鲁道夫·卡尔纳普概率确证理论及其方法论意义

卡尔纳普认为,“确证”只是对现阶段的得到的确定,“概率”是归纳前提(证据)对结论(假说)的确证,可用函数c(h,e)表示。为了计算c的值,卡尔纳普定义了状态描述、结构描述、量程等重要概念和定理,在构建的一阶语言系统Ln中,引入了测度函数m和确证函数c,其中测度函数是确证函数的基础,由语句所满足的状态描述的测度函数m值来确定确证函数c的值,后来又引入了λ参数进一步完善了他的理论。他的这一理论为归纳逻辑的形式化做出了巨大的贡献,对科学的合理性作出了辩护,并没沿概率的方向发展了现代归纳逻辑。     

卡尔纳普构造主义本质观评析

卡尔纳普以逻辑分析为方法论原则,提出了构造系统是建立在基本要素和基本关系基础之上的观点,从而形成了构造主义本质观。他从这种本质观出发,表达了自己在个别与一般、认知同一性、心理的、物理的和精神的对象种类的本质、身心一元论、意向性关系的本质和因果性的本质等问题的看法。他建立构造主义本质观的目的是为了重构科学的次序系统,但却走向了不彻底的科学主义。     

Logical Empiricism, Politics, and Professionalism

This paper considers George A. Reisch’s account of the role of Cold War political forces in shaping the apolitical stance that came to dominate philosophy of science in the late 1940s and 1950s. It argues that at least as early as the 1930s, Logical Empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap already held that philosophy of science could not properly have political aims, and further suggests that political forces alone cannot explain this view’s rise to dominance during the Cold War, since political forces cannot explain why a philosophy of science with liberal democratic, anti-communist aims did not flourish. The paper then argues that if professionalization is understood in the right way, it might point toward an explanation of the apolitical stance of Cold War philosophy of science.