The relationship between peak height velocity and physical performance in youth soccer players

Longitudinal changes in height, weight and physical performance were studied in 33 Flemish male youth soccer players from the Ghent Youth Soccer Project. The players' ages at the start of the study ranged from 10.4 to 13.7 years, with a mean age of 12.2 +/- 0.7 years. Longitudinal changes were studied over a 5 year period. Peak height velocity and peak weight velocity were determined using non-smoothed polynomials. The estimations of peak height velocity, peak weight velocity and age at peak height velocity were 9.7 +/- 1.5 cm x year-1, 8.4 +/- 3.0 kg x year-1 and 13.8 +/- 0.8 years, respectively. Peak weight velocity occurred, on average, at the same age as peak height velocity. Balance, speed of limb movement, trunk strength, upper-body muscular endurance, explosive strength, running speed and agility, cardiorespiratory endurance and anaerobic capacity showed peak development at peak height velocity. A plateau in the velocity curves was observed after peak height velocity for upper-body muscular endurance, explosive strength and running speed. Flexibility exhibited peak development during the tear after peak height velocity. Trainers and coaches should be aware of the individual characteristics of the adolescent growth spurt and the training load should also be individualized at this time.     

Congressmen and scientists in the making of science policy: The Allison Commission, 1884–1886

Conclusion The Allison Commission focused attention on the administration of the scientific bureaux and its relation to the jurisdictional system in the Congress. The commission also had a more considerable influence on congressional policy towards the scientific bureaux than was previously thought. Legislative recommendations offered by the Allison Commission became law, even if they avoided the notice of congressional opponents through the strategic manipulation of the appropriations process. Hilary Herbert was not a crude enemy of science, but a staunch defender of the obligations of Congress to scrutinise the expenditure of funds it allocated.This detailed political history of the Allison Commission is a necessary part of any history of American science policy. William Boyd Allison and Hilary Herbert were, no less than scientists like Powell, initiators of a tradition which has continued to be important in American governmental science policy.The form of the special committee devoted to scientific issues was initiated by the Allison Commission. It prefigured more recent and familiar congressional inquiries like the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Government Operations Committee under Representative Fountain, the House Science Policy Task Force, and the Energy and Commerce Committee under Representative Dingell. The attentiveness to details like pay, printing, food and morale—as small but manageable parts of the larger enterprise—foreshadows more contemporary inquiries into the details of the procedures for awarding grants and contracts and the assurances of financial and scientific integrity. The mechanisms of control applied to governmental science by the Allison Commission—particularly itemised appropriations, but also control over personnel through promotions and control of bureaucratic organisation by virtue of congressional rather than disciplinary organisation—stand as early examples of how Congress may continue to exert its constitutional authority to scrutinise an innovative and entrepreneurial scientific community.     

The Pumpkin or the Tiger? Michael Polanyi,Frederick Soddy,and Anticipating Emerging Technologies

Imagine putting together a jigsaw puzzle that works like the board game in the movie “Jumanji”: When you finish, whatever the puzzle portrays becomes real. The children playing “Jumanji” learn to prepare for the reality that emerges from the next throw of the dice. But how would this work for the puzzle of scientific research? How do you prepare for unlocking the secrets of the atom, or assembling from the bottom-up nanotechnologies with unforeseen properties – especially when completion of such puzzles lies decades after the first scattered pieces are tentatively assembled? In the inaugural issue of this journal, Michael Polanyi argued that because the progress of science is unpredictable, society must only move forward with solving the puzzle until the picture completes itself. Decades earlier, Frederick Soddy argued that once the potential for danger reveals itself, one must reorient the whole of one’s work to avoid it. While both scientists stake out extreme positions, Soddy’s approach – together with the action taken by the like-minded Leo Szilard – provides a foundation for the anticipatory governance of emerging technologies. This paper narrates the intertwining stories of Polanyi, Soddy and Szilard, revealing how anticipation influenced governance in the case of atomic weapons and how Polanyi’s claim in “The Republic of Science” of an unpredictable and hence ungovernable science is faulty on multiple levels.