HUMANIZING EDUCATION AND THE EDUCATIONALIZATION OF HEALTH

Abstract Theorists often take a condescending stance when speaking about the educationalization of social problems. Given their confidence with postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives, the educationalization of social problems is easily perceived as a set of questionable interventions by governments into educational practices. In this essay, Bert Lambeir and Stefan Ramaekers question the extent to which one can conceive of social problems without an understanding of education or, put more sharply, the extent to which social problems are conceivable without some form of educationalization. After describing four meanings of the concept of educationalization, Lambeir and Ramaekers discuss three popular criticisms of it. With these criticisms as context, the authors use the example of concerns about and initiatives in health education to investigate whether education can be completely freed from the educationalization of social issues. They conclude that it cannot.     

Child Rearing: Passivity and being able to go on. Wittgenstein on shared practices and seeing aspects

It is not uncommon to hear parents say in discussions they have with their children 'Look at it this way'. And called upon for their advice, counsellors too say something to adults with the significance of 'Try to see it like this'. The change of someone's perspective in the context of child rearing is the focus of this paper. Our interest in this lies not so much in giving an answer to the practical problems that are at stake, but at disentangling the issues on a conceptual level. Within the so-called second part of his Philosophical Investigations , Wittgenstein deals with shared practices and with concepts such as 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. What he says there is in terms of content linked with his earlier Tractatus position concerning ethics, a matter which will first be dealt with. After that, the relevant sections of his later work are discussed. Following Cavell, it is concluded that to try to get someone to see what one sees, necessarily presupposes giving it out of one's hands. The passivity this points at highlights what Erziehung in the end comes down to.     

Postmodernism: a 'Sceptical' Challenge in Educational Theory

Recently several educational theorists have argued for the incorporation of a scepticism of a postmodern kind into educational theory and into educational research more specifically. Their understanding of postmodernism in terms of scepticism harbours much potential, but to avoid confusion and misunderstanding it is of importance that the 'scepticism' associated with postmodernism is distinguished from traditional philosophical scepticism, be it as part of the very process of theoretical scrutiny or as a challenge towards its results. In this paper it will be argued that the interest of postmodernist 'scepticism' lies not in a quest for ever more certainty but rather in the way it moves beyond both foundationalism and philosophical scepticism. This will be elaborated from the point of view of a Wittgensteinian understanding of theoretical scrutiny (as found in On Certainty). This opens up the possibility of shedding light on postmodernist 'scepticism' in educational theory in terms of an aesthetic distance towards what is reflected upon.     

Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education

To understand Nietzsche's view of education requires us to grasp the importance Nietzsche attaches to being embedded in a particular historical and cultural frame. Education is, at least in the early stages, a matter of teaching the child to see and to value particular things or, in Nietzsche's way of putting this, teaching the child to lie. Here I develop an interpretation contrary to those who emphasise Nietzsche's radical individualism and thus view his Overman in subjectivistic terms. I argue that Nietzsche's most important lesson is not that we are to create anything radically new , but rather that we are to take up a serious engagement with respect to what we stand for.     

Figures of Disengagement: Charles Taylor,Scientific Parenting,and the Paradox of Late Modernity

In this essay Luc Van den Berge and Stefan Ramaekers take the idea(l) of “scientific parenting” as an example of ambiguities that are typical of our late‐modern condition. On the one hand, parenting seems like a natural thing to do, which makes “scientific parenting” sound like an oxymoron; on the other hand, a disengaged stance informed by the latest scientific findings is uncritically demanded of parents, as such an approach is conceived of as a panacea. Instead of taking sides in this discussion, the authors seek a way to make sense of it, drawing upon the work of Charles Taylor, who offers a striking account of our contingent modern condition as well as of our ontological human constitution. They focus particularly on two examples Taylor gives where the contingent self‐understanding does not coincide with our timeless human features. This opens a space for what might be considered paradoxes in our late‐modern Western culture. This essay thus confronts Taylor's philosophy with the new parenting discourse to reveal how our moral horizons have evolved. Following this approach, the authors both expand on Taylor's thinking about our late modernity and at the same time try to assess the new scientific parenting discourse.     

What All Parents Need to Know? Exploring the Hidden Normativity of the Language of Developmental Psychology in Parenting

In this article we focus on how the language of developmental psychology shapes our conceptualisations and understandings of childrearing and of the parent‐child relationship. By analysing some examples of contemporary research, policy and popular literature on parenting and parenting support in the UK and Flanders, we explore some of the ways in which normative assumptions about parenthood and upbringing are imported into these areas through the language of developmental psychology. We go on to address the particular attraction of developmental psychology in the field of parenting and upbringing within our current cultural context. Drawing on the work of (among others) Zygmunt Bauman, we will show how developmental psychology, as one of the instruments that contributes to a breaking down of our existential condition into a series of well‐defined, and thus apparently manageable, tasks and categories, displaces rather than confronts the possibly limitless depth of the enormity of the reality of ‘being a parent’.     

Problematising Critique in Education and Child‐Rearing: Ruhloff's Scepticism

In ‘Problematising Critique in Pedagogy’ Jörg Ruhloff develops a concept of critique that is motivated by a deep concern for the state of humanity. This is a thought‐provoking development of critique, but I find myself disagreeing over, or rather simply unconvinced by, his understanding of the human condition, and, connected to this, of criticism. Referring to Nietzsche, I start by illustrating one way in which a concept of critique such as Ruhloff's may in some sense be implied in educational praxis, focusing mainly on his concern that critique is not domesticated by political, economic, or other forces. In the second section I draw on Stanley Cavell to discuss some contentious aspects of Ruhloff's construal of criticism. Here I focus on Ruhloff's claim to universality, as contained in his appeal to what he calls the condition of human rationality and to a procedure of critical‐transcendental‐sceptical deliberation over the presuppositions of different standpoints. Ruhloff's understanding of criticism exemplifies an attitude that presents itself as a hostility to the ordinary. Connected to this, I sketch a conception of scepticism that is different—viz. more dynamic—than his understanding of it as a kind of methodological tool in the service of exposing presuppositions. Scepticism needs to be acknowledged in existential terms, as inherent to the human condition: a condition of life with language. With further reference to Cavell, the importance of expression, of revealing oneself as an exemplar, can then be emphasised. I conclude, in the third section, by indicating in what sense I find that a commitment to substantial judgements is lacking in Ruhloff's conception of critique and criticality.