| 高校后勤实体利益相关者博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭朝东. 高校后勤实体利益相关者博弈分析[J]. 黄冈师范学院学报, 2005, 25(5): 93-95 |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭朝东 |
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| 作者单位： | 黄冈师范学院,后勤产业集团,湖北,黄州,438000 |
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| 基金项目： | 湖北省社科基金＂十五＂规划项目研究成果,立项号：[2005]076. |
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| 摘 要： | 高校后勤实体的利益相关者之间存在着利益冲突与协调关系.从博弈论角度分析,后勤实体以相关者利益最大化为财务目标,建立和完善公司法人治理结构,可以实现博弈结果的纳什均衡和帕累托最优.
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| 关 键 词： | 高校后勤 利益相关者 博弈 纳什均衡 帕累托最优 财务目标 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-8078(2005)05-0093-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-04-01 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-04-01 |
A Game Analysis of Beneficiaries of Rear -service Group in Tertiary Institutes |
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| GUO Chao-dong. A Game Analysis of Beneficiaries of Rear -service Group in Tertiary Institutes[J]. Journal of Huanggang Normal University, 2005, 25(5): 93-95 |
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| Authors: | GUO Chao-dong |
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| Affiliation: | Huanggang Normal University, Huangzhou 438000, Hubei |
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| Abstract: | There exist both co - ordination and beneficial imbalance among the beneficiaries of the rear - service group viewed from game theory, all the beneficiaries financially aim at max mum interests. By establishing and improving co - orperative mechanisms, a general equilibrium and Nash balance can be achieved as game results. |
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| Keywords: | Rear - service in tertiary institutes beneficiaries game Nash balance financial aims |
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