Philosophy, Methodology and Action Research

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of methodology in action research. It begins by showing how, as a form of inquiry concerned with the development of practice, action research is nothing other than a modern 20th century manifestation of the pre-modern tradition of practical philosophy. It then draws in Gadamer's powerful vindication of the contemporary relevance of practical philosophy in order to show how, by embracing the idea of 'methodology', action research functions to sustain a distorted understanding of what practice is. The paper concludes by outlining a non-methodological view of action research whose chief task is to promote the kind of historical self-consciousness that the development of practice presupposes and requires.     

Education and Democracy: confronting the postmodernist challenge1

This paper takes seriously the claim that postmodernism has seriously undermined our‘modern’ understanding of what the role of education in a democratic society should be. It therefore seeks to reinterpret this role in a way that confronts the challenge that postmodernism has posed. In order to do this the paper clarifies how postmodernism has now discredited the‘modern’ assumptions on which our view of the relationship between education and democracy has been erected. Drawing on the philosophy of John Dewey, it then reconstructs the relationship between education and democracy so as effectively to resist the challenge that postmodernism has posed.     

Developing Countries and Foreign Universities

Countries which are underdeveloped, as measured by the size of the gross national product per person, need a high rate of increase of the gross national product if they are ever to have a standard of living anything like that of the wealthier countries. However, there are many obstacles to achieving such a high rate of development, amongst which is the inadequate provision, and standard, of technological and business education. That is to say, the education of people for the continuing development of industry is inadequate in some or even all respects. Some of these inadequacies can be removed or mitigated through co-operation with member institutions of SEFI and similar bodies. This co-operation has to be very carefully designed and implemented if it is to make any substantial impact on the rate of development. Engineering schools in underdeveloped countries have, or should have, different objectives from those in welldeveloped countries. These objectives will change as the development progresses but for a time they must be somewhat different if the schools are to have the most effect on industrial development.

This article is based on extensive experience of working in, or working for, engineering schools at universities in various developing countries. My interest in, and commitment to, enhancing the role of engineering schools in development began in 1964 when I was asked to go to the new University of Science and Technology in Kumasi Ghana, as a visiting professor for two terms. Since that time I have worked as a visiting professor and examiner or as an educational consultant and expert in engineering education for universities in several developing countries.     

Education for Democracy? A Philosophical Analysis of the National Curriculum

ABSTRACT This paper shows that the stated principles and content of the National Curriculum are those presupposed in any justification of education in a democracy. What it also shows is that the National Curriculum can only genuinely exercise its democratic role in the kind of society which provides the social and cultural conditions necessary for its practical application. But since the National Curriculum is being implemented in a society which lacks these conditions, any failure to provide an 'education for democracy' will not be a failure of the curriculum it prescribes, but of the kind of democratic society in which it is being enacted.     

Philosophy And Education—A Symposium

This symposium begins with a critique by Paul Hirst of Wilfred Carr's 'Philosophy and Education' (Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2004, 38.1) , where Carr argues that philosophy of education should be concerned with 'practical philosophy' rather than 'theoretical philosophy'. Hirst argues that the philosophy of education is best understood as a distinctive area of academic philosophy, in which the exercise of theoretical reason contributes critically to the development of rational educational practices and their discourse. While he acknowledges that these practices and their discourse must of their nature be directly developed in the exercise of practical reason, or phronesis, the notion of 'practical philosophy' is rejected as ultimately incoherent and illusory. In his reply to Hirst's critique, Carr identifies three central claims in Hirst's argument and takes issue with each of these. He reaffirms the need to draw upon the resources afforded by the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy in order to identify inadequacies in our present understanding of how philosophy is related to education. He suggests that it is only through bringing their own 'prejudices' into critical confrontation with this tradition that philosophers of education will be able to assess whether practical philosophy is incoherent and illusory, as Hirst claims, or whether it is indispensable to the future development of their discipline. In a rejoinder to Carr, Hirst, defends the claim that philosophy of education is a social practice concerned with developing justifiable propositional accounts of the conceptual relations, justificatory procedures and presuppositions of educational practices. He rejects the argument that this 'theoretical philosophy' approach must be replaced by that of a new 'practical philosophy'.