Why would medical publishers not incorporate core bioethical values into their Ethics Guidelines?

It is quite universally acknowledged by bioethicists, at least in the western world, that respect for the patients’ autonomy, non-malevolence, beneficence, and justice (also called equity) are four core ethical values in medicine. The Ethics Guidelines of key journals in laboratory medicine are not explicit about the first three of these values, and even implicitly, they seem to miss values of justice. Health equity being one of the main objectives of public health policy across the world, we suggest that values of equity explicitly become part of the Ethics Guidelines of laboratory medicine journals. Biochemia Medica could show the way to other medical publishers by incorporating into its Ethics Guidelines these very important core bioethical values.     

当代中国社会对医德医术核心诉求的分析

目的：院揭示当今中国医疗工作者医德医术上的核心诉求。方式院通过对中国特色社会主义以患者为本的医德医术内在性的分析,揭示当今中国医疗工作者在医德医术上的核心诉求。结果院敬业与高超技术是中国当今医德医术的核心诉求。结论院在现今的中国社会,以患者为本理念要得到很好地贯彻,医疗工作者必须拥有高尚的医德与高超的医术。     

论孔子师德观对当今师德建设的启示

孔子是中国历史上一位伟大的教育家、哲学家和思想家。他的师德观蕴含着丰富的教育伦理思想,加强对孔子师德观的学习和研究,对当今的师德建设具有十分重要的意义。     

异质同构的终末叙事——《驿站长》中宗教伦理的现代性反思

透过阐释学的视角，《驿站长》中源于《圣经》典故“浪子回头”的宗教图式与杜妮亚的人生轨迹有着结构上的同构，却在质性上指涉不同的意向。杜妮亚居于现代意义上的自觉人生选择与典故所隐喻的宗教伦理精神相悖而行，从而暗示俄国传统道德法则的失效，并在更高的意义上对宗教伦理的现代性困境作了一个终末式的叙述：社妮亚整个人生选择所预示的不仅是传统宗教伦理秩序面临的断裂，还是俄罗斯新女性代表的滥觞。     

道家道教生态伦理思想与当代生态哲学刍议

道家、道教生态伦理思想与当代伦理学相比 ,既有共通之处 ,也有独到之处。前者为它与当代生态伦理思想相互衔接提供了可能性 ,后者显示了它对丰富和发展当代生态伦理学的价值。道家、道教天人合一的生态伦理思想对生命的关切和热爱 ,又为它与当代生态哲学相衔接提供了可能性。且普遍存在于全球的严重的生态环境问题 ,使得这种相互衔接不仅具有可能性 ,而且具有现实性。     

伦理学视角下安乐死合法化问题辩难

随着我国对安乐死的道德辩护不断增强,安乐死合法化问题将进入一个更加重要的阶段。但在安乐死合法化可能带来的收益和风险面前,我们必须对诸如"公众的普遍赞同安乐死合法化是否有足够的说服力?痛苦是否是患者选择安乐死的惟一理由?国外的经验是否能够充分证明安乐死合法化的正当性?"等这样一些关于安乐死合法化的主要辩护理由进行反思。这样才有助于我们对安乐死的合法化问题作出正确的看待。     

高校体育文化与素质教育

体育文化是校园文化的重要组成部分，是人类文明的结晶。校园体育文化对促进学生素质的全面发展具有重要作用，其德育功能主要表现在教育性、科学性、文娱性、集体性、实践性和潜移默化性等方面。     

Stone Walks: inhuman animacies and queer archives of feeling

Excavating what Jeffrey Cohen [2015. Stone: An ecology of the inhuman. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press] calls ‘lithic ecomateriality’, in this paper we illustrate how rocks have traditionally been conceptualized through three tropes: rocks as insensate; rocks as personified; and rocks as transformative. We take up the concept of inhuman to challenge human-centric taxonomies of rocks and animacy. If rocks are not lifeless, or only considered as ‘resources’ or ‘threats’, to humans, then thinking with rocks as vital extends our ethical and political response. In the final section of the paper, we consider archives, not as a logical form of organizing knowledge, but as material, vital, and affective. We argue that when stones and archives are examined as something more than stable things – as interfactual, transcorporeal, and transmaterial co-compositions – different ethical relatings to the inhuman world become possible.     

My avatar,my self: Virtual harm and attachment

Multi-user online environments involve millions of participants world-wide. In these online communities participants can use their online personas – avatars – to chat, fight, make friends, have sex, kill monsters and even get married. Unfortunately participants can also use their avatars to stalk, kill, sexually assault, steal from and torture each other. Despite attempts to minimise the likelihood of interpersonal virtual harm, programmers cannot remove all possibility of online deviant behaviour. Participants are often greatly distressed when their avatars are harmed by other participants’ malicious actions, yet there is a tendency in the literature on this topic to dismiss such distress as evidence of too great an involvement in and identification with the online character. In this paper I argue that this dismissal of virtual harm is based on a set of false assumptions about the nature of avatar attachment and its relation to genuine moral harm. I argue that we cannot dismiss avatar attachment as morally insignificant without being forced to also dismiss other, more acceptable, forms of attachment such as attachment to possessions, people and cultural objects and communities. Arguments against according moral significance to virtual harm fail because they do not reflect participants’ and programmers’ experiences and expectations of virtual communities and they have the unintended consequence of failing to grant significance to attachments that we take for granted, morally speaking. Avatar attachment is expressive of identity and self-conception and should therefore be accorded the moral significance we give to real-life attachments that play a similar role. A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Cyberspace 2005 Conference at Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic