理解儿童的理解——从哲学解释学的角度分析

后现代哲学解释学认为理解是人存在的方式.人自从呱呱落地以后,就不断理解着世界,体现生命和生存的意义,那些看上去很浅薄的哲学和科学思想,以及简单的艺术手法,无不体现儿童对世界的理解.但在现实社会中,成人往往无法正确理解儿童,容易把成人的意识强加给儿童.我们要通过澄明阐亮和平等对话来改变这种现状,还儿童一片新的世界.     

Children's Understanding of Logical Inconsistency

Five experiments involving 245 participants examined children's understanding of logical consistency. For instance, a character said that a man was both tall and very short. Only by 6 years of age did children show any understanding of logical inconsistency. This occurred despite: (1) good memory for the characters' claims; (2) the use of three different question forms including whether a person had made sense, said something silly, or whether both things a person said could be right; (3) the ability to identify other types of statements (e.g., factual inconsistencies) as not making sense; (4) the ability to compare and contrast the characters' claims in other ways; and (5) attempts to deepen children's processing of the claims by asking them to draw what each character said. Similar to false belief understanding, there was a monotonic relation between the number of older siblings a child had and logical consistency understanding on one of the tasks. It is argued that children may fail the different consistency tasks because of both logical factors (e.g., insufficient insight into logical necessity) and nonlogical factors tied to their social knowledge or insight into representation.     

Children's Understanding of the Stream of Consciousness

Children and adults were tested for their understanding that there is a virtually continuous flow of mental content in a waking person, a "stream of consciousness" that continues to run even when the person is not examining stimuli perceptually or trying to solve a problem. There was a marked increase with age from preschool to adulthood in subjects' tendency to say that a person who was just waiting quietly was having "some thoughts and ideas" rather than "a mind empty of thoughts and ideas." 4-year-olds also tended to say that the mind of a waiting person was "not doing anything," whether that person was another individual or themselves, and that a person who wanted to could keep his or her "mind completely empty of all thoughts and ideas" for 3 min. These results suggest that preschoolers' conceptions of people's mental lives may be quite different from those of older children and adults.     

Young Children's Understanding of the Mind-Body Distinction

4 experiments investigated children's understanding of the mind-body distinction. Children of ages 4 and 5 recognized not only the differential modifiability of changeable versus unchangeable human properties and bodily versus mental properties, but also the independence of activities of bodily organs from a person's intention (Experiment 1). When presented 3 types of causal explanations (i.e., intentional, vitalistic, mechanical), 6-year-olds chose most often as most plausible for bodily functions vitalistic explanations (i.e., those ascribing the phenomena to a relevant bodily organ's initiative and effortful engagement in activity); 8-year-olds chose the vitalistic explanations second most often, following mechanical ones (Experiment 2). However, 6-year-olds, as well as 8-year-olds and adults, did not always choose vitalistic explanations over intentional explanations (Experiment 3); whereas they tended to prefer vitalistic explanations for biological phenomena, they predominantly accepted intentional ones for psychological phenomena (Experiment 3A). These results suggest that children as young as 6 years of age have acquired a form of biology as an autonomous domain which is separate from that of psychology.     

Children's Understanding of Parental Differential Treatment

This study examined whether established associations between perceptions of parental differential treatment and sibling relationship quality are moderated by children's perceptions and attributions about parental behavior. Sixty-one children, aged 11–13 years, and their siblings were interviewed separately about parental differential treatment. Children did not perceive PDT in two-thirds of the instances they reported about, and 75% of the children who acknowledged that differential treatment was occurring in their homes did not find this to be unfair. Children justified differential parental behaviors by identifying ways that they and their sibling differ from one another, that is, in terms of differences in their age, personal attributes, needs, relationship with parents, or strategic behaviors. Children who perceived their parents' differential behavior to be justified generally experienced more positive appraisals about their sibling relationship. Results reinforce the importance of examining how children construct their experiences in their families.     

Reflecting on Scientific Thinking: Children's Understanding of the Hypothesis-Evidence Relation

3 experiments were carried out to examine children's understanding of the role of covariation evidence in hypothesis formation. Previous research suggested that it is not until 8 to 11 years of age that children begin to understand how a given pattern of covariation supports a particular hypothesis about which factor is causally responsible for an observed effect. Experiments 1 to 3 employed a different (fake evidence) technique than previous research and showed that by 6 years of age most children understand how evidence would lead a story character to form a different hypothesis than the subject's own. Experiment 3 showed that most 6- and young 7-year-olds understand how a character's future actions (e.g., choice of an object) and predictions of future outcomes depend on the hypothesis he or she holds.     

Children's Sensitivity to Lack of Understanding

Successful tutoring depends in part on child tutors’ ability to recognise and interpret accurately signals of misunderstanding by their tutees. Age- and gender-related differences were investigated in a study which exposed 80 children to a video-recorded episode involving a target child receiving ambiguous instructions in her attempts to move a model car along a designated route on a playmat roadway from one destination to another. The results showed that explicit, general and facial modes of displaying puzzlement by the target child were judged as equally powerful expressions of degree of puzzlement, but 8-10 year olds judged the target child as significantly more puzzled than did 7 year olds. Older children were also more likely to attribute the puzzlement of the target child to the ambiguous instructions than to her verbal or facial expression of puzzlement. Girls were generally more accurate than boys in judging facial expressions and less likely than boys to give wrong or alternatively ambiguous responses when given the opportunity to correct the video-recorded ambiguous instructions. The results throw some light on the developing sensitivities of boys and girls in recognising and attributing failures of understanding by other children.     

Children's Understanding of Guild and Shame

Children's conceptions of the self-conscious emotions guilt versus shame were investigated. In Study 1, 10–12-year-old children answered questions about scenarios that should elicit feelings of guilt and/or shame (moral transgressions and social blunders). In Study 2, 7–9- and 10–12-year-old children completed a sorting task to ascertain the features they associate with guilt and shame. Feelings of guilt were aroused by moral norm violations. Guilt feelings were also seen as involving an approach-avoidance conflict with respect to the victim, self-criticism, remorse, desire to make amends, and fear of punishment. Feelings of shame resulted from both moral transgressions and social blunders. Younger children associated shame with embarrassment, blushing, ridicule, and escape. Older children additionally characterized shame as feeling stupid, being incapable of doing things right, and not being able to look at others.     

Junin Quechua Children's Understanding of Mind

2 tasks that examine the child's understanding of false belief, representational change, and the appearance-reality distinction were conducted among 34 4- to 8-year-old Junin Quechua children in Peru. A majority of children demonstrated an understanding of the appearance-reality distinction, though there was a clear improvement with age. Both younger and older children, however, performed poorly on questions that tested their understanding of representational change and false belief. These results raise questions as to whether or not thinking about thought and its relation to action develops in a similar manner in all cultures. If the Junin Quechua children's understanding of the appearance-reality distinction is grounded in the same representational ability that is necessary to understand one's own and another's misrepresentation of reality, then we must look for other factors that prevent them from performing correctly on tasks that test their understanding of false belief and representational change.     

学前儿童生命认知现状研究

生命教育是贯穿人的生命发展全程的终身教育,它有非常丰富的内涵。儿童时期的生命教育可为其今后一生的可持续发展奠定基础。当前,应该从生命起源教育、生命本质教育、生命安全教育、爱心教育和死亡教育这五个方面加强对学前儿童的生命教育。     

Young Children's Understanding of Forgetting over Time

2 studies investigated young children's understanding that as the retention interval increases, so do the chances that one will forget. In Study 1 (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds), 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that of 2 characters who simultaneously saw an object, the character who waited longer before attempting to find it would not remember where it was. In study 2 (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds), 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that of 2 objects seen by a character, the object that was seen a "long long time ago" would be forgotten and the object seen "a little while ago" would be remembered. The findings are discussed in relation to research on young children's understanding of the acquisition, retention, and retrieval of knowledge over time.     

Origin and Truth: Young Children's Understanding of Imaginary Mental Representations

In 2 studies, we address young children's understanding of the origin and representational relations of imagination, a fictional mental state, and contrast this with their understanding of knowledge, an epistemic mental state. In the first study, 54 3- and 4-year-old children received 2 tasks to assess their understanding of origins, and 4 stories to assess their understanding of representational relations. Children of both ages understood that, whereas perception is necessary for knowledge, it is irrelevant for imagination. Results for children's understanding of representational relations revealed intriguing developmental differences. Although children understood that knowledge represents reality more truthfully than imagination, 3-year-olds often claimed that imagination reflected reality. The second study provided additional evidence that younger 3-year-olds judge that imaginary representations truthfully reflect reality. We propose that children's responses indicate an early understanding of the distinction between mental states and the world, but also a confusion regarding the extent to which mental contents represent the physical world.     

Young Children's Understanding of the Causes of Anger and Sadness

This study investigated kindergarten children's understanding of the causes of anger and sadness. Previous research has shown that before 6 or 7 years of age, children have difficulty distinguishing hypothetical situations designed to evoke anger from those designed to evoke sadness. In this project, 80 kindergarten children (ages 5-1 to 6-5, M = 5-10) predicted and explained protagonists' emotional responses to a variety of hypothetical events. The results showed that intentional harm was not the feature young children used to distinguish anger from sadness. Children predicted anger most often when they believed that protagonists could change undesirable situations and reinstate their goals and when children focused on the person or conditions that brought about undesirable situations. Children predicted sadness most often when they believed that goal reinstatement was impossible and focused on the losses that would ensue as a result.     

学前儿童乘法能力研究综述

关于学前儿童乘法能力发展的研究大多集中在许多与一对应、乘法概念起源、乘法类型以及乘法问题解决策略等方面.已有研究成果对当前幼儿园开展数学教育有积极指导意义.本文通过对已有研究文献的综述,展望了今后的研究方向.     

Children's Understanding of the Meaning and Functions of Verbal Irony

We investigated children's understanding of irony and sensitivity to irony's meanness and humor. In Study 1, 89 participants (5–6-year-olds, 8–9-year-olds, adults) heard ironic and literal criticisms, and literal compliments. Comprehension of irony emerged between 5 and 6 years of age. Ratings of humor increased with age; ratings of meanness did not (showing that all ages perceived irony as more muted than literal criticism). In Study 2, results from 135 participants (6–7-year-olds, 8–9-year-olds, and adults) replicated these findings and revealed the role of form and intonation. Thus, comprehension of irony emerges between 5 and 6 years of age, and sensitivity to the muting function develops prior to sensitivity to the humor function.     

Masking of Children's Early Understanding of the Representational Mind: Backwards Explanation versus Prediction

3–5-year-olds heard a story involving identical twins, one of whom was absent when their ball was moved from one drawer to another. Children found it easy to infer that the twin who later went to the original location to get the ball was the one who had gone outside. Children in a comparison condition found it relatively difficult to predict where a (nonidentical) twin who was absent when the ball was moved, would search for the ball, and made the usual realist error. In further investigations involving variations on the identical twins task, children were equally successful at making the link between looking in the wrong place and having been absent, whether a backwards inference was required (as above) or a forwards one (inferring that the twin who went outside must now be the one who was at the wrong location). We ruled out one twin's physical association with the correct location as an artifactual explanation for facilitation. Children performed well whether or not the experimenter told them explicitly which twin did not know the ball had been moved. These findings support the view that children's early insight into the representational character of mind is masked in traditional prediction tests of false belief.     

Primary School Children's Understanding of Severe Learning Difficulties

This paper reports two studies in which non‐handicapped (NH) children (7‐ and 11‐year‐olds) were interviewed about their understanding of severe learning difficulties (SLD). The NH children, 19 7‐year‐olds and 32 11‐year‐olds, had been involved in a year of fortnightly or weekly (respectively) link sessions with children with SLD. The NH children's understanding of SLD can be interpreted in terms of three conceptual changes, identified by Katz (1982) and Aboud (1988), occurring during the primary school years. These changes are: a shift in focus from concrete to abstract characteristics of children with SLD; increasing recognition of intra‐SLD group differences and inter (mainstream‐SLD) group similarities; and acknowledgement of the irrevocability of the key cues of SLD. These changes are discussed in the broader context of the development of social cognition.