The Role of Age and Verbal Ability in the Theory of Mind Task Performance of Subjects with Autism

A number of studies have reported that most children with autism fail theory of mind tasks. It is unclear why certain children with autism pass such tests and what might be different about these subjects. In the present study, the role of age and verbal ability in theory of mind task performance was explored. Data were pooled from 70 autistic, 34 mentally handicapped, and 70 normal young subjects, previously tested for a number of different studies. The analysis suggested that children with autism required far higher verbal mental age to pass false belief tasks than did other subjects. While normally developing children had a 50% probability of passing both tasks at the verbal mental age of 4 years, autistic subjects took more than twice as long to reach this probability of success (at the advanced verbal mental age of 9-2). Possible causal relations between verbal ability and the ability to represent mental states are discussed.     

Drawing insight from pictures: the development of concepts of false drawing and false belief in children with deafness,normal hearing,and autism

Theory-of-mind concepts in children with deafness, autism, and normal development (N = 154) were examined in three experiments using a set of standard inferential false-belief tasks and matched sets of tasks involving false drawings. Results of all three experiments replicated previously published findings by showing that primary school children with deafness or autism, aged 6 to 13 years, scored significantly lower than normal-developing 4-year-old preschoolers on standard misleading-container and unseen-change tests of false-belief understanding. Furthermore, deaf and autistic children generally scored higher on drawing-based tests than on corresponding standard tests and, on the most challenging of the false-drawing tests in Experiment 2, they significantly outperformed the normal-developing preschoolers by clearly understanding their own false intentions and another person's false beliefs about an actively misleading drawing. In Experiment 3, preschoolers outperformed older deaf and autistic children on standard tasks, but did less well on a task that required the drawing of a false belief. Methodological factors could not fully explain the findings, but early social and conversational experiences in the family were deemed likely contributors.     

Metamemory in children with autism

Five experiments are reported comparing metamemory abilities in children with autism, age- and language-matched mentally retarded children, and language-matched young normal controls. The mean language age of the participants in Experiment 1 was approximately 6 years, in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 approximately 8 years, and in Experiment 5 approximately 9 years. All the children were given one or more false belief tests. Experiment 1 assessed the children's understanding that a task variable (list length) and a person variable (age) will affect their own and others' performances on an immediate auditory-verbal recall task. Experiment 2 assessed the ability to utilize category cues in a picture recall task. Experiments 3 and 4 assessed the ability to verbalize strategies used in a memory span test and in one retrospective and two prospective memory situations. Experiment 5 assessed the children's knowledge and understanding of another person's memory. On the basis of available evidence and theory, we predicted that the children with autism would be impaired on all the metamemory tasks and that impairment would be associated with failure on tests of false belief. Our predictions were not supported. The children with autism were not impaired on any of the metamemory tasks, although they were less likely than controls to make spontaneous use of memory strategies involving other people. Unexpectedly few of the children failed the false belief tasks. These results are discussed in relation to theories concerning primary psychological deficits underlying autism.     

Children''s Understanding of the Modal Expression of Speaker Certainty and Uncertainty and Its Relation to the Development of a Representational Theory of Mind

2 experiments examined children's understanding of the expression of speaker certainty and uncertainty and its relation to their developing theory of mind. In the first experiment, 80 children between 3 and 6 years of age were presented with a task in which they had to guess the location of an object hidden in 1 of 2 boxes. As clues to location, the children were presented with contrasting pairs of statements by 2 puppets. Different trials contained all of the possible pairwise combinations of either the modal verbs must, might, and could or the modal adjuncts probably, possibly, and maybe. Results showed that while 3-year-olds did not differentiate between any of the modal contrasts presented, 4-year-olds and older children were able to find the hidden object on the basis of what they heard. Performance was best for contrasts involving a highly certain term (either must or probably) paired with a less certain term (might, could, possibly, and maybe). Experiment 2 was designed to determine whether competence with modal terms was related to competence with mental terms in the same task, and whether performance on the certainty task was related to other aspects of the child's understanding of the nature of beliefs. 26 4-year-olds were presented with the certainty task, involving both modal and mental terms, and with tasks assessing their understanding of false beliefs, representational change, and the appearance-reality distinction. Results showed that all of these tasks were intercorrelated, implying that what may develop at 4 years of age may be a general understanding of the representational nature of belief.     

3名不同类型儿童心理推测能力的比较研究

本研究以自编的两个测验故事为测量工具,考察了同是9岁的3名不同类型儿童(高功能孤独症儿童、轻度智力障碍儿童和正常儿童)心理推测能力的水平及异同。结果表明:这三名儿童都能对自我和他人行为进行预期,但他们都没能通过错误信念测试。其中,轻度智力障碍儿童朱某很难理解自我和他人愿望,他和高功能孤独症儿童王某又在理解他人消极性情绪上存在缺陷。相比较而言,正常儿童的心理推测能力最好,其次是高功能孤独症儿童,再次是轻度智力障碍儿童。     

Three-Year-Olds'' Problems with False Belief: Conceptual Deficit or Linguistic Artifact?

Researchers are divided over whether young children understand other people's minds. This study reexamines the main technique used to show a basic inability in 3-year-olds to make judgments about a person's thoughts when that person's knowledge happens to be false. 131 children, aged 3, 3 1/2, and 4, were shown the real, unexpected contents of a chocolate box and were required to say what a friend would think was in it and what their own previous expectations had been. Success in this task was compared between the 3 age groups and also according to the specificity of questions asked. It was found, in contrast to previous findings, that test questions that are temporally specific and syntactically straightforward enable most 3-year-olds to attribute false beliefs to others. These results suggest that 3-year-olds' access to information about others' mental states is bounded by the linguistic demands placed upon them, but long before their fourth birthday children have some understanding of others' mind.     

Neurocognitive function and joint attention ability in young children with autism spectrum disorder versus developmental delay

Studies have shown that young children with autism are not impaired on prefrontal tasks relative to what would be expected for their mental age, raising questions about the executive dysfunction hypothesis of autism. These studies did not include ventromedial prefrontal tasks, however. The present study examined whether young children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are impaired on ventromedial prefrontal tasks, and whether performance on such tasks is correlated with a core autism symptom, joint attention ability. Seventy-two 3- to 4-year-old children with ASD, 34 3- to 4-year-old developmentally delayed children, and 39 12- to 46-month-old typically developing children, matched on mental age, were administered ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal tasks and joint attention tasks. Children with ASD performed similarly to comparison groups on all executive function tasks, indicating that at this early age, there is no autism-specific pattern of executive dysfunction. Ventromedial, but not dorsolateral, prefrontal task performance was strongly correlated with joint attention ability, however. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex is hypothesized to play a role in the development of joint attention and possibly some aspects of the autistic syndrome.     

Young Children's Understanding of Fictional versus Epistemic Mental Representations: Imagination and Belief

In 2 studies, 3- and 4-year-old children's ability to reason about the relation between mental representations and reality was examined. In the first study, children received parallel false belief and "false" imagination tasks. Results revealed that children performed better on imagination tasks than on belief tasks. The second study demonstrated that, when various alternative explanations for better performance on the imagination task were controlled for, children still performed significantly better when reasoning about another person's imagination than when reasoning about another person's belief. These findings suggest that children's understanding that mental representations can differ from reality may emerge first with respect to representations that do not purport to represent reality truthfully.     

Deaf children's understanding of beliefs and desires

Twenty-two children (5-12 year old) who were profoundly, prelingually deaf were given two tests designed to tap their 'theory of mind', that is, their ability to attribute independent mental states to other people. The tests were versions of Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith's Sally-Anne task and of Baron-Cohen's breakfast task. Seventy percent of the children were successful on all questions requiring belief attribution, a considerably and significantly larger percentage than the 29% obtained by Peterson and Siegal for a similar sample, though it is still lower than would be expected on the basis on chronological age. Children were universally successful on questions requiring the attribution of desire. We discuss implications of the findings.     

Do you see what I mean? Shared reference in non-native, early signing deaf children

A group of non-native, early signing deaf children between the ages of 7 and 11 years were tested on a referential communication task. A group of hearing children matched for sex and mental and chronological age were also included in the study. The aim was to study the deaf children's ability to take another persons perspective in a task that resembled a real-life communicative situation to a higher extent than the standard theory of mind (ToM) tasks. A further aim was to investigate the possible importance of a number of background variables such as mental and chronological age, working memory, and false-belief attribution. Results show that the hearing children outperformed the deaf children on the referential communication task and that results were highly correlated with both chronological and mental age, as well as with working memory. There was a positive, but not significant, correlation between false belief and success on the referential communication task. This is an indication that the two tasks tap different abilities and that false belief might be necessary, but not sufficient in order to be skilled in the art of referential communication. The possible role of working memory in the referential communication task is also discussed. The results support the hypothesis of the importance of early talk about mental states for the later development of ToM abilities.     

自闭症儿童的心理理论发展及其与言语能力的关系

研究用5个信念任务测量心理理论能力,用皮博迪图片词汇测验测量言语能力,比较12名自闭症儿童和同等言语能力的28名正常儿童的表现,并分析了心理理论和言语能力的相关。结果表明:(1)自闭症儿童的心理理论发展显著落后于同等言语智力的正常儿童;(2)自闭症和正常儿童的信念理解发展序列基本一致;(3)心理理论和言语能力保持中度相关,但控制年龄因素后的偏相关不显著。本研究支持心理理论发展的领域特殊性观点。     

探索自闭症幼儿装扮游戏特点的实验研究

为探索自闭症幼儿的装扮游戏特点 ,了解其游戏水平低下的相关因素 ,选取了6名平均心理年龄为 2 3个月的自闭症幼儿作为研究对象 ,同时将心理年龄与之匹配的弱智儿童和正常儿童各 6名作为对照组进行了实验研究。以秒为单位对实验结果和过程进行编码分析后所获结果 :自闭症幼儿的装扮游戏水平在三组中最低。分析游戏过程推测其可能原因为 :自闭症幼儿缺乏对游戏本身的兴趣、游戏过程中缺乏与他人经验分享、对玩具功能缺乏正确认知能力。     

不同语言能力幼儿在三种错误信念任务中的表现

本研究采用了实验的方法,以言语、非言语性任务,意外转移与表征变化任务为变量,考察了不同语言能力的88名3-4岁幼儿的错误信念理解能力。研究结果发现,降低错误信念任务对语言能力的要求并不能改变幼儿在错误信念理解上的年龄特征;在3岁和4岁两个年龄组中,语言能力超常的幼儿在各项实验任务上的表现均好于语言能力一般的幼儿。     

A tale of two representations: the misinformation effect and children's developing theory of mind

The present research investigates representational ability as a cognitive factor underlying the suggestibility of children's eyewitness memory. The misinformation effect is used as an index of children's suggestibility, and performance on the false belief task is used as an assessment of children's representational abilities (N = 117). Analyses that considered the effect of representational ability and general memory ability on children's susceptibility to misleading information showed that differences in representational ability and general memory ability predicted participants' susceptibility to misleading information. These results demonstrate that the eyewitness memory of children who lack either multirepresentational abilities, sufficient general memory abilities, or both (i.e., most 3- and 4-year-olds) is less accurate than the eyewitness memory of children with both multirepresentational abilities and sufficient memory abilities (i.e., most 6-year-olds and adults). Thus, it appears that the earliest age at which children's eyewitness memory can be considered to be similar to that of adults is 6 years of age, when children's mental representational abilities are similar to those of adults. These results suggest that one factor underlying children's vulnerability to misleading information is the number of representations of an event that they can simultaneously hold and compare.     

Children's suggestibility in relation to their understanding about sources of knowledge

In the experiments reported here, children chose either to maintain their initial belief about an object's identity or to accept the experimenter's contradicting suggestion. Both 3- to 4-year-olds and 4- to 5-year-olds were good at accepting the suggestion only when the experimenter was better informed than they were (implicit source monitoring). They were less accurate at recalling both their own and the experimenter's information access (explicit recall of experience), though they performed well above chance. Children were least accurate at reporting whether their final belief was based on what they were told or on what they experienced directly (explicit source monitoring). Contrasting results emerged when children decided between contradictory suggestions from two differentially informed adults: Three- to 4-year-olds were more accurate at reporting the knowledge source of the adult they believed than at deciding which suggestion was reliable. Decision making in this observation task may require reflective understanding akin to that required for explicit source judgments when the child participates in the task.     

Inferring False Beliefs from Actions and Reactions

Current evidence suggests that young children have little understanding of false belief. Standard false belief tasks, however, may underestimate children's ability for 2 reasons. First, the only cue to belief in these tasks is a protagonist's lack of perceptual access to some critical event, and this may not be a very salient cue for young children. Second, the standard tasks require children to make forward-looking predictions from the causes of a belief (e.g., from what a protagonist has or has not perceived) to either the protagonist's belief or the protagonist's action, and children may not be very skilled at making such predictions. In 2 experiments we investigated whether 3-year-olds would do better on tasks in which the belief cues were stronger, and in which they could reason backward to the belief from its effects (e.g., from a protagonist's actions and reactions). Even on these easy tasks, however, they did not perform well. These findings provide strong support for the view that children of this age do not fully understand the representational nature of belief.     

Role of the Embodied Cognition Process in Perspective-Taking Ability During Childhood

This study examined developmental changes in Level-2 visual perspective taking (VPT2) in 90 children aged 4–12 years and tested the role of their ability to mentally simulate changes to their bodily locations (self-motion imagery; SMI). Performance of a mental toy rotation task and a self-motion (SM) task (changing location of children) was superior to that of VPT2 and SMI tasks. Task performance of SMI was better than that of VPT2 before 10;0 (years;months). Furthermore, egocentric responses in VPT2 and SMI tasks were significantly more frequent than those in the mental rotation and SM tasks before 10;3. These findings suggest the involvement of embodied cognitive processes in perspective taking and the advantage of utilizing bodily information by age 10.     

自闭症儿童缺乏"心理理论"吗?——基于神经现象学的解读

心理理论这一概念将儿童心智阅读能力视作一种基于规则或逻辑的推理,并以此设计出了错误信念任务等经典任务.大量研究显示自闭症儿童在这些任务上的表现不佳,因此该群体被认为是缺少心理理论的"心灵盲".基于对心理理论概念及其元理论的分析,并在神经现象学视角下结合镜像神经元研究、自闭症儿童的主观报告及其行为的现象学描述,本文尝试揭...     

Young children's attribution of action to beliefs and desires

When and how children understand beliefs and desires is central to whether they are ever childhood realists and when they evidence a theory of mind. Adults typically construe human action as resulting from an actor's beliefs and desires, a mentalistic interpretation that represents a common and fundamental form of psychological explanation. We investigated children's ability to do likewise. In Experiment 1, 60 subjects were asked to explain why story characters performed simple actions, such as looking under a piano for a kitten. Both preschoolers and adults gave predominantly psychological explanations, attributing the actions to the actor's beliefs and desires. Even 3-year-olds attributed actions to beliefs and false beliefs, demonstrating an understanding of belief not evident in previous research. In Experiment 2, 24 3-year-olds were tested further on their understanding of false belief. They were given both false belief prediction and explanation tasks. Children performed well on explanation taks, attributing an anomalous action to the actor's false belief, even when they failed to predict correctly what action would follow from a false belief. We concluded that 3-year-olds and adults share a fundamentally similar construal of human action in terms of beliefs and desires, even false beliefs.     

Conceptual Coherence in the Child's Theory of Mind: Training Children to Understand Belief

Intuitive theories are defined as coherently interrelated systems of concepts that generate explanations and predictions in a particular domain of experience. 2 studies tested whether the child's theory of mind can be characterized as an intuitive theory. In Study 1, 3-year-old children who did not pass a false belief pretest were trained in 2 groups: (1) on the concept of belief, or (2) on the related concepts of desire and perception. Training took place over 2 weeks, with children given mental state tasks and receiving feedback according to their performance. Both training groups showed improved false belief performance on the posttest, compared to a control group trained on number conservation. This result is interpreted as demonstrating coherence in the child's theory of mind. In Study 2, these findings were repeated and expanded: training on belief as well as training on desire and perception resulted in improved performance on a variety of standard theory of mind posttests. Results are discussed with respect to competing theories of children's intuitive psychological knowledge.