Definition in science teaching

Summary Definitions, I have suggested, have both a function and a form. The function pursued and the form used should depend on the situation and on the term being defined. In the situation described at the outset, Mr. Beta should probably have seen to it that a stipulation of some sort was given-just in order to get on with the task at hand. The stipulation might have been based upon a true reported definition-or it might not-depending on political considerations and the linguistic flexibility of the people concerned. Since no one involved could plausibly have been trying to embody a program in a definition of dough, a programmatic definition was not appropriate in that situation.Several different forms for a definition of dough might reasonably have been used, but in this case the old reliable classification form was probably best, because of its completeness, neatness, and brevity. Two reasonable alternatives are the equivalent-expression form and the range form. The synonym, example-nonexample, and operational forms were probably not appropriate.My main point is that there is not just one way to define. I hope that my delineation of some major possibilities and variations will help those who read this article to be flexible in handling problems of definition when they arise; and they arise more often than most people realize.An ealier draft of this article was presented at a colloquium at the University of Illinois in honor of Professor B. Othanel Smith at his retirement.     

A Geohistorical Study of ‘The Rise of Modern Science’: Mapping Scientific Practice Through Urban Networks, 1500–1900

Using data on the ‘career’ paths of one thousand ‘leading scientists’ from 1450 to 1900, what is conventionally called the ‘rise of modern science’ is mapped as a changing geography of scientific practice in urban networks. Four distinctive networks of scientific practice are identified. A primate network centred on Padua and central and northern Italy in the sixteenth century expands across the Alps to become a polycentric network in the seventeenth century, which in turn dissipates into a weak polycentric network in the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century marks a huge change of scale as a primate network centred on Berlin and dominated by German-speaking universities. These geographies are interpreted as core-producing processes in Wallerstein’s modern world-system; the rise of modern scientific practice is central to the development of structures of knowledge that relate to, but do not mirror, material changes in the system.