“Stacking” and “picking” inventions: The patenting behavior of European inventors

By using a sample of 793 inventors drawn from the PatVal-EU dataset, this paper explores three aspects of patent production at the individual inventor level: (1) the number of EPO patents that the inventors produce; (2) the average value of their inventions; (3) the production of the most valuable patents. By jointly estimating the three equations we find that the inventors’ level of education, employment in a large firm, and involvement in large-scale research projects positively correlate with quantity. Yet, apart from the size of the research project, none of these factors directly influence the expected value of the inventions. They do, however, have an indirect influence, as we find that the number of patents explains the probability of producing a technological hit (the maximum value). Also, there is no regression to the mean in the invention process at an individual level, as the number of inventions that an inventor produces is not correlated with the average value.     

Economic feasibility of on-the-job training

Investing in on-the-job training (OJT) is risky because the value of specific human capital is lost if a permanent separation occurs between the employer and employee. An efficient contract between the two parties can reduce but not eliminate the risk. In theory, some form of “training insurance” could further reduce the risk or eliminate it entirely by pooling risk among employees or employers. The merits of this idea in practice could be determined by field tests, as could the value of ideas for improving the actual process of OJT.     

Grand Innovation Prizes: A theoretical,normative, and empirical evaluation

This paper provides a systematic examination of the use of a Grand Innovation Prize (GIP) in action – the Progressive Automotive Insurance X PRIZE – a $10 million prize for a highly efficient vehicle. Following a mechanism design approach we define three key dimensions for GIP evaluation: objectives, design, and performance, where prize design includes ex ante specifications, ex ante incentives, qualification rules, and award governance. Within this framework we compare observations of GIPs from three domains – empirical reality, theory, and policy – to better understand their function as an incentive mechanism for encouraging new solutions to large-scale social challenges. Combining data from direct observation, personal interviews, and surveys, together with analysis of extant theory and policy documents on GIPs, our results highlight three points of divergence: first, over the complexity of defining prize specifications; secondly, over the nature and role of incentives, particularly patents; thirdly, the overlooked challenges associated with prize governance. Our approach identifies a clear roadmap for future theory and policy around GIPs.     

The Effect of a Computerized Simulation on Middle School Students’ Understanding of the Kinetic Molecular Theory

The objective of this study was to evaluate the effect of a dynamic software simulation on the understanding of the kinetic molecular theory by 7th graders. Students in the control group (n = 62) studied a curricular unit that addressed the differences in arrangement and motion of molecules in the three phases of matter. The experimental group (n = 71) studied the same unit combined with a few computer lessons using a software simulation. The results indicate that the students in the experimental group scored significantly higher than those in the control group. Nonetheless, while both groups of students improved their understanding of the kinetic molecular theory, the overall achievements were very low. These findings suggest that the simulation improved the understanding of the 7th graders; however, it was insufficient in itself to promote meaningful learning. Statistically significant gender differences were not observed. This paper concludes with a discussion of the educational implications of this study.