政策性负担、逆向选择与中国高校软预算约束

Policy burdens of HEIs (higher education institutions) lead to the soft budget constraint (SBC) and the excessive loans of HEIs. Since information asymmetry and incentive are incompatible, policy burdens will result in the adverse selection of the president, and the excessive loans and low efficiency of HEIs. When HEIs are with policy burdens, the government’s restriction of the loan autonomy of HEIs is usually a hypo-optimizing institutional arrangement. The key to hardening budget constraint of HEIs is to free HEIs of policy burdens. __________ Translated from Gaodeng Jiaoyu Yanjiu 高等教育研究 (Journal of Higher Education), 2007, 28(9): 37–42     

政策性负担、逆向选择与高校软预算约束

高校所承担的政策性负担造成了高校软预算约束和超量贷款。在信息不对称和激励不相容的情况下,政策性负担将导致高校校长的逆向选择,从而造成高校的超量贷款和效率降低。当高校承担政策性负担时,政府限制高校的贷款自主权往往是一种次优的制度安排。硬化高校预算约束的关键在于剥离高校的政策性负担。     

基于相互信任系统的无穷期棘轮效应模型研究

通过分析政府和企业相互信任系统的信念临界点和稳定性条件,得出了政府和企业的最优跨期契约,并指出政府提高政策的稳定性,有助于相互信任系统实现的可能性,可提高政府和企业的收益。