On a theory of instruction: Why different forms of instruction result in similar knowledge

Why can instructional processes having widely different topographies—such as teaching through a demonstration (modeling), teaching through verbal explanation, and teaching by simply providing an occasion for the child's direct contingent experience—all result in the development of the same or similar knowledge? A recent series of experiments that examined the role of instruction in the intellectual development of young children provides evidence for the equivalence of different forms of instruction and leads to the postulation of a set of invariant processes of information exchange that underlies the surface characteristics of various forms of instruction.     

Formal reasoning ability and misconceptions concerning genetics and natural selection

Students often hold misconceptions about natural phenomena. To overcome misconceptions students must become aware of the scientific conceptions, the evidence that bears on the validity of their misconceptions and the scientific conceptions, and they must be able to generate the logical relationships among the evidence and alternative conceptions. Because formal operational reasoning patterns are necessary to generate these logical relationships, it was predicted that, following instruction, formal operational students would hold significantly fewer misconceptions than their concrete operational classmates. To test this hypothesis 131 seventh-grade students were administered an essay test on principles of genetics and natural selection following instruction. Responses were categorized in terms of the number of misconceptions present. The number of misconceptions was compared to reasoning ability (concrete, transitional, formal), mental capacity (<6, 6, 7), verbal intelligence (low, medium, high), and cognitive style (field dependent, intermediate, field independent). The only student variable consistently and significantly related to the number of misconceptions was reasoning ability; thus, support for the major hypothesis of the study was obtained.     

“Did I mean what I said?” — A reply to McCormick

In this note, I argue that the distinction between what one says and what one means by it is no more problematic (and no less) than the equally important distinction between evidence and theory. Both, I suggest, take a particular form in literate discourse.     

Gender Development in Transgender Preschool Children

An increasing number of transgender children—those who express a gender identity that is “opposite” their natal sex—are socially transitioning, or presenting as their gender identity in everyday life. This study asks whether these children differ from gender‐typical peers on basic gender development tasks. Three‐ to 5‐year‐old socially transitioned transgender children (n = 36) did not differ from controls matched on age and expressed gender (n = 36), or siblings of transgender and gender nonconforming children (n = 24) on gender preference, behavior, and belief measures. However, transgender children were less likely than both control groups to believe that their gender at birth matches their current gender, whereas both transgender children and siblings were less likely than controls to believe that other people's gender is stable.     

What is the role of induction and deduction in reasoning and scientific inquiry?

A long‐standing and continuing controversy exists regarding the role of induction and deduction in reasoning and in scientific inquiry. Given the inherent difficulty in reconstructing reasoning patterns based on personal and historical accounts, evidence about the nature of human reasoning in scientific inquiry has been sought from a controlled experiment designed to identify the role played by enumerative induction and deduction in cognition as well as from the relatively new field of neural modeling. Both experimental results and the neurological models imply that induction across a limited set of observations plays no role in task performance and in reasoning. Therefore, support has been obtained for Popper's hypothesis that enumerative induction does not exist as a psychological process. Instead, people appear to process information in terms of increasingly abstract cycles of hypothetico‐deductive reasoning. Consequently, science instruction should provide students with opportunities to generate and test increasingly complex and abstract hypotheses and theories in a hypothetico‐deductive manner. In this way students can be expected to become increasingly conscious of their underlying hypothetico‐deductive thought processes, increasingly skilled in their application, and hence increasingly scientifically literate. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Res Sci Teach     

Research Agendas and Computer Technology Visions: The Need for Closely Watched Classrooms

There are numerous research methodologies that may be applied to the study of computer technology, and each has the potential to provide insights into its usefulness. The selection of research methodologies should be driven by the nature of the questions under investigation rather than a predetermined idea that some research methods are superior to others. This article focuses on a particular methodology, case studies, and it describes their potential for making a unique contribution to our understanding of computer technology. The special value of case studies lies in helping us understand the complexities found in classrooms, where the multiple variables that influence computer use interact in complex ways. © 1999 IFIP, published by Kluwer Academic Publishers     

KDD: The challenge to individualism

KDD (Knowledge Discovery in Databases) confronts us withphenomena that can intuitively be grasped as highly problematic, but arenevertheless difficult to understand and articulate. Many of theseproblems have to do with what I call the ``deindividualization of theperson': a tendency of judging and treating persons on the basis ofgroup characteristics instead of on their own individual characteristicsand merits. This tendency will be one of the consequences of theproduction and use of group profiles with the help of KDD. Currentprivacy law and regulations, as well as current ethical theoryconcerning privacy, start from too narrow a definition of ``personaldata' to capture these problems. In this paper, I introduce the notionof ``categorical privacy' as a starting point for a possible remedy forthe failures of the current conceptions of privacy. I discuss some waysin which the problems relating to group profiles definitely cannot besolved and I suggest a possible way out of these problems. Finally, Isuggest that it may take us a step forward if we would begin to questionthe predominance of privacy norms in the social debate on informationtechnologies and if we would be prepared to introduce normativeprinciples other than privacy rules for the assessment of newinformation technologies. If we do not succeed in articulating theproblems relating to KDD clearly, one day we may find ourselves in asituation where KDD appears to have undermined the methodic andnormative individualism which pervades the mainstream of morality andmoral theory.