MEASURING THE THIRD-PERSON EFFECT OF NEWS: THE IMPACT OF QUESTION ORDER, CONTRAST AND KNOWLEDGE

This study investigated the extent to which the third-personeffect—the tendency of people to estimate greater impactof media messages on ‘other people’ than on themselves—mightdepend upon question-contrast effects (i.e. self-serving comparisonstriggered by back-to-back questions dealing with effect on othersand oneself), the order of questions, and respondents' levelsof background political knowledge. Two hundred and eighty-sevensubjects participated in two experimental studies involvingquestions about media coverage of President Clinton's possiblerole in the ‘Whitewater Affair’, his alleged frequentpolicy reversals, the O. J. Simpson murder trial, and childmolestation charges against Michael Jackson. Both experimentsresulted in significant third-person effects that did not dependupon having the same respondents answer both questions; meansfor single-question (no contrast) conditions did not differsignificantly from comparable means in two-question (contrast)conditions. No significant main effects of question order wereobserved. In Experiment 1 a significant interaction betweenpolitical knowledge and question order was found, such thata negative relationship between knowledge and perceived impacton oneself emerged when the ‘self’ question followeda question about perceived effects on others. Experiment 2 replicatedthe interaction for two of three news stimuli, and indicatedthat it was not a product of differences in the personal importanceof issues. Implications of these results for understanding thethird-person effect are discussed.     

GREEK PUBLIC ATTITUDES: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

The dictatorship that ruled Greece between 1967–74 hadlasting consequences on the country's political culture. FromWorld War II and the Greek civil war until the dictatorship'scollapse, pro-Western, anti-communist, pro-business, sociallytraditional values had dominated public opinion. The dramaticfall of the dictatorship amidst a ‘national tragedy’made it a scapegoat and made what it stood for very unpopularespecially among the younger generation. So, when the lattercame of age, it contributed to the emergence of a new set ofvalues that were anti-rights, anti-Western, anti-business, anti-traditionalistand even historically revisionist, and were majoritrian in the1980s. These values have been so strongly entrenched that neitherthe Panhellenic Socialist Movement's (PASOK's) poor record inpower, nor the indictment of some of its leaders for seriousscandals in 1989, nor even the emergence, under PASOK rule,of a new more moderate generation, have helped the right toregain the absolute majority of the votes so to govern the country,although it has led to a partial moderation of the radical ‘juntageneration’.     

TOWARDS A NOTION OF 'WORLD OPINION'

This paper presents a content analysis of the manner in which‘world opinion’ is used in stories and editorialsof two nations' major newspapers. The authors studied the InternationalHerald Tribune and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung for themonths of February, March, and April 1986 for articles whichcontained implicit or explicit references to ‘world opinion’.These refernces were studied using a pre-designed survey instrument,which analyzed several features of the term's usage. Topicsfor discussion included: (1) the various syonyms for world opinion;(2) the agenda for world opinion; (3) the timing of referenceto particular issues on the agenda; (4) the moral and pragmaticcomponents of world opinion; and (5) the link between worldopinion and the ‘international isolation’ of nationsor individuals. The paper concludes by combining the resultsof the study into a preliminary definition of ‘world opinion’,based upon the common usage of this term. The definition comparesthe characteristics of ‘world opinion’ and ‘publicopinion’, and discusses the possible ramifications ofunderstanding the concept in this manner.     

Katrin Doveling (2005). Emotionen--Medien--Gemeinschaft. Eine kommunikationssoziologische Analyse [Emotions--media--community. A study from the perspective of communication sociology]. Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag, 340 pp., ISBN 3-531-14236-4.

‘Here is a book that makes you want to shout, "Finally!"’That is the opening sentence of a recent book review that theauthor of this review wrote for the International Journal ofPublic Opinion Research about Campaigning for Hearts and Minds:How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work by Ted Brader (2006).The remark refers to the fact that Brader’s book focuseson an issue that has thus far received very little attentionin the field of communication studies, or, for that matter,in the fields of political science or sociology, namely, themajor role emotions play in explaining collective behavior,social decisions, opinion formation and—especially inthe case at hand—the effects of media coverage on opinionformation. Now, in the form of Katrin Döveling’scomprehensive new     

Gender Attitudes and Modernization Processes

The article aims to explain why attitudes toward gender equalityand gender relations in society vary between individuals andcountries. The hypotheses that are tested stem from two partlyconflicting theories of modernization. Wilensky (2002) advocatesa ‘structural’ explanation for variation in genderattitudes, while Inglehart (1990, 1997) suggests a ‘values’explanation. The author conducts a three-part analysis: an individual,a national, and a multilevel analysis. The structural explanationis better able to account for individual level gender attitudes.Values do, to some extent, serve as the mechanism that producesnational level variation. Inglehart (1990, 1997) is also rightin suggesting that the effect of values on gender attitudesincreases with increasing development. Received for publication August 30, 2005. Revision received December 10, 2005.     

PUBLIC OPINION AS PARADOX: AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDES TO THE RATE OF IMMIGRATION AND THE RATE OF ASIAN IMMIGRATION, 1984-1990

Over the last few years, questions in the Australian polls aboutthe rate of immigration and the rate of Asian immigration havegenerated a remarkably wide range of response. While most ofthe polls conducted since 1984 suggest majority opposition tothe rate at which immigrants, including Asian immigrants, havebeen coming to Australia, other polls suggest majority support.Differences between the 1984 poll figures and some of the morerecent polls may reflect changes over time. Other polled differencesalmost certainly reflect differences in the way the questionswere worded. However, the most remarkable if least obvious causeof the difference seems to be the contexts in which the questionswere asked; more precisely, differences in the length and focusof the various questionnaires in which questions on immigrationwere embedded. Public opinion on the rate of immigration isnot only ‘soft’, it is created in the very attemptto measure it. Under these circumstances there is little pointin trying to isolate ‘majority opinion’ or in attemptingto establish which of the polls provides the most accurate reading.Where different readings are a product of differing contextsthey may be best understood in terms of competing conceptionsof what ‘public opinion’ itself is all about.     

THE GULF CRISIS: A BRITISH PERSPECTIVE

This paper presents the results of a relatively large numberof public opinion surveys conducted in Britain during the Gulfcrisis—August 1990 to February 1991—many at weeklyintervals. The questions detailed here not only dealt with publicattitudes to the crisis itself but on its impact on the perceptionof the superpowers and the Arab world; again comparative trends,stretching back for almost forty years. There is also a discussionof the Gulf crisis and the British domestic political situation—wouldthe so-called ‘Falklands effect’ of 1982-1983 bereplicated by a ‘Gulf effect’ in 1991? This collectionof surveys probably represents one of the largest databaseson the topic in Britain. The paper shows a fairly stable positionof public opinion during the crisis; an improvement in the imageof the United States but a deterioration in that of the SovietUnion; but no significant effect on the British domestic politicalscene.     

VALUE-FRAMING ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN APPLICATION OF MEDIA SYSTEM DEPENDENCY THEORY

This paper is in the tradition of social analysis aimed at creatingframeworks to join mass media and public opinion processes (e.g.Clarke and Evans, 1983; Gamson, 1975; Gitlin, 1980; Hall, 1977;Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Lang and Lang, 1968, 1983; Lippman,1922; Mollotch and Lester, 1974; Noelle-Neuman, 1974; Paletzand Entman, 1981; Shaw and McCombs, 1977; Turner and Paz, 1986).After a brief review of media system dependency (MSD) theory,we illustrate how it may apply to public opinion processes thatentail contested issue ‘value-frames’ (Ball-Rokeachand Rokeach, 1987). In such cases, the media system is directlyimplicated in the negotiation of legitimacy of opposing positionson an issue. Our illustrative case is the abortion issue asit has been played out in the United States over recent decades(Luker, 1984). We focus upon the respective capacities of pro-and anti-abortion movements to control the value-frame of mediacoverage of the issue (Guthrie, 1989). A value-frame may beconceived as ‘... the main substantive theme of a moralityplay’ (Ball-Rokeach and Tallman, 1979) wherein the distinctionbetween ‘good’ and ‘bad’ hangs in thebalance; in this case, between positions on abortion. We suggestthat change in the value-frame of media coverage and publicdiscourse may be understood, at least in part, as an outcomeof change in contestants' MSD relations.     

COPING WITH FREEDOM AND UNCERTAINTY: PUBLIC OPINION IN HUNGARY, POLAND, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1989-1992

For the first time in more than four decades, Central and EastEuropeans can openly voice their opinion about everything fromthe price of bread to the performance of the government. Publicopinion has become a dynamic factor in the decision-making processof the new governments of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakiaand will play an important role in determining what kind ofpost-communist societies develop in these countries. In an effortto explore public sentiment about what kind of society theywant to develop, we analyze results from 14 nationwide, representativepublic opinion polls commissioned by the United States InformationAgency's Office of Research between June 1989 and January 1992in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. After tracing trendsin public opinion over this period, we look at some aspectsof the political culture in these countries. We then reporton our preliminary attempts to understand the determinants ofindividual preferences for either a society that emphasizesindividual freedom and responsibility (‘individual opportunities’society) or one in which the state assumes responsibility forassuring public welfare (‘state guarantees’ society).     

THE PRO-EEC CONVERSION OF GREEK PUBLIC OPINION (1981-90)

Greece became an EEC member in 1981, following a parliamentaryvote in the then New Democracy (conservative)–controlledparliament. Opinion polls indicated though that were a referendumheld at the time, membership would have been rejected, as thegovernment had lost its popular support (and lost power in thecourse of that year) and an across-the-board anti-western majorityhad emerged in a country whose people's national identity wasfirst defined during and as a defense against the crusades.Ten years later, there exists in Greece a very large consensusin favor of EEC membership which includes even the communistleft, at least programmatically. The spectacular, and unprecedentedamong Community countries, pro-EEC conversion is the subjectof this paper. First, using the European Commission's Eurobarometerand Eurodim's Helleno-barometer data, the evolution of Greekpublic opinion towards the EEC is documented. Secondly, thetrend data in the various voting groups show that this conversionis basically the result of the transformation of the socialistelectorate from anti-EEC to pro-EEC, but with a lag behind thesimilar change in the party's (PASOK) policies during its eight-yearrule (1981–9). Thirdly, evidence is provided that anti-westernismhas not died out in Greece, but that it has both mellowed andbecome ‘selective’. So, we conclude that the pro-EECconversion was not the result of some general ‘Westernization’of Greek public opinion, but the outcome of a ‘learningexperience’: during their country's ten-year EEC membership,the Greeks discovered that the benefits from this internationalcommitment far outweighed the costs. In fact, it is argued thatthe pro-EEC conversion of Greek public opinion has contributedto the mellowing of its anti-westernism: whereas the crusadeswere instrumental in cutting the Greeks from Europe, the EECappears now the vehicle of their reintegration into a worldin whose development they have historically played a major role.     

Using A Split-ballot Survey to Explore the Robustness of the 'MIP' Question in Agenda-Setting Research: A Methodological Study

Three aspects of the ‘most important problem’ questionused in agenda-setting research to measure issue salience amongthe public were examined. A split-ballot design in a state-widesurvey compared versions of the public agenda with a socialframe of reference versus a personal frame of reference, versionsusing the traditional term ‘problem’ versus ‘issue’,and the effects of question order. High correlations betweenthe different versions were found in all three sets of comparisons.     

Measuring Public Opinions About Surveys

Respondent's opinions about survey research are regarded asan expression at the individual level of the general survey-takingclimate. Based on a review of the research about ‘surveyson surveys’ five relevant dimensions of the respondent'sopinion about surveys are distinguished: survey enjoyment, surveyvalue, survey cost, survey reliability, and survey privacy.Items related to these aspects are used to develop an ‘Opinionsabout Survey Scale’. The results of an analysis of thepredictive validity of the scale support the expectations basedon the theory of planned behavior. Opinions about surveys areassociated with the intention to participate in future surveysand with hesitation to fill out the questionnaire of a mailsurvey. Opinions are not related with participation in a follow-upmail survey. The results of the wave analysis of a mail surveyare a clear indication that nonrespondents have more negativeopinions about different aspects of surveys. This also meansthat the measurement of opinions is biased. However, becauseof this bias it is worthwhile and useful to measure these opinions.     

Terrorism and Africa: A Study of Agenda Building in the United States

An agenda-building model was examined for the question of Africaand terrorism. A path analysis compared real-world events (deathsand attacks attributed to terrorism), presidential emphasis,media coverage, and foreign aid for 20 African nations. Resultsshow a clear agenda-building trend—when nations were emphasizedwith a terrorism frame. Presidential emphasis of nations’involvement in terrorism influenced media coverage and the policyagenda. The findings also suggest that deaths attributed toterrorism influenced the news and policy agendas. Media coverageof nations with a terrorism frame influenced the policy agenda.Only one significant path coefficient was found in the analysisof agenda setting without terrorism framing: The more PresidentBush mentioned a nation in his public statements, the more TheNew York Times covered the country. Received for publication September 29, 2006. Accepted for publication March 27, 2007.     

TIME-LAG DIFFERENCES IN THE AGENDA-SETTING PROCESS: AN EXAMINATION OF FIVE NEWS MEDIA

Five news media in the U.S. were examined to determine the optimaltime-lag for agenda-setting effects to occur for each. Publicresponses to an open-ended question ‘What is the numberone problem facing our country today?’ were compared tomedia coverage from one to 26 weeks earlier. A number of differenceswere found across the five media. The results show that televisioncoverage had a shorter optimal time-lag than newspapers. Themore immediate effect of television news, however, quickly deteriorated,and newspapers had a stronger long-term agenda-setting effect.National and regional media also had a more immediate impactthan local media. All media, generally, had slightly shorteroptimal time-lags than previous research would suggest.     

PUBLIC APPROVAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND OTHER NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT GOALS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

The environmental movement is one of the most successful socialmovements of the twentieth century, and a key reason for itssuccess has been strong public approval of the movement's goalof environmental protection. This paper reports cross-nationaldata on public approval of environmental protection relativeto approval of the goals of other major ‘new social movements’—theanti-nuclear power movement, the nuclear disarmament movement,the women's movement, the human rights movement and the animalrights movement—in Western Europe and the United States.The data come from a 1990 ‘lifestyles and attitudes’survey conducted by Gallup for Reader's Digest, based on nationallyrepresentative samples in the United States and seventeen Europeannations, and show higher public approval for environmental protectionthan for the goals of other new social movements.     

MASS MEDIA, THE ELECTORATE, AND THE BANDWAGON. A STUDY OF COMMUNICATION EFFECTS ON VOTE CHOICE IN GERMANY

The paper addresses two propositions: (1) that by publishingnews stories about the electoral strength of parties or candidates,the mass media contribute to shaping the voters' expectationsabout the likely outcome of an upcoming election; (2) that theseexpectations in turn stimulate a bandwagon effect, i.e. theyinfluence vote choice to the advantage of the apparent futurewinner of the election. Analyzing media content and survey datagathered during the campaign for the first all-German nationalelection of December 2, 1990, it can be shown that (1) interestin the media's political reporting as well as interpersonalpolitical communication contributed significantly to convertingvoters to the view of the election outcome that was constantlypresented by the mass media; (2) this belief in turn causedparticularly unsophisticated independent voters to vote forthe apparent winner of the election. Referring to the conceptualframework of ‘low information rationality’, thisbandwagon effect is interpreted as ‘majority-led proxyvoting’. Since public opinion polls play the key rolein its definition, the media portrayal of the competing parties'electoral prospects can be assumed to be fairly accurate, sothat voters relying on such information in casting their voteare not misled.     

Public Attitudes toward Polls: Evidence from the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election

This study investigates the perceived impact of election polls,focusing on the hotly contested 2000 U.S. presidential election.Survey data from 558 individuals gathered during the final daysof the election campaign are analyzed to examine beliefs thatthe polls greatly affect other voters, general views of pollsas good or bad for the country, beliefs about whether pollstersinfluence their results to come out a certain way, and supportfor banning election-night projections. Results indicate thatmost respondents felt the polls had no influence on themselveswhile still affecting others. Respondents exhibiting these ‘third-person-effect’perceptions were significantly more likely than others to believethat election polls are a bad thing for the country. Negativeperceptions of polls and beliefs that pollsters try to influenceresults were also related to general distrust of the news media.Negative views of polls in turn were associated with increasedsupport for prohibiting election-night projections. In general,the results illustrate the dependency of negative views aboutpolling on fears of untoward effects on voters, in particularthe fear that polls and election projections might lend supportto candidates opposed by the respondent.     

Domestic Adaptations of Europe: A Comparative Study of the Debates on EU Enlargement and a Common Constitution in the German and French Quality Press

The article investigates why a specific European issue is debatedin one country but disregarded in another, and why issues aredebated differently in different European countries. To understandthis national filtering, expectations are formulated as to howspecific policy traditions and issue-specific conflict constellationswithin a country are reflected in media debates. A systematiccontent analysis of the debates on EU enlargement and a commonconstitution for the years 2000–2002 in the German andFrench quality press reveals considerable variation in issuesalience, actors’ prominence and actors’ responsibilityattributions between and within the countries. This variationcan be seen to be connected with different policy traditionsand conflict constellations. The study seeks to go beyond merelydescribing variations in media coverage across Europe and systematicallyuses cross-national and cross-issue comparative research tounderstand this variation. Received for publication October 19, 2006. Accepted for publication April 5, 2007.     

Pre-Election Polls in Portugal: Accuracy, Bias, and Sources of Error, 1991-2004

This article examines the performance of the pre-election pollsin Portugal since 1991 and attempts to determine some of thecommon causes of poll inaccuracy in both National Assembly andEuropean Parliament elections. The analysis of poll resultsin this period reveals marked improvements in poll accuracysince 1991, which have brought it to levels that, today, arecomparable to those found in nations where the practice of bothsurvey research and opinion polling is longer and more established.No evidence of a systematic bias against any of the major partiesis found, and sources of error are congruent with those foundelsewhere. However, large errors remain the norm in polls pertainingto European Parliament elections, suggesting a shared inabilityof Portuguese polling organizations in dealing appropriatelywith the problems caused by low turnout and ‘landslide’elections.