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股权分置改革中支付对价的博弈分析
引用本文:陈聪慧,郭小平.股权分置改革中支付对价的博弈分析[J].襄樊职业技术学院学报,2007,6(1):20-22.
作者姓名:陈聪慧  郭小平
作者单位:西南财经大学,金融学院,四川,成都,610074
摘    要:为了使上市公司摆脱长期以来股权分置的困局出台了股权分置改革方案,但是经过对股改后的企业的调查发现效果并不明显,究其原因主要是改革中支付对价的不公平性问题严重。论文以博弈论为分析工具.在理性经济人假设下,针对支付对价问题,建立起非流通股股东与流通股股东之间的两方博弈模型,通过纳什均衡进行求解,给出各参数变量的政策含义,并提出相应的政策建议。

关 键 词:股权分置改革  博弈分析  对价支付
文章编号:1671-914X(2007)01-0020-03
收稿时间:2006-10-17
修稿时间:2006年10月17

Game Analysis of Consideration Payment in Split-share Reform
CHEN Cong-hui,GUO Xiao-ping.Game Analysis of Consideration Payment in Split-share Reform[J].Journal of Xiangfan Vocational and Technical College,2007,6(1):20-22.
Authors:CHEN Cong-hui  GUO Xiao-ping
Abstract:In order to get the listed companies out of the troubles resulting from split-share, split-share reform is carried out, but the improvement is not so significant after investigation, which is caused by the unfair consideration payment. By using the game theory, this article analyzes and discusses the problems of consideration payment between non-tradable and tradable shareholders under rational economic person supposition, and also proposes some corresponding strategies.
Keywords:split-share reform  game analysis  consideration payment
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