Reconsidering the Character and Role of Inquiry in School Science: Analysis of a Conference

We summarize a conference on scientific inquiry bringing together science educators, cognitive scientists and philosophers of science with three goals:

Constructivisms and Objectivity: Disentangling Metaphysics from Pedagogy

We can distinguish the claims of cognitive constructivism from those of metaphysical constructivism, which is almost entirely irrelevant to science education. Cognitive constructivism has strong empirical support and indicates important directions for changing science instruction. It implies that teachers need to be cognizant of representational, motivational and epistemic dimensions which can restrict or promote student learning. The resulting set of tasks for a science teacher are considerably larger and more complex than on the older more traditional conception, but the resources of cognitive sciences and the history of science can provide important parts of the teachers intellectual tool kit. A critical part of this conception of science education is that students must develop the skills to participate in epistemic interchanges. They must be provided opportunities and materials to develop those skills and the classroom community must have the appropriate features of an objective epistemic community.     

Cultural History’s Absent Audience

ABSTRACT

This article reconsiders Peter Mandler’s essay ‘The Problem with Cultural History,’ and the complexities of locating evidence of culture’s impact upon ordinary people, or ‘throw.’ A brief examination of the history of market research and public opinion surveys in the 20th century offers important lessons for the cultural historian faced with locating and interpreting evidence of audience response that is either rarely there, or more disturbingly, rarely meaningful by our current standards of interpretation. Ultimately this paper asks of my fellow cultural historians: Does culture matter as much as we cultural historians want it to?     

Two Views About Explicitly Teaching Nature of Science

Our focus is on the effects that dated ideas about the nature of science (NOS) have on curriculum, instruction and assessments. First we examine historical developments in teaching about NOS, beginning with the seminal ideas of James Conant. Next we provide an overview of recent developments in philosophy and cognitive sciences that have shifted NOS characterizations away from general heuristic principles toward cognitive and social elements. Next, we analyze two alternative views regarding ‘explicitly teaching’ NOS in pre-college programs. Version 1 is grounded in teachers presenting ‘Consensus-based Heuristic Principles’ in science lessons and activities. Version 2 is grounded in learners experience of ‘Building and Refining Model-Based Scientific Practices’ in critique and communication enactments that occur in longer immersion units and learning progressions. We argue that Version 2 is to be preferred over Version 1 because it develops the critical epistemic cognitive and social practices that scientists and science learners use when (1) developing and evaluating scientific evidence, explanations and knowledge and (2) critiquing and communicating scientific ideas and information; thereby promoting science literacy.     

What Are Models and Why Do We Need Them?

Educators and philosophers tout the virtues of the `new' view of theories. Unfortunately, there is no agreed-on name for the new view, but a recently a favored term has been `model based'. I address what a model might be in the context of science education. I am concerned about when and why we need to make the transition from implicit mental models to explicit external models.I explore two theories/models in physics. One draws on misunderstandings of rotating objects. The second concerns concerning density and flotation.I offer two morals:`Models' in physics are often mathematical, and more attention needs to be devoted to integrating mathematics and scienceModels are required in physics when we need an equation in which two variables occur and which is not linearly additive.