Moral and Religious Education

Abstract

Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral reasoning postulates a supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending, labelled Stage Six. Kohlberg identifies this with a principle of justice, though without adequately justifying the elimination of other autonomous universal principles. The claim that this principle provides consistent, reversible and universalizable moral judgements is criticized: by itself a purely formal principle of justice can provide no particular moral judgements at all; for that we need independent values, such as the value of life which Kohlberg appeals to, but does not justify, in his discussions of the Heinz dilemma. More generally there is no reason to expect that any form of moral reasoning will be supremely adequate in Kohlberg's sense, providing a solution to all moral problems and dilemmas. The principle of justice is merely one among the many specifically moral principles which Kohlberg locats at Stage Five, albeit the one which he personally happens to favour.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Lawrence Kohlberg's many accounts of his cognitive‐developmental theory of moral reasoning is the crucial importance which he attaches to the form of reasoning labelled Stage Six, when it is a stage of development that only a tiny minority of individuals actually attain. Indeed it appears that even that number has had to be revised downward in the light of changes to the theory and scoring system, until it begins to seem that only a handful of saints and heroes, such as Socrates or Martin Luther King, remain. In fact so slender is the empirical evidence for a separate form of Stage Six reasoning that the official scoring manual (Kohlberg et al., 1977) prefers to ignore it altogether. Clearly, then, the case for Stage Six must be almost wholly theoretical, not to say philosophical, as the supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending. And by the same token it may seem that criticisms of Kohlberg's claims for Stage Six will leave the rest of the theory untouched. But that, I think, is to underestimate the significance of Stage Six. It is the apogee of his system, providing both a focus and a rationale for the stage‐development that allegedly leads to it; it is as crucial to the theory as Kohlberg's own writings make it. Without Stage Six the cognitive‐developmental account stands in need of radical re‐thinking, to put it no higher.     

Responsibility,Moral Judgment and Moral Obligation

Abstract

This paper describes the evolution of the just community approach from Lawrence Kohlberg's earliest educational theorizing to the most recent experimental applications. The just community approach represents Kohlberg's most mature theory of moral education and has been the subject of intense research since 1975. Although Kohlberg initially recommended the discussion of moral dilemmas as a means of promoting moral development, he envisaged a far more radical and comprehensive approach. Inspired by a kibbutz school that successfully combined democratic and collectivist values, Kohlberg and his colleagues initiated a series of experimental programmes in public high schools. Evaluation of these programmes indicates that they establish cultures conducive to the development of socio‐moral reasoning and action.     

Broadcasting Ethics: Some Neglected Issues

Abstract

After some preliminary doubts about Kohlberg's method of assessing moral reasoning, his ‘stage‐structural’ theory is criticized under six heads. (1) The claim that the stages constitute structural wholes, representing unified and differentiated patterns of thought: it is argued that the available evidence, and Kohlberg's own methodology, unambiguously implies a developmental continuum, not discrete stage structures. (2) Invariance, which, after counter‐evidence led to a revision in the theory, has yet to be demonstrated. (3) Cultural Universality: it is argued that, because of an ambiguity in the notion of a universal principle, Kohlberg's arguments against cultural relativism tend, if anything, to support it. (4) Logical Necessity: it is argued that Kohlberg shows at most that the sequence forms a hierarchy, from which neither its logical nor even its psychological necessity follows. (5) Increasing Cognitive Adequacy, with the associated claim that it is cognitive conflict which produces movement from one stage to another: it is argued that the empirical evidence conflicts with the theoretical claims, and that the theoretical arguments establish, at most, an increase in moral understanding, which could well increase, rather than decrease, cognitive conflict. (6) Increasing Moral Adequacy: this claim is as yet unjustified in any of its three possible interpretations. Finally it is suggested that Kohlbergian theory is in danger of becoming, in Lakatos's terms, a degenerating research programme.     

A Comparative Study of Moral Development of Korean and British Children

The present study explored Kohlberg's theory of moral development in relation to Korean and British children. A total of 128 Korean and British children aged 7-16 years were interviewed individually using Kohlberg's moral dilemmas, Form A. It was thought that the children in both cultural groups would develop moral stages at a similar rate. However, they showed cultural differences in the use of moral orientations. In addition, it was not possible to match some of the responses from the Korean children to Kohlberg's manual, implying that there are some Korean traditional concepts which affect Korean children's moral reasoning that Kohlberg was not aware of. Thus, Kohlberg's system could be used to examine children's general moral stage but was insufficient to understand fully Korean children's moral reasoning. The present study suggests that the interpretation of children's moral reasoning should be made based on consideration of cultural influence.     

Self‐complexity and Self‐integration: Theory and Therapy in Clinical‐Developmental Psychology

Abstract

The growing field of clinical‐developmental psychology has been influenced by Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral judgement. Too literal a use of structural theory, however, has hindered this field's advancement. This paper argues that a new theory of self is required to apply appropriately developmental theory to clinical practice. The model consists of two related dimensions of self: self‐complexity and biographical themes (schemata and themata). A perspective on normal and atypical development given by the interactions between these components is described and implications for practice are discussed.     

An Overview of the Minnesota Approach to Research in Moral Development

This article traces the history of the Minnesota approach to moral judgement research. It is claimed that this history can be subdivided into four phases, each one associated with a different goal and theoretical consideration. Attention is also given to the issues motivating the different research goals as well as highlights of the outcomes of this work. It is concluded that the Minnesota approach has been a progressive force in the field, promoting change in both theory and measurement and also serving as a stabilising force by reaffirming Kohlberg's basic view that moral judgements are both cognitive and developmental.     

Management in Education

Abstract

This paper uses Durkheim's critique of Kant to criticize Kohlberg's theory of morality. After examining the applicability of Durkheim's criticism of Kant's definition of morality to Kohlberg's equation of morality with justice structures, it explores Durkheim's psychological views on emotional and dispositional aspects of morality, which are typically neglected by Kantians. Some standard criticisms of Durkheim's moral theory are re‐examined and the argument is advanced that Durkheim's social ethic is substantively at Stage Six on Kohlberg's developmental schema. Several modifications of Kohlberg's theory are proposed, using Durkheimian insights.     

Content and Form in Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

Abstract: R?rvik, H. 1980. Content and Form in Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 24,105‐120. One of the fundamental premises in Kohlberg's theory of moral development is the possibility of discerning between form and content, and he maintains that his test measures aspects of form alone. The present article reports on an empirical investigation of that allegation. The results of this study indicate that this part of Kohlberg's theory lacks support in the data. Thus, when teachers study groups of pupils’ answers from the Kohlberg's test, they recognize norms that the school intentionally transmits to pupils. Grading of this norm content and of motivation for choice of norm in moral decisions shows clear relations to grading advocated in connection with Kohlberg's test on moral judgment.     

Kohlberg and Piaget: Aspects of their Relationship in the Field of Moral Development

Abstract:

Kohlberg's system of moral judgment development has some important links with Piaget's work on moral judgment, though Piaget's work is not the only influence on Kohlberg's ideas. Piaget's system of moral growth is briefly examined, and the extent to which subsequent research has validated it, is noted, thus placing Kohlberg in a historical context. The ways in which Kohlberg extends or departs from Piaget's system of moral growth are examined. The concept of stages and the nature and processes of stage development are discussed, and in this context the relationship between Kohlberg's moral development and Piaget's cognitive development is examined. It is concluded on the basis both of logic and evidence that the relationship, although complex rather than isomorphic, is likely to hold considerable potential for future research.     

The Condition of Sophomoritis and its Educational Cure

Abstract

A problematic phase in the transition from conventional to principled moral judgement is characterized as the condition of ‘sophomoritis’. Then an experimental course designed around this problem is described. The course sought to integrate material from ‘Introductory Ethics’ courses with perspectives on moral development from Kohlberg's theory. The effects of the course are described in terms of change on Kohlberg's stages and in terms of qualitative analysis of interview data. The quantitative data indicate an average development of one‐third of a stage, compared to no change in a comparison group. The qualitative analysis presents a framework within which the condition of sophomoritis can be understood in more depth and the impact of this educational experiment can be described.     

A Comparison of Piaget's and Kohlberg's Theories and Tests for Moral Judgment

Abstract:R?rvik, H. 1980. A Comparison of Piaget's and Kohlberg's Theories and Tests for Moral Judgment. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 25,99‐124. Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories for moral judgment are compared. On the basis of this comparison, hypotheses are formulated regarding expected relationships between the tests constructed on the basis of the two theories. The empirical testing of these hypotheses indicates that there are marked similarities between Piaget's and Kohlberg's tests as to characteristics measured, power of discrimination between age levels, and in the stage placement of subjects.

The main differences between the tests seem to be that Piaget's test is most influenced by the personal relationship to other persons. Contrary to the impression given by the theorist himself, Kohlberg's test seems to a larger extent to measure the subjects’ norms and emotional reactions connected to inter‐nalization of norms. Moral behavior is more closely related to Kohlberg's measure.     

Kohl berg's Cognitive‐Developmental Theory in Educational Settings: Some Possible Abuses

Abstract

Kohlberg's cognitive‐developmental theory provides teachers with a framework for understanding the change and development of moral judgment and decision‐making of their pupils. One major abuse, however, may be when teachers take the stage labels associated with the hypothesized stage levels of moral judgment as indicative of static student qualities or characteristics, by placing more emphasis on perceived and labelled qualities than on the actual moral reasoning of the student. This, it is suggested, together with some empirical examples, may obscure the developmental trend of the student's moral judgment or even affect the teacher's expectations and consequently student's performance, and fails to take into account such factors as environment and interpersonal interaction. A study is reported in which curriculum consultants exposed to moral development theory were tested to determine whether they would use Kohlbergian labels of stage content or actual moral reasoning when required to make assessments. Suggestions are put forward as to how moral development theory can be more closely linked to pedagogy.     

Book Reviews

This paper reviews an ongoing debate about moral standards for vocational education in German speaking countries. At the centre of the controversy is the question of universalistic versus domain‐specific moral orientations, namely the question of whether business people ought to develop different moral points of view in different situations (such as ‘private’ versus ‘professional’). Of pivotal importance in this context is also a prominent ethical approach (by Karl Homann, a philosopher in the tradition of liberal economists) which serves as a foundation for those who advocate domain specificity and which is strongly criticized by their counterparts. This approach is also presented, since the author believes that it does not entail all of what its protagonists claim. Moreover, as argued in the last section, the purported dichotomy of universalism versus domain specificity may even be entirely overcome. The point is that Homann's ethics perhaps do not fit into the framework of Kohlberg's six stages and might therefore be reconstructed as entailing moral segmentation. However, it is well accommodated by a more comprehensive stage taxonomy suggested by the author.     

What Are You Doing—

The purpose of this paper is to provoke thought and hopefully stimulate action in physical educators in relation to moral education through physical education. A brief overview of three moral education programs in public schools serves to enlighten the reader concerning the possibilities for such development. Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach to moral education is discussed in greater depth since the author recommends this model as the foundation for moral education programs in physical education. A review of cognitive-developmental moral research culminates in the establishment of three guiding principles related to (a) nature of moral dilemmas, (h) nature of the environment, and (c) role of the teacher. An application of Kohlbergian techniques to physical education is discussed in relation to the three guiding principles. The paper concludes with an appeal to physical educators for greater concern and involvement with this long-standing goal of physical education for moral (character) development by the implementation of programs in the gymnasium classroom and in teacher education programs with concurrent research to support such programs.     

Moral Reasoning of Nigerian and Pakistani Muslim Adolescents

Abstract

Two studies were conducted to test the universality of Piaget's and Kohlberg's stages of the development of moral judgment in Nigerian and Pakistani cultures. For the first study, 120 Nigerian Muslim Hausa secondary school adolescents (60 boys and 60 girls), whose ages ranged between 14 and 16, were questioned individually about two of Piaget's moral judgment situations, representing two different moral attributes, clumsiness and equality. In the second study, 90 subjects (30 Nigerian Muslim Hausa, 30 Nigerian Muslim Yoruba, and 30 Pakistani Muslim Punjabi adolescents), whose ages ranged between 12 and 13, were questioned about one of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas. The nature of the subjects’ responses suggested that moral reasoning of Nigerian and Pakistani Muslim adolescents are greatly affected by their cultural values.     

DOES ETHICAL THEORY HAVE A PLACE IN POST‐KOHLBERGIAN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY?

Philosophers tend to assume that theoretical frameworks in psychology suffer from conceptual confusion and that any influence that philosophy might have on psychology should be positive. Going against this grain, Dan Lapsley and Darcia Narváez attribute the Kohlbergian paradigm's current state of marginalization within psychology to Lawrence Kohlberg's use of ethical theory in his model of cognitive moral development. Post‐Kohlbergian conceptions of moral psychology, they advance, should be wary of theoretical constructs derived from folk morality, refuse philosophical starting points, and seek integration with literatures in psychology, not philosophy. In this essay, Bruce Maxwell considers and rejects Lapsley and Narváez's diagnosis. The Kohlbergian paradigm's restricted conception of the moral domain is the result of a selective reading of one tendency in ethical theorizing (Kantianism). The idea that moral psychology may find shelter from normative criticism by avoiding ethics‐derived models overlooks the deeper continuity between “ethical theory” and “psychological theory.”

相似文献   

A Non‐Kohlbergian Approach to the Development of Justifications for Moral Judgements

Summary Two studies are reported that used a non‐Kohlbergian approach to categorising justifications for moral judgements by subjects from 7 to 15 and from 7 to 21 years, respectively. The first study showed that some developmental trends suggested by earlier studies for the 12‐21 year period could be replicated, while others in the age range 7‐11 years were established. These are interpreted as supporting a social focus and language use rather than a cognitive limitation view of the growth of moral reasoning. There were also appreciable differences in the balance of justification types elicited by different topics, possibly due to variations in perceived degree of personal control in different situations. The second study showed that Colby & Kohlberg's method of categorising moral justifications confounds form of justification with content and masks underlying developmental trends in justification types. The educational implications of the findings are discussed.     

Social Interaction and the Development of a Sense of Right and Wrong in Young Children

Abstract:

Cognitive developmental research has neglected the very early stages of moral development. Three recent attempts to fill this gap are briefly described. The first is Martin Hoffman's stage theory account of the origins of empathy. The second is Selman's theory of the development of social perspective‐taking. The third is Damon's account of the development of ‘positive justice’ in early childhood. The implications of these approaches for early moral education are then discussed.     

The Teacher As Moral Agent

Abstract

Lawrence Kohlberg's work in moral education appears to be significant enough philosophically that one is tempted to use much of it to resolve basic problems of long standing. In this essay it is argued that it would prove more fruitful for Kohlberg or anyone else to avoid applying his developmentalist position to the settling of such problems as utilitarian/formalist supremacy or the search for a ‘best’ morality. Instead, emphasis could be placed on the explicating of the fundamental requirements of a non‐relativistic, non‐egoistic morality of whatever sort.

Such basic moral requirements serve to highlight of what principled morality (Stages Five and Six) consists, and why it need not be tied to a Rawlsian Formalism, or to any other normative ethical position. In fact, there is considerable cause for supposing that what Kohlberg really achieves with clarity is nothing more than a sequential typology of development in moral thinking from egoism to universalism, and from situation‐specific rules to universalizable and reversable judgments of principle. This in itself constitutes, of course, an enormous undertaking and, if successfully defended, would be a very significant breakthrough in Psychology, Education and Philosophy. It is what Kohlberg ought to be about, rather than something unnecessarily contentious.