublic Opinion Research described the ideal spectrum of thejournal’s content, we would all very likely enumeratethe following five dimensions, usually in a comparative and/orinternational context: theories about the dynamics of publicopinion, methodological problems and developments, the roleof the news media in public communication, public opinion researchas a social and political problem, and public opinion data on     

Personal Bias or Government Bias? Testing the Hostile Media Effect in a Regulated Press System

This study examines the hostile media effect in relation topartisans’ perception of the slant of news coverage ina highly regulated press environment—Singapore. We foundthat partisans in Singapore perceived unbiased news to be infavor of the other side, while the nonpartisans perceived thesame news to be neutral. Our findings show that hostile mediaeffects can persist in a restricted press environment wherepeople are aware of the government's control of media coverage.We also found that partisans’ awareness of the government'scontrol of media information contributed to their perceptionof the article slant as well. Received for publication May 9, 2006. Accepted for publication December 5, 2006.     

THE ACCESSIBILITY BIAS IN POLITICS: TELEVISION NEWS AND PUBLIC OPINION

The influence of television news over public opinion is tracedto the ‘accessibility bias’ in processing information.In general, the argument stipulates that information that canbe more easily retrieved from memory tends to dominate judgments,opinions and decisions. In the area of public affairs, moreaccessible information is information that is more frequentlyof more recently conveyed by the media. Four different manifestationsor the accessibility bias in public opinion are described includingthe effects of news coverage on issue salience, evaluationsof presidential perfomance, attributions of issue responsibility,and voting choices.     

Ted Brader (2006). Campaigns for Hearts and Minds. How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 280 pp., ISBN 0-226-06989-3.

Here is a book that makes you want to shout, ‘Finally!’For decades, political scientists and communication researchershave been focusing intensively on the question of how peoplemake their final voting decision and how this decision is influencedby reporting in the mass media and campaign advertising. Nevertheless,even though there is enough literature on this subject to filla library, only very few studies have dealt with the issue ofemotional appeals in election coverage and campaign advertising—andvoters’ emotional, possibly irrational reactions to theseappeals. Although numerous findings in the fields of psychology,neuroscience, and behavioral research suggest that emotionalappeals and reactions play an important role when it comes toall kinds of decisions—which, of course, also includesvoting decisions—social researchers in the United Statesand elsewhere have,     

Validating the Willingness to Self-Censor Scale: Individual Differences in the Effect of the Climate of Opinion on Opinion Expression

Hayes, Glynn, and Shanahan (2005) defined self-censorship asthe withholding of one’s opinion around an audience perceivedto disagree with that opinion. They argued that people differin their willingness to self-censor and introduced an 8-itemself-report instrument, the Willingness to Self-Censor scale,to measure this individual difference. The results of an experimentalstudy presented here provide further evidence of the constructvalidity of the scale. Each participant in the study was presentedwith a hypothetical scenario that contained information suggestinga group of people the participant was conversing with abouta controversial topic held opinions that were either uniformlysimilar to or different from the participant’s own opinion.Four weeks prior, each participant had responded to the Willingnessto Self-Censor scale and a measure of dispositional shyness.As expected, the manipulation of the climate of opinion affectedwillingness to express an opinion to the group, but more soamong those who scored relatively high on the Willingness toSelf-Censor scale. These results support the notion that somepeople rely on information about the climate of opinion moreso than do others when they decide whether or not to voice theiropinion publicly, and they suggest that the Willingness to Self-Censorscale measures this individual difference.     

Pluralistic Ignorance About Sex: The Direct and the Indirect Effects of Media Consumption on College Students' Misperception of Sex-Related Peer Norms

The term pluralistic ignorance refers to erroneous beliefs heldby a group of individuals about the attitudes or behavior ofothers. In this study, we examined the degree to which collegestudents in Singapore misconceive their peers’ sexualattitudes and behavior. The data for this study came from aweb-based survey involving a random sample of 534 college studentsin Singapore. The results indicate widespread evidence of pluralisticignorance; that is, students believed that their peers weresignificantly more sexually active than was actually the case.The data also suggest that the students formed such erroneousimpressions of peers on the basis, in part, of the students’media consumption and of the students’ own sexual attitudes.     

THE MEDIA AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN HONG KONG 1983-95

This study tests the agenda-setting hypothesis for the environmentalissue in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1995. It was found that theagenda-setting hypothesis was supported for the initial periodof five and a half years. In the subsequent period of sevenand a half years, despite the increased media coverage of theissues, there was a significant drop in the perceived salienceof the environmental problem. This may be due to the dilutionof public attention as a result of diversity in the news agendaand reporting of local environmental problems as ‘soft’news. It was also found that the environmental issue failedto compete with other prominent issues directly affecting thepublic. The mass media played a much less important role inkeeping the environmental issue on the public agenda at thelater stage.     

THE INFLUENCE OF PERCEPTIONS OF MEDIA INFLUENCE: THIRD PERSON EFFECTS AND THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF OPINIONS

This paper explores the role of perceptions of the opinionsof others as they relate to the formation of public opinion.Two interrelated theories involving such perceptions, the thirdperson effect and the spiral of silence, are tested in the contextof public opinion regarding divestment of financial interestsin South Africa. As hypothesized by the third person effect, perceptions of theinfluence of media reports on others were found to be consistentlygreater than perceptions of influence on self. Findings werestrongly supportive of this component of the ‘third personeffect’ hypothesis. Perceptions of the opinions of otherswere also explored in relation to respondents' willingness toexpress their opinions publicly. As suggested by the spiralof silence theory, respondents were found to be more willingto express their opinions publicly when they perceived a trendin support of their viewpoint, or when there was a greater perceivedlikelihood of achieving success for their issue position. The size of the effect produced from joining these two processesis moderated by the role of issue salience. People perceivingdivestment as a highly important issue are more likely to ascribegreater media influence to others than to themselves, but theirwillingness to express their opinions publicly is least likelyto be influenced by perceptions of the climate of opinion.     

TIME-LAG DIFFERENCES IN THE AGENDA-SETTING PROCESS: AN EXAMINATION OF FIVE NEWS MEDIA

Five news media in the U.S. were examined to determine the optimaltime-lag for agenda-setting effects to occur for each. Publicresponses to an open-ended question ‘What is the numberone problem facing our country today?’ were compared tomedia coverage from one to 26 weeks earlier. A number of differenceswere found across the five media. The results show that televisioncoverage had a shorter optimal time-lag than newspapers. Themore immediate effect of television news, however, quickly deteriorated,and newspapers had a stronger long-term agenda-setting effect.National and regional media also had a more immediate impactthan local media. All media, generally, had slightly shorteroptimal time-lags than previous research would suggest.     

Press influence on presidential rhetoric: Lyndon Johnson at Johns Hopkins University,April 7, 1965

This case study traces the evolution of Lyndon Johnson's first major policy address on Vietnam in light of media influence on decisions concerning whether to issue public statements, how to schedule them, and what development the content of such statements should take.