The Virtue Approach to Moral Education: Some Conceptual Clarifications

There is a lot of talking and writing on virtues and education nowadays. In spite of this, a clear and convincing account of the defining characteristics of the virtue approach to moral education is still lacking. This paper suggests and discusses three different definitions of such an approach. With reference to each definition it is examined whether the virtue approach can be distinguished from other main perspectives on moral education, in particular from the so-called cognitive-developmental approach (including the just community approach). It is argued that only the definition that refers to an ethics of virtue will have the required differentiating capacity. Consequently, only on the basis of this definition can the virtue approach be regarded as a qualitatively new development in research on moral education.     

Reasonable paternalism and the limits of sexual freedom: a response to Greenspan and Leicester and Cooke

This response argues that Greenspan's comment is basically incoherent, and that the position taken by Leicester and Cooke has unacceptable practical consequences. Greenspan admits that many people with 'mental retardation' lack adult decision-making capacities, but at the same time assumes that they have these very capacities in assigning them freedom rights. Leicester and Cooke consistently argue that people with 'mental retardation' do have adult reasoning powers and therefore should be given freedom rights. But this point has the rather disquieting implication that both the practice of treating 'mental retardation' as an exempting condition and the practice of giving them important special welfare rights seem to loose their justification.     

Family Education, State Intervention and Political Liberalism

This paper tries, from the perspective of political liberalism, to answer the question whether parents can fail in the moral upbringing of their children to the extent that the state has the right to intervene or to override their legal authority over their children. It is argued that state intervention must meet the liberal criterion of justificatory neutrality, and, on the basis of a discussion of the notion of 'reasonable citizens', that only serious parental failure to inculcate basic rules can justify judicial intervention in the family that meets this criterion. It is concluded that political liberalism burdens the state with incompatible demands.     

Sex education,state policy and the principle of mutual consent

Constitutive of the prevalent sexual morality in most Western European countries is the liberal principle of mutual consent (PMC). This sociological fact may give rise to the ethical question as to whether or not the state has the right to make sure that its citizens will observe PMC, among other ways by prescribing some form of sex education which has PMC as its moral content. With reference to the ambiguity of the term ‘morally permissible’, it is argued that PMC can be interpreted in two fundamentally different ways, namely, as the freedom to arrange one's sexual life according to one's own values and preferences (PMC(a)) or as the view that consensual sex is morally all right or morally unobjectionable (PMC(b)). The claim is defended that PMC(a) should be taken as part of the public morality, whereas PMC(b) should be seen as a private morality. Accordingly, the state has the right to take PMC(a) as a basis for its educational policy, but the state is not allowed to prescribe any form of sex education that has PMC(b) as its moral content. The importance of the distinction between PMC(a) and PMC(b) is shown by giving an evaluation of the Dutch state's responses to recent public statements of orthodox religious leaders about the moral status of homosexuality. Also on the basis of this distinction, the central differences between liberal orthodox and fundamentalist orthodox religious views on sexuality and the role of the state are pointed out. In this connection, it is argued that any view which takes PMC(b) as part of the public morality should be disavowed as a kind of ‘liberal funda‐ mentalism’.     

Cultivating Sentimental Dispositions Through Aristotelian Habituation

The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle's explicit remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child's affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle's view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child's sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child's behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non‐cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman's primarily cognitive view.     

Sex between people with "mental retardation": an ethical evaluation

Is sex between people with "mental retardation" [1] morally permissible and, if at all, under what conditions? This paper tries to answer this question, but only with regard to sex between biologically mature individuals with mild or moderate mental retardation. First, the concepts of "sexual activity" and mental retardation" are analysed briefly, which is challenging given the widely divergent and sometimes rather awkward definitions of these concepts. On the basis of this analysis, it is argued that the liberal principle of mutual consent, if taken as a necessary condition of permissible sex, has unacceptable consequences for people with mental retardation. Many forms of sex between them would be morally impermissible, given the fact that their limited powers of practical reasoning will often make valid consent well-nigh impossible. As an alternative to the liberal principle of permissible sex, conditions are specified that include the additional consent of caretakers. If people with mental retardation do not have the capacities of practical deliberation required for valid consent, care providers with mature reasoning powers should act as their substitutes. Finally, some important implications for the moral education of future care professionals are spelled out.