从图像论到游戏说——维特根斯坦哲学的转变

路德维希·维特根斯坦（Ludwig Wittgensten,1889-1951）是分析哲学的重要代表.“语言批判”是贯穿维特根斯坦哲学发展的一条主线,他倡导通过语言分析解决和消除传统哲学问题,提出“语言图像论”和“语言游戏说”两种不同的理论.语言图像论到语言游戏说的转变,使分析哲学由对语言的逻辑分析走向了对语言的语用分析.立足于“语言图像论”和“语言游戏说”,分析维特根斯坦的哲学思想、思想的转变以及其思想在西方哲学中的影响.     

Wittgenstein at Cambridge: Philosophy as a way of life

Ludwig Wittgenstein was a reclusive and enigmatic philosopher, writing his most significant work off campus in remote locations. He also held a chair in the Philosophy Department at Cambridge, and is one of the university’s most recognized even if, as Ray Monk says (1990, 401), ‘reluctant professors’ of philosophy. Paradoxically, although Wittgenstein often showed contempt for the atmosphere at Cambridge and for academic philosophy in particular, it is hard to conceive of him making his significant contributions without considerable support from his academic colleagues, his research fellowship and later teaching career at Cambridge. It is this conflicted relationship we explore, between the revolutionary thinker and his base within an educational institution. Starting from a brief biographical sketch of Wittgenstein’s academic life at Cambridge, including his involvement as a student and faculty member in the Moral Sciences Club, we look at how he reconceived the role of philosophy throughout this period of creative antagonism. Throughout his work, from the early Tractatus to his ‘Lecture of Ethics’, and again later in his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein drew a boundary between empirical science and philosophy: the latter defined as an investigation of language and the limits of meaning. Seldom at home at the university, he was also at odds with his chosen field, offering a therapeutic approach that allows readers ‘to stop doing philosophy when they want to’ (PI §132). We conclude our investigation of Wittgenstein’s relationship with the university and academic philosophy with insights from Pierre Hadot on philosophical inquiry as a vital part of the bios, a form of life that is the life-blood of academia. Hadot offers insights on Wittgenstein’s self-limiting narratives as a crucial aspect of what makes universities such important and enduring institutions, in spite of the vitriolic criticism they draw from iconic members like Wittgenstein.     

不能不说的话:维特根斯坦与弗雷格、罗素

维特根斯坦在多大程度上受到了弗雷格、罗素对维特根斯坦的激发,这一直都是学界争论的问题。以实证的方法论证这种激发不会影响维氏哲学的独创性,而更加深了对维氏哲学的理解。     

Training and Mastery of Techniques in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy: A response to Michael Luntley

Responding to Michael Luntley's article, 'Learning, Empowerment and Judgement', the author shows he cannot successfully make the following three moves: (1) dissolve the analytic distinction between learning by training and learning by reasoning, while advocating the latter; (2) diminish the role of training in Wittgenstein's philosophy, nor attribute to him a rationalist model of learning; and (3) turn to empirical research as a way of solving the philosophical problems he addresses through Wittgenstein. Drawing on José Medina's analysis of the fundamental role of training in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the paper offers a tour of key passages in the Investigations and other works to develop an understanding of what Wittgenstein meant by 'mastery of techniques'. In opposition to Luntley's liberal-individual, or his subject as rational agent, the author explores Wittgenstein's non-foundationalist, forms of life approach to how we act with agreement. More effort must be given to differentiating Wittgenstein's view from that of the analytic school, which Luntley appears to echo despite his criticism of the analytic divide.     

Training and Mastery of Techniques in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy: A response to Michael Luntley

Responding to Michael Luntley's article, ‘Learning, Empowerment and Judgement’, the author shows he cannot successfully make the following three moves: (1) dissolve the analytic distinction between learning by training and learning by reasoning, while advocating the latter; (2) diminish the role of training in Wittgenstein's philosophy, nor attribute to him a rationalist model of learning; and (3) turn to empirical research as a way of solving the philosophical problems he addresses through Wittgenstein. Drawing on José Medina's analysis of the fundamental role of training in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the paper offers a tour of key passages in the Investigations and other works to develop an understanding of what Wittgenstein meant by ‘mastery of techniques’. In opposition to Luntley's liberal‐individual, or his subject as rational agent, the author explores Wittgenstein's non‐foundationalist, forms of life approach to how we act with agreement. More effort must be given to differentiating Wittgenstein's view from that of the analytic school, which Luntley appears to echo despite his criticism of the analytic divide.     

Training and Abrichtung: Wittgenstein as a tragic philosopher of education

As a landmark philosopher of language and of mind, Ludwig Wittgenstein is also remarkable for having crossed, with apparent ease, the ‘continental divide’ in philosophy. It is consequently not surprising that Wittgenstein’s work, particularly in the Philosophical Investigations, has been taken up by philosophers of education in English. Michael A. Peters, Christopher Winch, Paul Smeyers and Nicholas Burbules, and others have engaged extensively with the implications of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy for education. One challenge they face is Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘training.’ It appears throughout his discussions of language learning and in his periodic references to education. This is made all the more problematic by realizing that the German term Wittgenstein uses consistently is Abrichtung, which refers to animal dressage or obedience training, which is currently used in sadomasochistic practice, and which also connotes also the breaking of an animal’s will. I argue that this little-recognized fact has broad significance for many important Wittgenstinian insights into education. I conclude by considering how an unflinching recognition of the implications of Wittgenstein’s word choice might cast him as a pessimistic or tragic philosopher of education and upbringing—following German-language traditions—rather than as thinker more compatible with progressive Anglo-American perspectives.     

Language Games in the Ivory Tower: Comparing the Philosophical Investigations with Hermann Hesse's The Glass Bead Game

Wittgenstein explores learning through practice in the Philosophical Investigations by means of an extended analogy with games. However, does this concern with learning also necessarily extend to education, in our institutional understanding of the word? While Wittgenstein's examples of language learning and use are always shared or social, he does not discuss formal educational institutions as such. He does not wish to found a ‘school of thought’, and is suspicious of philosophy acting as a theory that can be applied to other areas of life. While Wittgenstein's focus on developing independent thinking was neither individualistic nor anti‐institutional, it did, however, focus on developing the thinking of his students rather than theorising about how this could be applied on a large scale. An analysis of Hermann Hesse's novel, The Glass Bead Game will help us to pick up where Wittgenstein deliberately left off—thinking about how (or if) one can institutionalise learning methods that encourage thinking for oneself. These differences in the writers’ treatment of education will become evident in the differences between their game analogies. While language‐games combat our ‘craving for generality’ in Philosophical Investigations, the Glass Bead Game represents this craving, and how it manifests itself throughout history in disciplines other than logic and philosophy of language. It also represents the potential for institutions to become insular, exclusive communities.     

伽达默尔的诠释学作为实践哲学读解

伽达默尔的诠释学一方面继承了亚里士多德实践哲学的传统,另一方面在批判近代科学理性的同时恢复实践理性的本来面目,因而他的诠释学实际上是一种实践哲学的诠释学,或者诠释学的实践哲学。伽达默尔的诠释学作为实践哲学,在《真理与方法》中表现为对理解的应用性问题的强调;而在其后期思想中,伽氏试图以诠释学的实践哲学来维护或确立人文科学知识与真理的合法地位,把实践哲学看作具有基础意义的哲学。诠释学的理解本体论离不开语言的对话,对话也是实践哲学的基本条件,因而对话精神是伽达默尔实现诠释学实践哲学理想的有力工具。伽达默尔认为人类未来社会的最终理想就是交谈共同体。     

分析哲学如何走向外在主义?--维特根斯坦意识理论及其后现代意义

外在主义通常被认为是认知科学和现象学“彻底逆转”后的走向与发展成果。然而文章认为,外在主义在分析哲学中有其存在论基础与根源,尤其在维特根斯坦的哲学叙述中表现得最为明显。维特根斯坦通过语词符号的形而上学研究介入对预期、意义、信仰等内在意识状态或过程之具体概念的逻辑分析中,并与此同时对传统的内部意识模型进行了彻底的消解与批判。从其整个分析哲学的发展历程来看,外在主义思想发微、凸显于前期维特根斯坦向后期维特根斯坦转变的过程中。在分析哲学这种走向的影响下,外在主义思想成为未来哲学理论研究的生长点和出发点,揭示并体现了维特根斯坦哲学“理论维度丰富性”和“历史影响广泛性”的后现代意义。     

维特根斯坦“语言游戏说”述评

本文主要是阐述维特根斯坦后期的主要哲学思想——“使用论”,维氏提出了“语言游戏说”。文章首先对其基本观点及思想作了一个简单的介绍,然后从优点和缺陷两方面对其进行评介。它主要对后来的言语行为理论和家族相似性理论的形成以及语用学的大力发展产生了积极深远的影响。     

维特根斯坦后期语言哲学中的语言生态系统研究

维特根斯坦后期语言哲学不仅成功促进了哲学研究的语言转向,同时也使得语言学研究进入了语用研究阶段。语用学、社会语言学、认知语言学等语言研究的核心理论都可以在维特根斯坦后期语言哲学中找到思想的源头,这些理论都与维特根斯坦后期语言哲学中的语言观,如"语言游戏理论""生活形式""家族相似性""私人语言"等有密切的关系。其实仔细研究发现,其实维特根斯坦后期语言哲学本身就是一个系统,是一个语言生态系统,可以很好地解释语言。     

维特根斯坦的“家族相似说”

"家族相似说"是维特根斯坦后期提出的一种影响深远的比喻性说法,被后人视为维特根斯坦反本质主义的纲领之一。"家族相似说"认为不存在语言的本质,各种语言游戏之间的"家族相似"是一种错综复杂、重叠交错的"相似性"关联,应通过"不要想,而要看"的方式研究语言的个别性、多样性。维特根斯坦的"家族相似说"对西方哲学的发展产生了重要而深远的影响。     

哲学是纯粹描述的——后期维特根斯坦论哲学的性质

后期维特根斯坦认为哲学的性质是纯粹描述的,这既不同于他前期哲学所认为的哲学是逻辑分析的活动,也不同于以建立理论体系为己任的传统哲学。当他把哲学归结为描述时,也就表明哲学不能是一种理论。     

逻辑原子主义哲学产生的动因

逻辑原子主义哲学是罗素和维特根斯坦相互影响下共同建立的哲学体系,它在西方哲学从认识论向语言学转向过程中处于重要地位,从历史、自然科学和哲学思想等方面探讨逻辑原子主义哲学产生的动因对于深入理解逻辑原子主义哲学的内涵具有极重要的意义。     

Rush Rhees on Education

R.S. Peters and Paul Hirst were the most influential figures in philosophy of education in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The claim in this paper is that their rationalist's approach was often misleading and unilluminating. They believed they were preparing children for life beyond school, but to a large extent they failed because they did not take into account the diversity of values and practices of life in general. The paper contains some reflections by Rush Rhees, a student of Wittgenstein, on some of their writings. Rhees had first met Wittgenstein when he attended his classes in 1936. They formed a lifelong friendship, and Rhees subsequently devoted much of his life to the dissemination, interpretation, and criticism of Wittgenstein's work. The reflections discussed here derive primarily from views Rhees expressed in the 1970s.     

言语行为理论中的语言规则

维特根斯坦的早期和晚期的思想虽有变化 ,但其一直关注语言的规范和界限。他早先提出的图式说让位于工具说和游戏说 ,给以后的研究言语行为理论的语言哲学家奠定了基础。在维特根斯坦那里 ,语言被比作一箱木匠工具 ,其中各种工具都有自身的特殊功能和运用技巧。语言也好比各种游戏 ,每一种游戏都有各自的设施、规则以及胜败标准。假如需要 ,而且具备了创造能力 ,当然还可以无限地增加新工具和新游戏。维氏的观点给英美语言哲学家奥斯汀和塞尔以启发 ,他们进而提出了自己的言语行为理论以及语言规则观点。如何使用语言 ,怎样认识语意和语用之间的关系问题 ,言语行为理论倡导者提出了自己的语言规则说。本文在介绍言语行为理论中的语言规则中 ,把维特根斯坦的日常语言哲学的观点同言语行为的学说联系起来加以分析 ,使人们看到其中的来龙去脉 ,对当代西方语言哲学有个新认识     

论维特根斯坦和伽达默尔在语言观上的差异

语言问题是英美语言哲学和解释学共同关注的重要问题,而维特根斯坦和伽达默尔无疑是这两派哲学最具代表性的人物。在语言与存在、语言与世界以及语言与理解等诸问题上,维特根斯坦和伽达默尔都有着迥然不同的观点,对他们在语言观方面的有关论述进行比较,也可以有助于我们加深对英美语言哲学和解释学这两大哲学传统的关系的理解。     

论庄子对苏轼谪居诗主体风格的促成

苏轼的生存背景、处世态度及其文论导向的形成，向世人昭示了庄子对苏轼谪居诗旷达简远的主体风格的促成：随着谪居黄州以来受庄子哲学、审美思想影响程度的加深，苏轼随遇而安的处世态度和自然率真的艺术追求日益明朗化。苏轼随遇而安的处世哲学，为其谪居诗超迈淡泊的特征的形成提供了思想基础。苏轼自然率真的艺术追求，为其谪居诗以旷达简远的艺术形式，自由、自然地表情达意提供了必要的条件。     

也谈郭象"独化论"的本体之学问题

郭象是我国西晋初期的重要哲学家,郭象哲学在中国哲学史上起着承先启后的作用.对于郭象哲学,我国哲学界大都认为其属于客观唯心主义.通过对"郭象哲学是客观唯心主义"论断及其根据的分析,以及对郭象哲学与王弼、裴危哲学的比较,笔者认为,把郭象"独化论"哲学划入客观唯心主义阵营是不妥当的,其哲学的基本倾向是唯物主义.     

维特根斯坦哲学之短议

维特根斯坦通过语言分析来"拒斥形而上学",对哲学,特别是传统哲学,采取虚无主义的态度;在他看来,命题的意义来自经验事实,其实事实也只不过是主观经验范围的东西;从他的逻辑原子论的主要观点来看,基本表现为唯心主义、形而上学和不可知论。