The Role of Consistency in Detecting Deception: The Superiority of Correspondence over Coherence

Inconsistency is often considered an indication of deceit. The conceptualization of consistency used in deception research, however, has not made a clear distinction between two concepts long differentiated by philosophers: coherence and correspondence. The existing literature suggests that coherence is not generally useful for deception detection. Correspondence, however, appears to be quite useful. The present research developed a model of how correspondence is utilized to make judgments, and this article reports on four studies designed to elaborate on the model. The results suggest that judges attend strongly to correspondence and that they do so in an additive fashion. As noncorrespondent information accumulates, an increasingly smaller proportion of judges make truthful assessments of guilty suspects. This work provides a basic framework for examining how information is utilized to make deception judgments and forms the correspondence and coherence module of truth-default theory.     

How Custom Agents Really Detect Lies

Research has found discrepancies among folk beliefs about lie detection, deception cue utility, and retrospective accounts of detected lies. Elite customs agents (N = 37) were surveyed regarding their overall beliefs about how to detect lies (general strategy), their opinions about best practices (best strategy), and about a successfully detected lie (actual strategy). Responses were coded in three nonexclusive broad categories: (a) behavioral cues, (b) communication content and evidence, and (c) interactive-questioning approaches. Behavioral cues, especially nonverbal cues, were listed most frequently as general beliefs. Opinions about the best approach were evenly split across the three categories. Communication content and evidence was the most frequently reported actual detection method and was mentioned in 97% of the responses. The results are discussed in relation to Truth-Default Theory and their implications for lie detection practice.     

To Catch a Liar: Challenges for Research in Lie Detection Training

Can we train people to detect deception? It is the contention of this article that communication scholars should learn how to train law enforcement professionals on how to detect high stake lies, like those faced by police, judges, customs officials, immigration officials, and so forth. It is proposed that in order to know whether we can train or should bother to train people to detect deception, each training study must meet 6 challenges: (1) relevance, (2) high stakes, (3) proper training, (4) proper testing, (5) generalizability across situations, and (6) generalizability over time. Our quantitative review of the literature suggests that training does significantly raise lie detection accuracy rates. Meta-analytic findings indicate a mean effect size of r = .20 across 20 (11 published studies) paired comparisons of lie detection training versus the control group (i.e., those without some type of training). It should be noted that the majority of the studies that attempt to train lie detectors fall short on many of the above challenges. Current research in lie detection training may actually underestimate the ability to train lie detectors due to the stimulus materials employed in most experiments.     

Sensemaking and Relational Consequences of Peer Co-worker Deception

This exploratory study examined sensemaking of peer co-worker deception from the perception of the deceived. A total of 58 narrative accounts of deception were collected via face-to-face interviews with 23 employed adults. Analysis revealed four primary narratives of co-worker deception: corrupt system narratives, “cover your ass” (CYA) narratives, personal gain narratives, and personality trait narratives. Perceived motives and consequences were primary considerations in the sensemaking process and employees reported changing their communication patterns to avoid deceptive co-workers or hold them more accountable for their actions. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed and suggestions for future research are posited.     

Strong Diagnostic Questioning Effects on Deception Detection Accuracy With U.S. Customs Agents

Recent communication research shows several paths to improving accuracy in deception detection. According to truth-default theory, one promising approach is diagnostic questioning. A sample of elite U.S. Customs agents participated in a deception detection task. Agents viewed senders who were interrogated with one of three different sets of questions that differed in diagnostic utility. The different questioning sets produced a 36-point swing in accuracy from 42% to 78% accuracy. These findings demonstrate that how someone is questioned can make a substantial difference in deception detection accuracy and that improved accuracy is possible with diagnostic questioning.     

基于儿童对说谎的道德认知和评价研究的德育反思

儿童说谎行为是一个较为普遍的现象,在道德教育中也是一个较为棘手的问题。本文从儿童关于说谎的道德认知发展和道德评价发展的角度出发,发现了当前针对说谎的道德教育中,存在的一些问题：＂白谎＂影响了儿童的道德发展并且在一定程度上影响了德育的效果;歪曲的集体主义教育,也在一定程度上对儿童的说谎认知和评价产生了消极影响;生活中成人的榜样作用在说谎行为方面给儿童造成了消极影响。本文基于上述的德育问题尝试提出一些德育建议。     

政治文化视域下的暴君——以越南前黎朝“卧朝王”黎龙铤为个案

黎龙铤是前黎朝第三位皇帝,在越南历史上素以残暴而著称;因为患有痔疾常卧而听朝,故史称“卧朝王”。以卧朝王为例,具体剖析君主政体下暴君的成因问题：“卧朝王”的暴虐行为,是其个人低劣的素质、体疾所造成的病态心理,残酷的宫廷斗争、冷漠的皇室亲情,以及不良的家庭影响等内外因综合促成的;不过观以政治文化的角度,暴君产生的根本原因,还在于专制制度下君主权力缺乏有效制衡的固有缺陷     

Self‐reported cues about deceptive and truthful communication: The effects of cognitive capacity and communicator veracity

One hundred four students watched a videotape of six communicators (three liars and three truthtellers) and were asked to judge the veracity of the strangers’ communication. In addition to judging deception, students reported which cites guided their veridical judgments. To limit their available cognitive capacity one‐half of the participants were given an additional cognitive task to complete (counting backwards from a number by 7) while viewing the videotapes. Results indicated that lie detectors with limited cognitive capacity reported using more vocal cues and fewer verbal cues than lie detectors whose cognitive capacity was not manipulated. Lie detectors with limited capacity were more accurate at catching liars and reported fewer truthful judgments than lie detectors in the high capacity condition. Overall, lie detectors reported using primarily demeanor cues and visual cues to distinguish truths from lies. Results also indicated that lie detectors’ beliefs about deception differed as a function of the communicators’ veracity. Specifically, when judging truthful communicators, lie detectors reported using fewer vocal cues and demeanor cues while relying on a greater number of verbal and visual cues as compared to lie detectors judging deceptive communicators.     

Deception Detection Accuracy is a Predictable Linear Function of Message Veracity Base-Rate: A Formal Test of Park and Levine's Probability Model

This study provided the first empirical test of point predictions made by the Park-Levine probability model of deception detection accuracy. Participants viewed a series of interviews containing truthful answers, unsanctioned, high-stakes lies, or some combination of both. One randomly selected set of participants (n=50) made judgments where the probability that each message was honest was P(H)=.50. Accuracy judgments in this condition were used to generate point predictions generated from the model and tested against the results from a second set of data (n=413). Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight base-rate conditions where the probability that a message was honest systematically varied from 0.00 to 1.00. Consistent with the veracity effect, participants in P(H)=.50 condition were significantly more likely to judge messages as truths than as lies, and consequently truths (67%) were identified with greater accuracy than lies (34%). As predicted by the model, overall accuracy was a linear function of message veracity base-rate, the base-rate induction explained 24% of the variance in accuracy scores, and, on average, raw accuracy scores for specific conditions were predicted to within approximately±2.6%. The findings show that specific deception detection accuracy scores can be precisely predicted with the Park-Levine model.     

Cultural differences in how individuals explain their lying and truth-telling tendencies

This study investigated how cultural differences between Korea and the United States in attitudinal and normative components affect individuals’ explanation of their intentions to lie or tell the truth. Study 1 examined individuals’ intentions to base their lying or truth-telling tendencies on attitude-related reasons (i.e., attitudinal reasons) and subjective norm-related reasons (i.e., normative reasons). Study 2 examined individuals’ evaluation of a person who used attitudinal reasons or normative reasons to explain his/her behaviors of lying or truth-telling. The results showed that neither culture used one type of reason consistently across different behaviors. Instead, the types of behaviors influenced the way attitudinal and normative components were related to behavioral intentions. The attitudinal component was important for individuals’ explanations of their attitudinal reasons to lie and to tell the truth and that the normative component was important for individuals’ explanations of their normative reasons to lie. However, both the attitudinal and normative components were important for individuals’ explanations of their normative reasons to tell the truth. Cross-culturally, Koreans were more likely to use normative reasons when they had to explain why they intended to lie for a friend, whereas Americans were more likely to use normative reasons when they had to explain why they intended to tell the truth. In addition, Koreans and Americans had different preferences for each reason type depending on the type of behavior probably because Koreans, as compared to Americans, tend to view lying for a friend less negatively.