专利侵权问题的主从博弈模型及其改进

技术交易中,专利权人与竞争者(潜在的侵权者)之间是典型的主从对策关系,而行动的先后顺序对双方的最终收益会产生重大地影响。本文分别建立一主一从和一主多从的模型,分析研究专利权人面对单个侵权者或者多个侵权者时,各方的均衡策略。通过一主一从模型,我们发现,只有在竞争者先行动的前提下才会出现"侵权倾向与罚金数正相关"的特殊现象;通过一主多从模型的分析,发现专利权人的"主方优势"比较明显,而竞争者只有在先行动时,才能争取主动,促使专利权人的打击力度尽量小,从而使自己的收益尽量高。

A leader- follower game model in patent infringement problems and its upgrade

In the technology transaction,the relationship between patent holders and competitors(potential infringers) is a typical leader-follower strategy.And the sequence of actions influences the payoff of both sides greatly.Models of "leader-one follower" and "leader-multiple followers" are set up respecti-vely,in order to analyze the strategies and equilibria in situations that a patent holder faces single or multiple competitors.According to the "leader-one follower" model,the corollary "likelihood of entry increases with the penalty" can only exist if the competitor acts preemptively.And results from the "leader-multiple followers" model indicates that the "leading advantage" lies definitely with the holder and that competitors need preemption to maximize their payoff by stimulating the holder to mitigate the litigation.