Defining 'special needs'

Policy, research and practice in special needs education are inevitably determined by our conceptions of ‘special needs’ and our understanding of that phrase. There is a distinction between (1) the meaning of the phrase (the linguistic equivalent of ‘special’ and ‘needs’) and (2) the criteria of application (what is to count as a special need). Both (1) and (2) are here explored, and it is shown that both depend ultimately on value judgements about what is important or desirable in human life and not just on empirical fact. Those concerned with the theory and practice of special needs have to face the task of clarifying, and defending, the value judgements on which their work relies.     

IS RELIGION SUFFICIENT?

Is religion as we interpret, teach and practice it today capable of motivating life? Can religion qualify or control conduct and so shape character? In common with lower forms of life, we respond to the drive of hunger, to the desire for a mate, to the compulsion of fear and anger, to the urge to live and to defend our lives. These motivations are all very simple and direct. They spring from nature's demand that the race shall not end, but shall go on.

But is there another source of motivation‐‐call it a higher source if you wil‐‐which is able to condition these more primitive and subjective drives and cause men to act with reference to values outside themselves? Is there a source of constraint capable of making men serve ideal ends? And is religion this source, has it this power over men?