Making Meaningful: Intention in Children's Art Making

Children's art work has often been the subject of study by researchers seeking to gain insight into the role of art making in children's learning and development. However, rarely are children's own explanations of their art making used to inform these studies. Children's perceptions of their own art making are important for research and practice in art education, because their artistic experiences and motivations determine how they will engage in and respond to art making activities. This study used ethnographic methods to learn about the art making that took place over the course of one year in an elementary school art room, and to gain insight into the students' experiences and perceptions of art‐making activity. Data were analysed using a socio‐cultural framework. By asking children why they made art and exploring children's own explanations of their art making, this study reveals some of the important intentions that children bring to their artistic activity, and some of the ways that children make meaning through art making.     

Young Children's Understanding of Addition Concepts

Children's knowledge of concrete versions of additive composition, commutativity and associativity was investigated in two studies. In Study 1, 24 four- to five-year-olds and 25 five- to six-year-olds judged the equivalence of conceptually related addition problems presented using groups of objects. In Study 2, 45 five- to six-year-olds judged related problems and solved addition problems. Both studies indicated that concrete versions of principles were salient to most children although associativity was more difficult than commutativity and there were considerable individual differences in children's understanding. Study 1 results indicated that schoolchildren were more accurate at recognising additive composition than preschoolers and Study 2 results suggested that commutativity knowledge was related to using advanced counting strategies for solving addition problems. Overall, the research supports the claim that examining early knowledge of addition principles provides important insights into children's emerging part-whole knowledge and mathematical development.     

论幼儿创造性人格及其培养

培养具有创造性的人一直是教育的主要目标。幼儿期是个体身心迅速发展的时期,也是幼儿创造性人格发展和培养的关键期。本文在概述幼儿创造人格结构的基础上,提出了培养幼儿创造性人格的六条途径:一是保护和巩固幼儿的好奇心、求知欲;二是为幼儿营造良好、安全的环境;三是培养幼儿的独立性和自信心;四是培养幼儿形成良好的意志力;五是培养幼儿的新异性和敏感性;六是培养幼儿学会与他人合作。     

Transfer in Young Children's Understanding of Spatial Representations

The creative and flexible use of symbols is a unique human ability. In order to use a symbol, one must understand the basic relation between the symbol and what it represents. How do young children come to appreciate such relations? One possibility is that insight into one symbolic relation helps children appreciate different ones. The 3 studies presented here support this possibility. In Experiments 1 and 2, both 2.5- and 3.0-year-old children showed transfer from an easy task that required appreciation of a model-room symbolic relation to a more difficult one, one that children their age typically do not appreciate. In Experiment 3, 2.5-year-olds showed transfer between symbol types: Experience with a model-room relation helped them appreciate a map-room relation. These transfer effects are consistent with the claim that early experience with symbolic relations contributes to symbolic sensitivity, a basic readiness to recognize that one object or event may stand for another.     

Young Children's Understanding of Forgetting over Time

2 studies investigated young children's understanding that as the retention interval increases, so do the chances that one will forget. In Study 1 (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds), 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that of 2 characters who simultaneously saw an object, the character who waited longer before attempting to find it would not remember where it was. In study 2 (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds), 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that of 2 objects seen by a character, the object that was seen a "long long time ago" would be forgotten and the object seen "a little while ago" would be remembered. The findings are discussed in relation to research on young children's understanding of the acquisition, retention, and retrieval of knowledge over time.     

Young Children's Understanding of the Mind-Body Distinction

4 experiments investigated children's understanding of the mind-body distinction. Children of ages 4 and 5 recognized not only the differential modifiability of changeable versus unchangeable human properties and bodily versus mental properties, but also the independence of activities of bodily organs from a person's intention (Experiment 1). When presented 3 types of causal explanations (i.e., intentional, vitalistic, mechanical), 6-year-olds chose most often as most plausible for bodily functions vitalistic explanations (i.e., those ascribing the phenomena to a relevant bodily organ's initiative and effortful engagement in activity); 8-year-olds chose the vitalistic explanations second most often, following mechanical ones (Experiment 2). However, 6-year-olds, as well as 8-year-olds and adults, did not always choose vitalistic explanations over intentional explanations (Experiment 3); whereas they tended to prefer vitalistic explanations for biological phenomena, they predominantly accepted intentional ones for psychological phenomena (Experiment 3A). These results suggest that children as young as 6 years of age have acquired a form of biology as an autonomous domain which is separate from that of psychology.     

Infants Perceive Three‐Dimensional Illusory Contours as Occluding Surfaces

The study assessed the contribution of stereoscopic depth cues to infants' perception of a Kanizsa rectangle as a surface that temporarily occludes a moving object. In Experiment 1, the Kanizsa figure was shifted into the foreground by enriching it with stereoscopic depth information. According to the results, perception of a three‐dimensional Kanizsa figure as an occluding surface emerges between 5 (n = 16) and 7 (n = 16) months of age. Experiment 2 demonstrated that 7‐month‐old (n = 16) infants performed similarly to the 7‐month‐olds who participated in Experiment 1 if the moving object was shifted into the background. These findings suggest that 7‐month‐old infants respond to stereoscopic depth cues and that they exploit it to perceive subjective contours as occluders.     

幼儿对幽默的理解及其绘画表现

本研究采用观察、访谈等形式,对上海市某幼儿园大班的12名5～6岁幼儿的幽默理解和幽默创造能力进行研究.研究发现,学前儿童已经具备一定的幽默理解能力,并且理解角度各不相同;学前儿童已经能够初步用绘画的方式表现自己的幽默创造,并且在内容和形式上都能体现幽默的感觉.     

幼儿对幽默的理解及其绘画表现

本研究采用观察、访谈等形式,对上海市某幼儿园大班的12名5～6岁幼儿的幽默理解和幽默创造能力进行研究。研究发现,学前儿童已经具备一定的幽默理解能力,并且理解角度各不相同;学前儿童已经能够初步用绘画的方式表现自己的幽默创造,并且在内容和形式上都能体现幽默的感觉。     

Young Children's Understanding of Changes in Their Mental States

3-year-old children have difficulty reporting their past false beliefs. We investigated their ability to remember and report other types of past mental state, in particular, pretenses, images, perceptions, desires, and intentions. In a series of tasks, children were placed in one mental state, that state was changed, and they were asked to report the initial state. 4-year-olds were generally able to report all their past mental states, including beliefs. 3-year-olds were able to report past pretenses, images, and perceptions extremely well. They had great difficulty reporting past beliefs. Reporting past desires and intentions was more difficult than reporting pretenses, images, and perceptions, but slightly less difficult than reporting beliefs. The evidence suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty understanding the nature of representation.     

Stability and Variability in Young Children's Understanding of Floating and Sinking During One Single‐Task Session

Intraindividual variability is a key component in explaining children's development and learning. Studying this type of variability on the micro‐timescale can help us understand real‐time constructive processes and the subsequent long‐term development. The aim of this article is to study the process of children's understanding of floating and sinking during one single‐task session. A total of 38 kindergartners were asked to explain the floating or sinking of 14 different objects. The results reveal that the majority of children showed a high degree of intraindividual variability. In general, most children had a decrease in variability of both content and complexity of explanations during one task session and stabilized in both complexity and content toward the end of the task. The analyses indicated that hypothesis testing was not related to changes in children's explanations. These results can be the starting point for further research about change on different, nested timescales.     

Young Children's Understanding of Thought Bubbles and of Thoughts

In a series of 4 studies, we explored preschoolers' understanding of thought bubbles. Very few 3-year-olds or 4-year-olds we tested knew what a thought-bubble depiction was without instruction. But, if simply told that the thought bubble "shows what someone is thinking," the vast majority of 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds easily understood the devices as depicting thoughts generally and individual thought contents specifically. In total, these children used thought-bubble depictions to ascertain the contents of characters' thoughts in a variety of situations; appropriately distinguished such depictions from mere associated actions or objects; described thought bubbles in the language of mental states; judged that persons' thoughts in these depictions were subjective in the sense of person-specific (and hence 2 people can have different thoughts about the same state of affairs); and judged that thought-bubble thoughts ( a ) were representational in the sense of depicting or showing some other state of affairs, ( b ) were mental and thus showed intangible, private, internal thoughts unlike real pictures or photographs, and ( c ) can be false, that is, can depict a person's misrepresentation of some state of affairs. We discuss the implications of these findings for young children's understanding of thoughts and thought bubbles, for their learning and comprehension of pictorial conventions, and for the use of thought bubbles to assess children's early understanding of mind.     

Young Children's Emotion Comprehension and Theory of Mind Understanding

Research Findings: The present study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and emotion understanding among 78 children 4½ to 6½ years old (35 boys, 43 girls). ToM understanding was assessed using ignorance and false belief questions within an emotion-understanding task that evaluated children's abilities to recognize facial expressions and identify the external causes of emotions (happy, sad, angry, scared, and surprised), understand the role of beliefs and desires in emotion, and comprehend felt versus expressed emotions. Results indicated that children's understanding of the external causes of emotion, hidden emotions, and a reminder's influence on emotions improved with age and that children's understanding of the external causes of emotion related to ToM understanding. Practice or Policy: Findings suggest that programs that seek to promote children's socioemotional awareness could benefit from encouraging the development of children's understanding of the external causes of emotions to improve overall social cognition.     

Young Children's Understanding of the Causes of Anger and Sadness

This study investigated kindergarten children's understanding of the causes of anger and sadness. Previous research has shown that before 6 or 7 years of age, children have difficulty distinguishing hypothetical situations designed to evoke anger from those designed to evoke sadness. In this project, 80 kindergarten children (ages 5-1 to 6-5, M = 5-10) predicted and explained protagonists' emotional responses to a variety of hypothetical events. The results showed that intentional harm was not the feature young children used to distinguish anger from sadness. Children predicted anger most often when they believed that protagonists could change undesirable situations and reinstate their goals and when children focused on the person or conditions that brought about undesirable situations. Children predicted sadness most often when they believed that goal reinstatement was impossible and focused on the losses that would ensue as a result.     

Young Children's Understanding of a Biological Basis for Parent-Offspring Relations

2 experiments evaluated whether young children understand that kinship implies, but does not guarantee, physical resemblance among family members. In Experiment 1, preschoolers expected adopted babies to share physical properties, but not beliefs and preferences, with their biological parents rather than with their adoptive ones. However, preschoolers in Experiment 2 recognized that shared properties per se do not guarantee kinship: a baby who looks like and lives with a woman is not her biological baby if he or she initially grew inside someone else, whereas a baby may neither resemble nor live with its biological parents. Overall, the results suggest that children expect parents and offspring to share physical properties, but understand that shared properties do not necessarily entail kinship. In both experiments, the extent of this understanding increased with age. However, preschoolers' overall performance supports the claim that some children at this age have a naive theory of biology. The results further suggest that the critical development in an understanding of kinship is acquisition of factual knowledge rather than structural change.     

Revisiting Young Children's Understanding of the Psychological Causes of Behavior

In 1989, Miller and Aloise challenged the prevailing belief that preschoolers tend to explain others' behavior in terms of external events or a person's physical attributes and have little understanding of psychological causes. That review documented preschoolers' understanding of, and even preference for, psychological causes as part of an emerging renaissance in developmental social‐cognitive research. The present, updated review (97 articles, participant ages 3 months to 6 years) suggests the emergence of a transformative new perspective in which social‐cognition is balanced between social and cognitive aspects rather than tilted toward cognition. Recent research on infants' awareness of mental states, young children's understanding of social categories and their judgments of the trustworthiness of informants, and cultural context reveals various ways in which preschoolers' social‐causal reasoning is social.     

Origin and Truth: Young Children's Understanding of Imaginary Mental Representations

In 2 studies, we address young children's understanding of the origin and representational relations of imagination, a fictional mental state, and contrast this with their understanding of knowledge, an epistemic mental state. In the first study, 54 3- and 4-year-old children received 2 tasks to assess their understanding of origins, and 4 stories to assess their understanding of representational relations. Children of both ages understood that, whereas perception is necessary for knowledge, it is irrelevant for imagination. Results for children's understanding of representational relations revealed intriguing developmental differences. Although children understood that knowledge represents reality more truthfully than imagination, 3-year-olds often claimed that imagination reflected reality. The second study provided additional evidence that younger 3-year-olds judge that imaginary representations truthfully reflect reality. We propose that children's responses indicate an early understanding of the distinction between mental states and the world, but also a confusion regarding the extent to which mental contents represent the physical world.     

Young Children's Understanding of "Remember" and "Forget"

3 studies examined young children's understanding that if one "remembers" or "forgot," one must have known at a prior time. In Study 1,4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood the prior knowledge component of "forgot"; both groups understood that a character with prior knowledge was "gonna remember." Study 2 controlled for the possibility that good performance on "remember" might be due to a simple association of remembering with knowledge. A significant number of 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that when 2 characters currently knew, the one with prior knowledge remembered, and that when neither character currently knew, the one with prior knowledge forgot. Study 3 made prior knowledge more salient by making the remembered or forgotten item visible to the subjects throughout. 4-year-olds performed near ceiling on both verbs, whereas 3-year-olds' performance did not differ from chance. The results are discussed in relation to children's developing understanding of the mind.     

Getting to No: Pragmatic and Semantic Factors in Two‐ and Three‐Year‐Olds' Understanding of Negation

Although infants say “no” early, older children have difficulty understanding its truth‐functional meaning. Two experiments investigate whether this difficulty stems from the infelicity of negative sentences out of the blue. In Experiment 1, given supportive discourse, 3‐year‐olds (N = 16) understood both affirmative and negative sentences. However, with sentence types randomized, 2‐year‐olds (N = 28) still failed. In Experiment 2, affirmative and negative sentences were blocked. Two‐year‐olds (N = 28) now succeeded, but only when affirmatives were presented first. Thus, although discourse felicity seems the primary bottleneck for 3‐year‐olds' understanding of negation, 2‐year‐olds struggle with its semantic processing. Contrary to accounts where negatives are understood via affirmatives, both sentence types were processed equally quickly, suggesting previously reported asymmetries are due to pragmatic accommodation, not semantic processing.     

Infants’ and Young Children's Imitation of Linguistic In‐Group and Out‐Group Informants

Although children can use social categories to intelligently select informants, children's preference for in‐group informants has not been consistently demonstrated across age and context. This research clarifies the extent to which children use social categories to guide learning by presenting participants with a live or video‐recorded action demonstration by a linguistic in‐group and/or out‐group model. Participants’ (N = 104) propensity to imitate these actions was assessed. Nineteen‐month‐olds did not selectively imitate the actions of the in‐group model in live contexts, though in‐group preferences were found after watching the demonstration on video. Three‐year‐olds selectively imitated the actions demonstrated by the in‐group member regardless of context. These results indicate that in‐group preferences have a more nuanced effect on social learning than previous research has indicated.