Education,Enlightenment and Positivism: The Vienna Circle's Scientific World-Conception Revisited

The scientific world-conception is properly understood as an enlightenmentphilosophy only if the current reassessment of the historical Vienna Circle(as opposed to the caricature still prevalent in the popular philosophicalimagination) is once more extended to comprehend not only its thorough-goingepistemological anti-foundationalism, but also the voluntarist point of its ethical`non-cognitivism'. That is to say, the scientific world-conception is properlyunderstood as the opposite of village positivism only if it is recognized that it hasan `other' and that the scientific world-conception was meant by its proponentsto perform its enlightenment work only in conjunction with that other of scientificreason – ethical will and willing. Scientific reason cannot determine all there is to determine, it cannot determine the will. In this sense, there was, pace villagepositivism, more than scientific reason dreamt of. Scientific reason was not madeabsolute: rather, its (self-) clarification was required if a satisfactory view of its placein `life' was to be attained.     

Being Mimicked Increases Prosocial Behavior in 18‐Month‐Old Infants

Most previous research on imitation in infancy has focused on infants' learning of instrumental actions on objects. This study focused instead on the more social side of imitation, testing whether being mimicked increases prosocial behavior in infants, as it does in adults (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004). Eighteen‐month‐old infants (N = 48) were either mimicked or not by an experimenter; then either that experimenter or a different adult needed help. Infants who had previously been mimicked were significantly more likely to help both adults than infants who had not been mimicked. Thus, even in infancy, mimicry has positive social consequences: It promotes a general prosocial orientation toward others.     

Knowing Who Your Friends Are: Aspects of the Politics of Logical Empiricism

This paper comments on Reisch’s book How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science. Overall supportive of Reisch’s project and perspective, it raises certain points where the data appear inconclusive and either provides additional support or briefly explores some interpretative alternatives.

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