Forthcoming events

The aims of this study were to quantify the effects of factors such as mode of exercise, body composition and training on the relationship between heart rate and physical activity energy expenditure (measured in kJ?·?min^?1) and to develop prediction equations for energy expenditure from heart rate. Regularly exercising individuals (n = 115; age 18?–?45 years, body mass 47?–?120?kg) underwent a test for maximal oxygen uptake ([Vdot]O_2max test), using incremental protocols on either a cycle ergometer or treadmill; [Vdot]O_2max ranged from 27 to 81?ml?·?kg^?1?·?min^?1. The participants then completed three steady-state exercise stages on either the treadmill (10?min) or the cycle ergometer (15?min) at 35%, 62% and 80% of [Vdot]O_2max, corresponding to 57%, 77% and 90% of maximal heart rate. Heart rate and respiratory exchange ratio data were collected during each stage. A mixed-model analysis identified gender, heart rate, weight, [Vdot]_2max and age as factors that best predicted the relationship between heart rate and energy expenditure. The model (with the highest likelihood ratio) was used to estimate energy expenditure. The correlation coefficient (r) between the measured and estimated energy expenditure was 0.913. The model therefore accounted for 83.3% (R ²) of the variance in energy expenditure in this sample. Because a measure of fitness, such as [Vdot]O_2max, is not always available, a model without [Vdot]O_2max included was also fitted. The correlation coefficient between the measured energy expenditure and estimates from the mixed model without [Vdot]O_2max was 0.857. It follows that the model without a fitness measure accounted for 73.4% of the variance in energy expenditure in this sample. Based on these results, we conclude that it is possible to estimate physical activity energy expenditure from heart rate in a group of individuals with a great deal of accuracy, after adjusting for age, gender, body mass and fitness.     

Development of children's knowledge about unconsciousness

Children of ages 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 years, and adults were asked whether people who are sound asleep and not dreaming could or would: (1) see, hear, listen, notice, think, wish, pretend, and feel things (primary-consciousness activities), (2), know that they are asleep, and know whether they are or are not engaged in primary-consciousness activities such as perceiving and thinking (reflective-consciousness activities), (3) deliberately decide to or try to perform mental or physical actions (control activities). Results indicated that the recognition that people do not engage in conscious mental activities when unconscious is still developing during the late middle-childhood years. We speculate that a developing understanding of consciousness may assist the development of an understanding of unconsciousness and vice versa, and that sensitivity to the phenomenology as contrasted with the content of mental states may be a late acquisition in the theory-of-mind area.     

Understanding and Remembering: Children''s Knowledge about the Differential Effects of Strategy and Task Variables on Comprehension and Memorization

Developmental changes in knowledge about the differences between the mental processes of comprehension and memory were investigated in 3 studies using first graders, third graders, and undergraduates as subjects. 2 types of knowledge were assessed: (a) knowledge about the types of strategies appropriate to achieving the goals of comprehension, memorization, or a combination of the 2; (b) knowledge about how different task variables differentially affect comprehension and memorization tasks. With respect to the former, only the 2 older groups showed some understanding of the differential effectiveness of rehearsal and word familiarity for memory versus comprehension and thus showed some understanding of the comprehension-memory distinction with respect to strategy knowledge. As for the latter, only undergraduates correctly differentiated between the 2 mental processes with respect to the task variables of list length, item familiarity, and the categorical organization of the items.     

Shifting goal posts: the impact of academic workforce reshaping and the introduction of teaching academic roles on the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning

This qualitative study reports on findings from interviews with ten academics in an Australian university six to twelve months following academic workforce reshaping and the widespread introduction of teaching academic roles. The research aimed to determine how the workforce reshaping impacted on the capacity of academics with teaching responsibilities to engage in the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SoTL). Findings indicate that whilst academics were willing to undertake SoTL, participants’ capacity to engage was hampered by the workload model, middle academic leaders’ capacity to define and lead SoTL, and a perceived lack of SoTL value. A major concern for participants was that shifting goal posts (in relation to roles and expectations) would make it difficult to successfully apply for future academic work. The research indicates the need for the sector to consider the selection criteria for middle leadership roles, as well as ongoing academic leadership development to support adaptability and change agility.     

Young children's ability to differentiate appearance-reality and level 2 perspectives in the tactile modality

A key acquisition in the child's developing knowledge of the mind is the subjective-objective distinction, which includes a clear understanding that things may appear to be other than the way they really are (appearance-reality distinction) and may present different appearances to self and others (Level 2 perspective-taking). Previous studies using tasks involving visual appearances have found that most children do not show such understanding until 4 or 5 years of age. However, a conceptual analysis of tactile as compared to visual and other perceptual experiences suggested the hypothesis that this understanding might appear earlier if the appearances the child must identify are tactile rather than visual. This hypothesis was supported by the results of 3 studies. In Studies 1 and 2, 3-year-old subjects could correctly indicate, for example, that an ice cube they were feeling with a heavily gloved finger did not feel cold to that finger (tactile appearance for the self), did feel cold to the experimenter's ungloved or thinly gloved finger (tactile appearance for another person), and was a cold ice cube, really and truly (reality). In contrast, and consistent with previous research findings, they were much poorer at distinguishing between real and visually apparent object identity, number, and color. Similarly, in Study 3 they tended to perform better on tactile appearance-reality tasks involving the properties of number, wetness, and intactness than on visual appearance-reality tasks that involved these same properties.     

Young Children''s Understanding of the Role That Sensory Experiences Play in Knowledge Acquisition

3 studies investigated whether young children understand that the acquisition of certain types of knowledge depends on the modality of the sensory experience involved. 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children were exposed to pairs of objects that either looked the same but felt different, or that felt the same but looked different. In Study 1, 36 children were asked to state, when one of these objects was hidden inside a toy tunnel, whether they would need to see the object or feel it in order to determine its identity. In Study 2, 48 children were asked to state which of 2 puppets knew that an object hidden inside a tunnel possessed a given visual or tactile property, when one puppet was looking at the object and the other was feeling it. In Study 3, 72 children were asked, in a scenario similar to Study 2, to state for each puppet whether he could tell, just by looking or by feeling, that the hidden object possessed a certain visual or tactile property. Children were also asked what was the best way to find out whether a given object possessed a certain visual or tactile property. Results of all 3 studies suggest that an appreciation of the different types of knowledge our senses can provide (i.e., modality-specific knowledge) develops between the ages of 3 and 5. The results are discussed in relation to young children's developing understanding of the role that informational access plays in knowledge acquisition.     

Inferring False Beliefs from Actions and Reactions

Current evidence suggests that young children have little understanding of false belief. Standard false belief tasks, however, may underestimate children's ability for 2 reasons. First, the only cue to belief in these tasks is a protagonist's lack of perceptual access to some critical event, and this may not be a very salient cue for young children. Second, the standard tasks require children to make forward-looking predictions from the causes of a belief (e.g., from what a protagonist has or has not perceived) to either the protagonist's belief or the protagonist's action, and children may not be very skilled at making such predictions. In 2 experiments we investigated whether 3-year-olds would do better on tasks in which the belief cues were stronger, and in which they could reason backward to the belief from its effects (e.g., from a protagonist's actions and reactions). Even on these easy tasks, however, they did not perform well. These findings provide strong support for the view that children of this age do not fully understand the representational nature of belief.     

Do young children think of television images as pictures or real objects?

Three studies investigated whether 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds interpret television images as mere pictorial representations of objects or as real, physically‐present objects. Four‐year‐olds gave clear evidence of making the former interpretation whereas 3‐year‐olds seemed to make the latter one. However, the data suggest that the younger children's errors reflect a failure to differentiate conceptually between television images and their referent objects rather than a conviction that real objects populate television sets.