用苏格拉底教学法激活思政课课堂教学

苏格拉底将哲学家的思维与教育家的责任恰当地融合在一起,创立了自己独特的教学方法,即“苏格拉底法”。苏格拉底教学法是一种问答式、对话式的教学方法,他用启发式的教学理念,引导学生批判性思考,激发学生寻找真理的热情与欲望。用苏格拉底教学法激活思想政治理论课课堂教学,倡导做一名苏格拉底式的教师,将讨论、辩论引入课堂教学,尊重学生的主体地位,调动课堂的学习气氛,使其摆脱面临的困境,进而增强思政课课堂教学的实效性。     

Midwives,Obstetrics, Fear,and Trust: A Four-Part Invention

When done well, maternity care brings together four “voices”: the voice of midwifery, which sees birth as a healthy physiological process; the voice of obstetrics, which can manage pathology; the voice of fear (or respect), which encourages vigilance; and the voice of trust, which allows a woman to have confidence in herself and her caregivers. Our goal is to keep these voices singing in harmony.     

苏格拉底启发式教学法及其启示

苏格拉底认为,教师在教学中的任务不是向学生传授现成的知识,而是要激发学生的思考,帮助学生获取头脑中所固有的知识,发展学生的认识能力。苏格拉底的这种激发学生主动获取知识的方法被称作“苏格拉底启发式教学法”或“苏格拉底法”,它是现代启发式教学法的重要源泉之一。     

Autonomous moral education is Socratic moral education: The Import of repeated activity in moral education out of evil and into virtue

Abstract

Kant’s commitment to autonomy raises difficult questions about the very possibility of Kantian moral education, since appeal to external pedagogical guidance threatens to be in contradiction with autonomous virtue. Furthermore, moral education seems to involve getting good at something through repetition; but Kant seems to eschew the notion of repeated natural activity as antithetical to autonomy. Things become even trickier once we remember that Kant also views autonomous human beings as radically evil: we are capable of choosing rationally and autonomously, but, left to our own devices, that same capacity for reason might tempt us to choose only out of a concern to satisfy our happiness. We thus need a moral education which realizes autonomy while dodging the dual bullets of external natural forces and internal evil forces. Ultimately, his concerns about external natural forces and internal evil forces do not lead Kant to reject either moral education or a role for repeated activity in it. Rather, he advocates a carefully circumscribed appeal to repeated activities within a course of Socratic moral education focused on encouraging the student, subjectively and first-personally, to claim her autonomy, resulting in the cheerful and vigilant exercise of virtue as an aptitude.     

论苏格拉底教育方法的当代意义

作为一种隐喻,苏格拉底把他独创的教育方法叫做“助产术”,即在谈话、辩论过程中,通过讥讽、助产、归纳和定义等几个步骤,让受教育者从具体的事例去思索最一般的原则,从而获得知识,感悟做人的道理。苏格拉底的这种方法对我们当今的教育实践有多方面的启示价值：教育活动需要准确地设置目标;教育必须质疑、挑战传统知识;教育要激发求知欲;知识必须自我认识;智育与德育相结合。     

论法学创新素质教育中的苏格拉底教学法

素质教育的核心是培养学生的创新素质。在诸多与此相应的教学方法中，源远流长、影响巨大的当属苏格拉底教学法。它通过问答、交谈、辩论等引导学生深入思考，助其发现正确答案。有效讲授、提问、倾听并即时反馈是谊教学法的三个关键环节。它所构建的是培养学生创新思维、发现真理能力的师生互动教学模式。我们应当使用包括案例教学、模拟法庭、课堂辩论等在内的多元化教学手段和方法，使苏格拉底教学法在现代社套发展和延伸。     

“启发法”与“助产术”之辨异

孔子的"启发法"和苏格拉底的"助产术"都以启发式教学著称于世,但二者又有一些明显的殊异,本文从内涵、认识论、师生观、方法论、对后世的影响等方面探析了二者的差异,以期加深对启发式教学的理解。     

The Socratic Dialogue and teacher education

This article argues that the Socratic Dialogue in the Nelson and Heckmann tradition will prove a considerable contribution in training teachers. A review of the literature and empirical research supports the claim that the Socratic Dialogue promotes student teachers' interpersonal sensitivity while stimulating conceptual understanding. The article provides a new definition of the Socratic Dialogue and introduces the idea of common concept formation. A concrete Socratic Dialogue in the context of teacher education is discussed by way of illustration. Finally we suggest a manner of integrating Socratic Dialogue in teacher education and propose a line of further research.     

“产婆术”与“中道”——苏格拉底与释迦牟尼教育法思想特质的比较

苏格拉底的"产婆术"思想与释迦牟尼佛的"中道"思想都是人类历史上著名的教育思想和文化思想,二者都强调人对自我存在的反思与觉醒。苏格拉底认为,教育的根本目的是培养高尚的人,强调智慧和美德;释迦牟尼佛的教育目的就是成佛,即成为明悟宇宙人生"中道"本体的觉者,强调体验、超越、悟性。苏格拉底的"产婆术",其方法的根基是认识论的;释迦牟尼佛的"中道",既是方法性的,也是本体性的。     

Where there are no rules or systems to guide us: argument from example in a hermeneutic rhetoric

Many rhetoricians treat argument from example as a kind of induction, an illustration of a general principle. Although this is one function of example, consistent with Aristotle's statements about the paradeigma and The New Rhetoric's “argumentation by example,” it camouflages the practice of exemplary proof that has contributed to our richest sense of rhetorical understanding. Inductive example allies itself with the principles of theoretical science and contradicts Aristotle's insight that rhetoric functions where rules or systems are wanting. A properly rhetorical understanding of the exemplum does not work through a universal, implicit or otherwise, but follows a sideways movement from particular to particular. This essay traces the alliance of the paradeigma with inductive science to an unstable fault-line in our Aristotelian heritage, then retraces the path of the prudential tradition by following the long and distinguished career of the rhetorical example in the West in order to reclaim this heritage and to challenge the pre-eminence of inductive subsumption.