The Very Idea of an Educated Public: On Philosophical Education and MacIntyre's Project

In this paper, I aim to reconsider MacIntyre's notion of an educated public. In particular, I aim to do so in light of his recent elucidation of the role of philosophical education in rejecting, or at least challenging, predominant and shared cultural assumptions. I begin by outlining MacIntyre's original case for an educated public as found in The Idea of an Educated Public. I then briefly consider and respond to three prominent criticisms of MacIntyre's original explication of the notion. In responding to these criticisms, it will be made clear that subtle shifts in MacIntyre's subsequent treatments of the notion reduces the dependency of such a public's existence on the university. I conclude by arguing that the development in MacIntyre's articulation of the necessary conditions for an educated public when considered in conjunction with his recent defence of the conditions for an ‘adequate philosophical education’ provides his philosophy of education with the conceptual resources needed to break free of a final difficulty which MacIntyre himself has articulated. Specifically, I contend that the four stages of an adequate philosophical education MacIntyre outlines are such that they need not be restricted to implementation in formal educational institutions such as the university.     

Refurbishing MacIntyre's Account of Practice

According to Alasdair MacIntyre's influential account of practices, ‘teaching itself is not a practice, but a set of skills and habits put to the service of a variety of practices’ ( MacIntyre and Dunne, 2002 , p. 5). Various philosophers of education have responded to and critiqued MacIntyre's position, most notably in a Special Issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Education (Vol. 37.2, 2003). However, both in that Special Issue and since, this debate remains inconclusive. Much of this earlier discussion seems to accept that teaching is a unique case in being a putative practice that does not fit readily into MacIntyre's account. In fact many supposed practices, including some nominated by MacIntyre himself, do not fit his account. A constructive critique of this account leads to a refurbished, broadly MacIntyrean account of practice. This will clarify the issue of whether teaching and a range of other activities are, indeed, practices.     

MacIntyre's Revolutionary Aristotelian Philosophy and his Idea of an Educated Public Revisited

In this article I revisit MacIntyre's lecture on the idea of an educated public. I argue that the full significance of MacIntyre's views on the underlying purposes of universities only become clear when his lecture on the educated public is situated in the context of his wider ‘revolutionary Aristotelian’ philosophical project. I claim that for MacIntyre educational institutions should both support students to learn how to think for themselves and act for the common good. After considering criticisms from Putnam, Wain and Harris I conclude that MacIntyre's later work points towards an idea of educated ‘community’ that is more outward looking and open to difference than his earlier articulated idea of an educated ‘public’.     

MacIntyre's Moral Theory and the Possibility of an Aretaic Ethics of Teaching

In this paper, I reconstruct Alasdair MacIntyre's aretaic, practical philosophy, drawing out its implications for professional ethics in general and the practice of teaching in particular. After reviewing the moral theory as a whole, I examine MacIntyre's notion of internal goods. Defined within the context of practices, such goods give us reason to reject the very idea of applied ethics. Being goods for the practitioner, they suggest that the eudaimonia of the practitioner is central to professional ethics. In this way, MacIntyre's moral theory helps us recover the untimely question, how does teaching contribute to the flourishing of the teacher?     

Learning from MacIntyre about Learning: Finding Room for a Second-Person Perspective?

In this article I try to bring into relief the background significance of learning in Alasdair MacIntyre's writings. After briefly adverting to his own manner of learning from other thinkers, I begin by outlining what he sees as essential to learning in early childhood (§I). Next, I spell out what I take to be important implications for learning, mainly in the context of schooling, of his conception of ‘practice’ (§II). Turning then to the ‘revolutionary Aristotelianism’ of his later work, I elucidate the kind of transformative learning that he deems necessary because of dominant tendencies in late modern societies (§III) and because of key features of human lives—including fallibility, narrativity and ‘final end’—that he analyses in his most recent book, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity (§IV). I then consider his conception of how one person's learning can be aided by another, suggesting that this conception would be strengthened by the incorporation of a second-person perspective (§V). I link the absence of such a perspective to what I see as his underestimation of the salience of the teacher–student relationship and his consequently diminished account of teaching—a largely Aristotelian-Thomist account whose strengths in other respects I acknowledge (§VI). I conclude by asking whether this line of criticism, if valid, might not indicate a lack in MacIntyre's conception of personal relationships more generally—despite the great import that he grants to them, for weal or woe, in all human lives (§VII). [The present article is included in wider discussion of issues bearing on learning and teaching in my Persons in Practice: Essays between Education and Philosophy (Wiley, forthcoming)].     

After Higgins and Dunne: Imagining School Teaching as a Multi‐Practice Activity

There remains a concern in philosophy of education circles to assert that teaching is a social practice. Its initiation occurs in a conversation between Alasdair MacIntyre and Joe Dunne which inspired a Special Issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Education. This has been recently utilised in a further Special Issue by Chris Higgins. In this article I consider two points of conflict between MacIntyre and Dunne and seek to resolve both with a more nuanced understanding of the implications of applying the concept ‘social practice’ to teaching. I critique both Dunne's and Higgins' focus on schools and school teaching. It is their focus on school teaching, rather than a broader account of teaching, that leads them astray. The result is that Dunne and Higgins have not shown that teaching is a social practice. School teaching is not a complex activity, but a complex set of different activities co‐located in one place and engaged in by the same agents. In a final section I offer an account of ‘school teaching’ as a multi‐practice activity which is consistent with MacIntyre's approach, and argue that schoolteachers have both an institutional and an educative role.     

Reframing the Idea of an Educated Public

This paper seeks to reframe the idea of an educated public as construed by Alasdair MacIntyre in his lecture of 1985. Like MacIntyre, it locates the emergence of an educated public in the Scottish Enlightenment and its universities, but its focus is on aspects which are not brought into focus by MacIntyre's narrative. The paper argues, firstly, that it is only through dialogue between “intellectuals” and the wider public that the ideas that matter develop and, secondly, that a more generous rendering of the idea of an educated public is required, one which recognizes that the agenda for education is set outside educational institutions. In the current context of rapacious globalization we need to look outwards to the many associations, groups and movements, including adult education movements, which are producing knowledge rooted in projects. Some of these, such as the World Social Forum, challenge the dominant instrumental assumptions which guide much university research and call for a radical critique of universities as institutions.     

Unsettling orthodoxies: education for the environment/for sustainability

In this paper I employ Foucault's notion of governmentality to reflect on a debate that occurred in the pages of this journal some 10 years ago. I argue that their exchanges indicate ways in which various positions are engaged in a struggle for dominance in this field, and how particular strategies are used to legitimate and maintain these positions. My purpose is not to propose a new orthodoxy – or even to critique those we have – but rather to raise questions about how the unquestioned ‘that‐which‐is’ of orthodoxies comes to be, and their effects. I also suggest that as environmental educators and researchers, we need to work harder to unsettle more often the taken‐for‐granted in environmental education so that we remain alert to our own easy acceptance of orthodoxies. Without this, we risk our exhortations to those we seek to educate – to think critically, to question assumptions, and so forth – becoming empty rhetoric if we are not practising these ourselves – examining our own, as well as others', assumptions and practices.     

LOVE AND RUIN(S): ROBERT FROST ON MORAL REPAIR

This essay begins where Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue begins: facing a moral world in ruin. MacIntyre argues that this predicament leaves us with a choice: we can follow the path of Friedrich Nietzsche, accepting this moral destruction and attempting to create lives in a rootless, uncertain world, or the path of Aristotle, working to reclaim a world in which close‐knit communities sustain human practices that make it possible for us to flourish. Jeff Frank rejects MacIntyre's framework and in this essay attempts to create an alternative path, one of moral repair. Through a close reading of several poems from Robert Frost's North of Boston, Frank develops the notion of moral repair and describes its ethical and educational implications.     

Practical reason and positioning

This paper argues that an emerging framework for studying social episodes known as ‘positioning theory’ is a rich tool for practical reasoning. After giving an outline of the Aristotelian conception of practical reason, recently developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, it is argued that positioning theory should be seen not as a detached, scientific theory, but rather as an important resource for learning to think and act in relation to practical and moral matters. I try to demonstrate a number of significant points of resemblance between MacIntyre's analysis of practical reason and Rom Harré's positioning theory. Following a pragmatist view of social theories, I suggest that positioning theory can be seen as explicating an understanding of social episodes that we need to acquire in order to learn to act as capable practical reasoners, but which quite often is left implicit in our everyday lives. Finally, I consider how positioning theory could be used to train the capacity for practical reasoning in moral education.     

Art Conquers All? Herbert Read's Education through Art

Herbert Read's Education through Art (henceforth ETA) is a pioneering attempt to provide empirical evidence for the need for art in the public school system. Rooting for art education, Read applies the conclusions of the newly evolving psychological research to his thesis on education, which he holds to be a contemporary revival of Plato's educational theory. Psychological research proves, Read believes, that art is required for the healthy cognitive and emotional development of the child, thereby creating a stable and productive society. ‘Education through art’ nurtures each individual's potential, so that every professional direction one would later take would be ‘art'. Since its publication in 1943, art‐education enthusiasts seem to hold that Read was on the right track, but that ETA suffers from a lack of evidence – a mere technicality that can be amended when research advances. Contrariwise, I argue that Read's thesis is inherently problematic, rather than empirically inaccurate. Psychological research may never suffice for the justification of art education, if ‘art education’ is both substituted for ‘creativity’ and expected to produce testable – immediate and quantifiable – results. My interest is not only in Read's theory per se, but in this form of justification. To wit, the discussion examines ETA as a case study in the empirical justification of art education.     

The University's Uncommon Community

In the UK, as elsewhere in the world, the global financial crisis has focused attention on the cost of public services and the need to reduce expenditure, not least in respect of higher education. This, however, raises a set of prior questions: What kind of society do we want? What is important to democratic society? What kind of higher education is desirable? The article takes Alasdair MacIntyre's critique of what he calls liberal capitalist society as a starting point for considering questions concerning the kind of higher education that would be valuable and relevant to a healthy democratic society. His thesis is outlined and the implications of this for the university set out. The article examines MacIntyre's notion of community, which he elaborates in relation to medieval religious worldviews, and argues that whilst his conceptualisation is more intellectually and educationally coherent than some others, it is ultimately too restrictive. The article argues instead for a recognition, within education, of what is uncommon. This may open greater possibilities for keeping alive the serious questions that we must constantly attend to, beyond and within our communities, secular or religious.     

Curriculum as open-ended inquiry in higher education

Abstract

Throughout the world, education curriculum are determined and guided by knowledge perceived as being critical for the advancement of humanity. Often such progress is indicated and determined by curriculum shaped by the ways of knowing of the dominant cultural group or languages that have achieved hegemonic status in such communities, in the process marginalizing any ‘indigenous’ ways of knowing as embedded in the language of other cultures. Sometimes such curriculum have little or no connection with contemporary reality. In this article I therefore argue that inclusive curricular knowledge types are critical in education in order to enable all people, individually and collectively, to progress without being inhibited by the hegemony of so-called ‘scientific’ knowledge. I also argue that knowledge as embedded in a language is power, and should therefore be connected to reality. Using critical social theory, I propose an alternative, inclusive treatment of knowledge types in education curriculum – open-ended inquiry – in order to level the learning field for all learners, and, in so doing, to adequately prepare tomorrow's world citizenry.     

Critical Factors in On‐Campus Clinical Experiences: Perceptions of Preservice Teachers

In this paper, I present the findings of a self‐study into my teaching practices as a sociology‐of‐education lecturer working in the pre‐service teacher education programme of a regional university in New South Wales, Australia. The principal data source is a logbook of the teaching practices which characterised several tutorial classes taught in 2007. To understand these practices, the paper draws upon Aristotle's concepts of techne and praxis, and Bourdieu's understanding of practices as socially constructed and contested. The paper situates tensions between more technicist and praxis‐oriented teaching approaches to pre‐service teacher education, within the teacher education and university contexts in which these classes were undertaken. In doing so, the paper reveals tensions between assessment‐driven and more authentic teaching practices, and more student‐ and teacher‐centred teaching practices. The paper also shows how accountability pressures within tertiary settings have led to a more instrumental approach to tertiary teaching. I conclude that there is a need for greater attention to the conditions of work which influence teacher educators' practices, rather than fetishising individualistic instantiations of such practices.     

Oral Storytelling,Speaking and Listening and the Hegemony of Literacy: Non-Instrumental Language Use and Transactional Talk in the Primary Classroom

The oral re-telling of traditional tales, modelled by a storyteller and taught to children in school, can be understood as ‘non-instrumental’ practice in speaking and listening that emphasises oral language over the reading and writing of stories. While oral storytelling has significant benefits to children’s education and development, it is under-utilised within Primary Education in the UK. This interview and library-based study explores participant perceptions of oral storytelling and the barriers to the utilisation of such non-instrumental practice in school. In addition, observation of an oral storytelling initiative provides a research context through which such perceptions are understood. The findings suggest that speaking and listening is implicitly devalued as a result of the elevation of instrumental literacy-based practice in the primary curriculum. In addition, enquiry into the specific effects of engaging with orality as a precursor to literacy development is lacking. It is suggested that while New Literacy Studies has enhanced our understanding of the interrelationship between the written and spoken word, it is less helpful when considering language as a ‘continuum of spontaneity’. It is concluded that spoken language that is explicitly unattached to literacy-based outcomes should be strongly encouraged in school. In addition, it is important to understand on an empirical basis whether the attachment of a written outcome affects the way that spoken language practice is engaged with in the classroom.     

Competing Conceptions of the Educated Public

Alasdair MacIntyre's paper ‘The idea of an educated public’ followed on his frontal attack in After Virtue on the ‘failed’ intellectual project of the Enlightenment and on its liberal heritage. His argument, in the paper, was that the only way we can save ourselves from that failure is by restoring the idea of an educated public modelled on the type found in eighteenth century Scotland. This article takes up the issue of the ‘crisis’ of modernity, and argues that MacIntyre's ‘public’ is just one possible one and not necessarily the best. Other, competing conceptions of an educated public have been proposed, among others by Dewey and Habermas, that do not necessitate the conservative solution of going back to the past.     

Thinking in Nearness: Seven Steps on the Way to a Heideggerian Approach to Education

This paper explores the concept of Gelassenheit as developed in the later thought of Martin Heidegger. It seeks to show the relevance of this to aspects of education, especially to the ways that teaching can be enhanced in order to do better justice both to the learners and to what is studied. Thinking in this way helps to overcome the dominance of representational thought, a kind of thinking that imposes barriers on the understanding and restrictions on how the world can come to be. In the end the thinking illustrated by Gelassenheit constitutes a more responsible and more responsive relationship to the truth. My paper provides examples of ways that this can enhance education. In the end, with a caveat, I revisit and re‐examine aspects of Heidegger's work about which I think there is reason to be cautious. This is to encourage a degree of vigilance in relation to Heidegger's thought, but in a way that does not deny its powerful insights.