Constructivist Metaphors of Learning Science

Based on an analysis of a fundamental distinction between metaphors of finding versus making for the obtaining of new knowledge, a number of constructivist positions in education are discussed and criticised, taking account of earlier criticism particularly by Suchting and by Matthews. Constructivist claims which are denied include the claim that we have no direct access to the world, and the claim that communication is inherently meaningless. What is valuable in constructivism, namely the insistence on active learning, on respect for the pupils own thinking, and on the high priority needed for ideas taught to make sense to pupils, together with the reminder that science is a human product, is important to retain without its additional and ill-founded philosophical baggage.     

Metaphorical understandings and scientific ideas

This study looks at the ideas which children have of the particulate model of matter, at the time they start formal science in school. Pupils aged about eleven in three European countries‐‐Greece, Portugal and the UK‐‐were studied using word association tests. In the UK and Portugal the children had received no teaching of the particulate model; in Greece the pupils had received one year of introductory science, containing some teaching of the particulate model. Key words associated with the particulate model were investigated as free associations. In Portugal and the UK there was little or no evidence of particulate ideas in the pupils’ responses. In the Greek data particulate ideas were more in evidence. There were other clear differences in the data from the three countries. Educational and research implications of the findings are discussed.     

A causal framework for analysing alternative conceptions

A model for the analysis of subjects’ causal reasoning is proposed, drawing on de Kleer and Brown's ‘mechanistic mental models’. The purpose of the model is to provide a framework for understanding the possible causal structure of children's and adults’ spontaneous reasoning about the physical world. The model is used to analyse data on students’ understanding of aspects of forces and motion; to reanalyse a protocol of Driver's; and to compare and criticize the models of Andersson and of Rozier. We show how the model can provide a language for describing common‐sense causal thinking.     

Use of systemic networks in the development of a questionnaire

The paper discusses the use of systemic networks as a basis for the construction of a questionnaire. The subject of the questionnaire was teachers' views of the philosophy of science. It is argued that systemic networks have potential value in questionnaire construction in such problematic areas, offering help in dealing with both construct and face validity.

The networks used, and the questionnaire based on them, were derived from an analysis of various philosophical positions. The analysis identified distinctions depicting the main philosophical differences, which were then represented in a network. The main systems described are inductivism, hypothetico‐deductivism (e.g., Popper, Lakatos), contextualism (e.g., Kuhn) and relativism (e.g., Feyerabend). Major distinctions turn on the issues of the unity of scientific method, criteria of demarcation, patterns of scientific change and the status of scientific knowledge.     

The Analysis of Qualitative Data

Summaries

English

A method for the analysis of qualitative data, based on the linguistic device of systemic networks used to represent a structure of possibilities, is reported. Some initial applications are described, and work in progress including a computing system is outlined.     

A psycho-logic of motion

In this paper we set out a theoretical account of how we suppose commonsense reasoning about motion may develop. We identify some of the most primitive building blocks necessary to the construction of a psycho-logic of motion. Our analysis shows how such primitive elements could combine together to provide schemes of motion, recognisable in psychological accounts of infancy, which themselves generate both prototypes of and rules for motion used in commonsense reasoning. The theory takes as fundamental the basic (essentially Kantian) categories of commonsense reasoning: action, object, space, cause, time and movement. We also start with Piaget’s intuition that action and movement are primitive and fundamental to all development. A number of levels are suggested from the initial primitive schemes, emerging rules and prototypes, new prototypes from combinations, projection of prototypes onto other objects and elaboration. Examples are given of prototypes which are the link between the deep seated ways of thinking and commonsense reasoning.     

Materiality as an aspect in learning

In this paper we exemplify how a social semiotic approach to pupils’ multimodal texts (texts which draw on and make available to the senses a range of resources, including the visual, material, and actional) can provide a way into understanding learning. We suggest that learning can be seen as a transformative process of sign making. Specifically, we suggest that materiality (use of frame, shape, texture, colour, and imported objects) can be seen as one expression of how pupils engage with knowledge and learning. In order to demonstrate this we focus on year seven (11 year old) pupils’ visual representations of cells in two science classrooms at a London girls school. We argue that the range of representational resources available within visual communication (spatial relations, materiality, etc.) enabled the expression of kinds of meaning which would have been difficult, or perhaps impossible, in language. We conclude that visual and linguistic modes of expression have different potentials for meaning making, and therefore different potentials for learning.